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Abstract
This thesis investigates fluctuations in the macroeconomy, from both empirical and
theoretical angles, and in the context of developed as well as emerging economies.
Chapter 1 focuses on the role of firm borrowing for macroeconomic fluctuations
in the United States. It presents micro-level evidence which highlights that firms’
access to debt is constrained by their current earnings. Such a constraint leads
to predictions about the transmission of investment shocks that are different from
a traditional collateral constraint. The chapter tests these predictions using both
aggregate and firm-level data. Empirical dynamics in the times series and cross-
sectional dimension strongly support the relevance of the earnings-based borrowing
constraint.
Chapter 2 turns to an open economy context and tackles the question of how
important movements in international commodity prices are for emerging economy
boom and bust cycles. For the case of Argentina, the chapter quantifies this nexus
and finds a sizeable influence of commodity price shocks for movements in output,
consumption and investment.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that misspecification of macroeconomic models can have
severe consequences when estimating those models on the data. It proposes a novel
concept to alleviate this concern, so-called agnostic structural disturbances (ASDs).
The idea behind ASDs is to enrich the empirical specification of models while relying
on relatively loose assumptions about how this restricts the dynamics.
Chapter 4 is concerned with tracking economic activity in real time. It develops
a dynamic factor model that allows for changes in both the long-run growth rate
of output and the volatility of business cycles. It documents a significant decline
in long-run output growth in the United States most of which occurred prior to
the Great Recession. The proposed model is capable of detecting shifts in long-run
growth in a timely and reliable manner.
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Chapter 1
Earnings-Based Borrowing
Constraints and Macroeconomic
Fluctuations
1.1 Introduction
Firm credit displays large cyclical swings which correlate with fluctuations in output,
employment and investment. Research on the drivers of this comovement has focused
on how constraints to credit evolve over the business cycle and how this feeds back
to economic activity.1 This paper studies the macroeconomic consequences of an
earnings-based constraint on firm borrowing. The focus on such a constraint is
motivated by direct evidence on the importance of firms’ current earnings flows for
their access to debt. Micro data covering more than 50,000 loans to 15,000 US
companies reveals the pervasive use of earnings-based loan covenants that make
it difficult for firms to borrow when their current earnings are low.2 I show that
incorporating the earnings-based constraint in business cycle analysis is crucial for
correctly capturing aggregate and firm-level credit dynamics and for characterizing
the transmission of fiscal and monetary policy in the macroeconomy.
Earnings-based borrowing constraints imply dynamics of firm debt that are differ-
ent from the ones generated by asset-based collateral constraints, which have become
a cornerstone of many business cycle models that incorporate credit.3 To demon-
strate this, I build a theoretical model in which firm debt can be restricted either by
a multiple of the firm’s current earnings or by a fraction of the expected value of its
1Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) survey how research on the role of credit in macroeconomics has
evolved since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, an event that marked a strong revival of this research
agenda.
2My motivating evidence builds on existing empirical studies in corporate finance, in particular
Lian and Ma (2018) who propose earnings-based constraints as a key determinant for firms’ access
to debt.
3The catalyst for research on collateral constraints was the seminal work by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). Examples include Jermann and Quadrini (2012) who study firm borrowing in a macroeco-
nomic context.
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capital.4 Under the alternative constraints, firm debt responds with opposite sign to
structural shocks that move current earnings and the expected value of collateral in
different directions. This is the case for a positive investment shock, which improves
the ability of firms to turn resources into productive investment. Such a shock causes
stronger economic activity and larger earnings, while it reduces the relative value of
capital. Larger earnings allow for more debt under the earnings-based constraint,
whereas, in contrast, the lower market value of capital reduces debt access with the
collateral constraint.5 In other words, to the extent that fluctuations are driven by
shocks to firm investment, earnings-based constraints imply a positive comovement
of firm debt with the business cycle, whereas collateral constraints imply a negative
one.
The corresponding dynamics of debt in the data are consistent with the earnings-
based constraint, and not in line with the predictions implied by a collateral con-
straint. To verify the model predictions, I study the dynamics of debt, earnings
and capital following investment shocks in both macroeconomic and firm-level US
data. In addition to exploiting the sharp differential predictions under the alter-
native constraints, there are two key advantages of my focus on investment shocks.
First, previous studies have highlighted that shocks to the investment margin of the
economy are an important quantitative feature of business cycles (see for example
Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, 2011).6 Second, investment shocks can
be identified in the data, based on a well-defined empirical counterpart, the inverse
of the relative price of investment goods. I exploit identification strategies using this
observable to verify the differential model predictions stemming from earnings-based
versus collateral constraints.
Debt dynamics in aggregate data support the relevance of earnings-based bor-
rowing constraints for the economy as a whole. This finding is based on a structural
vector autoregression (SVAR) for US time series. I identify investment shocks us-
ing two alternative identification schemes, imposing long-run restrictions (following
Fisher, 2006), as well as medium-run restrictions (in the spirit of Barsky and Sims,
2012). In both cases, the shock is identified based on its low frequency impact on the
inverse relative price of equipment investment. I find that aggregate business sector
debt increases in response to a positive investment shock, supporting the economy-
wide importance of earnings-based constraints, and inconsistent with the dynamics
implied by collateral constraints. In line with the model mechanism, business earn-
ings rise and the value of the capital stock falls.
4I also discuss microfoundations for the presence of “asset-based” and “cash flow-based” lending.
5As an illustration, think about an airline and imagine a shock that makes the production of
airplanes more efficient and lowers their relative price. The implication of this shock for borrowing
differs sharply depending on the constraint. If airplanes serve as collateral, their falling relative
value tightens the borrowing constraint. By contrast, the earnings-based constraint is relaxed as
cheaper airplanes increase the airline’s profitability.
6My use of the term investment shock at this stage encompasses different variations of this shock,
including investment-specific technology shocks, marginal efficiency of investment shocks, as well
as shocks to investment adjustment costs. I provide more detail on the differences between these
concepts throughout the paper.
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Heterogeneous debt dynamics in firm-level data provide further support for the
model mechanism. I classify firms into those that face earnings-based covenants
and those that borrow against collateral, and study their heterogeneous responses
to investment shocks. Using a panel-version of the local projection method of Jordà
(2005), I regress individual firm borrowing on the macro investment shock estimated
from the SVAR, interacted with dummy variables that indicate earnings or collateral
borrowers. To address endogenous selection into borrower types I control for rich
firm characteristics and use different fixed-effect specifications. The results show
that earnings-based borrowers significantly and persistently increase borrowing in
response to a positive investment shock. The response of collateral borrowers is
either negative or flat depending on the specification.7
Finally, earnings-based borrowing constraints also alter quantitative conclusions
about US business cycles, in particular the transmission of policy shocks. I extend
my model to incorporate features of a New Keynesian structural macroeconomic
model. The extended model features a number of additional shocks and frictions,
such as price and wage rigidities, alongside a constraint which limits debt by a
combination of an earnings-based and a collateral component. I estimate the weight
between the components as well as other structural parameters of the model on
US postwar data. The data assigns a posterior weight of 0.9 on the earnings-based
borrowing component, 0.1 on the collateral component. Counterfactual estimations
indicate that the presence of earnings-based constraints dampens the output response
of fiscal shocks, whereas monetary shocks have much stronger effects on inflation and
somewhat stronger but less persistent effects on output. The intuition for the former
result is that fiscal shocks crowd out investment to a larger extent when there is no
additional benefit from building up collateral. The latter result is driven by a low
degree of estimated price rigidity that emerges in the presence of the earnings-based
constraint. The estimated model also implies that investment shocks more than
half of the variation in US output, which lends further support to my focus on this
shock for verifying the relevance of earnings-based borrowing constraints in macro
and micro data.
Relation to the literature. First and foremost, this paper contributes to the
vast literature on the role of financial frictions in macroeconomics, going back to
the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1992), and
7In a formal test, the null hypothesis of equal responses across borrower types is rejected. In
an alternative setting I also show that firm-level responses of debt to a fall in the relative price of
investment goods, using investment shocks as an instrumental variable (IV), are consistent with the
proposed mechanism.
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Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).8,9 In a retrospective on business cycle models, Kehoe,
Midrigan, and Pastorino (2018) highlight the importance of disciplining macro mod-
els with direct micro evidence. In this spirit, my paper uses micro evidence on firm
borrowing to capture firm debt dynamics more accurately in the context of studying
macroeconomic fluctuations.
Second, the motivating evidence I provide builds on existing insights, highlighted
by the empirical corporate finance literature, on the pervasive use of loan covenants.
Important contributions are Chava and Roberts (2008) and Sufi (2009).10 The focus
of my paper is closely related to that of Lian and Ma (2018) who investigate the
relevance of cash flow-based relative to asset-based firm borrowing. Based on a
comprehensive empirical analysis, their paper proposes that the key constraint to firm
debt are cash flows measured by earnings. These authors mainly focus on causally
identifying the extent to which increases in earnings relax borrowing constraints at
the micro level.11 My paper embeds the relevance of borrowing based on current
earnings into a macroeconomic model, verifies the predicted dynamics empirically at
both the micro and the macro level, and demonstrates quantitative consequences for
business cycles.
Third, my model predictions and their empirical verification relate to the liter-
ature on investment shocks, which includes theoretical work by Greenwood, Her-
cowitz, and Huffman (1988) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000), and
papers that identify investment shocks in SVARs building on the key contribution
by Fisher (2006). Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010, 2011) investigate
the role of investment shocks in US business cycles and find them to be a key force
behind output fluctuations. I contribute to this literature by analyzing borrowing
dynamics that arise from investment shocks.12,13
8Research on borrowing constraints includes for example Lorenzoni (2008), Geanakoplos (2010),
Gertler and Karadi (2011), Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Liu, Wang,
and Zha (2013), Buera and Moll (2015), Azariadis, Kaas, and Wen (2016), Del Negro, Eggertsson,
Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2016) and Cao and Nie (2017). Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll
(2004) investigate the quantitative importance of collateral constraints. While collateral constraints
are typically based on limited contract enforcement, another important class of financial frictions
is based costly state verification problems in the spirit of Townsend (1979), see e.g. Bernanke and
Gertler (1995), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Quadrini
(2011) provides a survey on financial frictions in macroeconomics.
9Recent papers that focus on corporate debt dynamics over the business cycle but do not highlight
earnings-based constraints include Crouzet (2017), Xiao (2018) and Grjebine, Szczerbowicz, and
Tripier (2018).
10Other papers that focus on covenants include Dichev and Skinner (2002), Roberts and Sufi
(2009a, 2009b), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012), Murfin (2012), Bradley and Roberts (2015) and
Falato and Liang (2017). Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2017) study empirically how bank health
transmitted to the economy via covenants during the 2008-09 financial crisis. For a theoretical
treatment see Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009).
11Their paper also contains an exploration of cash-flow based lending in a Kiyotaki-Moore econ-
omy. An earlier paper that aims to identify the determinants of borrowing constraints at the micro
level, but does not focus on earnings constraints, is Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012).
12See also Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) for a business cycle model with investment shocks.
Other papers in the SVAR literature include Barsky and Sims (2012) and Francis, Owyang, Roush,
and DiCecio (2014).
13My econometric approach to studying firm-level responses to investment shocks using local
projections relates to work by Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2017) and Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel,
and Surico (2018).
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Fourth, there are a few existing papers, within and outside the business cycle
literature, in which flow variables rather than assets restrict borrowing (for example
Kiyotaki, 1998).14 My contribution relative to these papers lies in explicitly compar-
ing theoretical and empirical differences between income flow-related and collateral
constraints on firms.15 I provide a detailed exploration of how different stock and
flow borrowing constraints relate and demonstrate that the definition of earnings as
opposed to other financial flows is key for characterizing empirically plausible debt
dynamics with the earnings-based constraint.
Fifth, in many countries mortgage contracts also contain income-related con-
straints, often directly imposed by the regulator. Greenwald (2017) formulates a
payment-to-income limit in addition to a collateral (loan-to-value) constraint for
mortgage borrowing and studies the transmission of macroeconomic shocks through
the mortgage market.16 My paper focuses on corporate debt rather than household
mortgages, where the relevance of earnings-based constraints for business cycles is
still understudied.
Finally, in a recent paper Adler (2018) studies the aggregate impact of financial
covenants on investment in a business cycle model. Relative to his work, I focus less
explicitly on the aspect of covenant breaches, but interpret the prevalence of earnings
covenants as evidence of an earnings-based credit constraint. Moreover, I derive and
verify predictions for debt dynamics at the macro and micro level and investigate
consequences of the constraint for the transmission of monetary and fiscal policy.
Structure of the paper. Section 1.2 presents microeconomic evidence that mo-
tivates the focus on earnings-based borrowing constraints for firms. Section 1.3
introduces a business cycle model that features an earnings-based constraint and
discusses the resulting debt dynamics in comparison to a collateral constraint. Sec-
tion 1.4 verifies the differential theoretical predictions for investment shocks using
both SVAR analysis on aggregate data and panel projections on firm-level data. Sec-
tion 1.5 turns to quantitative questions by estimating a New Keynesian model with
earnings-based borrowing. Section 1.6 concludes.
14See also Jappelli and Pagano (1989) in the context of the permanent income hypothesis and
Arellano and Mendoza (2002), Mendoza (2006), Bianchi (2011) and Korinek (2011) in the context
of sovereign debt. Brooks and Dovis (2018) examine the sensitivity of credit constraints to profit
opportunities in a trade framework. Li (2016) studies how the lack of pledgeability of both assets
and earnings reduces aggregate productivity in Japan.
15Constraints based on income flows often provide an ad-hoc way to restrict borrowing, for exam-
ple if the model does not feature capital. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) provide some discussion
on stock versus flow constraints on sovereign debt. Diamond, Hu, and Rajan (2017) lay out a the-
ory of firm financing in which control rights both over asset sales and over cash flows have varying
importance over time.
16A related study is Corbae and Quintin (2015). Earlier work that studies household mortgages in
business cycle models typically focuses on collateral, see for example Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello
and Neri (2010).
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1.2 Motivating evidence on earnings-based borrowing
This section presents stylized evidence on corporate borrowing in the US economy.
Using information from more than 50,000 loan deals issued to 15,000 firms, I doc-
ument that earnings are a key indicator that determines the extent to which firms
have access to loans.
Data source. I use the ThomsonReuters LPC Dealscan data base. For the United
States, this data covers around 75% of the total commercial loan market in terms of
volumes.17 The unit of observation is a loan deal, which consists of loan facilities.
Deal and facility can be the same unit, e.g. for a standard bank loan, or a deal can
consist of a syndicated credit arrangement in which several lenders provide facilities
of different types and conditions. The data contain rich information, including the
identity of borrower and lender, the amount, maturity, and interest rate. I consider
USD denominated loan originations since 1994 for US nonfinancial corporations. In
Section 1.4.3, I merge the Dealscan data to the Compustat Quarterly data, which
covers accounting information of listed US companies.18
The pervasive use of loan covenants. Loan covenants, sometimes referred to
as nonprice terms, are legal provisions which the borrower is obliged to fulfill during
the lifetime of a loan. They are usually linked to specific measurable indicators,
for which a numerical maximum or minimum value is specified. A covenant states
for example that “the borrower’s earnings-to-debt ratio must be above 4”. Covenant
breaches lead to technical default, which gives lenders discretion in taking contingent
actions: calling back the loan, imposing a penalty payment, increasing the interest
rate or changing other conditions in the contract. Breaches have been shown to occur
frequently with large economic effects. Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2017) show for
example that one third of nonfinancial firms breached their covenants during the
2008-09 financial crisis. Importantly, Roberts and Sufi (2009a) find that net debt
issuing activity experiences a large and persistent drop immediately after a covenant
violation.19 These findings indicate that debt access is significantly reduced when
the variable specified in the covenant moves above (below) its maximum (minimum)
value.
The importance of earnings. Table 1.1 lists the most popular covenant types,
sorted by their frequency of use. The frequency is calculated for loans that feature
at least one covenant and the table includes covenants which appear in more than
10% of these loans. Note that a given contract in the sample can have up to eight
covenants. The table also contains the median, 25th and 75th percentile as well as
17See Chava and Roberts (2008). The data does not include a big share of marketable debt
instruments such as corporate bonds, a limitation which I will discuss later in this section.
18Appendix 1.7.1 contains further information on the data set as well as summary statistics.
19Chava and Roberts (2008) find strong effects of breaches on investment and Falato and Liang
(2017) strong effects on employment.
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the value-weighted mean of the covenant value, that is, the numerical maximum or
minimum value that restricts a given indicator.
Table 1.1: loan covenant types, values and frequency of use
Covenant type p25 Median p75 Mean Frequency
1 Max. Debt to EBITDA 3.00 3.75 5.00 4.60 60.5%
2 Min. Interest Coverage (EBITDA / Interest) 2.00 2.50 3.00 2.56 46.7%
3 Min. Fixed Charge Coverage (EBITDA / Charges) 1.10 1.25 1.50 1.42 22.1%
4 Max. Leverage ratio 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.64 21.3%
5 Max. Capex 6M 20M 50M 194M 15.1%
6 Net Worth 45M 126M 350M 3.2B 11.5%
Note: The table list the most pervasive covenant types, sorted by their frequency of use in the
Dealscan loan data. Covenant types with a frequency above 10% are included in the table. As
there can be more than one covenant per loan, the frequency adds up to more than 100%. EBITDA
abbreviates earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. As indicated in brackets,
a minimum interest coverage covenant typically links to the ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses
and a minimum fixed charge coverage covenant to the ratio of EBITDA to fixed loan charges. The
sample consists of loan deals with at least one loan covenant, issued between 1994 and 2015 by US
nonfinancial corporations. The mean and frequency are weighted with real loan size. ‘M’ and ‘B’
refer to million and billion of 2009 real USD, respectively.
The table shows that the three most frequently used covenants are all related to
earnings. The specific earnings measure is EBITDA, which measures earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. EBITDA is a widely used indicator
of a firm’s economic performance. It captures firm profits that come directly from
its regular operations and is not confounded by accounting treatment of taxes and
depreciation. It is also readily available for scrutiny by lenders as part of standard
financial reporting. The most frequently occurring covenant implies that the lender
requires the level of debt not to exceed this measure by a multiple of 4.6 on average
at any given point in time. At this stage, I interpret the prevalence of earnings-
based covenants as suggestive evidence that the flow of current earnings constitutes
an important constraint on companies’ access to debt. The subsequent sections
of this paper will be dedicated to studying whether credit dynamics support this
interpretation, and whether it affects conclusions about aggregate fluctuations.
Further channels through which earnings affect debt access. Loan covenants
are a direct manifestation of current earnings potentially constraining access to debt,
as they are explicitly written into contracts. There is also evidence of implicit debt
constraints related to earnings. For example, lenders may base their decisions on
credit ratings, which are typically constructed with a strong emphasis on EBITDA.
Furthermore, scrutiny of earnings by lenders could come in the form of internal credit
risk models that use earnings as an input, or be based on reference levels in earnings
ratios that lenders are accustomed to consider without explicitly using covenants.20
20According to Standard & Poor’s Global Ratings (2013a, 2013b), the financial risk profile of
corporations is assessed based on core ratios, which are the funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt
and the debt-to-EBITDA ratio, as well as supplemental ratios, which relate to other operating cash
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Figure 1.1: importance of earnings-based and asset-based debt in comparison
(a) Frequencies of covenants and secured loans
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Note: Panel (a) displays the value-weighted shares of loan deals that contain covenants (left bar)
and are secured/unsecured (right bar). In the left bar, the dark blue area represents the share with
at least one earnings-based covenant. The light blue area covers loans with covenants unrelated to
earnings. In the right bar, the different orange shades capture loans secured with specific assets
(dark), other secured loans (medium) and unsecured loans (light). In both bars, loans without the
relevant information are represented by the white area. Panel (b) repeats the left column of Panel
(a), but breaks down the sample into loans secured with specific assets and other loans (with any
information on secured/unsecured). The sample used for both panels consists of loan deals issued
between 1994 and 2015 by US nonfinancial corporations.
Earnings-based vs. asset-based lending. Figure 1.1 analyzes the frequency of
loan covenants and of collateral, that is, debt that is secured with specific assets.21
Panel (a) plots different value-weighted shares in the total number of loans. The left
bar presents the share of loans with at least one earnings-related covenant (dark blue
area) and with only other covenant types (light blue area). For the remaining share,
the information on covenants is not available (white area). The right bar presents the
share of loans that are secured with specific assets, other secured loans, unsecured
loans, and loans without information on whether and how they are secured (dark
orange, medium orange, light orange, and white areas, respectively).22 The left bar
indicates that earnings-based covenants, which dominate within covenants overall,
feature in around 35% of loans. This number is a lower bound, as the remainder of
loans does not have any information, which does not necessarily mean that covenants
are absent. The share of earnings-based covenants is higher than the share of debt
secured by specific assets, shown in the right bar.23 Note that other secured debt
flow measures. Together with the business risk profile (country risk, industry risk, competition)
this determines the credit rating of a company.
21Since the information on secured/unsecured is at the facility-level, while the information on
covenants is at the deal-level, I aggregate to the deal level, summing over the relevant facilities
within deals.
22According to Lian and Ma (2018), loans secured with “all assets” in Dealscan should be classified
as cash-flow based loans, as the value of this form of collateral in the case of bankruptcy is calculated
based on the cash flows from continuing operations. Therefore, I define loans backed by specific
assets as secured loans but exclude those that are backed by “all assets”. I assign the latter to the
separate category called “Other secured loans”. I thank Yueran Ma and Chen Lian for a helpful
discussion on these differences.
23Table 1.7 in the Appendix lists the frequencies of different asset classes that are used as collat-
eral.
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is composed of loans that are secured by the entire balance sheet of the borrower.
Finally, it is noteworthy that a sizable chunk of loans are unsecured.
Panel (b) breaks down the frequency of covenants conditional on the loan being in
two different groups. The first one is loans that are secured by specific assets while the
second one is other loans, excluding loans without information on secured/unsecured.
This provides evidence on the extent to which the use of loan covenants and collateral
is related across loans. The panel shows that covenants overall are more likely to
appear in a loan contract when specific collateral is not present. However, the loans
backed by specific assets still have a reasonably high share of covenants. Taken
together, the loan information suggests that earnings-based borrowing is pervasive,
exceeding the prevalence of asset-based debt, and that earnings-based covenants are
used both in addition to and instead of collateral.24
Existing evidence in the literature. Lian and Ma (2018) supplement the Dealscan
data with a variety of data sources and present detailed evidence that US nonfinancial
firms primarily borrow based on cash flows as measured by earnings. The magni-
tudes that Lian and Ma (2018) report paint a picture that is perhaps even stronger
in favor of earnings-based borrowing, likely due to the fact that my analysis does
not cover most marketable debt securities such as corporate bonds.25 Other stud-
ies also resort to data sources different from Dealscan to study related questions.
Azariadis, Kaas, and Wen (2016) use Compustat data to highlight the quantitative
importance of firm borrowing without collateral.26 While the focus on earnings-
based constraints for firms is relatively novel, the fact that recent research using
additional or other data sources reaches similar conclusions on the pervasiveness of
such constraints lends further support to studying this microeconomic phenomenon
in a business cycle context.
1.3 A business cycle model with earnings-based debt
This section proposes an earnings-based constraint on firm borrowing to formalize
the microeconomic evidence. I set up a prototype business cycle model in which
the firm issues one of two debt types, which are constrained by current earnings
and the value of collateral, respectively. This allows me to study the dynamics
arising from the earnings-based constraint in comparison with a traditional asset-
24Figure 1.15 in the appendix repeats the analysis with equal-weighted rather than value-weighted
shares.
25This means that despite the comprehensive coverage of Dealscan within the universe of loans,
a sizable chunk of aggregate corporate sector liabilities are not captured. To get a rough idea, I
calculated using Flow of Funds data for 2016 that outstanding loans in the nonfinancial business
sector amount to around 7.6 tn USD, while 5.8 tn USD of liabilities are in debt securities. The
Dealscan data contains mostly syndicated loan deals and many of the facilities within a deal are
credit lines (see also Appendix 1.7.1). Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) study the syndication aspect
of corporate borrowing in more detail. For work with a more explicit focus credit lines see for
example Sufi (2009) and Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2013).
26Azariadis, Kaas, and Wen (2016) use a specific Compustat item which captures secured debt
and calculate unsecured debt as a residual, subtracting it from total debt liabilities.
20
based constraint. To derive sharp differential predictions, the characterization of the
model dynamics focuses on a structural shock that moves earnings and the value of
collateral in opposite directions: the investment shock. Section 1.5 extends the model
to a quantitative framework and also highlights how the earnings-based constraint
differentially affects the transmission of other shocks, including monetary and fiscal
shocks.
1.3.1 Model environment
Time is discrete, denoted by t, and continues infinitely. The frequency is quarterly.
The economy is populated by a representative firm and a representative household.
There is a government which runs a balanced budget.
Firm problem
The firm produces a final consumption good using capital, which it owns and accu-
mulates, and labor, which it hires on a competitive labor market taking the wage rate
wt as given. The consumption good is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production
function
yt = ztk
α
t−1n
1−α
t , (1.1)
and its price is normalized to 1. α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share in production. Total
factor productivity (TFP), zt, is subject to stochastic shocks, to be specified below.
The firm’s period earnings flow, or operational profits, is denoted as pit and defined
as
pit ≡ yt − wtnt. (1.2)
This definition of earnings corresponds to EBITDA, that is, sales net of overhead
and labor costs, but without subtracting investment, interest payments or taxes.
Hence, the model definition in (1.2) is consistent with the indicator that features in
the most pervasive covenant according to the evidence provided in Section 1.2. pit is
the measure that will enter the firm’s earnings-based borrowing constraint.
Capital kt−1 is predetermined at the beginning of the period and its law of motion
is
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + vt
[
1− Φt
(
it
it−1
)]
it, (1.3)
where δ is the depreciation rate and vt is a stochastic disturbance, following a process
specified further below. In the environment presented here, where the production of
consumption, investment and capital goods is not decentralized into different sectors,
vt captures both the level of the economy’s investment specific technology (IST) as
well as its marginal efficiency of investment (MEI). I refer to shocks to the process
of vt simply as “investment shocks”.27 The term Φt
(
it
it−1
)
introduces investment
27IST captures the efficiency at which consumption is turned into investment, while MEI repre-
sents the efficiency at which investment is turned into installed capital. Both types of disturbances
have been studied extensively in business cycle research, e.g. by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell
(2000) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). The key difference is that IST corresponds
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adjustment costs. Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets
and Wouters (2007) I assume that Φt(1) = 0, Φ′t(1) = 0, and Φ′′t (1) = φt > 0. The
t subscript captures the possibility of stochastic shocks to adjustment costs. I refer
to the composite term vt
[
1− Φt
(
it
it−1
)]
as the investment margin. The results I
characterize below will show that for the purpose of disentangling the two alternative
borrowing constraints, different types of shocks to this margin work in similar ways.
Both the presence of investment adjustment costs as well as vt will lead to varia-
tion in the market value of capital. In the case of adjustment costs, this arises from
the standard result that adjustment costs move the value of capital inside the firm
relative to its replacement value, that is, they affect the ratio known as “Tobin’s Q”
(see for example Hayashi, 1982).28 In the case of vt, it is important to note that even
in the absence of any adjustment costs, vt will be inversely related to the relative
price of kt in consumption units. To see this, consider the flow of funds constraint
of the firm, in units of the consumption good, which reads
Ψ(dt) + it + bpi,t−1 + bk,t−1 = yt − wtnt + bpi,t
Rpi,t
+
bk,t
Rk,t
. (1.4)
Ψ(dt) denotes the dividend (equity payout) function, and the b terms capture debt
financing, both of which will be explained in more detail below. Setting Φt(·) = 0
and substituting it from equation (1.3) into equation (1.4), it can be seen that the
relative price of capital directly varies with the inverse of vt, a key property of models
that feature such disturbances entering the investment margin:
Ψ(dt) +
kt
vt
+ bpi,t−1 + bk,t−1 = yt − wtnt + (1− δ)kt−1
vt
+
bpi,t
Rpi,t
+
bk,t
Rk,t
. (1.5)
This observation about the relative price of capital will play a key role in the dynamics
of debt following investment shocks under different borrowing constraints.
The firm has access to two means of financing its operations, equity and debt.
The variable dt denotes equity payouts and the presence of the function Ψ(dt) cap-
tures costs related to equity payouts and issuance. Following Jermann and Quadrini
(2012),
Ψ(dt) = dt + ψ(dt − d¯)2, (1.6)
where d¯ is the long run dividend payout target (the steady state level of dt). Equation
(1.6) captures in reduced form the fact that raising equity is costly and that there
are motives for dividend smoothing.29 Debt financing can be undertaken in the form
of two alternative one-period risk-free bonds, denoted bpi,t and bk,t, where bpi,t−1 and
empirically to the inverse of the relative price of investment, while MEI does not have a readily
available empirical counterpart. This will come into play when taking my model predictions to the
data in Section 1.4.
28In his original paper, Hayashi (1982) introduces a similar formulation as in equation (1.3) and
refers to the composite term
[
1− Φt
(
it
it−1
)]
it as the “installation function”. In his setting, there
is no variation in IST and the price of investment goods in consumption units is exogenously given.
29Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) provide evidence of increasing marginal costs in equity underwrit-
ing. Lintner (1956) discusses dividend smoothing motives.
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bk,t−1 are predetermined at the beginning of period t. The effective gross interest
rates faced by firms are Rpi,t and Rk,t, and are both subject to a tax advantage,
captured by τpi and τk, of the following form:
Rj,t = 1 + rj,t(1− τj), j ∈ {pi, k} (1.7)
where rpi,t and rk,t are the market interest rates received by lenders. This creates
a preference for debt over equity and makes the firm want to borrow up to its con-
straints. Since the household does not receive this tax rebate, there is a heterogeneity
in the desire to borrow and save across sectors of the economy, the household wants
to lend funds, and debt is in positive net supply in equilibrium. This type of tax
exists in many countries and the related modeling assumption follows Hennessy and
Whited (2005).30
Introduction of alternative borrowing constraints. Both types of debt are
subject to borrowing constraints, which are formulated in consumption units and
which I specify as
bpi,t
1 + rpi,t
≤ θpipit (1.8)
and
bk,t
1 + rk,t
≤ θkEtpkt+1(1− δ)kt. (1.9)
The θ parameters capture the exogenous tightness of the constraints.31 In the
earnings-based borrowing constraint (1.8), debt is limited by a multiple θpi > 1
of current earnings, pit.32 I also allow a more general form of this constraint, in
which f(pit−3, pit−2, pit−1, pit,Etpit+1) enters on the right hand side, and f(·) is a linear
polynomial. This captures the idea that loan covenant indicators in practice are
typically calculated as 4-quarter trailing averages (see Chodorow-Reich and Falato,
2017). An alternative formulation of the earnings-based constraint would be one
that captures the interest coverage ratio, that is, a constraint on rj,tbj,t. I focus
exclusively on the debt-to-earnings formulation, as the corresponding covenant is
the most frequently used in the loan data, ahead of the coverage ratio (see Table
1.1).33
30See also Riddick and Whited (2009). Strebulaev and Whited (2012) provide a comprehensive
review of the dynamic corporate finance literature. In effect, the tax advantage makes the firm “less
patient” than the market, which discounts at rate 1
1+rj,t
, and thus induces the firm to borrow up
to its constraint. This outcome could be generated in alternative ways, for example by making the
firm an entrepreneur household with a lower discount factor.
31In Section 1.5, I allow these parameters to be time-varying and subject to stochastic “financial
shocks” in the spirit of Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
32A constraint on bj,t rather than
bj,t
1+rj,t
would capture a different timing of the interest payment
and would not change the dynamics of the model in a meaningful way.
33Lian and Ma (2018) emphasize the presence of both debt-to-earnings ratios as well interest
coverage ratios in covenants. Daniel Greenwald’s discussion of their paper at the NBER Monetary
Economics Meeting, available online, contains some further thoughts on the differences between the
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In equation (1.9) debt issued by the firm in t is limited by a fraction θk < 1 of
the capital stock net of depreciation next period, which is valued at price pk,t+1. In
the borrowing constraint pk,t+1 could reflect either the book or the market price of
capital.34 Formally,
pk,t =
 1vt if collateral is book valueQt if collateral is market value (1.10)
where Qt is the market price of capital, to be determined in equilibrium. In the
presentation of the main results, I will focus on the market value formulation, but it
is important to emphasize that in the presence of investment shocks the book price of
capital is not 1 but 1/vt, as the debt contract is specified in consumption units. The
equilibrium value of Qt will also be inversely related to vt but will be additionally
affected by adjustment costs. If adjustment costs are set to zero, the market and
book value of capital coincide at 1/vt.
Discussion of borrowing constraints. Borrowing constraints reflect that the
ability of a borrower to issue debt is limited due to an underlying friction such as
information or enforcement limitations. In the case of the collateral constraint, a
large body of work shows how the market incompleteness implied by the constraint
can be derived from such frictions. Typically, a collateral constraint emerges as the
optimal solution in a setting in which borrowers have the ability to divert funds
or withdraw their human capital from a project, but the withdrawal remains an
off-equilibrium threat (see for example Hart and Moore, 1994).
In the case of the earnings-based borrowing constraint, one interpretation is that
the firm is able to directly pledge its earnings stream rather than an asset in return
for obtaining debt access. A second interpretation is that the borrower has the
ability to divert funds, in which case the lender can seize and operate the firm
herself. As the lender cannot perfectly predict the value of the firm when it is taken
over, she estimates this contingent firm value as a multiple of current earnings.35
A third interpretation is based on regulation. Regulatory requirements on lenders
require a different risk treatment of loans that feature a low earnings-to-debt ratio.
Exogenously imposed constraints that are not the outcome of a contracting problem
could reflect such regulation.36 In Appendix 1.7.3, I sketch out a specific formal
environment that captures the second of these three potential interpretations. In
that appendix, I also discuss the existing literature on the microfoundations of loan
covenants, and provide additional details on relevant regulation.
Naturally, the formalization of the constraints ignores some differences between
asset-based loans and loans subject to earnings covenants in reality. For example,
two.
34With the term “book value”, I do not refer to the value at historical costs, but to the value that
does not take into account market price variation arising from adjustment costs.
35Valuation by multiples is a common practice for assessing various types of assets and investment
opportunities, see Damodaran (2012) for a textbook treatment.
36Greenwald (2017) rationalizes borrowing constraints for household mortgages along similar lines.
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while collateral is pledged upon origination and may be seized in the case of de-
fault, covenants can in principle be exercised at any point during the lifetime of a
loan. I abstract from these differences on two grounds. First, the fact that only the
specific variable entering the right hand side of the debt limit is different between
(1.8) and (1.9) allows for transparency in characterizing the implied differences in
business cycle dynamics. Second, the Dealscan data shows that the maturity of cor-
porate debt is relatively short, in particular compared to household debt, and that
the relation between lenders and borrowers in the commercial loan market entails
repeated interaction both in relation to covenant assessment and in relation to col-
lateral.37 The latter observation also justifies the simplification that both borrowing
constraints affect one-period debt, which abstracts from considerations regarding
maturity choice.38
Firm’s maximization problem. The objective of the firm is to maximize the ex-
pected discounted stream of the dividends paid to its owner, that is, its maximization
program is
max E0
∞∑
t=0
Λtdt (1.11)
subject to (1.1), (1.2), (1.3), (1.4), (1.6), and either of the borrowing constraints
(1.8) or (1.9). The term Λt in the objective function is the firm owner’s stochastic
discount factor between periods 0 and t. The firm’s optimality conditions are shown
in Appendix 1.7.4.
Household, government and equilibrium
Details on the household problem, the government and the definition of the equilib-
rium can be found in Appendix 1.7.4. The household consumes the good produced
by the firm and supplies labor. She does not receive the tax rebate on debt and
therefore becomes the saver in equilibrium. The government runs a balanced budget
in every period.
It is worth noting that the model presented here does not feature a labor wedge, as
the marginal product of labor (MPN) equals marginal rate of substitution (MRS)
between consumption and leisure in equilibrium. I have explored extensions of the
model in which the firm requires working capital loans to pre-finance expenditures.
Since the results in this section are about qualitatively different borrowing dynamics
arising from the alternative constraints, I stick to the simplest version in which
MRS = MPN .39
37In the Dealscan data, the average (median) maturity of loans in 52 (60) months, and the
value-weighted share of loans that refinance a previous loan is 83%.
38For a general equilibrium treatment of long-term debt, see for example Gomes, Jermann, and
Schmid (2016). Cao and Nie (2017) provide a study of the role of market incompleteness implied
by the non state-contingency of debt that is typically assumed alongside borrowing constraints.
39The literature, in particular Jermann and Quadrini (2012), has advocated the working capital
formulation as a way to introduce an interaction between the labor wedge and financial frictions
as an important amplification mechanism that delivers quantitatively more elevated responses to
shocks. See also Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) for a general discussion of the labor wedge
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1.3.2 Model parameterization and specification
The stochastic processes underlying the exogenous disturbances follow autoregressive
processes of order one in logs. See Appendix 1.7.4 for details. I specify the investment
adjustment costs as a quadratic function that satisfies the functional form assump-
tions introduced by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and has been used
in various subsequent papers on US business cycles, that is,
Φt
(
it
it−1
)
=
φt
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
. (1.12)
This specification gives a steady state market value of capital of 1.40,41 Furthermore,
in steady state, Φ′′(1) = φ.
Panel (a) of Table 1.2 summarizes the values I set for the structural parameters
of the model. Most parameter values are standard in business cycle research for the
US case or match standard moments in US macroeconomic data. I set φ = 4 in line
with Smets and Wouters (2007). To parameterize β, I calculate the average interest
rate faced by firms in the Dealscan data base.42 Panels (b) and (c) of the table
show the calibration of the parameters that are related to the alternative borrowing
constraints (1.8) and (1.9). In this part of the paper, I investigate model dynamics
using the simplification that either one or the other constraint is faced by the firm.
To do this, I exploit the fact that the model nests restricted versions in which only
a collateral or only an earnings-based constraint are present. Each constraint can be
shut off by parameterizing θj = τj = 0, for j ∈ {k, pi} and ∀t. In this case debt type
j is in zero net supply and the other constraint binds at all times.43
I set the tax advantage of debt τj to 0.35 following Hennessy and Whited (2005).
Regarding the tightness parameters of the constraints I proceed as follows. Using the
Dealscan data I calculate the dollar-weighted mean covenant value of the debt-to-
EBITDA covenant, the empirical counterpart of my earnings-based constraint. This
gives a value of θpi = 4.6 (see Table 1.1). As this value is for annualized EBITDA
and my model is quarterly, I divide by four. I then set the tightness of the collateral
component to that value which achieves the exact same steady state debt level, which
in business cycle models.
40For the result presented in this section the specific form of adjustment costs is not crucial.
For example, the conclusions drawn from the results are the same with adjustment costs in capital
rather than investment. I choose this specification mainly to be consistent with Section 1.5.
41In order to study the adjustment cost shock to φt I introduce a minor modification to (1.12) in
which steady state adjustment costs exceed zero by an arbitrarily small magnitude. This is done in
order to be able to compute IRFs to this shock as deviations from the nonstochastic steady state.
See more in Appendix 1.7.4.
42In particular I use the sum of the “All-in spread drawn”, and add the 12-month LIBOR rate. I
then calculate the mean over loan deals which feature either collateral, earnings-related covenants,
or both.
43Throughout my analysis I focus on binding borrowing constraints. This assumes that shocks
are small enough in magnitude to keep the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint positive, that is,
µjt > 0, j ∈ {k, pi}, ∀t. Modifying my model to feature occasionally binding constraints would
be relatively straightforward. This would make it feasible to also study possible switching effects
between different types of borrowing constraints over the business cycle, similar to what Greenwald
(2017) and Ingholt (2018) emphasize for the case of household mortgages. I leave an extension in
this direction for future work.
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Table 1.2: model parameterizations
Parameter Value Details on parameterization
(a) Structural parameters
α 0.33 Capital share of output of 1/3
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate of 2.5% per quarter
φ 4 Prior of Smets and Wouters (2007)
β 0.9752 Steady state annualized interest rate of 6.6%∗
χ 1.87 Target n = 0.3 in steady state
ψ 0.46 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
(b) Model with earnings-based constraint only
θk 0 Shut off collateralized borrowing
τk 0 Shut off collateralized borrowing
θpi 4.6/4 Average value of debt-to-EBITDA covenants∗
τpi 0.35 Following Hennessy and Whited (2005)
(c) Model with collateral constraint only
θk 0.0485 Same steady state debt as Panel (b)
τk 0.35 Following Hennessy and Whited (2005)
θpi 0 Shut off earnings-based borrowing
τpi 0 Shut off earnings-based borrowing
Note: Panel (a) describes the parameterization of the structural parameters which are the same
independent of which type of constraint is specified to feature in the model. Panels (b) and (c)
present the parameterizations that achieve that the firm faces either one or the constraint. ∗
indicates parameter values that are calculated directly from the micro data, using ThomsonReuters
Dealscan.
results in θk = 0.0485. It should be emphasized that the results shown in the stylized
model environment of this section are robust to variations in these parameter values.
In particular, as the model is linearized and I focus on qualitative predictions, the
results are not sensitive to varying the θ parameters across a range of values.
1.3.3 Dynamics implied by earnings-based vs. collateral constraints
Figure 1.2 plots the IRFs of firm debt to a positive TFP shock and a positive invest-
ment shock. Both shocks are permanent.44 The dark blue lines correspond to the
model in which firms face the earnings-based constraint (parameterization shown in
Panel (b) of Table 1.2), while the light orange lines are generated in a model where
the collateral constraint is present (see Panel (c)). The figure shows that while the
responses of firm debt to the TFP shock are positive under both alternative borrow-
ing constraints, the sign of the responses for the investment shock flip between one
44I show the results for permanent shocks since the SVAR methodology in Section 1.4 will allow
me to identify permanent rather than transitory shocks in the data. The qualitative conclusions
regarding the sign of the responses on impact are similar with transitory persistent shocks. See also
Figure 1.3 further below.
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and the other parameterization, implying the opposite comovement of debt with the
shock. In other words, different conclusions about the dynamics of firm borrowing
are drawn depending on how the borrowing friction of the firm is formulated.
Figure 1.2: model irfs of firm debt under different borrowing constraints
(a) Permanent TFP shock
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Note: The figure displays model IRFs of firm debt to different shocks, under two alternative calibra-
tions in which only the earnings-based constraint (dark blue line) or only the collateral constraint
(light orange line) is present. Panel (a) show the debt IRF to a positive TFP shock and Panel (b)
to a positive investment shock. The parameters to generate these IRFs are shown in Table 1.2.
I set ρz = ρv = 1 (the shocks are permanent) and σz = σv = 0.05. The figure highlights that
the responses of debt to investment shocks have a different sign under the alternative borrowing
constraints.
The intuition behind these dynamics is as follows. The TFP shock raises both
the firm’s earnings as well as the market value of capital, supporting more debt under
both constraints. While the magnitudes differ, the sign of the debt responses to this
shock are therefore the same under the alternative constraints. This is different for
the investment shock, which leads to higher efficiency in the economy’s investment
margin. This induces investment and stronger economic activity accompanied by
growing earnings. However, the shock reduces the relative value of capital in con-
sumption units. This means that if the firm faces a collateral constraint, it needs to
reduce its debt level, while it is able to borrow more in the face of an earnings-based
constraint. The responses to this shock thus imply sharply different debt dynamics
depending on the relevant borrowing constraint. These differences will provide the
testing ground for my empirical analysis in Section 1.4.
As an illustration of the mechanism, think about an airline and imagine a shock
– an exogenous technological innovation – that makes the production of airplanes
cheaper, which lowers their price relative to other goods in equilibrium. The implica-
tion of this shock for borrowing differs sharply depending on the relevant constraint.
If airplanes serve as collateral, their falling relative value tightens the borrowing con-
straint. By contrast, the earnings-based borrowing constraint is relaxed as cheaper
airplanes increase the airline’s profitability.
As discussed above, when the production of capital and investment goods are
not disaggregated into separate sectors, a shock to vt can be thought of as both an
investment-specific technology (IST) and a marginal efficiency of investment (MEI)
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Figure 1.3: model irfs of firm debt: additional investment margin shocks
(a) Persistent adjustment cost shock
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(b) Persistent investment shock with φ = 0
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Note: The figure displays IRFs of firm debt to additional investment margin shocks generated from
the model, under the two alternative calibrations in which only the earnings-based constraint (dark
blue line) or only the collateral constraint (light orange line) is present. Panel (a) plots the IRFs
to a negative adjustment costs shock with ρφ = 0.5 and σφ = 1. Panel (b) repeats the investment
shock IRFs from Figure 1.2 as a transitory but persistent shock (ρv = 0.5 and σv = 0.05) and
without investment adjustment costs (φ = 0). The different signs of the IRFs across models show
that the proposed mechanism is broad enough to carry through to different types of shock to the
investment margin.
shock.45 At a later stage in the analysis, for the purpose of the empirical verification
of the mechanism in Section 1.4, I will narrow down the interpretation of vt to
capture IST. This allows me to establish a mapping of vt to the data. At this
stage, in terms of the main message behind the results, the distinction between these
refined concepts is not of first order importance. In fact, the proposed mechanism
has a broad interpretation which carries through to other shocks that affect the
economy’s investment margin. To demonstrate this, Figure 1.3 plots two more sets
of IRFs. In Panel (a), the IRFs to a negative persistent adjustment cost shock
for the two model versions are plotted. This is another disturbance that distorts
the economy’s investment margin. It is evident that this shock also results in a
different sign of the debt responses on impact depending on which constraint is at
play. In Panel (b), I repeat the IRFs to the investment shock from Figure 1.2,
but shut off any adjustment costs and specify the shock as persistent rather than
permanent. This corresponds to a setting in which there are no fluctuations in
the price of capital other than through the exogenous disturbance itself. There is
again a different sign of the impact response, with a positive debt response under
the earnings constraint and a negative one when the collateral constraint is present.
These additional responses highlight the broad scope of the key mechanism that the
model delivers. Various types of disturbances that enter the investment margin give
rise to different implications under the alternative constraints.
In Appendix 1.7.4 I repeat Figures 1.2 and 1.3 for a version of the earnings
45See the discussion below the introduction of equation (1.3) in Section 1.3.1. More details on
this distinction is contained in Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2012).
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constraint in which current and three lags of earnings enter the constraint. This is
based on the idea that covenants are often evaluated based on a 4-quarter trailing
average of the indicator. The results for this specification are similar to the ones
shown in the above figures. The shape of the IRFs changes due to the fact that
current earnings will affect the borrowing ability in future periods. In particular,
there is a delayed and hump-shaped response under this version of the earnings-
based constraint, but the signs of the responses remain unchanged.
Note that in deriving testable model predictions I focus primarily on the IRFs
of debt. I turn to selected additional variables in the next subsection, and show the
IRFs of remaining model variables in Appendix 1.7.4. The appeal of this strategy
is that debt dynamics are tied very directly to the alternative constraint formula-
tion and are not driven by further modeling choices on the structure in which they
operate. Interestingly, in a prototype neoclassical setting under standard calibra-
tions, debt constraints themselves typically do not have strong effects on the model’s
overall dynamics. Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) provide a detailed exploration of this
insight.46,47 I therefore show the responses of other variables only insofar as they
help me to understand the different debt dynamics across parameterizations of the
model. In Section 1.5 of the paper I do consider the dynamics of typical macroeco-
nomic variables of interest.
In summary, the results highlight the different qualitative conclusions that can be
drawn about the dynamics of debt depending on the type of borrowing constraint. In
the next subsection I provide a more in-depth characterization of these results with
an explicit focus on the theoretical link between asset values, earnings and other flow
variables. After this additional discussion I turn to verifying the model predictions
in US data in Section 1.4.
1.3.4 Discussion: borrowing against flow vs. stock variables
The analysis highlights the differences between two variables limiting the access to
debt for firms: earnings and the value of capital, a flow variable and a stock variable,
respectively. To further characterize the results, this section analyzes to what extent
this difference has an influence on the differential responses to investment shocks.
From a theoretical point of view, the market value of an asset corresponds to the
net present value (NPV) of future flows that can be derived from that asset. In the
context of a firm, its market value is equal to the flows that the firm generates for
its owner. Several observations can be made on how the firm’s market value and the
46A similar discussion is provided by Kocherlakota (2000), who shows that the amplification
generated by credit constraints in a small open economy setting is sensitive to the quantitative
specification of the underlying model structure, in particular factor shares. In related work, Fuerst
(1995) shows that agency frictions in the spirit of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) also add little
amplification in a basic business cycle model.
47As shown in Appendix 1.7.4, apart from the debt IRFs the model behaves extremely similar
under the two constraints. This is different for example when raising the value of ψ or when choosing
a working capital formulation, as discussed after the introduction of the firm’s maximization problem
above. The predictions on the qualitative dynamics of total firm debt, however, are not altered by
these modifications of the model.
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flows to the owner relate to the specific variables constraining debt in my model.
Figure 1.4: irfs of different flow and asset values to investment shock
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Note: The figure displays model IRFs of selected variables to a permanent investment shock, gen-
erated from a version of the model without any debt. This is intended to highlight the relation
between alternative flows and asset values which may affect the right hand side of potential bor-
rowing constraints. The unit of the IRFs is in levels of consumption units in the model (earnings
and dividend flows are additionally scaled by 10). The net present values (NPVs) are recursively
computed in the model using the household’s stochastic discount factor.
First, in the equilibrium of the model, the market value of the firm corresponds
to the NPV of dividend flows. That is, the firm’s overall value is the infinite stream
of dt, discounted at the stochastic discount factor of the household SDFt,t+1 ≡
Λt+1
Λt
=
βuct+1
uct
. We can define the market value of the firm recursively as Vd,t =
dt + Et(SDFt,t+1Vd,t+1). Importantly, this value of flows is different both from the
current earnings flow pit as well as from the NPV of earnings flows, which can also
be recursively defined as Vpi,t = pit + Et(SDFt,t+1Vpi,t+1). Second, in a neoclassical
production economy, the market value of a firm is proportional to the capital it owns
if specific conditions on technology are satisfied (see Hayashi, 1982): if technology
is constant returns to scale and adjustment costs are homogeneous of degree 1 in k,
it is the case that Vd,t = Qtkt−1. In this context Qt is known as “Tobin’s Q”. As a
consequence of the two observations, if the conditions of Hayashi (1982) hold, the
collateral constraint is equivalent to a constraint in which the firm’s overall market
value serves as collateral. In turn, this constraint would have an equivalent flow-
related analogue, if the flows entering the flow constraint were all discounted future
dividend flows. In this case, the two borrowing limits would be equivalent.
In light of these theoretical insights, we can see that the earnings-based borrowing
constraint (1.8) and the collateral constraint (1.9) are not equivalent for two reasons.
First, they differ in terms of the flow definition. The earnings-based constraint
features earnings rather than dividends. Second, they differ in terms of the flow
timing. The earnings-based constraint features a current flow variable rather than
the NPV of all current and future flows.48 In the model, I can check directly which
of these two differences drives the results in Figure 1.2, by comparing the responses
48As shown in the previous section, I have explored sensitivity of the results to generalizations of
the earnings-based constraint where lagged or one period ahead expected earnings can enter. These
versions are still very different from the NPV, so the arguments made here again carry through.
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of dt, Vd,t, pit, Vpi,t and Qtkt−1 to the investment shock. Figure 1.4 displays these
IRFs in a model without borrowing constraints. This is essentially a comparison of
different variables that could potentially appear on the right hand side of a borrowing
limit. The figure shows that both current earnings as well as the NPV of earnings
rise in response to the shock. This means that with an earnings constraint additional
debt could be issued in response to the investment shock and that timing of earnings
by itself is not key in this case. However dividends as well as the NPV of dividends,
which equal the firm value and the value of the capital stock under the Hayashi
conditions, is reduced.49 This leads to the counterfactual debt response with the
collateral constraint. Hence, for the investment shock the difference in the debt
response is driven by the flow definition. The results in Panel (b) of Figure 1.2 arise
not because debt is constrained by a flow instead of by an asset value per se, but by
the specific variable that defines this flow, current earnings.
1.4 Verifying the model predictions for investment shocks
This section empirically verifies the model predictions implied by the alternative bor-
rowing constraints. First, I investigate which of the two borrowing limits, earnings-
based or collateral constraint, is consistent with comovements we observe in US
macroeconomic data. Second, I examine if the dynamics in the data are in line with
the specific mechanism through which the constraints on the firm operate in the
model. I resort to analyzing both aggregate and firm-level data, using an SVAR
(Section 1.4.1) and a panel regression framework that allows for heterogeneous re-
sponses to shocks (Section 1.4.3).
The empirical analysis focuses on the structural shock that has given different
qualitative predictions in the model: the investment shock. As explained in Section
1.3, the disturbance vt can capture both shocks to investment-specific technology
(IST) as well as to marginal investment efficiency (MEI). The former type is directly
tied to a readily available empirical counterpart, the inverse relative price of invest-
ment goods.50 Observable time series of this price have been exploited by previous
research to identify IST shocks. I build on this work to study the conditional dy-
namics of US data with a focus on the debt responses to investment shocks. That
is, while the interpretation of the model mechanism can be broadly applied to dif-
ferent shocks to the investment margin, for the purposes of verifying the predictions
empirically, I interpret vt as a specific type of investment shock, a shock to IST.51
49Under the functional form of investment adjustment costs chosen in (1.12), the Hayashi condi-
tions are not satisfied in the model (see also Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009). However in the calibration
the numerical difference between NPV of dividends and the market value of capital is very small,
as can be seen from the similarity bewteen the dashed line in the left chart and the solid line in the
right chart of Figure 1.4.
50In a subset of the loan-level data from Dealscan, it is possible to directly observe the type of
collateral that is used in loan facilities. After excluding non-informative categories such as “Other”
and “Unknown”, the category “Property & equipment” is the largest one, three times as large as
“Real Estate”, both in terms of the number of facilities and the dollar volume. See Table 1.7 in the
Appendix.
51Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011) emphasize that MEI shocks are more important
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1.4.1 SVAR on aggregate US data
I specify an SVAR framework to estimate the impact of IST shocks on the US
economy as a whole. The system includes variables that allow me to distinguish
between dynamics that are supportive of either the earnings-based constraint or the
collateral constraint: debt, earnings and capital. I use two different identification
schemes. First, following the literature on technology shocks in SVARs, I identify IST
shocks using long-run restrictions building on the work of Fisher (2006).52 Second, I
use medium-run restrictions following Barsky and Sims (2012), and Francis, Owyang,
Roush, and DiCecio (2014).53 I apply both identification methods to US postwar
data. In addition, I set up a Monte Carlo experiment in which I repeatedly run the
SVAR model on data that I generate directly from the model, in order to check the
SVAR’s ability to distinguish between the alternative borrowing constraints.
SVAR setting and identifying assumptions
I begin by formally introducing the general setting that encompasses both identifica-
tion methods. Consider the n-dimensional vector of macroeconomic time series Yt,
which is specified to follow
B0Yt = B1Yt−1 + ...+BpYt−p + ut, (1.13)
where the vector ut denotes the structural shocks with covariance matrix Ωu = In.
The model can be rewritten in its MA(∞)-representation as
Yt = B(L)
−1ut, (1.14)
where L denotes the lag operator. The structural shocks ut are not identified unless
additional restrictions are imposed on the parameters of the system.
Identification using long-run restrictions. The idea behind long-run restric-
tions is to impose identifying assumptions on the long-run multiplier B(1)−1 =
[B0 − B1 − ... − Bp]−1. Following the seminal study of Fisher (2006), I use as
the first three variables the log difference of the relative price of investment, the
log difference in output per hour, and the log of hours. The idea is to identify two
shocks, using a recursive scheme on B(1)−1: the long-run level of the first variable
is only affected by the first shock, and the long-run level of second variable is only
affected by the first and the second shock. The first shock has the interpretation of
than IST shocks for US business cycles. MEI shocks, however, are not directly identifiable the same
way that IST shocks are. It will turn out that the IST shock I identify is reasonably important in
terms of the historical variance decomposition of debt implied by the SVAR.
52Long-run restrictions are the most common way to identify technology shocks in SVARs. Blan-
chard and Quah (1989) and Gali (1999) are early contributions which focus exclusively on TFP.
Fisher (2006) and various subsequent papers also estimate the effect of IST shocks. A recent example
is Ben Zeev and Khan (2015).
53Ramey (2016) provides a useful summary of the literature on both long-run and medium-run
restrictions.
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investment-specific technological change, as the relative price of investment is only
affected by this shock in the long run. The second shock represents a concept akin
to a TFP shock, as it is the only driver that affects, other than IST, the economy’s
labor productivity in the long run.54 It is important to highlight that these restric-
tions are satisfied in the model of Section 1.3. For the purpose of this paper, I view
the identification of the TFP shock as a by-product and mainly present the model
results for the IST shock, as the latter shock implies sharply contrasting predictions
under the alternative borrowing constraints.
As I only identify two shocks and leave the remaining rows of B(1)−1 unrestricted,
I can add further variables to the system, for which the ordering becomes irrelevant
to the identification of IST and TFP. The additional variables are the log difference
in aggregate business earnings, the log difference in the relative value of the capital
stock and the log difference in business sector debt. In particular the inclusion of
debt is key, as I have shown that in the model this variable responds with a different
sign to investment shocks depending on the borrowing constraint component that is
present. Together this gives, in line with the notation of the model,
Yt = [dlog(pkt) dlog(yt/nt) log(nt) dlog(pit) dlog(pktkt) dlog(bt)]
′. (1.15)
pkt is the relative price of investment, which corresponds to v−1t if vt captures IST.
Identification using medium-run restrictions. The idea behind medium-run
restrictions is to identify a shock such that its forecast error variance decomposition
(FEVD) share for a selected variable at a specific finite horizon h is maximized.
These restrictions have been introduced to overcome weaknesses of the long-run
identification method, such as their small sample properties (for details see Faust and
Leeper, 1997). Francis, Owyang, Roush, and DiCecio (2014), for example, identify a
technology shock as the shock that maximizes the FEVD share of labor productivity
at horizons of 2.5 to 20 years. Barsky and Sims (2012) implement a variant of this
method where the shock maximizes the sum of the FEVD up to a specific horizon.55
I follow the latter authors’ variant of this identification scheme. Using the same
vector of observables Yt, I identify the IST shock as the shock that maximizes the
cumulative FEVD share in the relative price of investment over varying horizons h.
Again, I leave the remaining shocks unidentified.56
54This identification scheme implies that the first row of B(1)−1 is composed of zeros apart from
the first element and the second row is composed of zeros apart from the first two elements. Fisher
(2006) also imposes the additional, overidentifying restriction that labor productivity responds in a
fixed proportion to movements in the relative investment price. While this improves the precision
of the estimates, I do not impose this restriction to remain as agnostic as possible.
55Earlier work on these types of restrictions includes Uhlig (2004) and Faust (1998). They are
also applied in recent paper by Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2018).
56To implement the medium-horizon identification, I begin by estimating the VAR in reduced form
and calculating an initial estimate of the B−10 matrix, based on a simple Cholesky decomposition. I
then take an orthonormal rotation of this matrix such that the identifying restriction is satisfied. In
practice, this means that I run a constrained optimization routine over n× n matrices D, in which
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Data used for SVAR analysis
I use data from the US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), and the US
Financial Accounts (Flow of Funds) for the total nonfinancial business sector. De-
tails can be found in Appendix 1.7.1. To compute real variables I use nominal data
which I deflate with the consumption deflator for nondurable goods and services. An
important consideration lies in the choice of data for pkt. Following the literature
on IST shocks, I use the relative price of equipment investment.57 I construct this
relative price from NIPA data and use the Gordon-Violante-Cummins (GVC) invest-
ment price for robustness.58 For debt I use the sum of loans and debt securities for
the nonfinancial business sector and also consider these debt categories separately
for robustness. As some of the variables display low frequency movements after log
differencing, I detrend some of the series before estimating the VAR.59 I estimate
the reduced form VAR using OLS, recover the IRFs from inverting (rotating) the
relevant matrices under the identifying restrictions, and compute 68% error bands
using bootstrap techniques.
1.4.2 SVAR results: aggregate responses to investment shocks
IRFs. The results on quarterly US data from 1952 to 2016 for p = 4 are shown in
Figure 1.5. The figure presents the IRFs for a positive permanent IST shock identified
based on its long-run impact on the relative price of capital. Section 1.7.5 in the
appendix presents the analogous IRFs based on the medium-horizon identification
scheme with h = 20 and h = 40, implying that IST is the main driver of the relative
price of investment at a 5 and 10 year frequency, respectively. For both identification
methods the figure shows a positive response of debt, which is in line with the model
predictions for the earnings-based constraint but not for the collateral constraint.
In line with the dynamics of the model, the rise in debt is accompanied by growing
earnings and a fall in the value of capital.
To best interpret these results, suppose the model introduced in Section 1.3
approximates well the data-generating process behind the time series used in the
SVAR. Given the positive debt response to the IST shock in Figure 1.5, the IRFs
are supportive of the version of the model that features an earnings-based constraint
and not a collateral constraint. The dynamics in US data, conditional on identified
I calculate the FEVD implied by DB−10 , and the objective is to maximise the FEVD share of the
first shock in the first variable. The constraint of the routine is that D′D = In must be satisfied.
57Among different relative investment price categories, the equipment price is the one with a clear
downward trend in US data based on which the IST shock can be identified. The deflator for total
investment and for structures do not display as strong trends. Interestingly, the Dealscan data set
provides information on the type of collateral used in loan contracts: “property and equipment”
is the top category of specific assets pledged as collateral, which further supports this choice. See
Table 1.7 in the Appendix.
58Appendix 1.7.1 contains a figure comparing the two alternative series. I also run a unit root
test to confirm that both series are nonstationary in levels and stationary after first-differencing, as
required by the identification scheme of the SVAR. See also Gali (1996) for details.
59Blanchard and Quah (1989) provide a related discussion. The detrending mostly increases the
precision of the estimates but has little influence on the shape of the estimated IRFs.
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Figure 1.5: svar irfs to positive ist shock identified with lr restrictions
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Note: The figure displays the IRFs to an investment-specific shock identified from an estimated
SVAR model using US data. The identification scheme relies on long-run restrictions following
Fisher (2006). The responses are shown for all six variables included in the system, in percent. The
unit of the shock is one standard deviation. The sample period used for estimation is 1952:Q2 to
2016:Q4. 68% error bands are calculated using bootstrap techniques. The figure shows a positive
response of debt to an investment shock, which is in line with the predictions arising from a earnings-
based borrowing constraint in the theoretical macro model.
shocks, thus lend support to the importance of earnings-based borrowing for debt
dynamics in US business cycles.60
Historical variance decomposition. My empirical strategy only relies on the
sign of the responses, and conceptually it does not require the importance of the shock
in a variance decomposition sense to be large. However, if the shock is an important
driver of macroeconomic dynamics, this means that the relevance of the earnings-
based borrowing constraint should have important effects also on the unconditional
dynamics of the macro data. Figure 1.6 shows the historical decomposition of debt
using the long-run identification method. The solid black line plots the actual data
of the cyclical component of debt, and the colored bars represent the contribution
at each point in time of the different shocks (IST, TFP and other). It can be seen
that IST shocks have played a marked role in different episodes of the postwar US
business cycle. For example, consistent with the narrative around the tech boom,
60Appendix 1.7.5 presents the IRFs to the TFP shock. Consistent with the model, this shock has
an expansionary effect, raising the variables in the system, despite hours. Debt also rises (albeit
not significantly). For TFP shocks, however, it did not make a big difference which constraint is
relevant to begin with, so the empirical verification of the specification of the borrowing constraint
relies on the responses to the IST shock.
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Figure 1.6: svar: historical variance decomposition of firm debt
Note: The figure shows the historical variance decomposition of firm debt estimated by the SVAR
model identified with long-run restrictions. The black line is the percent deviation from trend of
debt liabilities (loans and debt securities) of the nonfinancial business sector, taken from the US
financial accounts. The bars indicate the contribution of different structural shocks to the variance
of debt as estimated by the SVAR model. The dark blue bars represent investment shocks, the
light blue ones TFP shocks, and the contribution of shocks that remain unidentified are shown by
the white bars. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. The decomposition is calculated following
Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017).
the 1990s expansion was strongly driven by IST. The boom and bust of the 2000s, on
the other hand, was less influenced by IST according to the SVAR model. Appendix
1.7.5 provides the historical decompositions of the remaining variables in the system.
Monte Carlo simulations. To verify the ability of the SVAR methodology to dis-
tinguish between different borrowing constraints, I set up a Monte Carlo experiment
in which I estimate the SVAR on simulated data generated from the model in Section
1.3. Specifically, I repeatedly create two types of data samples, each generated from
one of borrowing constraint specification (Panel (b) vs. Panel (c) in Table 1.2). I
do so by randomly drawing TFP, IST and additional shocks and then simulating
the time series in (1.15) from the policy rules of the model. For each sample type I
generate 10,000 repetitions and run the SVAR identified with long-run restrictions
on each of them. The results, shown in Appendix 1.7.5, are reassuring. For exam-
ple, the negative debt response generated from a collateral constraint model is fully
contained in the 68% confidence set across Monte Carlo repetitions.
Robustness checks. I explore robustness of the SVAR results along several di-
mensions. First, following Fisher (2006), I split the sample in the early 1980’s to
account for the change in the trend exhibited by the relative price of investment. In
the first part of the sample the shapes of the IRFs are preserved, while the bands
get wider. In the second part, the debt response to IST is again positive and sig-
nificant, but more hump-shaped rather than settling at a permanent level. Second,
I construct the business debt time series separately for loans and debt securities.
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This split reveals that the debt IRF in Figure 1.5 is mainly driven by loan dynamics,
while the response for debt securities is noisy, and even negative for the first three
quarters. Third, similar to many papers in the IST literature, I use the Gordon-
Violante-Cummins (GVC) relative equipment price series as opposed to the relative
NIPA deflator as an alternative measure of the relative price of equipment.61 The
results are very similar to the ones obtained using NIPA data. Finally, as the data
on investment deflator dynamics is subject to a few large spikes, I also adjust this
data for outliers as a robustness check. The IRFs get smaller in magnitude, but their
shapes and statistical significance is preserved.
1.4.3 Panel projections in firm-level US data
The SVAR results indicate that the earnings-based constraint is relevant for debt
fluctuations in the aggregate economy. The responses of aggregate earnings and cap-
ital are consistent with the model mechanism. In this subsection, I exploit micro-level
information on how firm borrowing is restricted to verify the proposed mechanism
more directly. I merge the Dealscan data set used in Section 1.2 with balance sheet
information from the Compustat Quarterly data base to obtain a firm panel that has
information on earnings-based covenants and collateral as well as on rich firm char-
acteristics. I regress firm-level borrowing on the macro investment shock obtained
from the SVAR. I obtain average IRFs across all firms, as well as heterogeneous IRFs
for different borrower types, allowing me to verify whether the suggested mechanism
is plausible in generated debt dynamics at the firm level.62
Panel setting and assumptions
I estimate the IRF of borrowing of firm i at horizon h to the investment shock by
running the linear regression
log(bi,t+h) = αh + βhuˆIST,t + γXi,t + γt+ ηi,t+h (1.16)
and obtaining estimates of βh, h = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,H. The right hand side variable uˆIST,t
denotes the time series of the identified exogenous investment shock from the SVAR
model above. Xi,t is a vector of controls. t is a linear time trend. This regression
is a panel version of the local projection method to estimate IRFs following Jordà
(2005). Equation (1.16) gives an average IRF across all firms in the panel. My
model predicts the response of debt to the investment shock in this regression to be
positive under an earnings-based constraint (βh > 0) and negative with a collateral
constraint (βh < 0).
61This series was originally constructed by Bob Gordon and extended by Cummins and Violante
(2002). See also DiCecio (2009) for details. Appendix 1.7.1 contains a figure comparing the long-run
trends and cyclical dynamics in the two relative investment prices.
62I also study the firm-level debt responses to a fall in the relative price of investment goods,
using an IV strategy in which the estimated investment shock serves as the instrument. This is in
the spirit of Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2017). Related studies on firm-level responses to macro
shocks are Bahaj, Foulis, Pinter, and Surico (2018) and Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel, and Surico (2018)
who focus on monetary policy.
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Given the information in the Dealscan data, I can interact the shock with dum-
mies that capture whether a firm is subject to earnings-based covenants or uses col-
lateralized loans, effectively obtaining heterogeneous IRFs across different borrower
types. This allows me to verify the proposed theoretical mechanism more directly.
Formally,
log(bi,t+h) = αh + βhuˆIST,t + γXi,t
+ βearnh 1i,t,earn × uˆIST,t + αearnh 1i,t,earn
+ βcollh 1i,t,coll × uˆIST,t + αcollh 1i,t,coll + γt+ ηi,t+h,
(1.17)
where 1i,t,earn and 1i,t,coll are dummy variables that capture whether the firm is
subject to earnings-related covenants or uses collateral. Their data counterparts are
discussed further below. The interactions with these dummy variables allow me to
estimate heterogeneous IRFs for four different firm groups. In particular, the IRF of
an “earnings only” (“collateral only”) borrower at horizon h is given by the sum of
the coefficients βh and βearnh (βh and β
coll
h ). My theoretical mechanism predicts that
βh + β
earn
h > 0 and βh + β
coll
h < 0.
An alternative version of (1.17) based on an IV strategy is provided in Appendix
1.7.6. The idea is to study the responses to a fall in the relative price of investment
goods, instrumented by the exogenous investment shock, rather than considering the
direct responses to the shock itself. The corresponding results are presented in the
same appendix and are discussed below.
Data and specification used for panel regressions
The Dealscan-Compustat merge is enabled by a link file connecting the identifiers
in the two data sets, which has been created by Michael Roberts and collaborators
(see Chava and Roberts, 2008).63 The final data set I use covers around 150,000
firm-quarter observations for more than 4,000 distinct firms from 1994 to 2015. bi,t
is the quarterly level of debt liabilities from Compustat (calculated as the sum of
the items ‘dltq’ and ‘dlccq’). Consistent with the data treatment in the SVAR, I
obtain a real series by deflating with the consumption deflator for nondurable goods
and services. The firm-level classification into “earnings borrowers” and “collateral
borrowers” based on the information in Dealscan is consistent with the aggregate
shares I present in Figure 1.1. 1i,t,earn is equal to 1 if a given firm issues a loan with
at least one earnings covenant. 1i,t,coll is equal to 1 if the debt issued by the firm
is secured by specific assets (see the explanations provided in Section 1.2). As an
alternative, I also construct a version of 1i,t,coll based on whether the firm uses a
secured revolving line of credit.64 Summary statistics for the full data sample and
conditional on the first grouping are provided in Appendix 1.7.1.
63I am extremely grateful to these authors for publicly providing this link. More details about
the construction of the merged data set can be found in Appendix 1.7.1.
64This follows Lian and Ma (2018), who point out that secured “revolvers” are typically asset-
based.
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I focus on the version of uˆIST,t estimated using long-run restrictions in Section
1.4.1. To the extent that my identification in the SVAR is credible, this shock is a
purely exogenous regressor, meaning that there are no endogeneity issues in (1.16).
Clearly, however, the dummy interactions to generate heterogeneous responses in
equation (1.17) are a cause for concern. There may be omitted variables that affect
both the left hand side and the endogenous selection of borrowers into a particular
type. I address this problem by controlling for omitted characteristics that may
simultaneously be driving debt responses to investment shocks and selection into
borrower types. Specifically, I use a specification with 3-digit industry-level fixed
effects and firm size, as well as firm-level real sales growth to control for firm-specific
cyclical conditions. In an alternative specification I also introduce firm-level fixed
effects. In all versions of (1.16) and (1.17) that I estimate, I include one lag of the
left hand side variable and a linear time trend to the regression. Furthermore, I
add a control variable that is intended to capture macroeconomic shocks other than
investment shocks, which I construct from the SVAR residuals.65 I set H = 12, and
keep the firm composition constant when expanding h, that is, I restrict the analysis
to firms where debt information is available for the current and 12 quarters ahead.
It should be emphasized that while Compustat is an actual panel, the loan is-
suance information from Dealscan is “sparse” in the sense that firms only have an
issuance that is captured in this data every other quarter. Many firms appear only
a few times during the sample period, while their total debt liabilities are continu-
ously recorded in Compustat. This has two consequences. First, using any Dealscan
information at time t means that the sample to estimate (1.17) is restricted to those
firms that have a loan issuance captured by the Dealscan data in period t, which
reduces the sample relative to the one I can use to estimate (1.16). Second, this
also implies that the sample used to estimate (1.17) is restricted to firms that issue
any debt to begin with. While I address the endogenous selection into debt types, I
cannot address the endogenous extensive margin selection into being a borrower.
1.4.4 Firm-level results: heterogeneous responses to investment
shocks
I first present the average debt response across all firm in the panel, that is, the
estimates of βh in (1.16) across horizons, together with the associated 90% bands.
I cluster standard errors at the 3-digit industry level to allow for correlation in the
residuals across firms within the same industry. In this regression I do not add
any controls other than lags of the left-hand-side variable, a time trend and the
exogenous shock itself. Figure 1.7 shows that the dynamic response of firm debt
to an investment shock is positive, in line with the aggregate debt response in the
SVAR, and consistent with the model in which the earnings-based constraint is the
relevant debt limit. It matches the SVAR responses also in terms of the magnitude
65I use the reduced form residuals of the debt equation in (1.14) and orthogonalize them with
respect to the structural IST shock. The resulting series captures innovations to aggregate debt
that are unrelated to IST.
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and persistence. This is reassuring, since Compustat-Dealscan firms are a specific
subset of the total US nonfinancial business sector for which I use data in the SVAR.
Figure 1.7: empirical firm-level irf of debt to an investment shock
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Note: The figure plots the average IRF of firm debt to a macro investment shock across individual
firms, estimated using the method of Jordà (2005) in a panel data context, as formulated by equation
(1.16). The macro shock has been identified using the SVAR model in the previous section, based
on long-run restrictions following Fisher (2006). The data set used is a merge of Dealscan loan-level
information with balance sheet variables from the Compustat quarterly data base. The IRF is
shown in percent. 90% bands are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry
level. The figure shows that the debt IRF matches the one of aggregate debt in SVAR model and is
in line with the predictions arising from an earnings-based borrowing constraint in the theoretical
macro model.
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Figure 1.8: firm-level irfs of debt to ist shock for different borrower types
(a) Using collateral classification based on specific assets
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(b) Using collateral classification based on secured revolvers
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Note: The figure displays average IRFs of firm borrowing within different firm groups, estimated
using the method of Jordà (2005) in a panel context, as formulated by equation (1.17). In both
panels, the debt IRF for borrowers with earnings covenants and no collateral (left) and borrowers
without earnings covenants but with collateral (right) are plotted. The results are based on a
specification with detailed firm-level controls (3-digit industry fixed effects, size as measured by
number of employees, growth of real sales and other macroeconomic shocks). Panel (a) uses the
collateral classification based on whether a loan is backed by specific assets or not (see details in
Section 1.2). Panel (b) uses an alternative grouping where secured revolvers are categorized as
collateralized debt (see Lian and Ma, 2018). The investment shock is identified using the SVAR
model in the previous section, based on long-run restrictions following Fisher (2006). The data set
used is a merge of Dealscan loan-level information, with balance sheet variables from the Compustat
quarterly data base. 90% bands are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry
level. The IRFs shown in the figure are consistent with the model’s prediction of a positive debt
response under an earnings-based constraint and a negative one under a collateral constraint. A
formal test rejects the null hypothesis of equal responses across the two firm types for various
horizons, as shown in Table 1.12 in the Appendix. The results for alternative specifications, as well
as the responses for the remaining two borrower types are given in Appendix 1.7.6.
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The heterogeneous IRFs based on estimating equation (1.16) are presented in
Figure 1.8. These results are based on a specification with 3-digit industry fixed ef-
fects, size as measured by number of employees and growth of real sales. As discussed
above, I also control for other macroeconomic shocks. Panel (a) shows the results
where the classification of collateralized debt is based on whether a given firm’s bor-
rowing is secured with specific assets (see Section 1.2 for details). Panel (b) shows
the results using the alternative classification of asset-based debt based on whether
a firm uses secured revolvers (see Lian and Ma, 2018). Again, I plot 90% error bands
based on standard errors that are clustered at the 3-digit industry level. The bands
across all four figures are wider than in Figure 1.7 due to the lower number of ob-
servations when using 1i,t,earn and 1i,t,coll in the regression. Both panels of Figure
1.8 show that the IRF of debt to an investment shock is positive for firms that are
subject to earnings-related loan covenants, but negative for firms that borrow against
collateral. This confirms the key prediction of the model, as presented in Panel (b)
of Figure 1.2. Interestingly, while the shape of the IRF for earnings-borrowers is sim-
ilar to the model prediction – small on impact and then increasing persistently – the
IRF of collateral borrowers differs from its model counterpart. Similar to the model
prediction, the response on impact in Panel (a) is significantly negative. However it
then rises and is again significantly negative after around 2 years. This may be due
to the fact that one aspect of the theoretical mechanism I propose – the assumption
that dynamics of new and already installed capital prices are the same – is not borne
out by the data. Empirically, the relative price effect at the heart of my mechanism
may not be strong enough to generate a negative effect for collateral borrowers that
is as sizable as in the model. Reassuringly, the null hypothesis of an equal response
across the two borrower is rejected over several horizons at the 5% level. This is not
directly visible in Figure 1.8, but is formally presented in Table 1.12 in the Appendix.
Appendix 1.7.6 presents a host of additional results based on alternative vari-
ations of equation (1.17). First, I estimate the IRF to a fall in the relative price
of equipment investment, instrumented by the investment shock (rather than the
response to the investment shock directly). Second, the results for a specification
based on firm fixed effects are presented. Finally, the appendix also shows the IRFs
of Figure 1.8 for the two additional groups, which are firms subject to both earnings
covenants and collateral, as well as firms that are subject to neither. Qualitatively,
these results look very similar to the ones presented above. The exception is the firm
fixed effect specification, where the debt response of collateral borrowers is flat and
the response of earnings borrowers is positive in just one out of the two classifications.
1.4.5 Take-away: empirics in line with earnings-based constraint
The proposed model mechanism allows to distinguish between alternative borrowing
constraints based on credit dynamics arising from investment shocks. In an econ-
omy in which firms are borrowing constrained, a boom driven by an expansionary
shock which suppresses capital prices, debt levels rise in the presence of an earnings-
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based constraint, but not if capital serves as collateral. The empirical responses of
debt to investment shocks in macroeconomic data, shown above, indicate that the
relevant one for US aggregate corporate debt dynamics is such an earnings-based con-
straint. Moreover, heterogeneous firm-level responses are in line with the mechanism:
earnings-based borrowers increase their debt liabilities in response to an aggregate
investment shock, firms subject to collateral constraints do not.
1.5 Earnings-based borrowing in a quantitative macro
model
This section extends the model of Section 1.3 to incorporate features of a New Keyne-
sian quantitative macro model. Specifically, I add a number of shocks and frictions,
such as price and wage rigidities to feature alongside borrowing constraints. I es-
timate the model on US time series to let the data speak about the importance of
earnings-based borrowing relative to borrowing against collateral, and also relative
to other frictions in the economy. This analysis goes beyond the focus on qualitative
responses, which has guided my analysis above.
1.5.1 Setup of the quantitative model
The model is a New Keynesian DSGE model in the spirit of Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). These models have become the
workhorse model in central banks, perhaps due to their appealing philosophy: in
order to gauge the overall effect of any macroeconomic policy change, this policy
needs to be assessed net of other important forces that operate across parts of the
economy.66 For the purpose of adding borrowing constraints, I build on a variation of
the Smets and Wouters (2007) model suggested by Jermann and Quadrini (2012).67
The details of the model are provided in Appendix 1.7.7, in what follows I elaborate
mainly on the borrowing constraints.
While in Section 1.3 I study alternative model calibrations in which either the
earnings-based or the collateral constraint is binding, I now move to a formulation
where both constraints are present simultaneously and where the estimation of the
model can attribute a different relative importance to either constraint. Specifically,
there is a continuum of firms which have access to a nominal risk-free bond that is
constrained by a weighting between an earnings-based and a collateral component
(in real terms). The interest rates paid on the debt is subject to a tax advantage of
66For recent discussions, see for example Galí (2018) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt
(2018).
67The quantitative model of Jermann and Quadrini (2012) differs from Smets and Wouters (2007)
in the following ways. Firms rather than households own and accumulate capital. Nominal rigidities
arise because firms face Rotemberg price adjustment costs rather than Calvo pricing. The monetary
policy maker targets output deviations from steady state rather than from the natural level. The
exogenous disturbances do not feature moving average terms. Finally, firms have access to debt
and receive a tax advantage on debt. I also add some corrections to the model that were suggested
by Pfeifer (2016).
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the type in equation (1.7). The constraint of firm i reads
bi,t
Pt(1 + rt)
≤ ωθpi,tpii,t + (1− ω)θk,tEtpkt+1(1− δ)ki,t. (1.18)
ω captures the relative weight on the earnings-based component in firm borrowing.
The θ terms are subject to shocks to financial conditions. I choose the formulation
of (1.18) as a reduced form way to capture that, in the aggregate, either constraint
type will contribute to the dynamics to a certain degree. Using a weighting has the
advantage that this degree can be captured directly by one single parameter without
requiring important modifications of the model with respect to an otherwise relative
standard New Keynesian structure. I estimate this parameter together with the
other structural parameters of the model.
1.5.2 Data and estimation settings for quantitative model
For the estimation of the model I retrieve quarterly data for the 7 observables used by
Smets and Wouters (2007) (output, consumption, investment, employment, interest
rates, wages and inflation) and add the change in nonfinancial sector debt from the
flow of funds, scaled by output, as an eighth observable. Consistent with the previous
sections of this paper, my data treatment captures explicitly the variation in the
relative prices between consumption and investment goods: I obtain real variables by
deflating with the consumption deflator of nondurables and services. This is a similar
treatment to the one in Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). Following the
same authors, the sample period for the baseline estimation is 1954:Q3 - 2009:Q1.
Details on the data used for estimation are provided in Appendix 1.7.1.
I estimate the model with Bayesian methods, combining the likelihood of the
model with prior information on the parameters.68 I calibrate the means of θpi,t and
θk,t in the same way as in Section 1.3. For ω I specify a uniform prior between 0
and 1.69 For comparability to previous studies, I otherwise estimate the same set
of parameters as Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and use identical priors. I obtain
1,000,000 draws from a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm and discard the first
20% and use the remaining ones to compute posteriors.
1.5.3 Estimation results: the quantitative role of earnings-based
debt
I analyze the role of earnings-based borrowing constraints in the estimated New Key-
nesian model from a number of angles. Specifically, I present the posterior estimate
68An and Schorfheide (2007) provide a survey on Bayesian techniques to estimate DSGE models.
For a recent exploration of the sensitivity of these methods to misspecification, see Den Haan and
Drechsel (2018).
69While of course there is prior information available on the shares of earnings based borrowing
and debt secured with specific assets – including the evidence shown in the previous parts of this
paper – I impose the uniform prior in order to use the model as a separate device to the assign
the relative quantitative importance to the constraint components purely based on the information
contained in macroeconomic data.
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of the weight on the earnings-based component in the constraint, characterize the
debt responses to investment and other shocks in different model counterfactuals, and
analyze to what degree the different shocks in the model contribute to the variation
in the data. In the subsection that follows I turn to studying policy.
The estimated weight on earnings-based debt. Panel (a) of Figure 1.9 plots
the prior and posterior density of ω. A value of 0 implies a model with only a col-
lateral constraint, while 1 implies the presence of only an earnings-based constraint.
The figure shows that while the prior assigns an equal importance to any weight,
the posterior density implies a clear tilt towards the earnings constraint with a mean
estimate of ω = 0.90. This finding provides additional evidence that the dynamics
in US data, now interpreted through the lens of a richer model structure, favor the
earnings-based constraint. The results also highlight that the collateral component
remains a feature of the model, although with a much lower weight.70
Figure 1.9: properties of the estimated quantitative model
(a) Weight on earnings-based component
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Note: Panel (a) presents the prior and posterior density (grey and black solid lines, respectively)
over values of ω, as estimated in the quantitative New Keynesian model on US data. An estimate
of 0 implies a model with only a collateral constraint, while an estimate of 1 implies a model with
only an earnings-based constraint. See equation (1.18). Panel (b) shows the IRFs to a permanent
investment shock, calculated at the posterior means of the estimated model (dotted black line) and
for counterfactual models in which the weight of the earnings-based constraint is set to 1 (dark blue
line) and 0 (light orange line), but all other parameters are kept at their estimated values. Debt
refers to the level of real debt liabilities.
Panel (b) presents the IRFs of real debt liabilities to a permanent positive invest-
ment shock, calculated at the posterior means of the estimated model (dotted black
line). The chart also contains corresponding IRFs in counterfactual models in which
the weight of the earnings-based constraint is set to 1 (dark blue line) and 0 (light
orange line), while the other parameters are kept at their posterior mean estimates.71
70Table 1.13 in the Appendix presents the priors and posterior estimates of all estimated param-
eters.
71Full re-estimation of the other parameters does not change the chart qualitatively, so I stick to
presenting this simpler counterfactual experiment. In Section 1.5.4, when focusing on policy shocks,
I fully re-estimate all model parameters across the counterfactuals.
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In line with the insights of Section 1.3, permanent investment shocks lead to a per-
sistent increase in debt, fostered by a rise in earnings. A pure collateral constrained
model would predict a fall in debt, due to the lower value of collateral in equilibrium.
The mechanism that is at the heart of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 thus remains intact also
when a variety of other frictions are present alongside the borrowing constraint.
Figure 1.10: debt irf to additional shocks across model counterfactuals
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Note: The figure shows the IRFs of firm real debt liabilities to a preference shock (Panel a) and
a price markup shock (Panel b). In both cases, the IRFs are calculated at the posterior means
of the estimated model (dotted black line) and for counterfactual models which are the weight of
the earnings-based constraint is set to 1 (dark blue line) and 0 (light orange line), but all other
parameters are kept at their estimated values.
Additional sign differences in debt responses. Figure 1.10 plots the IRFs of
firm debt to other selected shocks in the New Keynesian model. Panel (a) presents the
responses to a preference shock (an exogenous increase in the household’s marginal
utility), while Panel (b) shows those for a price markup shock. Again, both charts
display the IRF calculated at the posterior means of the estimated model (thick black
line) together with corresponding IRFs in counterfactual models in which ω = 1 and
ω = 0 (dark blue and light orange lines, respectively). The figure shows that the
two alternative borrowing constraints imply opposite signs of the responses of debt
also for additional shocks in the model. This is because, similar to the investment
shock, both shocks raise earnings but suppress the value of capital. The intuition
for the preference shock is that the relative marginal utility between today and
tomorrow is raised by the shock. Firms, acting on behalf of the household, cut
back on investment, shift resources to the present and pay out dividends. Earnings
rise and the capital stock next period is reduced. The intuition for the markup
shock is that it allows firms to cut back on production inputs, reducing capital, but
simultaneously realize higher profits due to the higher markup. In both cases, the
response of the pure earnings-based constraint model lie close to the model in which
the weighting between the two components is estimated. This is intuitive, since the
posterior estimate of ω is close to, but not equal to, 1.
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Variance decomposition of observables. Table 1.3 presents the forecast error
variance decomposition of the variables that are used as observables to estimate the
model (Table 1.15 in the Appendix shows the corresponding decomposition for a
model without any borrowing constraints). This decomposition shows the relative
importance that the model attributes to different structural shocks in driving a given
observable. For example, according to the model markup shocks to prices and wages
are an important driver of inflation dynamics, while consumption growth dynamics
are importantly affected by shocks to intertemporal preferences. One observation
that stands out in the table is the overall importance of investment shocks. Con-
sistent with similar findings in the literature, the investment margin appears to be
crucial for capturing variation in US macroeconomic data (see in particular Jus-
tiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010, 2011). This lends further support to my
approach of using this shock in the context of studying which type of corporate bor-
rowing constraints are in line with credit dynamics at the macro and micro level.
Table 1.3: variance decomposition of observables in quantitative model (%)
TFP Inv Pref Price Wage Gov Mon Fin
Output growth 4.74 53.47 11.7 5.86 2.49 13.09 6.16 2.48
Consumption growth 5.53 5.02 82.81 1.39 1.21 0.02 4.01 0
Investment growth 2.52 86.81 0.25 2.69 2.61 0 5.09 0.03
Inflation 13.07 13.87 4.97 43.48 18.73 0.83 4.98 0.05
Interest rate 4.11 11.94 3.07 16.47 8.12 0.56 55.72 0.01
Employment growth 29.64 39.72 7.27 1.54 3.73 11.12 5.92 1.06
Wage growth 14.21 2.45 2.02 23.86 57.33 0.02 0.08 0.03
Debt issuance 1.13 4.75 0.74 1.65 0.56 0.69 1.14 89.35
Note: Infinite horizon forecast error variance decomposition of the observables used for the estima-
tion of the model. The decompositions are calculated at the estimated posterior means. Each row
presents the decomposition for a given observable, columns correspond to different structural shocks
that feature in the model: TFP-Total productivity shock; Inv-Investment shock; Pref-Preference
shock; Price-Price markup shock; Wage-Wage markup shock; Gov-Government spending shock;
Mon-Monetary policy shock; Fin-Financial shock. Appendix 1.7.7 contains details on the model
and specification of the structural shocks.
1.5.4 Counterfactual dynamics for policy shocks
So far my analysis has primarily focused on the dynamics of firm debt to distin-
guish the role of different borrowing constraints. Figure 1.11 turns to studying the
responses of other macroeconomic variables and examines the consequences of the
earnings-based constraint for the overall transmission of shocks in the economy. To
illustrate the role of the constraints in the quantitative model, I focus on policy
shocks. Panel (a) shows the responses to an expansionary fiscal shock, that is, an
exogenous increase in government spending. Panel (b) focuses on a contractionary
monetary shock, an exogenous increase in the interest rate. In each case I plot the
IRFs of the estimated model, calculated at the posterior means as the thick black
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Figure 1.11: policy shocks in counterfactual estimated models
(a) Selected IRFs to an expansionary government spending shock across models
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(b) Selected IRFs to a contractionary monetary policy shock across models
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Note: The figure shows the IRFs of selected economic variables to a fiscal policy shock (Panel a)
and a monetary policy shock (Panel b). In both panels, the IRFs are calculated at the posterior
means of the estimated model (dotted black line) and for counterfactual models in which the weight
of the earnings-based constraint is set to 1 (dark blue line) and 0 (light orange line), and the other
structural parameters are re-estimated. In panel (a), the shock size and persistence to create the
IRFs is the same across models. In Panel (b) the size of the shock is adjusted to give the same
interest rate response on impact.
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line, together with IRFs from counterfactual models based on setting ω = 1 (dark
blue line) and ω = 0 (light orange line), and re-estimating the other parameters of
the model.72 For studying policy, this is my preferred type of counterfactual, as I
want to characterize hypothetical situations in which a policy maker would only have
one or the other model at her disposal.
The figure demonstrates that a policy maker would reach different conclusions
across estimated models with alternative borrowing constraints. The presence of
earnings-based debt alters the transmission of both fiscal and monetary shocks. In
the case of fiscal policy, the intuition is as follows. The spending shock gives rise to
temporarily higher demand for the consumption good produced by the firm, which
raises earnings and gives an incentive for bringing resources to the presence. Un-
der the earnings-based constraint this incentive is strong enough to crowd out in-
vestment. As debt access is determined by earnings, firms borrow more. With a
collateral constraint, investment has the additional benefit of building collateral, so
firms respond by raising investment and the crowding-out effect disappears. This
response is not strong enough to offset the tightening constraint from the fall in the
value of capital and the firm reduces its debt position. In net terms, the crowding
out of investment dampens the overall stimulus from the spending shock with an
earnings constraint. Despite the reduced debt space with the collateral constraint,
the stimulus is stronger. Most of the IRFs from the model with both components lie
between the other two.
In the case of the monetary shock, the counterfactual estimations show that
the earnings-based constraint implies a stronger inflation response and a somewhat
stronger but less persistent output response than the collateral constraint. While
there are no differences in the sign of any of the responses across models, a com-
parison of the estimated parameter values of the different models reveals that this
is driven by the fact that a model with only an earnings-based constraint implies a
relatively low degree of price rigidity relative to the pure collateral model.73 This
finding demonstrates that the specification of the borrowing constraint interacts with
other frictions of the model, which highlights that the specification of firm borrow-
ing constraints is crucial for drawing conclusions from a quantitative macro model.
Finally, in the case of the monetary shock it is noteworthy that the IRFs of the base-
line model, which features both an earnings and collateral component, are generally
closer to the ones stemming from the pure collateral constraint model. This is due
to the fact that in the re-estimation of the counterfactual models both the dynamics
in response to shocks as well as their relative contribution change. This means that
any individual IRF of the model with both components does not necessarily lie in
72When calculating the IRFs to the fiscal shock, I use the persistence and standard deviations of
the disturbances that are implied by the baseline model to ensure comparability. In the case of the
monetary shock, I rescale the size of the shock to give the same interest rate response.
73Table 1.13 in the appendix shows the priors and posteriors of the model with both components.
The model is estimated with a high degree of price adjustment costs, which is driven by the col-
lateral component. The pure collateral constraint is also associated with a high degree of dividend
adjustment costs, while, interestingly, estimated investment adjustment costs are similar across the
counterfactuals.
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between the two counterfactual models. In fact, the presence of the earnings-based
constraint makes the responses to monetary shocks stronger, but the implied model
assigns a lower importance to monetary policy shocks for US business cycles.
1.6 Conclusion
Capturing the relation between credit and economic activity is crucial for under-
standing macroeconomic fluctuations. This paper emphasizes the fact that firms’
borrowing capacity is tightly connected to their earnings flows, as current earnings
are subject to scrutiny by lenders. Grounded on microeconomic evidence on this
link, I propose a debt limit that restricts borrowing to a multiple of earnings. The
predictions of a business cycle model which features this earnings-based borrowing
constraint are in line with both aggregate and cross-sectional credit dynamics in US
data. Furthermore, the constraint plays a key role in drawing quantitative conclu-
sions about the transmission of shocks in the economy.
To the extent that debt-to-earnings ratios are targeted in macroprudential reg-
ulation, the insights provided in this paper encourage further research to improve
policies targeted at firms in credit slumps. Moreover, obtaining a deeper understand-
ing of the cross-sectional heterogeneity that determines the specific conditions under
which companies borrow, as well as the potential interaction between different types
of credit constraints faced by firms over the business cycle are promising subjects for
future research in the field of macro-finance.
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1.7 Appendices
1.7.1 Details on the data
This appendix provides details on the data sources used across all sections of the
paper. First, Section 1.7.1 describes the Thomson Reuters LPC Dealscan data base
and presents summary statistics. This data set is used for the motivational evidence
in Section 1.2 of the main text, as well as some of the model calibrations in Section
1.3. Second, the merged data set consisting of the Dealscan data, together with
quarterly balance sheet information from Compustat is explained in Section 1.7.1.
This data is used in Section 1.4.3 of the main paper, for the local projections of the
investment shock in panel data. Third, the construction of the time series data used
for the estimation of the SVAR in Section 1.4.1 and the estimation of the quantitative
model in Section 1.5 is laid out in Section 1.7.1.
Thomson Reuters LPC Dealscan data set
LPC Dealscan is a detailed loan-level data base provided by Thomson Reuters. The
data was retrieved in March 2017 through the LSE Library Services and consists
of a full cut of the entire data base provided by Thomson Reuters as of October
2015. The data covers around 75% of the total US commercial loan market (see
Chava and Roberts, 2008). The unit of observation is a loan deal, sometimes called
loan package, which can consist of several loan facilities. As explained in the main
text, rich information is provided both and the deal and facility level. Note that the
information is collected at the time of origination but is then not followed over time,
so that the data can be thought of as a large cross section with different origination
dates.
Data coverage. The raw data set retrieved contains 214,203 deals with 307,660
facilities for 78,646 unique borrowers globally. For the main sample considered in
the text I choose loan packages in which the lender is a US nonfinancial Corporation
(excluding SIC codes 6000-6999) and the debt is US Dollar denominated. Following
Chava and Roberts (2008), I start the sample with loans originated in 1994. These
choices result in a sample of 54,400 packages, 83,290 facilities and 15,358 unique
borrowing corporations. The number of deals per borrower ranges from 1 to 41, with
on average 7.35 deals per borrower. Figure 1.12 summarizes the number of deals,
facilities and borrowers split up by origination time.
Summary statistics. Tables 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 provide further descriptive in-
formation on the data for the sample described above. Table 1.4 provides summary
statistics on the size of both deals and facilities and of the maturity of the loans,
which is available at the facility level. As the table shows loans reach from single
digit million amounts up to the size of a few billion dollars. Facility amounts are
smaller on average, which is true by construction since a deal consists of at least one
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facility. The maturity of a facility is on average between 4 and 5 years (52 months).
1.5 shows the coverage of the data across industries. Table 1.6 lists the ten most
frequently stated loan purpose, which is provided at the deal level. This information
is available for every deal in the sample (no missing fields), although it is apparent
that the number one category “corporate purpose” is relatively unspecific. Table 1.7
lists the most common asset types of collateral pledged in secured loan facilities.
Figure 1.12: coverage of dealscan sample by origination date
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Note: The figure plots the number of loan deals (or packages), loan facilities and borrowing cor-
porations for the sample used in the main analysis of the paper, broken down by origination date
since 1994. The sample covers USD denominated debt for US nonfinancial corporations.
Table 1.4: summary statistics for dealscan data
Deal amount Facility amount Facility maturity Interest rate
(mio 2009 USD) (mio 2009 USD) (months) (drawn spread)
Mean 418.2 273.2 52 259
Std. deviation 1002.1 683.1 27 166
1st percentile 2.5 1.3 5 20
10th percentile 23.7 10.4 12 65
25th percentile 60.0 29.9 36 150
Median 151.2 92.2 60 250
75th percentile 395.8 257.4 60 330
90th percentile 951.1 619.4 84 450
99th percentile 4144.2 2750.0 120 830
Observations 54,397 83,288 76,205 70,282
Note: Summary statistics for Dealscan loan sample used for the main analysis in the paper. Real
values were obtained using the US business deflator with base year 2009. The interest rate in the
all-in spread for drawn facilities, expressed as a spread over LIBOR in basis points. Changes in the
number of observation result from missing fields.
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Table 1.5: industry coverage in dealscan data
Industry No of firms No of loan deals Amount borrowed
Consumer Nondurables 1,120 4,420 1.83
Consumer Durables 424 1,738 0.80
Manufacturing 1,741 7,036 2.52
Oil, Gas, and Coal 805 3,479 1.78
Chemicals 382 1,699 0.91
Business Equipment 1,503 4,718 1.76
Telephone and TV 795 2,755 2.21
Utilities 767 3,964 2.27
Wholesale, Retail 2,216 8,579 2.83
Healthcare 1,003 3,469 1.65
Other 3,311 10,982 3.93
No SIC code available 1,290 1,560 0.25
Note: Industries are based on the Fama-French 12 Industry Classification. Finance and Utilities
have been excluded. The amount borrowed is in trillions of 2009 real USD.
Table 1.6: frequency of stated deal purpose in dealscan data
Share Share
Deal purpose (equal-weighted) (value-weighted)
Corporate purposes 46.7% 44.0%
Working capital 12.3% 7.6%
Debt Repayment 11.9% 9.6%
Takeover 6.3% 13.8%
Acquisition line 5.3% 4.2%
LBO 4.4% 4.9%
CP backup 3.8% 8.1%
Dividend Recap 1.4% 1.1%
Real estate 1.3% 0.3%
Debtor-in-possession 1.0% 0.5%
Note: The table shows the ten most frequently stated "deal purposes". This information is available
at the deal level for all 50,437 observations in the US sample. The first column calculates the
frequency by firm, the second one by (real) USD.
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Table 1.7: most frequently pledged assets in secured loans in dealscan data
Collateral type Number of loan facilities Volume in bn USD
Property & Equipment 2292 353
Accounts Receivable and Inventory 1801 332
Intangibles 1367 238
Cash and Marketable Securities 989 328
Real Estate 737 142
Ownership of Options/Warrants 104 19
Patents 84 12
Plant 50 12
Agency Guarantee 25 6
Note: The numbers in this table are calculated by restricting Dealscan facilities to secured facilities
and then calculating the frequencies of different security types. The table focuses on specific asset
categories, i.e. excludes the categories “unknown”, “all”, and “other”. According to Lian and Ma
(2018), facilities secured by all assets (excluded in this table), can generally be classified as cash-flow
based loans, as the value of this form of collateral in the event of bankruptcy is calculated based on
the cash flow value from continuing operations. The key function of having security is to establish
priority in bankruptcy.
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Merged Dealscan-Compustata panel data set
Compustat Northamerica Quarterly. This data set provides accounting data
for publicly held companies in the US and Canada at quarterly frequency starting
in 1960. The data was accessed through the Upenn Whartson Research Data Ser-
vices (WRDS) in September 2016. I keep firms incorporated in the United States
with positive assets and sales and exclude Financials (SIC codes 6000-6999). In
addition, I generally exclude the sector of ’unclassifiable’ firms (SIC codes starting
with 99), since this sector contains very few large holding firms, which are typically
financial firms (e.g. Berkshire Hathaway). Finally I drop firms that are present less
than 5 years. These sample restrictions are typically made in papers that focus on
nonfinancial Compustat firms (see for example Bates et al., 2009).
Merge of Dealscan with Compustat. As described in the text, I use Michael
Roberts’ identifier link, which is available on Michael Roberts’ personal website and
which is infrequently updated. See also Chava and Roberts (2008). The version of
the link file which I retrieved is the April 2018 version. I drop firms from Compustat
that do not appear at least once in the Dealscan data and restrict the sample to the
period covered by the link file. I deseasonalise the variables I use from Compustat
by regressing them on quarter-dummies before using them in the actual regressions.
The resulting merged data set covers more than 150,000 firm-quarter observations
for more than 4,000 distinct firms from 1994 to 2015.
Summary statistics for the merged data set. Table 1.8 provides summary
statistics for the firms in the full Compustat-Dealscan panel, which is constructed as
described above, and used to estimate equation (1.16). Table 1.9 presents the corre-
sponding information for firms based on the baseline classification used in equation
(1.17). Note that since firms can have several loan issuances, a given firm may appear
in several panels of the table. For a given time period in the estimation of (1.17),
the grouping is mutually exclusive.
Table 1.8: summary statistics for full compustat-dealscan panel
Firm-qrt obs Mean SD Min Median Max
Real total assets (bn 2009 USD) 153,554 4.6 16.2 0.0 0.8 542.7
Real sales (bn 2009 USD) 153,554 1.0 3.7 0.0 0.2 124.3
Real sales growth (percent) 149,049 3.4 16.6 -27.6 1.9 43.3
Employment (thousands) 136,575 14.3 53.5 0.0 2.8 2200.0
Real debt liabilities (bn 2009 USD) 153,554 1.4 6.4 0.0 0.2 339.6
Cash ratio 153,543 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9
Market-to-book ratio 140,325 1.8 1.8 0.5 1.4 45.0
Book leverage (broad) 153,543 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.3
Book leverage (narrow) 153,543 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.9
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Table 1.9: summary statistics for subgroups in compustat-dealscan panel
Firm-qrt obs Mean SD Min Median Max
Panel (a): Borrowers taking at least one loan with earnings covenants only (N = 1, 721)
Real total assets (bn 2009 USD) 46,680 5.4 17.2 0.0 1.6 455.6
Real sales (bn 2009 USD) 46,680 1.1 2.7 0.0 0.4 55.0
Real sales growth (percent) 46,044 4.9 16.3 -27.6 2.8 43.3
Employment (thousands) 43,164 17.7 40.8 0.0 5.4 707.9
Real debt liabilities (bn 2009 USD) 46,680 1.8 6.1 0.0 0.4 251.9
Cash ratio 46,668 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9
Market-to-book ratio 43,848 1.7 1.0 0.5 1.5 16.8
Book leverage (broad) 46,668 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.3
Book leverage (narrow) 46,668 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.9
Panel (b): Borrowers taking at least one loan with specific collateral only (N = 1, 470)
Real total assets (bn 2009 USD) 28,128 3.5 10.2 0.0 0.6 192.8
Real sales (bn 2009 USD) 28,128 0.8 3.0 0.0 0.1 86.3
Real sales growth (percent) 26,652 4.7 17.6 -27.6 2.8 43.3
Employment (thousands) 25,860 12.5 52.6 0.0 2.1 1900.0
Real debt liabilities (bn 2009 USD) 28,128 1.5 4.4 0.0 0.2 131.1
Cash ratio 28,128 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9
Market-to-book ratio 25,428 1.7 1.5 0.5 1.3 45.0
Book leverage (broad) 28,128 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.7 1.3
Book leverage (narrow) 28,128 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.9
Penal (c): Borrowers taking at least one loan with both (N = 1, 855)
Real total assets (bn 2009 USD) 44,124 2.2 9.8 0.0 0.6 513.3
Real sales (bn 2009 USD) 44,124 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.1 51.9
Real sales growth (percent) 42,864 6.0 17.8 -27.6 3.5 43.3
Employment (thousands) 41,652 9.2 24.0 0.0 2.6 355.0
Real debt liabilities (bn 2009 USD) 44,124 1.0 5.6 0.0 0.2 307.5
Cash ratio 44,124 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9
Market-to-book ratio 40,764 1.6 0.9 0.5 1.3 12.0
Book leverage (broad) 44,124 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.3
Book leverage (narrow) 44,124 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.9
Panel (d): Borrowers taking at least one loan without either (N = 844)
Real total assets (bn 2009 USD) 20,424 12.8 26.4 0.0 4.2 375.8
Real sales (bn 2009 USD) 20,424 2.6 5.6 0.0 0.7 66.0
Real sales growth (percent) 20,040 4.7 17.8 -27.6 2.7 43.3
Employment (thousands) 14,724 39.4 83.9 0.0 10.3 1383.0
Real debt liabilities (bn 2009 USD) 20,424 3.8 10.2 0.0 1.2 216.3
Cash ratio 20,424 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9
Market-to-book ratio 18,048 1.7 1.0 0.5 1.4 12.7
Book leverage (broad) 20,424 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.6 1.3
Book leverage (narrow) 20,424 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.9
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US aggregate time series data
Data sources. The aggregate time series data used for the SVAR analysis and the
estimation of the quantitative model come from a number of sources, including the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the US Financial
Accounts provided by the Federal Reserve (also known as Flow of Funds). I retrieved
these series using FRED and the data download program of the US Financial Ac-
counts. In the treatment of relative prices in both panels, I closely follow Fisher
(2006) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). The selection of variables
for the New Keynesian model is the same as Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Table
1.10 lists the time series and their construction, together with the specific identifiers.
Details on the earnings measure. To calculate an aggregate corporate earn-
ings/profit measure, I use the item ‘FA146110005.Q: Income before taxes’ for the
nonfinancial business sector, available from the table F.102 in the US Financial Ac-
counts. I cross-checked the cyclical properties of this series with the ‘ebitda’ item
from Compustat and found it to be relatively similar, see Figure 1.13 below:
Figure 1.13: us financial accounts vs compustat
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
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3.5
4
Business Sector Earnings (US Financial Accounts)
Compustat Total Quarterly EBITDA
Note: The figure shows a comparison of earnings measures from the US financial accounts and
Compustat Quarterly. Both series are normalized to 1 in 1984:Q1. The Compustat series is not
seasonally adjusted.
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Table 1.10: Details on aggregate time series data
Panel (a): Data used in estimation of SVAR
Variable Series sources and construction Transform
Relative price of investment Implicit price deflator of nonresidential fixed equipment investment (FRED: Y033RD3Q086SBEA), deflated with
implicit price deflator of personal consumption expenditures of nondurable goods and services (FRED: CONSDEF)
log diff
Relative price of investment
(alternative measure)
See DiCecio (2009) for details (FRED: PERIC) log diff
Labor productivity Nominal business sector value added (FRED: A195RC1Q027SBEA), deflated with consumption deflator (see
above), divided by hours worked (see below)
logdiff
Hours worked Hours of all persons in the nonfarm business sector (FRED: HOANBS) log
Business sector earnings Sum of nominal income before taxes in the nonfinancial noncorporate sector (USFA: FA146110005.Q) and
corporate profits before tax excluding IVA and CCAdj (USFA: FA146110005.Q), deflated with consumption
deflator (see above)
logdiff
Level of the capital stock Constructed from capital expenditures in the nonfinancial business sector (USFA: FA145050005.Q) minus
depreciation (consumption of fixed capital in the nonfinancial business sector, USFA: FA106300083.Q), valued at
the relative price of investment (see above)
logdiff
Business sector debt Level of debt securities and loans in the nonfinancial bussiness sector (constructed from USFA: FA104122005.Q
and FA144123005.Q), deflated with consumption deflator (see above)
logdiff
Panel (b): Data used in estimation of New Keynesian model
Variable Series sources and construction Transform
Output Nominal GDP (FRED: GDP), divided by population (FRED: B230RC0Q173SBEA), deflated with consumption
deflator (see above)
logdiff
Consumption Real consumption expenditures of nondurable goods and services (FRED: PCNDGC96 and PCESVC96), divided
by population (see above)
logdiff
Investment Sum of nominal gross private domestic investment expditures (FRED: GPDI) and nominal private consumption
expenditures on durable goods (FRED: PCDG), divided by population (see above), deflated with consumption
deflator (see above)
logdiff
Hours worked See above logdiff
Real wage Nominal compensation per hour in the nonform business sector (FRED: COMPNFB), deflated with consumption
deflator (see above)
logdiff
Inflation Percentage change in consumption deflator (see above) none
Interest rate Nominal effective Federal Funds Rate (FRED: FEDFUNDS) none
Debt issuance / output Change in level of business sector debt (sum of USFA: FA104122005.Q and FA144123005.Q), divided by real
output (see above)
none
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Details on relative equipment prices. Figure 1.14 compares the two alternative
measures used for the relative price of equipment investment. The first is the one
based on NIPA data, constructed as the ratio between the equipment investment
deflator and the deflator of consumption on nondurables and services. The second
one is the Gordon-Violante-Cummins (GVC) relative equipment price, see Cummins
and Violante (2002) and DiCecio (2009). Panel (a) plots the evolution in the level
and Panel (b) plots the quarterly growth rates. More details can be found in Table
1.10.
Figure 1.14: measures of the relative equipment price
(a) Levels (1982:Q3 = 100)
(b) Growth rates (annualized %)
Note: Panel (a) plots the evolution in the level and Panel (b) the quarterly growth rates of the two
alternative measures used for the relative price of equipment. The solid dark blue line shows the
one constructed from NIPA deflators and the dashed light blue one the Gordon-Violante-Cummins
(GVC) relative equipment price, see Cummins and Violante (2002) and DiCecio (2009). Table 1.10
contains additional details.
Table 1.11 reports the results from an augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) test on the
two alternative equipment price series plotted in Figure 1.14. The test is specified
as in Gali (1996). The model under the null has a unit root, the alternative is the
same model with drift and deterministic trend. The lag order is 4. Consistent with
the assumptions required by the SVAR identification scheme, the test fails to reject
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a unit root in the level, but rejects a unit root in after first-differencing for both
alternative measures.
Table 1.11: results of unit root tests on equipment price series
Test statistic 5% critical value Reject?
NIPA levels -3.34 -3.43 No
NIPA first differences -5.40 -3.43 Yes
GVC levels -0.15 -3.43 No
GVC first differences -6.99 -3.43 Yes
Note: Unit root test on alternative equipment price series in levels and first differences. See Table
1.10 for details on the series. Following Gali (1996) the table reports the relevant t-statistics for
the null hypothesis of a unit root in the level and the first difference of each time series, based on
an augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) test with 4 lags, intercept and time trend.
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1.7.2 Additional evidence
Figure 1.15: the importance of earnings-based and asset-based debt (equal-weighted
shares)
(a) Frequencies of covenants and secured loans
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(b) Covenants within (un)collateralized loans
Loans with collateral Other loans
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Note: The figure repeats Figure 1.1 of the main text for equal-weighted rather than value-weighted
shares. Panel (a) displays the shares of loan deals that contain covenants (left bar) and are se-
cured/unsecured (right bar). In the left bar, the dark blue area represents the share with at least
one earnings-based covenant. The light blue area covers loans with covenants unrelated to earnings.
In the right bar, the different orange shades capture loans secured with specific assets (dark), other
secured loans (medium) and unsecured loans (light). In both bars, loans without the relevant infor-
mation are represented by the white area. Panel (b) repeats the left column of Panel (a), but breaks
down the sample into loans secured with specific assets and other loans (with any information on
secured/unsecured). The sample used for both panels consists of loan deals issued between 1994
and 2015 by US nonfinancial corporations.
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1.7.3 Discussion of microfoundation
The two borrowing constraints introduced in Section 1.3 of the text are exogenously
imposed on the firm. This appendix discusses a formal rationalization of these con-
straints. I lay out a setting in which the constraints are derived as the solution to
an enforcement limitation, in which borrower and lender predict the renegociation
outcomes in the event of a default. The appendix also provides a further discus-
sion of the potential frictions underlying the earnings-based constraint, by giving a
summary of the literature on the microfoundations of loan covenants and presenting
additional details on regulatory requirement in relation to earnings covenants.
A formal rationalization of the alternative borrowing constraints
Collateral constraint. I begin with this constraint, as it is more familiar in the
literature. Consider the firm as described in the text and the first type of debt it
has access to. Suppose that at the end of period t, when all transactions have been
settled, the firm can default on its debt liabilities, which at this point amount to
bk,t
1+rk,t
. In the absence of any punishment, the firm would have an advantage from
doing this, as the repayment of bk,t would not reduce resources in its flow of dividends
constraint (1.4) next period.
Suppose the legal environment surrounding this type of debt is such that in the
event of default the lender can address a court which grants it the right to seize the
firm’s collateral at the beginning of t + 1. The lender will be able to re-sell this
collateral after depreciation at market prices, but incur a transaction cost which is
a fraction (1 − θk) of the resale value of capital. Hence, instead of having bk,t1+rk,t on
the asset side of her balance sheet at the end of the period, the lender now has a
legal claim on selling the asset tomorrow, which is valued as θkEtpk,t+1(1− δ)kt. If
the collateral is seized by the lender, the firm is required to stop operating.
Suppose that before going to the next period, lender and borrower are able to
renegotiate. The borrower can offer a settlement payment sk,t to the lender, in
combination with a promise to repay the amount of liabilities she has defaulted on.
Any settlement amount that the lender would agree to needs to satisfy
sk,t +
bk,t
1 + rk,t
≥ θkEtpk,t+1(1− δ)kt. (1.19)
Now, for the firm to never choose to default, the value of operating in absence
of default must exceed the value of the firm after successful renegotiation. In other
words, as long as the required settlement payment is positive, the predicted outcome
of renegotiation is such that the firm would never choose to default. Formally, from
combining this non-negativity condition with (1.19), we obtain
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sk,t ≥ 0 (1.20)
θkEtpk,t+1(1− δ)kt − bk,t
1 + rk,t
≥ 0, (1.21)
which can be rearranged to equation (1.9) in the text.
Earnings-based constraint. Suppose that for the second debt type the environ-
ment is such that when the firm defaults on its liabilities bpi,t1+rpi,t at the end of t+ 1,
the court grants the lender the right to seize ownership of the entire firm. She can
then either operate the firm herself or sell it on the market. Importantly, however,
the lender is uncertain about the value of the firm in this case. Denote V˜ endd,t the end-
of-period value of the firm after ownership rights have been transferred to the lender.
In order to determine this uncertain value, the lender uses the common practice of
valuation by multiples.74 Specifically, she evaluates firm ownership after default by
using fixed multiple of the last available realization of a fundamental profitability
indicator, EBITDA. Formally,
V˜ endd,t ≈ θpipit. (1.22)
In this case, the required settlement amount in the renegotiation process needs
to satisfy
spi,t ≥ 0 (1.23)
θpipit − bk,t
1 + rk,t
≥ 0. (1.24)
The last inequality can be arranged to (1.8) in the text.
Remarks. As shown above, both collateral and earnings-based borrowing con-
straint can arise in a world of limited enforcement. Specifically, they can be derived
from a situation in which lenders and borrowers predict the outcome of a renegotia-
tion process that would be triggered in the event of default. Based on the predicted
outcomes of this renegotiation, the firm will not choose to default, but borrowing is
subject to the respective limit on the debt liabilities.
In the setting laid out, the underlying contractual frictions behind equations (1.8)
and (1.9) differ as follows. In the case of the earnings-based constraint, there is an
informational friction regarding the contingent firm value. The transfer of ownership
rights is not accompanied by a transaction cost, but by uncertainty that surrounds
the value of the firm after ownership rights have been transferred. In the case of
collateral, there is a rational prediction of the resale value, but a transaction cost
needs to be incurred.
74For a textbook treatment, see Damodaran (2012).
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Further discussion of the flow-based constraint
Microfoundation of loan covenants in the literature. Since I empirically
motivated the earnings-based constraint based on the presence of loan covenants,
studying the academic literature that has studied these covenants lets us get a sense
of how researchers conceptualize earnings-based constraints at a micro level. As
I stress in Section 1.2 of the text, however, covenants are one but not the only
mechanism through which current earnings flows feed back to the ability to issues
debt.
The literature on loan covenants can broadly be distinguished between two strands.
The first are empirical papers that investigate covenants and their economic effects
in firm-level data. This includes the papers that I have cited in Section 1.2 of the
text. Key references are for example Chava and Roberts (2008), Roberts and Sufi
(2009a) and Bradley and Roberts (2015). These papers do not provide a fully fledged
theoretical rationalization of why loans contain covenants, but mostly take them as
a given empirical phenomenon and test their effects in the data. Nevertheless these
papers typically do provide some remarks on the rationale for covenants to guide
their analysis. The second strand is theoretical work in the (incomplete) contracts
literature that directly addresses the microfoundation of covenants. This literature
builds on seminal work of Aghion and Bolton (1992) and goes back at least to Jensen
and Meckling (1976). One example that directly studies the contractual design of
covenants is Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009).
Both streams of work have generally highlighted moral hazard issues. A compact
description is provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). According to the authors a
key rationale for covenants is the allocation of contingent control rights over the firm.
Adding covenants to a contract provide debt holders with the option to intervene in
the companies management. In the same spirit, Dichev and Skinner (2002) refer to
covenants as “trip wires”. Such a contingent transfer of control rights provides an
additional incentive to management behavior that is in line with the debt holders’
objectives. While in my macro model these moral hazard problems are not explicitly
present, the formal rationalization above has shown that is possible to generate the
constraint from an enforcement issue. Furthermore, the earnings-based constraint
introduces an important feedback between firms’ earnings and their ability to borrow.
The fact that the covenants literature finds large economic effects of covenants (and
their breaches) on the borrowing firm suggests that such a feedback is a plausible
empirical pattern.
Regulation. As mentioned in the main text, an alternative way to think about
the earnings-based constraint is the presence of regulation that lenders, in particular
banks, are subject to. For example, regulators in the US define “leveraged trans-
actions”, among other criteria, based on the debt-to-EBITDA ratio of borrowers.75
75See for example the US Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending (2013), available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1303a1.pdf. Similar definitions can be
found in EU regulations.
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Whether transactions are defined in this way in turn affects risk-weights and hedging
requirements for lenders.
In the case of mortgages, regulatory requirements on income flows have been
highlighted by Greenwald (2017), who also studies collateral (loan-to-value) and
flow-related (payment-to-income) constraints. He imposes the two borrowing con-
straints household debt and refers to them as “institutional rules that are not the
outcome of any formal optimization problem”. Given that both collateral and the
debt-to-EBITDA ratio also feature in the regulation of lenders that provide fund to
nonfinancial firms, an alternative way to think about equations (1.8) and (1.9) is
that they are the outcome regulation rather than an underlying contracting frictions
that lender and borrowing need to overcome.
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1.7.4 Details on the model of Section 1.3
Firm optimality conditions
The firm’s optimality conditions with respect to nt, bk,t, bpi,t and kt and it are derived
as follows76
Fn,t = wt (1.25)
Rk,tEt
{
Λt+1
Λt
}
+ µk,t
Rk,t
1 + rk,t
= 1, (1.26)
Rpi,tEt
{
Λt+1
Λt
}
+ µpi,t
Rpi,t
1 + rpi,t
= 1, (1.27)
Qt = Et
{
Λt+1
Λt
[(1− δ)Qt+1 + Fk,t+1 + µpi,t+1θpiFk,t+1] + µk,tθk(1− δ)pk,t+1
}
(1.28)
Qtvt[(1− Φt)− Φ1,tit] + Et
{
Λt+1
Λt
Qt+1vt+1Φ−1,t+1it+1
}
= 1 (1.29)
where Fn,t and Fk,t denote the marginal products of labor and capital, respectively.
The Lagrange multipliers on the borrowing constraints (1.8) and (1.9) are denoted by
µpi,t and µk,t, respectively. Qt is the Lagrange multiplier on the capital accumulation
equation (1.3) and defines the market value of the capital stock (see Hayashi, 1982).
As is typical in models with adjustment costs, its dynamics are characterized by the
first order condition of investment, equation (1.29). In this equation Φ1,t and Φ−1,t+1
denote the partial derivatives of Φt
(
it
it−1
)
and Φt+1
(
it+1
it
)
to it, respectively. The
capital price pk,t that is relevant in the collateral constraint is given by (1.10) in the
main text.
Household, government, and definition of equilibrium
Household problem
The household’s objective is to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, nt), (1.30)
subject to the budget constraint
ct +
bpi,t
1 + rpi,t
+
bk,t
1 + rk,t
+ ptst + Tt = wtnt + bpi,t−1 + bk,t−1 + st−1(dt + pt). (1.31)
Equity shares in the firm are denoted by st and evaluated at price pt. Tt is a lump
sum tax. I specify preferences using a log-log utility function in consumption and
leisure
u(ct, nt) = log(ct) + χ log(1− nt), (1.32)
76For ease of notation I focus on the case without dividend adjustment costs (ψ = 0).
67
where χ governs the relative utility of leisure. The household takes rk,t, rpi,t, pt and
wt as given when maximizing her objective.
Household optimality conditions. The household’s optimality conditions with
respect to nt, bk,t, bpi,t and st are
uctwt + unt = 0 (1.33)
uct = β(1 + rk,t)Etuct+1 (1.34)
uct = β(1 + rpi,t)Etuct+1 (1.35)
uctpt = βEt(dt+1 + pt+1)uct+1 , (1.36)
where uct and unt denote marginal utility of consumption and labor, respectively.
Government
The lump sum tax Tt is required to finance the tax advantage of debt that is
given to the firm, which amounts to the difference between debt issued (valued at
R−1j,t ) and debt received (valued at (1 + rj,t)
−1) for both debt types j ∈ {k, pi}. In
principle this lump sum tax could be levied on the firm as well, which would not alter
the results. For simplicity I assume that the government does not save or borrow.
Taken together, budget balance requires
Tt =
bk,t
Rk,t
− bk,t
(1 + rk,t)
+
bpi,t
Rpi,t
− bpi,t
(1 + rpi,t)
. (1.37)
Equilibrium
I collect the exogenous states of the model in the vector xt = (zt, vt, φt)′. These
variables are assumed to follow a stochastic process of the form xt+1 = Axt + ut,
which will be specified in the parameterization section below. The endogenous
states of the model are kt−1, bk,t−1 and bpi,t−1. A dynamic competitive equilib-
rium is then defined as a set of quantities {dt, nt, bk,t, bpi,t, kt, ct, st, Tt}∞t=0 and prices
{wt, Qt, pk,t, Rk,t, Rpi,t, rk,t, rpi,t, µk,t, µpi,t,Λt}∞t=0 such that:
1. dt, nt, bk,t, bpi,t and kt solve the firm’s maximization problem specified above
2. ct, nt, bk,t, bpi,t and st solve the household’s maximization problem specified
above
3. The household owns the firm: Λt = βtuct and st = 1
4. The government’s budget constraint holds
5. The exogenous disturbances follow xt+1 = Axt + ut
6. Markets clear
The equilibrium admits a recursive formulation, to which the solution is a set of
policy functions that map state variables into endogenous controls. Section 1.7.4 of
this appendix contains details on the calculation of the model’s steady state. I solve
for the policy functions with standard first-order perturbation techniques.
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Specification of stochastic processes
The stochastic processes underlying the exogenous disturbances are defined as
log(zt) = (1− ρz)log(z) + ρzlog(zt−1) + uz,t (1.38)
log(vt) = (1− ρv)log(v) + ρvlog(vt−1) + uv,t (1.39)
log(φt) = (1− ρφ)log(φ) + ρφlog(φt−1) + uφ,t (1.40)
where the structural shocks {uz,t, uv,t, uφ,t} are uncorrelated, iid, mean zero, normally
distributed random variables with standard deviations {σz, σv, σφ}.
Sketch of analytical calculation of the steady state
To compute the steady state of the model, I proceed as follows:
1. Drop time subscripts, obtain a system in steady state variables.
2. Steady state must fulfill rj = (1 − β)/β, Rj = 1 + r(1 − τj) and µj = (1 +
rf )(1/Rj − β) from bond Euler equations for firm and household, that is,
equations (1.26), (1.27), (1.34) and (1.35).
3. Steady state must fulfill Q = 1
4. Solve (1.28) for the steady state capital-labor ratio as a function of model
primitives.
5. Calculate steady state wage rate w from (1.25) using steady state capital-labor
ratio.
6. Combine the capital-labor ratio, the wage rate, (1.33) and the resource con-
straint to calculate n as a function of model primitives.
7. Recover k from the definition of the capital-labor ratio.
8. The calculation of the remaining variables is straightforward.
To match steady state moments, I run a minimization routine over the above steps,
where the objective to be minimized is the Euclidean distance between model mo-
ments from their empirical targets.
Note that to allow for adjustment cost shocks I introduce a small alteration to the
model in which steady adjustment are non-zero. In particular I define
Φt
(
it
it−1
)
=
φt
2
(
it
it−1
− ι
)2
,
and set ι to 0.999.
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IRF comparison with moving average earnings-based constraint
Figure 1.16: model irfs of debt: modified earnings-based constraint
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Note: This figure repeats Figure 1.2 for a formulation of the earnings-based constraint in which
current and three lags of earnings enter in equation (1.8). It displays the IRFs of firm debt to
different shocks generated from the model, under the two alternative calibrations in which only the
(in this case modified) earnings-based constraint (dark blue line) or only the collateral constraint
(light orange line) is present. Panel (a) show the debt IRF to a positive TFP shock and Panel (b) to
a positive investment shock. The structural parameters to generate these IRFs are shown in Table
1.2. I set ρz = ρv = 1, and σz = σv = 0.05.
Figure 1.17: model irfs to investment margin shocks: modified earnings-based con-
straint
(a) Persistent adjustment cost shock
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(b) Persistent investment shock with φ = 0
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Note: This figure repeats Figure 1.3 for a formulation of the earnings-based constraint in which
current and three lags of earnings enter in equation (1.8). It displays IRFs of firm debt to different
shocks generated from the model, under the two alternative calibrations in which only the (in this
case modified) earnings-based constraint (dark blue line) or only the collateral constraint (light
orange line) is present. Panel (a) plots the IRFs to an adjustment costs shock with ρφ = 0.5 and
σφ = 0.5. Panel (b) repeats the investment shock IRFs from Figure 1.2 without the presence of
investment adjustment costs (φ = 0).
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Model IRFs of additional variables
Figure 1.18: irfs to permanent tfp shock
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Figure 1.19: irfs to permanent investment shock
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1.7.5 Additional results for SVAR
IRFs to TFP shock
Figure 1.20: svar irfs to positive tfp shock identified with lr restrictions
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Note: The figure displays the IRFs to a TFP shock identified from an estimated SVAR model using
US data. The identification scheme relies on long-run restrictions following Fisher (2006). The
responses are shown for all six variables included in the system, in percent. The unit of the shock is
one standard deviation. The sample period used for estimation is 1952:Q2 to 2016:Q4. 68% error
bands are calculated using bootstrap techniques. This shock is identified using the same estimation
procedure and identification scheme as the investment shock in the main text, but is not used to
verify predictions from the theoretical macro model.
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IRFs using medium-term restrictions
Figure 1.21: svar irfs to investment shock identified with mr restrictions
(a) Identification based on 5-year horizon
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(b) Identification based on 10-year horizon
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Note: The figure has the same scope as Figure 1.5 in the main text but uses a different identification
scheme. This scheme is based on the method suggested by Barsky and Sims (2012). Panel (a) shows
the results for a 5-year horizon (h = 20) and Panel (b) for a 10-year horizon (h = 40). In both
cases, the responses are shown for all six variables included in the system, in percent. The unit of
the shock is one standard deviation. The sample period used for estimation is 1952:Q2 to 2016:Q4.
68% error bands are calculated using bootstrap techniques. The figure shows a positive response
of debt to an investment shock, which is in line with the predictions arising from a earnings-based
borrowing constraint in the theoretical macro model.
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Historical decompositions for other variables
Figure 1.22: svar: historical variance decompositions
(a) Investment price
(b) Labor productivity
(c) Hours worked
Note: Historical variance decomposition of variables as estimated by the SVAR model. The black
line is the actual (detrended) data series. The bars indicate the contribution of different structural
shocks to the variance of the respective observable as estimated by the SVAR model. The dark blue
bars represent investment shocks, the light blue ones TFP shocks, and the contribution of shocks
that remain unidentified are shown by the wight bars. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
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Figure 1.23: svar: historical variance decompositions
(a) Business earnings
(b) Capital stock
Note: Historical variance decomposition of variables as estimated by the SVAR model. The black
line is the actual (detrended) data series. The bars indicate the contribution of different structural
shocks to the variance of the respective observable as estimated by the SVAR model. The dark blue
bars represent investment shocks, the light blue ones TFP shocks, and the contribution of shocks
that remain unidentified are shown by the wight bars. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions.
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SVAR IRFs using simulated data
This appendix presents the results of a Monte Carlo exercise, which I set up as
follows. I generate simulated data from the model in Section 1.3 and estimate the
SVAR on this data. I repeatedly create two types of data samples, each generated
from one of the two alternative borrowing constraint specifications (Panel (b) vs.
Panel (c) in Table 1.2). I do so by randomly generating the time series in (1.15) from
the model’s solution. Specifically, I randomly draw permanent investment shocks,
permanent TFP shocks, stationary government spending shocks (all with the same
variance), and then plug them into the linearized policy rules of the model to generate
observables. I then add iid measurement error to all series, calibrated to be 5% of
the size of the structural shocks. For each sample type I generate 10,000 repetitions
and run a SVAR identified with long-run restrictions on each of these samples. The
identification procedure is carried out as described in the main text.
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 1.24. Panel (a) plots the IRFs
from estimations on samples generated with the earnings-based constraint, Panel (b)
the equivalent with the collateral constraint. Each subpanel shows the mean (dashed
line) and and 68% confidence sets (light blue area) across Monte Carlo repetitions.
The figure shows that the direction of the debt IRF implied by the model is correctly
picked up by the SVAR on average. Interestingly, while the negative debt response
arising from the collateral constraint is estimated to be statistically significant, the
positive one implied by the earnings constraint model is imprecisely estimated.
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Figure 1.24: svar irfs using simulated data
(a) SVAR IRFs to IST shock - Underlying data simulated with earnings-based constraint
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(b) SVAR IRFs to IST shock - Underlying data simulated with collateral constraint
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Note: The figure plots IRFs from an SVAR model estimated on data that is repeatedly simulated
from the model in Section 1.3. Panel (a) uses the data generated with an earnings-based constraint,
Panel (b) with a collateral constraint. In both cases, the data is generated from TFP shocks,
investment shocks, an additional stationary demand shock. Normal iid measurement error is added
to all series. 68% significance sets and means across 10,000 Monte Carlo repetitions are shown.
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1.7.6 Additional results for firm-level projections
This appendix presents additional results on the estimation of equation (1.17) in
Section 1.4.3 of the main text. Section 1.7.6 of the appendix reports the coefficient
estimates of the difference between earnings and collateral borrowers’ debt IRFs,
which serves as a formal test of the difference between the IRFs shown in Figure 1.8.
Section 1.7.6 shows the results of Figure 1.8 for an alternative specification in which
I estimate the IRF to a fall in the relative price of equipment investment, instru-
mented by the investment shock (rather than the debt response to the investment
shock directly). Section 1.7.6 contains the results for a firm fixed effects regression
specification. In Section 1.7.6, the main results displayed in Figure 1.8 are shown
also for the two additional groups, which are firms subject to both covenants and
collateral, as well as firms that are subject to neither.
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Significance of the difference between heterogeneous IRFs
Table 1.12: estimates of the difference between irf coefficients
Classification based Classification based
on specific assets on secured revolvers
βearn0 − βcoll0 0.0328 -0.0029
(0.0213) (0.0248)
βearn1 − βcoll1 0.0308 0.0004
(0.0318) (0.0285)
βearn2 − βcoll2 0.0340 0.0162
(0.0282) (0.0307)
βearn3 − βcoll3 0.0511 0.0511
(0.0334) (0.0365)
βearn4 − βcoll4 0.0600* 0.0464
(0.0345) (0.0404)
βearn5 − βcoll5 0.0491 0.0384
(0.0331) (0.0370)
βearn6 − βcoll6 0.0581* 0.0400
(0.0351) (0.0395)
βearn7 − βcoll7 0.0688* 0.0642*
(0.0353) (0.0356)
βearn8 − βcoll8 0.0865** 0.0813**
(0.0355) (0.0358)
βearn9 − βcoll9 0.0810** 0.0725*
(0.0389) (0.0386)
βearn10 − βcoll10 0.0773* 0.0624
(0.0406) (0.0403)
βearn11 − βcoll11 0.0927** 0.0893**
(0.0420) (0.0432)
βearn12 − βcoll12 0.0690 0.0658
(0.0433) (0.0442)
Note: The table shows estimates of the difference between the IRF of earnings borrowers and
collateral borrowers as estimated by equation (1.17) in the main text. The left column shows these
estimates for the specification corresponding to Panel (a) of Figure 1.8 and the right column for
Panel (b). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
79
IV strategy
The results presented here study the responses of firm debt to a fall in the relative
price of investment goods, instrumented by the exogenous investment shock, rather
than considering the direct responses to the shock itself, as formulated by equation
(1.17) and presented in the main text. To this end, equation (1.17) from the main
text is modified to
log(bi,t+h) = αh + βhpk,t + γXi,t
+ βearnh 1i,t,earn × pk,t + αearnh 1i,t,earn
+ βcollh 1i,t,coll × pk,t + αcollh 1i,t,coll + γt+ ηi,t+h,
(1.41)
where pk,t is defined as in Section 1.4.1. Equation (1.41) is then estimated by using
uˆIST,t as an IV for pk,t.77 The results for this specification, presented analogous to
Figure 1.8, are shown in Figure 1.25 below. They paint a very similar picture to
the results in the main text. The responses are smaller in magnitude, and standard
errors are lower relative to when the shock is used as a regressor directly.
77See Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2017) for a similar approach in different context.
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Figure 1.25: firm-level irfs to fall in investment price, ist shock as iv
(a) Using collateral classification based on specific assets
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(b) Using collateral classification based on secured revolvers
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Note: This figure repeats Figure 1.8 from the text but instead plots the IRFs to a fall in the relative
price of investment, instrumented with the investment shock, see equation (1.25) above. In both
panels of the figure, the debt IRF for borrowers with earnings covenants and no collateral (left) and
borrowers without earnings covenants but with collateral (right) are plotted. The results are based
on a specification with detailed firm-level controls (3-digit industry fixed effects, size as measured
by number of employees, growth of real sales and other macroeconomic shocks). Panel (a) uses
the collateral classification based on whether a loan is backed by specific assets or not (see details
in Section 1.2). Panel (b) uses an alternative grouping where secured revolvers are categorized as
collateralized debt (see Lian and Ma, 2018). The investment shock is identified using the SVAR
model in the previous section, based on long-run restrictions following Fisher (2006). The data set
used is a merge of Dealscan loan-level information, with balance sheet variables from the Compustat
quarterly data base. 90% bands are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry
level. The IRFs shown in the figure are consistent with the model’s prediction of a positive debt
response under an earnings-based constraint and a negative one under a collateral constraint.
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Results for specification with firm fixed effects
Figure 1.26: firm-level irfs investment shock: firm fixed effects specification
(a) Using collateral classification based on specific assets
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(b) Using collateral classification based on secured revolvers
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Note: This figure repeats Figure 1.8 from the text for a regression specification with firm-fixed
effects. The figure displays average IRFs of firm borrowing for different firm groups, estimated
using the method of Jordà (2005) in a panel data context, see equation (1.17). In both panels of the
figure, the debt IRF for borrowers with earnings covenants and no collateral (left) and borrowers
without earnings covenants but with collateral (right) are plotted. Panel (a) uses the collateral
classification based on whether a loan is backed by specific assets or not (see details in Section 1.2).
Panel (b) uses an alternative grouping where secured revolvers are categorized as collateralized debt
(see Lian and Ma, 2018). The investment shock is identified using the SVAR model in the previous
section, based on long-run restrictions following Fisher (2006). The data set used is a merge of
Dealscan loan-level information, with balance sheet variables from the Compustat quarterly data
base. 90% bands are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level. The
IRFs shown in the figure are consistent with the model’s prediction of a positive debt response
under an earnings-based constraint and a negative one under a collateral constraint.
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Results for all four firm groups
Figure 1.27: irfs for all four categories: collateral classification based on specific
assets
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Note: This figure repeats Panel (a) of Figure 1.8 in the main text, and additionally plots the
IRFs of the remaining two firm groups: borrowers with both earnings covenants and collateral, and
borrowers with neither. The results are based on a specification with detailed firm-level controls (3-
digit industry fixed effects, size as measured by number of employees, growth of real sales and other
macroeconomic shocks). The investment shock is identified using the SVAR model in the previous
section, based on long-run restrictions following Fisher (2006). The data set used is a merge of
Dealscan loan-level information, with balance sheet variables from the Compustat quarterly data
base. 90% bands are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level.
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Figure 1.28: irfs for all four categories: collateral classification based on secured
revolvers
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Note: This figure repeats Panel (b) of Figure 1.8 in the main text, and additionally plots the
IRFs of the remaining two firm groups: borrowers with both earnings covenants and collateral, and
borrowers with neither. The results are based on a specification with detailed firm-level controls (3-
digit industry fixed effects, size as measured by number of employees, growth of real sales and other
macroeconomic shocks). The investment shock is identified using the SVAR model in the previous
section, based on long-run restrictions following Fisher (2006). The data set used is a merge of
Dealscan loan-level information, with balance sheet variables from the Compustat quarterly data
base. 90% bands are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 3-digit industry level.
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1.7.7 Details on the quantitative model of Section 1.5
Model setup
The model is a variant of the medium scale New Keynesian model introduced by
Smets and Wouters (2007), similar to Jermann and Quadrini (2012). The core of
the model is that of Section 1.3 but a variety of additional frictions are added.
Final good firm The final good firm produces a consumption good Yt using inputs
yi,t that are provided by intermediate producers. The production function is
Yt =
(ˆ 1
0
y
1
ηt
i,t di
)ηt
. (1.42)
ηt is a stochastic price markup disturbance. The final good is sold to households
at price Pt and intermediate inputs are purchased at price pi,t. The optimality
conditions of the final good firm can be written as
pi,t = PtY
ηt−1
ηt
t y
1−ηt
ηt
i,t (1.43)
which is the demand function that intermediate producers take as given, and inter-
mediate prices aggregate to the economy’s price level as Pt =
(´ 1
0 p
1
1−ηt
i,t di
)1−ηt
.
Intermediate goods firms There is a continuum of size 1 of firms, which produce
an intermediate good yi,t that is sold at price pi,t to a final good producer. The
production of intermediate goods is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function
yi,t = zt(ui,tki,t−1)αn1−αi,t , (1.44)
where TFP, zt, is common across firms and will be subject to stochastic shocks.
ki,t−1 is capital, which is owned and accumulated by firms and predetermined at the
beginning of the period. ui,t is the utilization rate of capital, which is an endogenous
choice taken subject to a cost to be specified further below. α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital
share in production. ni,t denotes labor used by firm i at the wage rate wi,t, which is
a composite of different labor types j that will be supplied by households:
ni,t =
(ˆ 1
0
n
1
ϑt
j,i,t dj
)ϑt
, (1.45)
where vt is stochastic shock that affects demand for labor. A firm’s period earnings
flow, or operational profits, is denoted as pii,t and defined as
pii,t ≡ yi,t − wi,tni,t. (1.46)
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As in the model in Section 1.3 the law of motion of capital is
ki,t = (1− δ)ki,t−1 + vt
[
1− φ
2
(
ii,t
ii,t−1
)2]
ii,t. (1.47)
MEI shocks enter via the disturbance vt. Note that in the quantitative application I
do not allow for shocks to φt for comparability with previous studies.
Firms take (1.43) as given given when setting their price. Combining this equa-
tion with the production function, the price can be written as a function of aggregate
variables and individual inputs, so that
pi,t = PtY
ηt−1
ηt
t
(
zt(ui,tki,t−1)αn1−αi,t
) 1−ηt
ηt . (1.48)
The capital utilization cost is specified as
Ξ(ut) = ξ1(u
1+ξ2
t − 1)/(1− ξ2) (1.49)
The parameter ξ1 is calibrated to generate steady state utilization of 1.
The firm sets prices subject to a Rotemberg adjustment cost. As discussed in
detail by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), this approach to generating price rigidities
– as opposed to, say Calvo pricing – substantially facilitates the aggregation of the
decision of individual firms when financial frictions are introduced.
Specifically, a firm that has previously set price pi,t−1 faces adjustment costs
Φ˜(pi,t−1, pi,t, Yt) =
φ˜
2
(
pi,t
pi,t−1
− 1
)2
Yt. (1.50)
The firm has access to debt, which is limited by weighting between an earnings-
based and a collateral component. The details of this constraints are given in the
main text, see the description of equation (1.18).
Firm maximization problem. The objective of firms is similar to what is de-
scried in equation (1.11) in the more stylized model of Section 1.3. In the New
Keynesian setting, firms maximize the flow of (nominal) dividends, discounted with
the household’s stochastic discount factor, subject the flow of dividends equation
(which now contains also price adjustment and utilization costs), the borrowing con-
straint (1.18), the law of motion of capital (1.47) and the demand function given by
(1.43). They now also choose their price pi,t and utilization rate ui,t, in addition to
di,t, ni,t, ii,t, ki,t, and bi,t.
Households There is a continuum of size 1 of households. Household j′s expected
lifetime utility is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
γtβ
t
(cj,t − hcj,t−1)1−σ
1− σ − χ
n
1+ 1

j,t
1 + 1
 (1.51)
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where γt is a preference disturbance and h captures external consumption habits.
The parameter  denotes the elasticity of labor supply. Households supply individual
labor types nj,t and charge wage rate wj,t. The budget constraint is
cj,t +
bj,t
1 + rt
+ pft sj,t + Tj,t +
ˆ
qω¯j,t+1aj,t+1dwj,t = wj,tnj,t + bj,t−1 +Ptdj,t + p
f
t sj,t−1.
(1.52)
aj,t+1 are holdings of state-contingent claims with which households can insure
against wage shocks. They are traded at price qwj,t+1. The notation in (1.52) is
otherwise similar as in the stylized mode of Section 1.3.
The demand for labor coming from the intermediate goods firms is given by
nj,t =
(
wj,t
Wt
)− ϑt
ϑt−1
nt, (1.53)
where Wt and nt are the aggregate wage and employment level, respectively. (1.53)
is taken as given by the household when choosing nj,t and wj,t.
Households face wage rigidities, which arise, in the spirit of Calvo, from the fact
that a given firm can only change their wage with probability (1 − ω¯). From the
optimization problem I derive a log-linear optimal wage equation. Given that all
households make the same choices, this implies a sluggish low of motion for the
aggregate wage rate Wt (for details, see Jermann and Quadrini, 2012).
Household’s optimality condition for bonds implies an Euler euqation in which
the real return (1+rt)
(
Pt
Pt+1
)
is priced with the stochastic discount factor SDFt,t+1 ≡
Λt+1
Λt
=
βγt+1uct+1
γtuct
, where u(·) denotes the period utility function in (1.51).
Government The government’s budget constraint, in nominal terms, reads
Tt =
bt
Rt
− bt
(1 + rt)
+ PtGt, (1.54)
where Tt are nominal lump sum taxes levied on households, the term btRt −
bk,t
(1+rk,t)
is the tax subsidy given to firms, and Gt is a real spending shock that follows an
exogenous stochastic process.
Monetary policy There is a Taylor rule specified as
1 + rt
1 + r¯
=
[
1 + rt−1
1 + r¯
]ρR [(pipt
p¯ip
)ν1 ( Yt
Yt−1
)ν2]1−ρR [ Yt/Y ∗t
Yt−1/Y ∗t−1
]ν3
ςt, (1.55)
such that interest rates react to deviations of inflation from steady state, output
growth, and output growth in deviations from it steady state.78 Note that I denote
inflation by pipt , not to be confused with firm profits pii,t. ρR > 0 captures interest
78See Jermann and Quadrini (2012) for more details.
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rate smoothing. ςt is a stochastic disturbance that captures monetary policy shocks.
Stochastic processes The model features eight structural disturbances, capturing
shocks to TFP, investment, preferences, price markups, wage markups, fiscal policy,
monetary policy and financial conditions. The follow autoregressive processes of
order one:
log(zt) = (1− ρz)log(z) + ρzlog(zt−1) + uz,t (1.56)
log(vt) = (1− ρv)log(v) + ρvlog(vt−1) + uv,t (1.57)
log(γt) = (1− ργ)log(γ) + ργlog(γt−1) + uγ,t (1.58)
log(ηt) = (1− ρη)log(η) + ρηlog(ηt−1) + uη,t (1.59)
log(ϑt) = (1− ρϑ)log(ϑ) + ρϑlog(ϑt−1) + uϑ,t (1.60)
log(gt) = (1− ρg)log(g) + ρglog(gt−1) + ug,t (1.61)
log(ςt) = (1− ρς)log(ς) + ρς log(ςt−1) + uς,t (1.62)
log(ξt) = (1− ρξ)log(ξ) + ρξlog(ξt−1) + uξ,t (1.63)
The error terms follow standard deviations {σz, σv, σγ , ση.σϑ, σG, σς , σξ} I normalize
z¯ = v¯ = γ¯ = ς¯ = ξ¯ = 1, calibrate g¯ to match the US purchases-to-output ratio, and
estimate η¯ and ϑ¯.
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Additional estimation results
Table 1.13: priors and posteriors from bayesian estimation
Prior shape Prior Mean Prior Std Post. mean 90% HPD interval
ω Uniform 0.5
√
12 0.8992 0.7968 1
φ˜ Inv-Gamma 0.1 0.3 23.433 19.7002 26.9731
σ Normal 1.5 0.37 1.6721 1.1921 2.1902
 Normal 2 0.75 1.6229 0.6464 2.5399
h Beta 0.5 0.15 0.9709 0.9615 0.981
ω¯ Beta 0.5 0.15 0.843 0.7718 0.9049
φ Inv-Gamma 0.1 0.3 5.7251 4.2177 7.4163
ψ Beta 0.5 0.15 0.4556 0.2548 0.658
κ Inv-Gamma 0.2 0.1 0.3395 0.2072 0.4685
ρR Beta 0.75 0.1 0.6434 0.5823 0.703
ν1 Normal 1.5 0.25 2.3287 1.9708 2.6836
ν2 Normal 0.12 0.05 -0.0487 -0.0862 -0.0117
ν3 Normal 0.12 0.05 0.2181 0.1536 0.2865
η¯ Beta 1.2 0.1 1.459 1.3817 1.5376
ϑ¯ Beta 1.2 0.1 1.1519 1.0229 1.2823
ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9903 0.9844 0.9967
ρgz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9328 0.8756 0.9908
ρv Beta 0.5 0.2 0.754 0.6814 0.8303
ργ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.3669 0.2594 0.4754
ρη Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8893 0.8407 0.9364
ρϑ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.3034 0.2215 0.3831
ρG Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9442 0.9084 0.9813
ρς Beta 0.5 0.2 0.4173 0.3167 0.5171
ρξ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9893 0.9821 0.9967
σz Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0073 0.0067 0.0079
σv Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.1343 0.0933 0.1754
σγ Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.247 0.1786 0.3092
ση Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0162 0.0133 0.0191
σϑ Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 1.3028 0.9642 1.5692
σG Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0176 0.0161 0.019
σς Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0094 0.0086 0.0102
σξ Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0395 0.0356 0.0434
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Table 1.14: priors and posteriors for model without borrowing constraint
Prior shape Prior Mean Prior Std Post. mean 90% HPD interval
φ˜ Inv-Gamma 0.1 0.3 7.083 6.26 7.9168
σ Normal 1.5 0.37 2.0603 1.7621 2.3992
 Normal 2 0.75 0.7779 0.6112 0.9231
h Beta 0.5 0.15 0.8091 0.7676 0.8505
ω¯ Beta 0.5 0.15 0.2911 0.199 0.424
φ Inv-Gamma 0.1 0.3 5.8699 5.0646 6.4816
ψ Beta 0.5 0.15 0.7283 0.625 0.8244
κ Inv-Gamma 0.2 0.1 0.8349 0.6237 1.0961
ρR Beta 0.75 0.1 0.654 0.6256 0.6834
ν1 Normal 1.5 0.25 3.0458 2.9881 3.0903
ν2 Normal 0.12 0.05 -0.0166 -0.0539 0.0156
ν3 Normal 0.12 0.05 0.1713 0.1063 0.2213
η¯ Beta 1.2 0.1 1.4217 1.3582 1.4741
ϑ¯ Beta 1.2 0.1 1.0774 1.0462 1.1093
ρz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.983 0.9749 0.9911
ρgz Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9509 0.9113 0.9928
ρv Beta 0.5 0.2 0.7128 0.6586 0.7668
ργ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8122 0.7699 0.8559
ρη Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9775 0.9606 0.9957
ρϑ Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9848 0.9734 0.9965
ρG Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9781 0.9612 0.996
ρς Beta 0.5 0.2 0.1896 0.1158 0.2653
σz Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0072 0.0067 0.0077
σv Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.1865 0.1709 0.2027
σγ Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0585 0.0505 0.0663
ση Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0113 0.01 0.0124
σϑ Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0628 0.0521 0.0727
σG Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0177 0.0162 0.0191
σς Inv-Gamma 0.001 0.05 0.0097 0.0088 0.0106
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Table 1.15: variance decomposition without borrowing constraints (%)
TFP Inv Pref Price Wage Gov Mon Fin
Output growth 11.9 27.4 1.5 11.7 33.1 10.2 4.2 -
Consumption growth 11.1 6.6 14.7 7.6 52.7 0.9 6.3 -
Investment growth 1.7 82.1 7.7 1.5 6.8 0.0 0.3 -
Inflation 12.4 12.1 34.2 17.5 9.8 0.3 13.7 -
Interest rate 6.0 18.2 38.9 8.2 6.9 0.5 21.3 -
Employment growth 25.7 25.3 0.6 3.4 33.0 9.3 2.8 -
Wage growth 27.4 3.2 5.4 55.3 6.2 0.1 2.4 -
Debt issuance 0.37 0.29 28.66 4.44 65.26 0.52 0.46 -
Note: Repeats Table 1.3 from the text, but for a version of the model that is re-estimated without
any borrowing constraints. In this model, debt is in zero net supply so debt issuance cannot be used
as an observable, so the financial shock is dropped. The table shows the infinite horizon forecast
error variance decomposition of the observables used for this model version. The decompositions
are calculated at the estimated posterior means. Each row presents the decomposition for a given
observable, columns correspond to different structural shocks that feature in the model: TFP-Total
productivity shock; Inv-Investment shock; Pref-Preference shock; Price-Price markup shock; Wage-
Wage markup shock; Gov-Government spending shock; Mon-Monetary policy shock; Fin-Financial
shock.
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Chapter 2
Commodity Booms and Busts in
Emerging Economies
2.1 Introduction
Emerging economies, particularly those that are dependent on commodity exports,
have a long history of volatile and disruptive economic cycles. A rich literature in
International Macroeconomics has proposed several explanations for these cycles,
pointing to different plausible triggers or underlying sources of shocks. The relative
importance of the various triggers, however, still divides the literature. Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) argue that the main source of fluctuations is nonstationary total
factor productivity (TFP) shocks - the cycle is the trend. García-Cicco et al. (2010)
refute the argument, showing that these shocks only explain a negligible fraction
of fluctuations. They contend that the main drivers of shocks are stationary TFP
shocks as well as exogenous shocks to the country’s interest rate. The latter result
relates to work by Guimaraes (2011), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Uribe and
Yue (2006), who highlight the role of changes in global interest rates as a potential
driver of the cycle. The role of commodity prices and, more generally, terms of trade,
has been equally divisive. Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002) argue that fluctuations
in the terms of trade explain a large fraction of the output variance. However, em-
pirical work by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017) has raised questions on the ability
of terms of trade to match critical features of business cycles in emerging economies.
Interestingly, though, estimates by Fernández et al. (2017) suggest that fluctuations
in commodity prices account for a significant fraction of output fluctuations.1 For
1Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017) empirically estimate the impulse response functions of GDP
and consumption to terms of trade shocks. They find that consumption responds negatively to terms
of trade innovations, in sharp contrast to the positive response of GDP. Given the overall positive
comovement between consumption and GDP in the data, their work bodes negative prospects for
terms of trade as a key driver of the cycle. Empirical results in Fernández et al. (2017) however,
suggest that commodity prices potentially account for a significant fraction of output fluctuations,
though their paper does not provide impulse response functions for the various macroeconomic
aggregates to shed light on the comovements across variables and potential mechanisms. Another
empirical paper with a focus on commodity prices, and the resulting procyclicality of fiscal policy,
is Cespedes and Velasco (2014).
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economies with a comparative advantage in the production of commodities, fluctu-
ations in the terms of trade and in real commodity prices tend to display a highly
positive correlation, and hence the tension between these two empirical studies’ re-
sults invites a fresh take. In turn, these results call for a tighter connection with
the aforementioned studies on the relative importance of different productivity and
interest rate shocks.
This paper seeks to quantitatively assess the drivers of emerging economy busi-
ness cycles using a unified model that nests the various sources of shocks advanced
in the literature. The model builds on the small open economy setting of Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007) and García-Cicco et al. (2010) by adding two elements absent
from their analysis. First, it allows for a second sector to capture the separate role
of commodities in the economy. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the case of a
net commodity exporting country facing exogenous international price changes. Sec-
ond, the model embeds a negative relation between the interest rate premium and
commodity prices. The relevance of this channel has recently been highlighted by
Fernández et al. (2015) and Shousha (2016), and is consistent with the empirical
evidence.
To study the predictions of our model, we resort both to a calibration exercise
and to the estimation of the model with Bayesian methods. The quantitative analysis
throughout the paper focuses on Argentina, a quintessential example of a commod-
ity exporting emerging economy. Given the lengthy duration of Argentine cycles,
we carry the analysis over a long period (1900-2015) in order to capture multiple
cycles.2 To set the stage, we begin by revisiting a number of empirical regularities.
In common with other emerging economies, Argentina displays large and persistent
cyclical fluctuations, excess volatility of consumption over output, high volatility of
investment, and a negative correlation between output growth and the trade balance.
In addition, the Argentine data reveal large positive effects of world commodity price
shocks on output, consumption, and investment, as well as negative effects on the
trade balance. We identify these shocks using a structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) model with a standard Cholesky decomposition, relying on the assumption
that world commodity prices are not contemporaneously affected by Argentina’s eco-
nomic activity. Furthermore, the data display a strong negative association between
interest rate spreads in Argentina and world commodity prices. Maintaining the
assumption that international commodity prices are exogenous to developments in
Argentina’s economy, we estimate this relation with a set of regressions of measures
of Argentine real rates (net of world interest rates) on an international commodity
price index and various controls. The strongly negative relation is robust across a
2Shousha (2016) focuses on a quarterly sample from 1994-2013 pooling together various emerging
economies. In the case of Argentina, this would not be lengthy enough to capture a full cycle. Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007) analyze an even shorter period for Argentina, 1993-2002. Fernández et al.
(2015) estimate their model on a pool of countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru) covering
the period 2000:Q1 to 2014:Q3. We concur with García-Cicco et al. (2010) in that a long period is
necessary in order to distinguish trend and cyclical shocks. They base the analysis on 1900-2010
and hence our results are more directly comparable to theirs.
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number of specifications, with different spread measures and different sets of con-
trols, including output growth, the trade balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio. The
lower bound of our estimates suggests that a 10% deviation of commodity prices
from their long-run mean can move Argentina’s real interest rate spread by almost 2
percentage points. This finding confirms the existing evidence from the literature on
interest rate spreads of commodity exporting economies (see in particular Bastourre
et al., 2012, Fernández et al., 2015, and Shousha, 2016). It also connects with earlier
work by Kaminsky et al. (2005) on the procyclicality of capital flows in developing
countries.3
In the model calibration exercise we analyze the response of the economy to
commodity price shocks of a sensibly calibrated size, which we can directly compare
to the impulse response functions obtained from the SVAR. We find that the model
impulse response functions line up well with their empirical counterparts. The two
effects stemming from commodity prices (that is, the competitiveness effect and the
borrowing cost effect) jointly produce impulse response functions to a commodity
price shock that match the empirical responses. They generate strongly positive
effects on GDP, consumption, and investment, and a negative effect on the total
trade balance. They also give rise to a somewhat larger response of consumption over
output. We show that the first effect alone (akin to a productivity increase) cannot
generate a countercyclical trade balance. Similarly, the second effect alone (which is
isomorphic to a simple negative interest rate shock) does not give a contemporaneous
response in output, while consumption and investment do increase on impact. The
net contribution of the two effects can reproduce the empirical regularities.
The aim of the structural estimation of the model is to gauge the quantitative im-
portance of commodity price shocks, relative to other shocks, in driving the business
cycle. We apply Bayesian estimation methods, using data on output, consumption,
investment, and the trade balance of Argentina. We estimate the stochastic processes
of various exogenous disturbances, as well as the two parameters governing the sen-
sitivity of the interest rate spread to commodity prices and to the debt level. Our
results suggest a sizeable contribution of commodity price shocks to Argentine busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. The posterior forecast error variance decomposition based
on data from 1900 to 2015 attributes 22% of the observed variation in output growth
to commodity price shocks. Furthermore, 24% of consumption growth and 34% of
investment growth can be accounted for by commodity price shocks. Reassuringly,
the model-implied process for the commodity price shares important features with
empirically observed world commodity prices. Since it mimics the data particularly
closely after 1950, we carry out the estimation on the post-1950 subsample and
find that the contribution of commodity price shocks to output, consumption, and
investment growth rises to around 38%, 42%, and 61%, respectively.
Our assessment of the remaining variation in macroeconomic aggregates sheds ad-
ditional light on the debate about the candidate drivers of emerging economy business
3See also Reinhart and Reinhart (2009), Gavin et al. (1996), Prasad et al. (2006), and Frankel
(2011).
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cycles previously proposed in the literature. We find that, in general, stationary tech-
nology shocks remain the most important source of fluctuations, explaining around
half of the variation in output growth. These stationary shocks to TFP are quan-
titatively more important than non-stationary TFP shocks. While this echoes the
conclusion of García-Cicco et al. (2010), who question the notion that the “cycle is
the trend” in emerging economies, the contribution of nonstationary shocks remains
non-negligible, as these shocks are able to explain 21% of the variation in output
growth in both samples used in the estimation.4 We also find a significant role for
preference shocks and interest rate shocks in explaining the variation in consumption,
investment, and the trade balance.
Taken together, our results suggest that commodity prices should feature promi-
nently in the analysis of business cycles in emerging economies. In terms of quanti-
tative contribution, they are among the three most important shocks driving output
growth in Argentina. Importantly, shocks to international commodity prices, in con-
trast to inherently more opaque concepts such as domestic TFP shocks, are factors
that are easier to identify and measure, and potentially act upon, by policy makers.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a number
of empirical regularities characterizing Argentine business cycles. As said, many of
these regularities are shared with other emerging commodity exporting countries,
though for the sake of accuracy in the mapping from the data to the model, we
think it is insightful to focus on a single country. Section 2.3 introduces the model.
Section 2.4 performs the calibration exercise and studies the role of commodity price
shocks in the model. Section 2.5 estimates the model and carries out a quantitative
analysis of the various sources of shocks; it also discusses practical issues concerning
the measurement of real GDP. Section 2.6 contains concluding remarks.
2.2 Emerging Market Cycles: Empirical Regularities
This section presents the main empirical features that characterize the business cycle
of Argentina’s economy from 1900 to 2015.
2.2.1 Data and Sample
Although there are strong commonalities across emerging countries, we think it is
important to work with a straight mapping from a single country to the model,
rather than using averages across different countries, which might confound effects
due to aggregation. The focus on a long time period is both insightful and befitting
4Our conclusion with respect to this aspect is quite similar to recent findings of Akinci (2017).
5Our model does not feature sovereign default or distress. While sovereign default episodes have
been important for Argentina, we think there is a lot of merit in understanding the triggers of the
cycles and how they are affected by external factors such as commodity prices in a relatively simple
setting, which more realistically would end with a technical default. A better understanding of
these regularities may actually help in avoiding default episodes by guiding policy. As will become
clear, the model features a negative externality, as households do not take into account the effect
of their borrowing on interest rates, which can lead to overborrowing.
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for a number of reasons. First, Argentina’s large and persistent economic cycles call
for a lengthy time span in order to capture a reasonable number of completed cycles
in the analysis. Second, unlike advanced economies, Argentina’s cyclical properties
have shown virtually no changes over this long period. This is apparent in Figure
2.1, Panel (a), which plots the logarithm of Argentine real GDP per capita from 1900
to 2015. Argentina’s output volatility in the first half of the 20th century (measured
as the standard deviation of real GDP growth rates) is practically the same as the
volatility in the post 1950 period, despite the higher levels of development in the
latter part of the sample. In the corresponding plot for the United States, shown in
Panel (b), marked changes in the volatility of output are visible. This typically leads
researchers to separately analyze data before and after the World War II, or before
and after the 1980s, which was when the Great Moderation occurred in the United
States. Such changes in volatility are not present in Argentina, which supports the
case for analyzing fluctuations jointly over the entire period.6 Third, Argentina’s
trend growth rate has been remarkably stable since 1900, at 1.2% per year, a con-
stancy that can be fully appreciated by taking a long-term perspective in analyzing
its business cycles.7 In addition to output data, we will focus on typical macroeco-
nomic variables of interest in small open economies, by studying the fluctuations of
consumption, investment, and the trade balance. The data come from a variety of
sources, including most notably Ferreres (2005).8
Furthermore, since our aim is to assess the importance of commodity price fluc-
tuations for Argentina’s economy, we need to select an appropriate commodity price
index. Our preferred index is the one constructed by Grilli and Yang (1988), which we
update following Pfaffenzeller et al. (2007). The index is available from 1900 and re-
flects world commodity prices, which is advantageous because developments in global
prices are arguably exogenous to economic conditions in Argentina (see further dis-
cussion below). The drawback, of course, is that it may capture price developments
of commodities that are unimportant, or even absent, in Argentina’s commodity ex-
port composition.9 We therefore cross-check this index with an Argentina-specific
commodity price index, which we construct using commodity price data provided
by the World Bank, together with trade weights available from the UN Comtrade
data base. This construction is possible from 1962 onwards. Figure 2.2, Panel (a),
plots the two indices (in nominal terms) and shows that their year-on-year changes
6A similar argument is made by García-Cicco et al. (2010); they emphasize the importance
of a long horizon to disentangle transitory shocks from shocks to trend growth in business cycles
of emerging economies, which are the focus of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). We will also aim
at disentangling these two types of shocks in our model estimation, in addition to our focus on
commodity prices.
7This is also different in the US, where low frequency changes in the trend growth rate are
present (see Antolin-Diaz et al., 2017, for comprehensive evidence). We therefore fit a cubic rather
than linear trend in Panel (b) of Figure 2.1.
8We extend the series of Ferreres (2005) to 2015. Compared to García-Cicco et al. (2010), we
add another half decade of data. Details on the sources and construction of the data are provided
in Appendix 2.7.1.
9Argentina exports mainly agricultural and food commodities such as meat, maize, and soy
beans, but to a lesser extent also petroleum, gold, and other non-food commodities.
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Figure 2.1: Output per capita 1900-2015 - Argentina vs. US
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1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
Log Real GDP per capita (Argentina)
Linear trend
(b) United States
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
Log Real GDP per capita (USA)
Cubic trend
Note: Panel (a) displays Argentine real GDP per capita in log scale, together with a linear trend.
Panel (b) shows the log of US real GDP per capita and adds a cubic trend. The sources are Ferreres
(2005) (updated series) and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively.
are fairly synchronized, mitigating the concern that the world price index may not
be representative of commodity prices faced by Argentina. We deflate the Grilli and
Yang (1988) index to be a relative (“real”) price using an index of (US-dollar denom-
inated) import prices for Argentina.10 Figure 2.2, Panel (b) plots this time series in
deviations from its sample mean. We focus on mean deviations rather than other
detrending methods, since we are interested in capturing persistent movements over
longer time spans, sometimes referred to as “supercycles” in commodity prices.
We begin our characterization of the empirical regularities by documenting busi-
ness cycle moments. We then turn to estimating an SVAR in order to gauge the
dynamic effects of exogenous commodity price developments on Argentina’s econ-
omy. Furthermore, we present evidence on the relation of commodity prices and
Argentina’s real interest rate spread. Finally, we summarize the insights of this
section into a set of stylized facts.
2.2.2 Business Cycle Moments
Table 2.1 summarizes key business cycle moments of Argentina’s economy. We re-
port mean, standard deviation, persistence, and contemporaneous cross-correlation
of GDP growth, consumption growth, investment growth (all per capita), as well as
the trade balance, defined as exports minus imports scaled by GDP. As the table
shows, many properties of the Argentine business cycle are in line with what is typ-
ically observed in advanced economies. Output, consumption, and investment are
strongly correlated and investment is much more volatile than output. On the other
10The import price index updates the series published by Ferreres (2005). We have tried alter-
native ways of deflating the commodity price series, for example using manufacturing prices (also
expressed in US dollars), or the US consumer price index. The changes did not have a material
impact on the results we present. We prefer the deflation using import prices (expressed in US dol-
lars), since this brings the observed price index closest to the corresponding concept in our model,
which is the relative price between commodities and a final tradable consumption good.
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Figure 2.2: Commodity prices
(a) World vs. Argentina-specific index
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Note: Panel (a) compares the updated index of Grilli and Yang (1988) with an Argentina-specific
commodity price index constructed based on UN Comtrade and World Bank data. These series are
in nominal terms and normalized to the same value in 1962. Panel (b) displays the commodity price
index of Grilli and Yang (1988), deflated with the Argentine import price index (in US dollars),
and in log-deviations from its sample mean.
hand, there are features that are distinctive of fluctuations in emerging markets. In
particular, it is worth highlighting that consumption growth is more volatile than
output growth.11 Furthermore, as often observed in emerging markets, the trade
balance is countercyclical. In the case of Argentina the contemporaneous correla-
tion with output growth is not large, calculated at -0.07, but the magnitude of the
negative correlation is more pronounced with consumption and investment.
Table 2.1: Business Cycle Moments 1900-2015
GDP Cons. Inv. Trade
growth growth growth balance
Mean 1.17% 1.12% 1.40% -0.04%
Standard deviation 5.27% 5.84% 19.16% 4.76%
Persistence 0.14 0.05 0.34 0.72
Correlation with GDP growth 1 0.86 0.76 -0.07
Correlation with Cons. growth 0.86 1 0.49 -0.11
Correlation with Inv. growth 0.76 0.49 1 -0.20
Correlation with trade balance -0.07 -0.11 -0.20 1
Note: GDP, consumption, and investment growth are real and in per capita terms. The trade
balance is defined as total exports minus total imports, scaled by GDP. Persistence is the coefficient
from an estimated AR(1) process. The frequency of the data is annual.
11Interestingly, the excess volatility of consumption is smaller in our sample than in García-Cicco
et al. (2010)’s sample, suggesting that this phenomenon has attenuated in recent years.
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2.2.3 Commodity Price Shocks and Emerging Economy Cycles
In order to gauge the effect of international commodity prices on merging market
business cycles, we consider the following structural vector autoregression (SVAR):
A0Zt = at+A1Zt−1 + . . .+ApZt−p + ut, (2.1)
where Zt is a vector containing the commodity price index in log deviations
from mean, as plotted in Figure 2.2, together with the log-levels of the business cycle
variables of interest - output, consumption, investment, and the trade balance; ut is a
vector of normally distributed structural shocks with covariance matrix E(utu′t) = I5;
and t is a linear time trend. We set the number of lags to p = 2.12
We estimate the reduced form version of equation (2.1) using OLS, obtain the
residuals ˆt = Aˆ−10 uˆt and then recover commodity price shocks, that is, the element
of uˆt corresponding to commodity prices, using restrictions on A0. Our underlying
identifying assumption is that international commodity prices are not contempora-
neously affected by any other variable in the system. Given that Argentina is a
relatively small country that should not be a driver of world-wide commodity prices,
we believe this assumption is reasonable and justifies ordering the commodity price
first in a Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of ut.13
Due to the imperfections in the measurement of commodity prices faced by Ar-
gentina discussed earlier, we focus solely on the IRFs of the SVAR, but do not resort
to a forecast error variance decomposition. Our working assumption is that the IRFs
in response to a shock identified from this specification give a meaningful representa-
tion of the dynamics following an exogenous shock to international commodity prices.
However, we think that making quantitative statements about the total contribution
of commodity prices to the variance of output from this exercise could be misleading
given the noisy nature of the Grilli and Yang (1988) index as a measure of the actual
price movements faced by Argentina. We instead carry out such a decomposition
using the structural model in Section 2.5.
The impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock to commodity
prices are plotted in Figure 2.3. The results show that there is a statistically and
economically significant positive response of output, consumption, and investment.
The total trade balance response is negative, that is, net exports fall in response to
a commodity price increase. All responses are hump-shaped, peaking around two
years following the shock, and quite persistent. Measured at peak, a one standard
deviation shock in international commodity prices increases the level of real GDP
per capita by more than one percent.
12This lag length is selected against p = 1 using various lag length selection criteria.
13We leave the remaining shocks to the system unidentified, so that the ordering of the remaining
variables is irrelevant.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse responses to 1 S.D. Commodity Price Shock
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Note: The structural shock is identified using Cholesky ordering. 80% confidence bands are plotted,
as suggested by Sims and Zha (1999). GDP, consumption, and investment are real, in per-capita
terms and in log-levels. The trade balance is defined as exports net of imports divided by GDP.
2.2.4 Commodity Prices and Interest Rate Spreads
What are possible channels behind the influence of commodity prices on emerging
market business cycles? One key observation that has been highlighted in previ-
ous research on commodity exporting economies is the strong negative comovement
of interest rate spreads and commodity prices. Fernández et al. (2015) highlight
the strong negative effect of commodity price increases on country risk premia in
sovereign bond spreads. Bastourre et al. (2012) estimate the correlation between a
common factor of emerging economy bond returns and a common factor of commod-
ity prices to be -0.81. Shousha (2016) emphasizes that the negative correlation is a
major difference between emerging and advanced commodity exporters. Incorporat-
ing this effect into our analysis is important, since strongly countercyclical interest
rate movements in general have been found to be a key driver of emerging mar-
kets business cycles, see for example Uribe and Yue (2006) and Neumeyer and Perri
(2005).14
To shed further light on the link between the real spread and commodity prices
in the case of Argentina, we run a set of regressions of the Argentine real interest
rate spread on the real commodity price index (in log deviations from its mean). The
regressions are specified as follows:
14This result connects with work on the procyclicality of capital flows and borrowing in emerging
and developing economies. See for example Kaminsky et al. (2005).
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rt − r∗t = α+ ξ(lnp˜t − ln ¯˜p) + βXt + vt, (2.2)
where rt is the real interest rate of Argentina, r∗t is a measure of the world interest
rate, p˜t is the commodity price (with lnp˜t − ln ¯˜p being the log deviation from mean,
which we plot in Figure 2.2, Panel (b)), and Xt is a vector of control variables
including output growth, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the trade balance. The key
parameter of interest is ξ, which denotes the sensitivity of the real interest rate
spread with respect to changes in world commodity prices. Note that this sensitivity
parameter will also feature in our model and we will calibrate it based on the results
presented in this section. Since interest rate data for Argentina are not available over
our baseline 1900-2015 sample, we stick to a smaller time period and try different
interest rate series available. Specifically, we use the domestic lending rate, savings
rate, and the money market rate, which are all provided by the IMF International
Financial Statistics in nominal terms. To obtain a real measure we deflate these series
using a corrected inflation measure for Argentine inflation (“inflación verdadera”),
since several authors have highlighted the misreporting of inflation by official sources
in recent years (see Cavallo, 2013, for a discussion).15 For the world interest rate
we use a measure of the UK real interest rate published by the Bank of England.
We once again emphasize that the commodity price measure captures international
commodity price developments which are arguably exogenous to economic activity
in Argentina.
The baseline results are presented in Table 2.2. We show several other results us-
ing different interest rate measures in Appendix 2.7.2. Our findings across all regres-
sions, including those in the appendix, give negative point estimates of ξ. These es-
timates are economically significant though not always statistically significant, likely
due to the small sample. If we consider the smallest estimate (in absolute value) that
is statistically significant, which is -0.199, the interpretation is that a 10% deviation
of commodity prices from their long-run mean can move Argentina’s real interest
spread by almost 2 percentage points. We view this as strong evidence in support of
a channel by which exogenous international commodity prices put downward pres-
sure on interest rate premia faced by commodity exporting emerging economies.
This evidence will guide our modeling choices below, where we also provide further
theoretical discussion of this economic relation.
2.2.5 Summary of Stylized Facts
Based on the empirical analysis above, we summarize the following stylized facts
around aggregate fluctuations in Argentina 1900-2015:
1. A relatively constant trend in GDP per capita growth at an average of 1.2%
15In a previous version of the paper we additionally used a real interest rate measure directly
provided by the world bank. This series is also based on the IMF lending rate measure but uses
the official Argentine GDP deflator to obtain a real series, which we chose to avoid. The results are
available on request.
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Table 2.2: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS variable Real spread (calculated from domestic lending rate)
Commodity price -0.200*** -0.199*** -0.214*** -0.210*** -0.203***
(0.049) (0.045) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
Output growth -0.434** -0.406
(0.206) (0.241)
Trade balance -0.252 -0.164
(0.224) (0.385)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.033 0.015
(0.036) (0.062)
Constant 0.023* 0.034** 0.024* 0.041* 0.026
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.034)
Observations 21 21 21 21 21
R-squared 0.462 0.568 0.497 0.485 0.573
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The real spread is calculated by deflating the domestic lending rate, provided by the IMF,
with a corrected inflation measure (see Cavallo, 2013), and then subtracting the UK real rate. The
commodity price is in log deviations from mean, as plotted in Figure 2.2, Panel (b). Appendix 2.7.1
provides details on the sources of the other regressors.
annually, with a relatively stable variance throughout the period.
2. Excess volatility of consumption over output.
3. A negative correlation between GDP growth and the trade balance.
4. Large of effects of commodity price shocks on all key business cycle variables.
5. A negative relation between interest spreads and commodity prices.
2.3 A Two-Sector Small Open Economy Model
We build on the small open economy model formulated by Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) and García-Cicco et al. (2010), which in turn build on Mendoza (1991).16 Our
model adds two elements absent in their analysis. First it allows for a second sector
to capture the distinctive role of commodities present in many emerging economies.
Second, as in Shousha (2016), the model embeds a negative relation between the
interest rate premium and commodity prices, consistent with the empirical evidence
presented above. The model nests the various sources of shocks identified in previous
work and allows for a double-role of commodity prices. Increases in commodity
prices improve both the competitiveness of the economy (which is a net commodity
16We abstract from nominal frictions and the important question of fixed versus nominal exchange
rate choice. See for example Frankel (2004), and Mitchener and Pina (2016), who examine the
costs and benefits of fixed exchange rates. For a modeling framework that incorporates nominal
elements, we refer readers to Gali and Monacelli (2005) and the literature that built on their seminal
contribution.
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exporter) and the economy’s borrowing terms, as higher prices are associated with
lower spreads between the country’s borrowing rates and world interest rates.
We begin by describing the technology. There are two sectors in the economy: a
final-good sector and a commodity-producing sector. The final good is produced by
combining capital K1t , commodity inputs M˜t, and labor N1t . It can be consumed,
invested and exported or imported. The production function in the final good sector
is
Yt = at(K
1
t )
αK (M˜t)
αM (XtN
1
t )
1−αK−αM . (2.3)
Commodities can be produced domestically using capital K2t and labor N2t ; they
can be used as an intermediate input in final goods production or traded on inter-
national markets. The production function in the commodity sector is
Y˜t = a˜t(K
2
t )
α˜K (XtN
2
t )
1−α˜K . (2.4)
In the production functions, at and a˜t capture total factor productivities, which
are exogenous and assumed to be stationary. Xt is the nonstationary level of labor-
augmenting technology common to both sectors. We denote the gross growth rate
of the nonstationary technology as gt = Xt/Xt−1, which is stochastic with mean
g. Xt is introduced to capture shocks to the trend, which has been a key focus
in the literature on emerging market business cycles.17 The price of the final good
is normalized to 1 and the price of commodities p˜t is exogenously given on world
markets and subject to shocks. We assume that at, a˜t, gt, and p˜t follow stochastic
processes which will be specified further below.
Firms in both sectors rent capital and hire labor in competitive input markets.
The total stock of capital in the economy Kt is measured in final goods and is divided
between the two production technologies, so that
Kt = K
1
t +K
2
t . (2.5)
Capital depreciates at rate δ and is accumulated through investment It which gives
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It. (2.6)
The economy is populated by a representative household who supplies the two
types of labor, owns and rents out the capital stock, and borrows from abroad. The
budget constraint is given by
Ct+Kt+1+Dt+St+
φ
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
− g
)2
= rk1t K
1
t +r
k2
t K
2
t +w
1
tN
1
t +w
2
tN
2
t +(1−δ)Kt+
Dt+1
1 + rt
,
(2.7)
17See in particular Aguiar and Gopinath (2007). The fact that in our model the nonstationary
technology is common to both sectors ensures that the model admits a non-stochastic balanced
growth path (BGP), as shown in Appendix 2.7.3.
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where Ct is final good consumption, Dt denotes the level of (real) debt, and
Dt+1
1+rt
is newly issued debt at net interest rate rt. St is exogenous government spending,
where st = St/Xt−1 will follow a stochastic process to be specified further below. r
kj
t
and wjt , j = 1, 2, are the returns from renting out capital and supplying labor to the
two sectors, respectively. Note that in equilibrium the expected return on capital
will equalize across the two sectors. The presence of φ > 0 captures investment
adjustment costs faced by the household.
The household’s objective is to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
νtβ
t [Ct − θω−1Xt−1(N1t )ω − θω˜−1Xt−1(N2t )ω˜]1−γ − 1
1− γ (2.8)
with γ > 0, subject to the relevant constraints and a no-Ponzi condition. The
parameter β is the discount factor and νt captures shocks to preferences. The utility
function features Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences, which eliminate the wealth
effect on labor supply. Note that the presence of Xt−1 ensures a constant labor
supply along the non-stochastic BGP. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply will be
determined by ω and ω˜, and θ governs the weight on the relative disutility of labor.
Based on the small open economy assumption, the steady state real interest rate
is exogenously given. In particular, rt is determined by the world interest rate r∗
and a spread (or premium) term which is further composed of three additive terms:
rt = r
∗ + ψ
(
eD
∗
t+1/Xt−d∗ − 1)+ ξ (ln(p˜t)− ln(p˜)) + (eµt−1 − 1) . (2.9)
The first term of the spread in (2.9) is standard in the literature. Following
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), it is assumed that the premium is increasing in
the (detrended) level of debt. The presence of D∗t+1 is taken as exogenous by the
representative household but Dt+1 = D∗t+1 holds in equilibrium. This debt-elastic
interest rate ensures a stationary solution of the model after detrending.18
The second term determining the spread rt−r∗ captures the robust empirical ob-
servation, discussed in detail in Section 2.2.4, that commodity prices strongly affect
interest rate premia of commodity exporting economies. The parameter ξ governs
the sensitivity of the interest rate spread with respect to commodity price deviations
from steady state and can be calibrated to the corresponding parameter we estimated
in Section 2.2.4. Our approach here is to embed the relation between rt − r∗ and
p˜t in a reduced-form fashion, similar to Shousha (2016) and Fernández et al. (2015),
who also document further empirical evidence in line with our findings. While we do
not provide a complete formal rationalization of the relationship and focus mainly
on the resulting implications for emerging economy business cycles, the link between
commodity prices and interest rate premia can be derived from first principles fol-
lowing different approaches. Specifically, the negative relation between rt−r∗ and p˜t
may result from the effect of commodity prices on the country’s repayment capacity
to international creditors. This could come in the form of a borrowing constraint,
18See also Lubik (2007) for further discussion.
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in which the value of the country’s collateral depends directly on commodity prices
through export earnings. Creditors decrease the required interest rate premium when
commodity prices increase, as the collateral value of the economy is higher.19 Min
et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence for this particular channel, showing that
export earnings and better repayment capacity bring down yield spreads. Alterna-
tively, a possible mechanism could entail financial frictions in which domestic firms
(rather than the government) borrow against collateral, which is positively linked
to the terms of trade, and a relaxation in these constraints leads to a fall in credit
spreads.20
Finally, the last term in the rate spread in (2.9) allows for a simple interest rate
premium shock, similar to the one specified in García-Cicco et al. (2010). Since it is
central to our objective to trace out the effects of commodity price movements for the
economy, we also allow for the presence of µt in order to capture possible exogenously
driven movements in the interest premium that are unrelated to commodity prices
and thereby avoid hardwiring into the model that interest rate movements must be
related to commodity prices. An alternative interpretation of this shock is of course
an innovation in global interest rates (rather than the interest rate premium). We
do not take a strong stance on this distinction in the analysis. From the domestic
economy’s perspective, exogenous changes in the premium and the global interest
rate have similar effects on the domestic interest rate.
Our modeling choice is arguably restrictive, as apart from commodity prices we
only allow one additional shock to directly affect interest rates via the last term
in the spread. This restrictiveness has the benefit of allowing a direct comparison
of the relative importance of the mechanism we introduce vis-à-vis a collection of
exogenous disturbances which are defined in the same way as in García-Cicco et al.
(2010). These authors also estimate their model on Argentine data over a similar time
period and their results therefore provide our preferred benchmark for the estimation
results.
Equations (2.3) to (2.9) feature a set of exogenous disturbances to technology,
preferences and prices, {at, a˜t, gt, p˜t, st, νt, µt}, which we specify to follow autoregres-
sive processes in logs that are subject to stochastic shocks {at , a˜t , gt , p˜t , st , νt , µt }.
The shocks are normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviations de-
noted by {σa, σa˜, σg, σ˜,p, σs, σν , σµ}. The processes for gt, st and p˜t have determin-
istic means different from 1 that are parametrized as g, s, and p˜, and which will be
calibrated to match business cycle moments of the steady state model. We specify
autoregressive processes of order one for all shock processes, but allow the log of the
commodity price p˜t to follow an AR(2). This enables us to calibrate the parameters
19In Appendix 2.7.5 we formally illustrate this idea in a simple setting that gives rise to the
postulated relation.
20Akinci (2017), for example, generates a countercyclical country risk premium by introducing
financial frictions in the spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999) to the economy’s firm sector. Her model
does not feature a commodity sector, but an extension to include it seems natural. Fernández et al.
(2015) allow future commodity prices to affect the spread. In justifying their modeling assumptions
regarding the relation between spreads and commodity prices, they make very similar arguments
to the ones we have provided here.
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to the ones obtained from the SVAR analysis in Section 2.2.3. The processes are
ln(at) = ρaln(at−1) + at (2.10)
ln(a˜t) = ρa˜ln(a˜t−1) + a˜t (2.11)
ln
(
gt
g
)
= ρgln
(
gt−1
g
)
+ gt (2.12)
ln
(st
s
)
= ρsln
(st−1
s
)
+ st (2.13)
ln(νt) = ρν ln(νt−1) + νt (2.14)
ln(µt) = ρµln(µt−1) + 
µ
t (2.15)
and
ln
(
p˜t
p˜
)
= ρ1p˜log
(
p˜t−1
p˜
)
+ ρ2p˜log
(
p˜t−2
p˜
)
+ p˜t . (2.16)
The model features the following resource constraints. In the final good sector
the resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + It + St +
φ
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
− g
)2
+ TBt (2.17)
where TBt denotes the trade balance in final goods. The commodity market
resource constraint reads as
p˜tY˜t = p˜tM˜t + ˜TBt, (2.18)
where ˜TBt denotes the real commodity trade balance, that is, net exports of
commodities measured in terms of final goods. Carrying out some further national
accounting, we compute the GDP and the total trade balance of the economy, both
measured in terms of final goods, as
Y GDPt = Yt + p˜tY˜t − p˜tM˜t (2.19)
TBTotalt = TBt +
˜TBt. (2.20)
The complete list of optimality conditions derived in this model is provided in
Appendix 2.7.3. The Appendix also contains the derivation of a normalized version of
the model that is stationary, that is, where all variables that grow in equilibrium are
divided by Xt−1. This results in a stationary system in normalized variables, which
we denote with lower case letters, and which we solve numerically with standard
perturbation techniques. We carry out both a calibration exercise and a structural
estimation of the model in order to asses the quantitative contribution of different
shocks to fluctuations in the main macroeconomic aggregates.
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2.4 Calibration and Business Cycle Characteristics
The goal of this section is to study the business cycle characteristics of the model that
are induced by shocks to the commodity price. To do so, we calibrate all structural
parameters of the model, including the parameters governing the stochastic process
of ln(p˜t). We then generate impulse response functions, focusing exclusively on
commodity price shocks.21
2.4.1 Calibration
Table 2.3 summarizes our baseline calibration. Many of the parameter values are
standard in business cycle research, but several are worth highlighting. Both the
mean of the commodity sector productivity a˜t as well as the steady state relative price
of commodities p˜ can be adjusted to determine the relative size of the two sectors in
the economy. We have normalized the mean technology in both sectors to 1 - as can
be seen in equations (2.10) and (2.11) - and find the value of p˜ that matches the ratio
of net exports of commodities to GDP observed in Argentine data (8.60%).22 This
pins down the relative size of the commodity price sector that is in line with Argentine
data. The parameter d∗ in equation (2.9) is calibrated to match the average trade
balance to output ratio in the data (-0.041%, consistent with Table 2.1). We calibrate
the mean of the exogenous spending process s to match the average government
spending to GDP ratio observed in the data (9.38%). The parameter ξ, which
governs the sensitivity of the interest rate spread to commodity prices, is calibrated
to the value obtained from the regressions in Section 2.2.4. To be conservative, we
take the lower bound of -0.199 among the statistically significant estimates we have
obtained across a broad range of regression specifications. The average technology
growth rate of the economy g is set directly to 1.0117 in order to generate the
observed mean output growth in the data. We impose equal capital shares in both
sectors (αk = α˜k) and set the commodity share in the final goods production to
αm = 0.05 following Shousha (2016). The parameter ψ is typically positive but close
to zero in the small open economy literature (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe,
2003). The estimation results of García-Cicco et al. (2010), however, highlight that
the data support a larger value of this parameter. In particular, a large value is
necessary to generate a standard deviation of the trade balance roughly as big as
the one of output growth and a decreasing autocorrelation function of the trade
balance. We therefore set ψ = 2.8 in line with their posterior estimate.23 We set the
adjustment cost parameter to φ = 6, slightly higher than in one-sector models in the
literature because this reduces the impact response of the economy to commodity
shocks, which is needed to match our SVAR results (lower values would overstate
21We provide impulse responses functions to all other shocks in Appendix 2.7.4.
22To compute this target ratio in the data, we use a broad measure of commodity exports which
includes manufactures of commodities. Due to data availability we use an annual sample starting
in 1980.
23In our estimation exercise we proceed similar to García-Cicco et al. (2010) and estimate ψ.
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the effect of commodity prices).24 The stochastic process of ln(p˜t) is calibrated to be
in line with the estimated SVAR coefficients in Section 2.2.3, which gives ρ1p˜ = 0.95,
ρ2p˜ = −0.13, and σp˜ = 0.1064.
Table 2.3: Model Calibration
Parameter Value Calibration target/source
p˜ 0.5244 Target commodity net exports to GDP in the data (8.60%)
d∗ -0.001 Target trade balance to GDP in the data (-0.041%)
s 0.0189 Target gov’t spending to GDP in the data (9.38%)
ξ -0.199 Estimated coefficient in Section 2.2.4
g 1.0117 Average GDP growth in the data
ψ 2.8 Estimate of García-Cicco et al. (2010)
αk 0.32 García-Cicco et al. (2010)
αm 0.05 Shousha (2016)
α˜k 0.32 Impose equal capital share across both sectors
δ 0.1255 García-Cicco et al. (2010)
φ 6 Roughly match impact responses in SVAR
β 0.93 Steady state interest rate ≈ 10%
γ 2 Standard value in business cycle analysis
θ 1.6 N1 +N2 ≈ 1/3
ω,ω˜ 1.6 Standard in SOE literature
ρ1p˜ 0.95 Estimated SVAR coefficient (Section 2.2.3)
ρ2p˜ -0.13 Estimated SVAR coefficient (Section 2.2.3)
σp˜ 0.1064 Estimated SVAR coefficient (Section 2.2.3)
2.4.2 Impulse Response Functions to Commodity Price Shocks
Figure 2.4 displays the impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation com-
modity price shock p˜t , using the calibration described above. The figure shows that
the responses on impact are in line with the stylized facts of the business cycle of
Argentina highlighted in Section 2.2. Positive commodity price shocks boost the
economy by increasing total output, consumption, and investment. The investment
response is the strongest, and the consumption response is larger in magnitude than
the output response. The total trade balance response is negative, rendering total
net exports countercyclical.
To understand the mechanism behind the dynamics visible in Figure 2.4, note
that commodity prices in the model give rise to two effects. The first effect goes
through commodity trade revenues. The economy needs to trade off the cost of
more expensive commodity inputs in the production of final goods with the benefits
of being able to produce and export commodities at higher prices (thus generating
24Note that the literature in general gives little guidance on sensible values for φ.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse response functions to commodity price shock
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Note: Model impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation commodity price shock p˜t ,
using the calibration described in the text.
trade revenues). The second effect is governed by the negative sensitivity of the
interest spread rt − r∗ to commodity prices present in equation (2.9) and based on
the empirical evidence in Section 2.2.4. Both of these effects are necessary to generate
the responses in Figure 2.4. To highlight this, Figures 2.5 and 2.6 open up the double
role of commodity prices in our model, by plotting impulse response functions for
the two effects separately and inspecting them across the two sectors of the economy.
In both cases, the responses of consumption and investment growth are omitted.
Figure 2.5 studies the first effect of commodity price shocks, which we dub “com-
petitiveness effect.” The figure plots the responses of GDP and the total trade
balance to a commodity price shock when setting ξ = 0, that is, shutting off the
channel through the interest rate, which we will analyze separately below. It also
breaks down these responses into the dynamics in both sectors, that is, the final
good sector and the commodity sector, separately. What the left panels of the figure
reveal is that after a commodity prices increase, the value-added in the commodity
sector increases significantly, as higher international prices make it attractive to in-
crease production and exports. The final good sector actually suffers, as intermediate
commodity inputs necessary to produce final goods become more expensive. This
effect, however, is dwarfed by the boom in the commodity sector and total produc-
tion in the economy increases. The trade balances in the two sectors, shown in the
right panels of the figure, move in different directions. The economy starts exporting
more commodities and importing final goods, as the former are very attractive to
sell abroad and the latter less attractive to produce domestically. Looking at the two
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sectors together, the total trade surplus increases with the commodity price increase.
This highlights that the first effect alone does not generate a countercyclical total
trade balance, which is a salient feature in emerging economy business cycle data.
Figure 2.5: Breakdown of IRFs: No interest rate channel (ξ = 0)
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Note: Model impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation commodity price shock p˜t ,
using the calibration described in the text but setting ξ = 0.
Figure 2.6 shows the dynamics arising from the second effect, which we call
“borrowing cost effect.” The figure plots the IRFs of total GDP and the total trade
balance to a simple interest rate shock. This shock is (qualitatively) isomorphic
to an increase in commodity prices that only goes through the presence of p˜t in
equation (2.9) but that does not directly affect production in either sector.25 It thus
completely shuts off the competitiveness channel described above and only shows
the effect that commodity price have through the spread between the economy’s
borrowing rate and the world interest rate. As before, the figure breaks down the
response by displaying the dynamics in each sector separately. The figure shows that
the exogenous fall in borrowing rates allows households and firms to bring resources
to the present by borrowing funds and decreasing the final good trade balance, that
is, importing final goods. Some of these resources will be consumed (consumption
goes up on impact, not shown in the figure), and some will be invested into capital
(investment goes up on impact, not shown in the figure) in order to produce final
goods and maintain a smooth path of consumption. Some of the capital will also be
used to produce commodities, which are a required intermediary input to final good
production. This gives a slow and hump-shaped increase in the GDP of each sector
25For the purpose of the comparison, the standard deviation of the interest rate shock is calibrated
to have the same maximum output response as the total response in Figure 2.4. The persistence is
set to 0.9.
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and of the total economy. Hence, the total trade balance falls and output increases,
but not on impact. This lack of impact response in output stands in contrast with
the empirical impulse responses and suggests that this channel alone cannot mimic
the data.
Figure 2.6: Breakdown of IRFs: Pure interest rate shock
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Note: Model impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation interest rate shock µt , using
the calibration described in the text.
In conclusion, the double-role of commodity prices in our model, through the
joint impact of the competitiveness and the borrowing cost channels, gives rise to
dynamics that are well in line with the empirical regularities observed in Argentina,
as shown by comparing the SVAR results from Figure 2.3 with the model responses
presented in Figure 2.4. This insight further highlights the importance of endoge-
nously countercyclical spreads for aggregate fluctuations in commodity exporting
economies, as recently also noted by Fernández et al. (2015) and Shousha (2016).26
We emphasize again that the focus of the calibration exercise in this section lies
on explaining the dynamics that arises from commodity shocks alone. This is done
to highlight our mechanism in light of the facts present in the data.27 In order to
systematically gauge the fraction of aggregate fluctuations that can be accounted
for by commodity price shocks, in comparison to all other shocks, we move on to
estimating the model in the next section.
26Recent work by Ben Zeev et al. (2017) and Farias and da Silva (2017) focuses on commodity
price news shocks. These news shocks might also be connected with (and in fact be capturing) the
interest rate effect, a link that deserves further exploration.
27In Appendix 2.7.4 we report the IRFs to all of the other shocks we have defined in the model.
118
2.5 Estimation: Assessing the Quantitative Contribution
of Different Sources of Shocks in Emerging Economies
In this section our goal is to assess the quantitative contribution of different shocks
to aggregate fluctuations in emerging economies for which commodity exports are
potentially important. To do so, we take the model to Argentine data and struc-
turally estimate it with the goal of running a “horse race” between the various shocks
that possibly drive the business cycle. We maintain the calibration of most of the
parameters (see Table 2.3), and estimate the stochastic processes of the exogenous
disturbances defined by equations (2.10) to (2.16). In addition, we also estimate
two key structural parameters. The first is at the heart of our mechanism: ξ, which
governs the sensitivity of the real interest rate spread to commodity prices. Estimat-
ing this parameter allows the data to speak about the strength of this mechanism
within our model structure. Furthermore, we estimate ψ, a parameter that governs
the trade balance dynamics in the economy.28 In carrying out the estimation exer-
cise, we give equal footing to all different shocks, which correspond to the candidate
triggers previously proposed in the literature.
2.5.1 Estimation Specification
We carry out a Bayesian estimation defining standard priors on the estimated pa-
rameters. We run a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to obtain draws
from the marginal posterior distributions of the parameters.29 We then compute
forecast error variance decompositions as well as historical variance decompositions
of the observables at the estimated posterior modes. To estimate the model we add
the following measurement equations
∆lnY GDP,obst = lnY
GDP
t − lnY GDPt−1 (2.21)
∆lnCobst = lnCt − lnCt−1 (2.22)
∆lnIobst = lnIt − lnIt−1 (2.23)
TBTotal,obs/Y GDP,obst = TB
Total
t /Y
GDP
t , (2.24)
where ∆lnY GDP,obst ,∆lnCobst ,∆lnIobst and ∆TBTotal,obs correspond to the em-
pirically observed time series which we analyzed in Section 2.2.30 The variables on
the right hand side of equations (2.21) to (2.24) are model concepts defined in Sec-
tion 2.3.31 As explained above, we estimate the parameters governing the stochastic
28The importance of estimating this parameter has been stressed by García-Cicco et al. (2010).
29We take 10 million draws. We discard the first 25% of draws and keep the remaining ones for
inference. The acceptance ratio is 27.3%.
30In principle we could add the commodity price series, which we used for parts of the calibration
of the model, as an observable. However, since the Grilli and Yang (1988) may capture some
dynamics unrelated to prices actually faced by Argentina, and an Argentina-specific index is only
available for a much shorter sample, our preferred specification is to estimate the model without
this observable and then compare the model-implied commodity price process with the empirically
observed index. See the discussion further below.
31Note that while we solve the (linearized) model in variables that are normalized by Xt−1 (see
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processes of all shocks, as well as ξ and ψ (all other parameters are calibrated as
before). Table 2.4 summarizes the priors imposed on the parameters. As is standard
in the estimation of DSGE models, we use beta priors on the persistence parameters
and inverse-gamma priors on the standard deviations. The parameter values of the
priors are the same as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and a number of related papers,
except for the commodity price process. Since the latter is specified as an AR(2),
we use priors that at the mode impose the same maximum root as for the other
disturbances.32 We set identical scale parameters on the standard deviation of the
shocks to remain agnostic about the relative importance of the different shocks. We
put a normal prior on ξ, which is centered around the smallest statistically signifi-
cant regression estimate from Section 2.2.4, with the standard deviation equal to the
standard error obtained from the regression. Finally, our prior on ψ, also normal, is
centered around the estimate obtained by García-Cicco et al. (2010).
Table 2.4: Estimated parameters and priors
Parameter Prior Mean Std. dev.
ξ Normal -0.199 0.045
ψ Normal 2.8 0.5
ρ1p˜ Beta 0.8 0.2
−ρ2p˜ Beta 0.15 0.1
σp˜ Inverse-Gamma 0.05 2
ρi Beta 0.5 0.2
σi Inverse-Gamma 0.05 2
i = a, a˜, g, s, ν, µ
2.5.2 Estimation Results
How large is the contribution of different structural shocks to the variation in output,
consumption, investment and the trade balance in emerging economies? We address
this question using the results in Table 2.5. Panel (a) of the table shows the results
of an (infinite horizon) forecast error variance decomposition based on the poste-
rior estimates of our model using Argentine data from 1900 through to 2015.33 For
each of the variables used as observables, this gives the share of variation that can
be explained by a particular shock. We begin by focusing on the commodity price
shock, as this is the main difference with respect to Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and
Appendix 2.7.3), we here use growth rates in the original non-normalized variables. This is possible,
as the implied nonstationary variables can be recomputed from the model solution.
32ρ1p˜ = 0.8 and ρ2p˜ = −0.15 imply that the larger root of the process 0.5, which is the same for an
AR(1) processes with ρ = 0.5.
33Table 2.8 in the appendix reports posterior mean and credible intervals of the individual pa-
rameters we estimate.
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García-Cicco et al. (2010). As the table reveals, a sizable fraction of output (21.67%),
consumption (24.02%) and investment growth (34.11%) can be explained by com-
modity price shocks. This confirms the intuition we derived from the calibration
exercise and from the responses that were present in our SVAR analysis.
Table 2.5: Variance decomposition for baseline estimation
Stationary Nonstat. Interest Comm. Spending Pref.
technology technology rate price shock Shock
(a) Baseline sample from 1900-2015
Output growth 51.15% 20.55% 1.12% 21.67% 0.19% 5.33%
Consumption growth 35.32% 10.87% 3.24% 24.02% 1.51% 25.05%
Investment growth 11.68% 2.15% 23.8% 34.11% 1.9% 26.35%
Trade balance 1.19% 2.53% 64.71% 16.33% 2.08% 64.71%
(b) Shorter sample from 1950-2015
Output growth 39.14% 20.57% 0.69% 37.97% 0.08% 1.54%
Consumption growth 28.47% 11.72% 2.01% 42.28% 1.14% 14.39%
Investment growth 9.48% 2.57% 15.35% 61.11% 0.50% 10.99%
Trade balance 1.28% 3.03% 52.83% 31.56% 0.42% 10.87%
Note: Forecast error variance decomposition (at infinite horizon) of the observables used for esti-
mation, calculated at the posterior modes. Stationary technology is the sum of the contribution of
at and a˜t. These estimates are obtained from the baseline estimation specification explained in the
text.
Turning to the other shocks, the table shows that our estimation attributes most
of the variation in output growth (51.15%) to transitory technology shocks (the table
reports the joint contribution of at and a˜t). This finding is in line with García-Cicco
et al. (2010). We do not, however, confirm their conclusion regarding the very small
contribution of shocks to nonstationary technology à la Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
We find the contribution of these shocks to be sizable, explaining 20.55% of the vari-
ation in output growth in Argentina.34 Preference shocks and interest shocks also
play an important role in understanding the business cycle. The former, affecting
directly the intertemporal choices of the household, explains in particular consump-
tion and investment growth, as well as trade balance variation, while the latter also
contributes substantially to the variance of investment growth. The government
spending (endowment) shock is generally found to be unimportant, which is in line
with the previous literature.
To shed further light on our findings with respect to commodity prices, in Figure
2.7 we plot two series. The first one, indicated with the dashed black line, corre-
sponds to the model-implied commodity price process, that is, the time series of
p˜t obtained from feeding the estimated shocks 
p˜
t into equation (2.16) and setting
34Interestingly, Akinci (2017) also finds both types of technology shocks to be important in the
context of a model that features financial frictions and time-varying risk premia. This is in contrast
with Chang and Fernandez (2013), who find that nonstationary productivity shocks play a minor
role relative to stationary TFP and interest shocks, broadly confirming the results of García-Cicco
et al. (2010). None of these studies feature a role for commodity prices.
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the parameters ρ1p˜ and ρ
2
p˜ to their estimated posterior mode. The second series,
indicated with a solid blue line, shows the real commodity price index, which we
have plotted and used for calibrating parts of the model above. It is apparent that,
reassuringly, the two time series broadly share common features, such as a similar
volatility and reasonably synchronized movements. This is particularly the case in
the post-1950 period, while the war and interwar period give rise to some large level
differences between the two price series. The wars are special periods in which trade
barriers an production are affected, giving room to large swings in trade and com-
modity prices that were not connected in the way our theory would prescribe. (Trade
barriers fluctuated significantly during this period, opening a volatile gap between
international commodity prices and the actual prices received by Argentine produc-
ers.) Furthermore, we point out that the commodity price index by Grilli and Yang
(1988) captures world commodity prices and not necessarily those commodity prices
faced by Argentina. With growing financial integration, the global cross-section of
commodity prices has become more correlated over time and thus may render the
index more closely related to the actual commodity prices faced by Argentina in the
later parts of the estimation sample.
Figure 2.7: Estimated and actual process for commodity prices
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Note: The blue solid line repeats the commodity price series from Figure 2.2. The dashed black
line is the commodity price process p˜t that is implied by the posterior estimates of the parameters
and shocks of the estimated model.
Given these concerns, we re-estimated the model using a subsample of the data
from 1950 to 2015. The results of the forecast error variance decomposition are shown
in Table 2.5, Panel (b). In this sample, the quantitative contribution of commodity
price shocks is estimated to be even larger. Commodity price shocks explain 37.97%
of the variance in output growth, 42.28% in consumption growth and 61.11% in
investment growth. The relative importance of other shocks remains broadly similar
in this sample.
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While we primarily focus on comparing our quantitative results to García-Cicco
et al. (2010), as these authors use a similarly long sample for Argentina, our findings
are also broadly in line with comparable recent work on commodity price shocks
in emerging markets that has estimated quantitative models on shorter samples.
Fernández et al. (2015), for example, estimate that the share of commodity shocks
in the variance of real output across a number of emerging economies is 42%, a
number that is very similar to our post-1950 estimate.
In addition to the decomposition given in Table 2.5, which is a theoretical object
computed at the posterior modes, it is also possible to construct a historical variance
decomposition that breaks down the movements of a variable at a given point in the
actual data sample into the contribution of the different shocks. Figure 2.8 presents
such a decomposition for Argentine output growth from 1900 to 2015. The black
line displays the actual time series of growth in real GDP per capita, which is used
as one of the observables in the estimation. The bars represent the contribution
of different shocks to the movements in the output time series at given points in
time. Overall, the figure mirrors the insights from Table 2.5, given that commodity
price shocks and technology shocks (of both types), capture most of the variation in
output growth. Figure 2.8, in addition, enables us to inspect particular episodes in
the economic history of Argentina, as scrutinized for example by Taylor (2014), and
interpret them through the lens of our model.
Taken altogether, our results suggest that commodity prices should feature promi-
nently in the analysis of business cycles in emerging economies. In terms of quanti-
tative contribution, we find that they are among the three most important shocks in
driving output growth in Argentina. Importantly, shocks to international commodity
prices, in contrast to inherently very different concepts such as domestic TFP shocks,
are easier to measure and identify, and eventually act upon, by policy makers.
2.5.3 Further Discussion: Measurement of GDP
How “direct” is the effect of commodity price variation on real GDP? The relative
price p˜t directly enters the calculation of real GDP in our model, but national ac-
counting techniques in practice may not reflect the full variation in relative prices in
the way our measurement equation (2.19) prescribes.35 It is therefore of interest to
break down the variation in GDP resulting from commodity price fluctuations into
the share that comes directly from p˜t and the share that arises from the endogenous
changes in quantities following commodity price changes. This latter effect on quan-
tities would be the only source of change in measured real GDP if the statistical office
kept prices constant in its measurement. If this share of the variation is important,
then the effect of commodity price shocks on GDP that we measure would be more
robust to the specific measurement of real GDP in practice.
35This could be due to base-year pricing, chain-linking or simply due to price mismeasurement or
interpolation. Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), for example, argue that changes in the terms of trade have
no first-order effect if output is measured as chain-weighted real GDP.
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Figure 2.8: Historical Decomposition of Argentine Output Growth 1900-2015
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Note: The line displays the actual time series of real GDP per capita growth, which is used as one
of the observables in the estimation. The bars represent the contribution of different shocks to the
movements in this series at a given point in time. The estimates are obtained using the baseline
estimation specification explained in the text. “Other” includes ν, s, µ and the contribution of
initial values, which is negligible.
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To study this question, Figure 2.10 in the Appendix plots two alternative mea-
sures of GDP from a simulation exercise. The exercise consists of feeding observed
commodity prices into the model, holding all other disturbances constant, and then
computing two alternative GDP measures. The first measure is Y GDPt computed as
in equation (2.19), whereas the second one, Y GDP ∗t , computes the economy’s GDP
holding commodity prices fixed at their steady state value p˜, that is,
Y GDP
∗
t = Yt + p˜Y˜t − p˜M˜t. (2.25)
The figure shows that the two resulting series are very similar, and the variation
in Y GDP ∗t accounts for most of the variation in Y GDPt .36 This highlights that the
economy’s endogenous dynamics in response to changes in international commodity
prices accounts for the major bulk in the variation of total real value added. This
makes the results in our paper robust to different methods used to measure real
GDP.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper has sought to answer a classical question in International Macroeco-
nomics: what causes the large swings in economic activity in emerging markets?
The literature has proposed a variety of triggers, but remains split on the answers.
We study the question anew, combining a model that nests the previous sources of
shocks advanced in the literature and historical data for Argentina going back to
1900.
The model features two key elements. First, it allows for a second sector to
capture the separate role of commodities in the economy. Specifically, the analysis
focuses on the case of a net commodity exporting country, facing exogenous price
changes. Second, the model embeds a negative relation between the interest rate
premium and commodity prices, which is consistent with the empirical evidence.
Exogenous increases in commodity prices improve both the competitiveness of the
economy and its borrowing terms through the negative effect of higher prices on the
spread between the country’s borrowing rates and world interest rates. Both effects
jointly result in strongly positive effects of commodity price movements on GDP,
consumption, and investment, and a negative effect on the total trade balance. They
also generate an excess response of consumption over output.
We estimate the model using data on Argentina from 1900 to 2015 to provide a
quantitative evaluation of the various sources of shocks and their effect on macroe-
conomic aggregates. Our estimate of the contribution of commodity price shocks
to fluctuations in output growth of Argentina is in the order of 22%. Furthermore,
commodity prices account for 24% and 34% of the variation in consumption and
investment growth, respectively. The contribution of these shocks is even bigger
on a post-1950 data sample, accounting for 38% of the variance of output growth,
36The R-squared from regressing one series on the other is 0.95.
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42% of consumption, and 61% of investment. We also find a role for non-stationary
productivity shocks - albeit much smaller than the one documented in Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007), though bigger than García-Cicco et al. (2010) - and an important
role for stationary productivity shocks, consistent with previous findings.
Though in this paper we do not address normative issues, the results offer hope.
Insofar as part of the cycle can be accounted for by observable variables (interna-
tional commodity prices) that cannot be manipulated for political goals, contingent
macroeconomic policies can be designed to help mitigate the cycle. Given the nature
of the driver, sovereign wealth funds may offer a promising avenue for tackling volatil-
ity in commodity producing countries like Argentina. A proper normative analysis
would require, at a minimum, an extension of the model to incorporate default, a
task we leave for future work.
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2.7 Appendices
2.7.1 Details on Data
GDP and its components
Data on real GDP, Investment, Consumption, Government Spending and Net Ex-
ports from 1900 through to 2009 come from Ferreres (2005) - Ferreres has extended
these series to 2009. We extend the data further to 2015 using the corresponding
series from the Argentine Finance Ministry “Ministerio de Economia (Ejecución Pre-
supuestaria de la Administración Nacional),” available online. The growth rate of
the latter series was applied to Ferreres’ 2009 figure.
Commodity Prices
Data on world commodity prices are based on the Grilli and Yang (1988) commod-
ity price index series updated by Pfaffenzeller et al. (2007), which runs from 1900
through to 2011. We update the series to 2015, following Pfaffenzeller et al. (2007)’s
procedure.
The Argentina-specific price index is constructed using Argentine export weights
available in the UN Comtrade data base. We match these weights with commodity-
specific price indeces provided by the World Bank. This is done for the broad com-
modity categories fuel, timber, food, beverages and fertilizer from 1962.
As a deflator for the commodity price series we use the index of US-dollar import
prices for Argentina provided by Pfaffenzeller et al. (2007), which we update till 2015
using the figures from INDEC. For robustness we also tried manufacturing prices (ex-
pressed in US dollars), and the US consumer price index, available via FRED. The
results remain broadly unchanged using these deflators.
World Real Interest Rate
To measure global real interest rates we use the UK nominal interest rate series pub-
lished by the Bank of England from 1900 through 2015 and subtract the UK inflation
rate provided by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS).
Domestic Real Interest Rates
We use the nominal domestic lending rate, savings rate and money market rate,
provided by the IMF International Financial Statistics. We deflate these series us-
ing the corrected inflation measure available at http://www.inflacionverdadera.com/.
See Cavallo (2013) for a discussion.
Government Debt
Data on Debt-to-GDP ratios come from Argentina’s national statistical office, IN-
DEC (Online, Table 7.10).
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2.7.2 Additional Regression Results
Table 2.6: Additional Regression Results: Using the Lending Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS variable Real spread (based on savings rate)
Commodity price -0.131 -0.123 -0.174 -0.138 -0.188
(0.111) (0.113) (0.117) (0.116) (0.119)
Output growth -0.317 -0.259
(0.426) (0.427)
Trade balance -0.526 -1.398
(0.478) (0.906)
Debt-to-GDP ratio -0.020 0.154
(0.075) (0.139)
Constant -0.113*** -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.102* -0.176**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.050) (0.075)
Observations 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.057 0.080 0.106 0.060 0.183
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The real spread is calculated by deflating the domestic savings rate, provided by the IMF,
with a corrected inflation measure (see Cavallo, 2013), and then subtracting the UK real rate. The
commodity price is in log deviations from mean, as plotted in Figure 2.2, Panel (b). Appendix 2.7.1
provides details on the sources of the other regressors.
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Table 2.7: Additional Regression Results: Using the Money Market Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LHS variable Real spread (based on money market rate)
Commodity price -0.183 -0.165 -0.175 -0.162 -0.178
(0.187) (0.184) (0.206) (0.196) (0.207)
Output growth -0.941 -0.931
(0.641) (0.661)
Trade balance 0.088 -0.579
(0.829) (1.377)
Debt-to-GDP ratio 0.052 0.107
(0.122) (0.203)
Constant 0.031 0.044 0.030 0.003 -0.004
(0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.078) (0.102)
Observations 34 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.029 0.092 0.029 0.035 0.101
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: The real spread is calculated by deflating the money market rate, provided by the IMF,
with a corrected inflation measure (see Cavallo, 2013), and then subtracting the UK real rate. The
commodity price is in log deviations from mean, as plotted in Figure 2.2, Panel (b). Appendix 2.7.1
provides details on the sources of the other regressors.
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2.7.3 Model Details
Optimality conditions
Firms
The first-order conditions for final goods producers with respect to K1t , N1t and
M˜t are
rk1t = αKat(K
1
t )
αK−1(M˜t)αM (XtN1t )
1−αK−αM (2.26)
w1t = (1− αK − αM )at(K1t )αK (M˜t)αM (XtN1t )−αK−αMXt (2.27)
p˜t = αMat(K
1
t )
αK (M˜t)
αM−1(XtN1t )
1−αK−αM . (2.28)
The first-order conditions for commodity producers with respect to K1t and N1t
are
rk2t = α˜K p˜ta˜t(K
2
t )
α˜K−1(XtN2t )
1−α˜K (2.29)
w2t = (1− α˜K)p˜ta˜t(K2t )α˜K (XtN2t )−α˜KXt (2.30)
Representative Household
Setting up the dynamic Lagrangian
L =
∞∑
t=0
νtβ
t
{
[Ct − θω−1Xt−1(N1t )ω − θω˜−1Xt−1(N2t )ω˜]1−γ − 1
1− γ
−X−γt−1λt
[
Ct +K
1
t+1 +K
2
t+1 +Dt + St +
φ
2
(
Kt+1
Kt
− g
)2
−rk1t (K1t )− rk2t (K2t )− w1tN1t − w2tN2t − (1− δ)K1t − (1− δ)K2t −
Dt+1
1 + rt
]}
,
(2.31)
the first-order conditions with respect to Ct, N1t , N2t , Dt+1, K1t+1, and K2t+1 are
derived as follows:
[Ct − θω−1Xt−1(N1t )ω − θω˜−1Xt−1(N2t )ω˜]−γ = λtX−γt−1 (2.32)
[Ct − θω−1Xt−1(N1t )ω − θω˜−1Xt−1(N2t )ω˜]−γθXt−1(N1t )ω−1 = λtX−γt−1w1t (2.33)
[Ct − θω−1Xt−1(N1t )ω − θω˜−1Xt−1(N2t )ω˜]−γθXt−1(N2t )ω˜−1 = λtX−γt−1w2t (2.34)
νtλtX
−γ
t−1 = β(1 + rt)X
−γ
t Et(νt+1λt+1) (2.35)
νtλtX
−γ
t−1
[
1 + φ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− g
)]
=
βX−γt Et
{
νt+1λt+1
[
rk1t+1 + 1− δ + φ
(
Kt+2
Kt+1
− g
)
Kt+2
Kt+1
− φ
2
(
Kt+2
Kt+1
− g
)2 ]}
(2.36)
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νtλtX
−γ
t−1
[
1 + φ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− g
)]
=
βX−γt Et
{
νt+1λt+1
[
rk2t+1 + 1− δ + φ
(
Kt+2
Kt+1
− g
)
Kt+2
Kt+1
− φ
2
(
Kt+2
Kt+1
− g
)2 ]}
(2.37)
Note that equations (2.36) and (2.37) imply that the expected return on capital
is equalized across the two sectors in the economy.
Stationary version of equilibrium
Imposing market clearing and denoting ct = CtXt−1 , k
1
t =
K1t
Xt−1 , k
2
t =
K2t
Xt−1 etc., and
using the fact that gt = Xt/Xt−1, the first-order conditions (2.32) to (2.37) can be
rewritten in stationary form as:
[ct − θω−1(N1t )ω − θω˜−1(N2t )ω˜]−γ = λt (2.38)
[ct − θω−1(N1t )ω − θω˜−1(N2t )ω˜]−γθ(N1t )ω−1
= λtg
(1−αK−αM )
t (1− αK − αM )at(k1t )αK (m˜t)αM (N1t )−αK−αM
(2.39)
[Ct − θω−1(N1t )ω − θω˜−1(N2t )ω˜]−γθ(N2t )ω˜−1
= λtg
(1−α˜K)
t (1− α˜K)p˜ta˜t(k2t )α˜K (N2t )−α˜K
(2.40)
λt = β(1 + rt)g
−γ
t Et
(
νt+1
νt
λt+1
)
(2.41)
p˜t = αMg
(1−αK−αM )
t at(k
1
t )
αK (m˜t)
αM−1(N1t )
1−αK−αM (2.42)
νtλt
[
1 + φ
(
kt+1
kt
gt − g
)]
=
βg−γt Et
{
νt+1λt+1
[
g1−αK−αMt αKat+1(k
1
t+1)
αK−1(m˜t+1)αM (N1t+1)
1−αK−αM
+1− δ + φ
(
kt+2
kt+1
gt+1 − g
)
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
kt+2
kt+1
gt+1 − g
)2 ]}
(2.43)
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νtλt
[
1 + φ
(
kt+1
kt
gt − g
)]
=
βg−γt Et
{
νt+1λt+1
[
g1−α˜Kt α˜K p˜t+1a˜t+1(k
2
t+1)
α˜K−1(N2t+1)
1−α˜K
+1− δ + φ
(
kt+2
kt+1
gt+1 − g
)
kt+2
kt+1
− φ
2
(
kt+2
kt+1
gt+1 − g
)2 ]}
(2.44)
The remaining equations of the system that define the stationary equilibrium
are given by the budget constraint (with factor prices eliminated), the production
functions and the interest rate equation, all normalized in the same way, i.e. by
ct+kt+1gt+p˜tm˜t+dt+st+
φ
2
(
kt+1
kt
gt − g
)2
= yt+p˜ty˜t+(1−δ)kt+ dt+1
1 + rt
gt (2.45)
yt = at(k
1
t )
αK (m˜t)
αM (N1t )
1−αK−αM (2.46)
y˜t = a˜t(k
2
t )
α˜K (N2t )
1−α˜K (2.47)
rt = r
∗ + ψ
(
edt+1−d
∗ − 1)− ξ (log(p˜t)− log(p˜)) + (eµt−1 − 1) (2.48)
and by the stochastic processes (2.10) to (2.16) in the body of the paper. The
total trade balance and GDP of the economy can be calculated accordingly.
Steady state
To compute the steady state, we can proceed as follows:
1. Drop all time subscripts.
2. Steady state must fulfill r = r∗ = 1β g
−γ − 1 and d = d∗ from (2.41) and (2.48).
3. Solve (2.44) for the steady state capital-labor ratio in the commodity sector as
a function of primitives
4. Combine (2.38) and (2.39) through λ. Plug in the capital-labor ratio. It is
possible to solve analytically for N2 as a function of primitives. Using the
capital-labor ratio, can solve for k2.
5. Combine (2.38), (2.40), (2.42), and (2.43) to eliminate λ, k1, m˜. Obtain an
equation for N1 as an implicit function of primitives. Solve this equation for
N1 numerically.
6. Use the equations combined in the previous step to solve for k1 and m˜ given
the solution for N1.
7. Use the budget constraint to solve for c.
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2.7.4 Additional Model Results
Figure 2.9: Impulse response functions to different shocks
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(b) Commodity sector productivity shock a˜t
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(c) Growth shock gt
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(d) Commodity price shock p˜t
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(e) Interest rate shock µt
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(f) Spending shock st
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(g) Preference shock νt
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Note: All shocks have been re-scaled to give the same maximum GDP growth response as the
commodity price shock in the body of the paper.
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Figure 2.10: simulated gdp under different price measurement
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Model-implied log GDP at constant commodity prices
Note: The blue solid line shows the economy’s GDP, computed as in (2.19), when feeding in
commodity prices and holding all other disturbances constant. The dotted line repeats the same
exercise but computes GDP at the steady state relative price of commodities, that is, p˜t = p˜.
Table 2.8: Posterior estimates of parameters
Parameter Prior mean Posterior mean 90% HPD interval
ξ 0.199 0.2212 0.1550 0.2876
ψ 2.8 3.2057 2.5050 3.8984
ρa 0.5 0.8277 0.7494 0.9092
ρa˜ 0.5 0.5887 0.2827 0.8980
ρg 0.5 0.5244 0.3199 0.7299
ρν 0.5 0.8687 0.8382 0.8996
ρs 0.5 0.6440 0.5075 0.7832
ρµ 0.5 0.9199 0.8743 0.9693
ρ1p˜ 0.8 0.8060 0.6840 0.9388
−ρ2p˜ 0.15 0.1278 0.0105 0.2298
σa 0.10 0.0295 0.0231 0.0360
σa˜ 0.10 0.0525 0.0242 0.0810
σg 0.10 0.0261 0.0193 0.0327
σν 0.10 0.4582 0.4145 0.5000
σs 0.10 0.1876 0.1659 0.2089
σµ 0.10 0.0547 0.0410 0.0683
σp˜ 0.10 0.1765 0.0876 0.2652
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2.7.5 Interest rate premia and commodity prices: Simple formal
illustration
Suppose there is a borrower who borrows amount Dt. With probability λ she is able
to repay in full. With probability 1−λ only a repayment smaller than the borrowed
amount Dt can be made. This repayment is a fraction φ of commodity output p˜ty˜t
(equivalently, p˜ty˜t can be thought of as collateral which the lender can seize when
full repayment is not possible). The presence of a risk-neutral lender who herself can
obtain funds at the risk-free rate r∗ and who faces perfect competition, will result in
the following zero profit condition:
(1 + r∗)Dt = λ(1 + rt)Dt + (1− λ)φp˜ty˜t, (2.49)
which can be rearranged to
rt =
1 + r∗
λ
− 1− λ
λDt
φp˜ty˜t − 1. (2.50)
As can be seen from (2.50), an increase in p˜t reduces the interest rate rt, ceteris
paribus. This is the key assumption of our model we aim to rationalize with the
above illustration. Furthermore, and also consistent with our formulation in (2.9),
rt is increasing in the level of debt Dt.
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Chapter 3
Agnostic Structural Disturbances
(ASDs): Detecting and Reducing
Misspecification in Empirical
Macroeconomic Models
3.1 Introduction
Exogenous random shocks are the lifeblood of modern macroeconomic business cycle
models. These shocks enter the model as innovations to structural disturbances that
affect key aspects of the model. Whereas the prototype real business cycle (RBC)
model features total factor productivity (TFP) as the only structural disturbance,
recent generations of business cycle models typically include a multitude of structural
disturbances. To avoid singularities when estimating a model, one needs at least as
many unobserved random disturbances as observables. These random shocks can
take the form of measurement error or structural disturbances. The larger the role
for measurement error, the smaller the role of the theoretical model.1 Thus, if
researchers want the theoretical model to explain an important part of the data and
they do not want to set aside information contained in additional observables, then
they need to come up with a sufficiently large set of structural disturbances.
Incorporating structural disturbances correctly is nontrivial and it is not enough
to have the right set. Structural disturbances impose (cross-equation) restrictions
on model equations and, thus, on the model’s solutions. Thus, each structural dis-
turbance has to enter each model equation correctly. This is a real concern, since
we often do not have independent evidence on how structural disturbances should
affect the system. For example, should a risk-premium disturbance affect all Euler
equations or only those of a specific type of investment? Is it correct to assume that
structural disturbances are uncorrelated as is commonly done? Chari et al. (2007)
1There is a fundamental difference between measurement error and structural random distur-
bances. The latter are part of the economic model and their shocks affect the system through time
according to the equations of the model. Measurement error does not.
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propose “wedges” as alternatives to standard structural disturbances. However, it is
important to realize that wedges also impose restrictions. For example, suppose one
adds a “labor wedge" to the labor first-order condition. The assumption that this
wedge does not enter any other equation implies restrictions on how this disturbance
affects policy rules.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, based on a series of econo-
metric estimation exercises using data generated from a known economic model, we
document that a minor misspecification of the empirical model regarding structural
disturbances can easily lead to large distortions for parameter estimates and model
properties, such as business cycle statistics and impulse response functions (IRFs).
Specifically, we consider the case where the empirical model wrongly excludes one
of the structural disturbances and wrongly includes another. Everything else is cor-
rectly specified, including functional forms. Even though we adjust parameter values
to ensure that this is a relatively minor type of misspecification, the results can be
very drastic. For example, standard deviations as implied by the misspecified model
are frequently multiples of their true values and correlation coefficients and IRFs can
flip sign. These results are due solely to misspecification, since we use large samples
and a consistent estimator.
Second, we propose agnostic structural disturbances (ASDs) as an alternative
structural disturbance. In contrast to regular structural disturbances, ASDs impose
no additional restrictions on policy rules. Nevertheless, they are very different from
measurement error, because they are structural disturbances and propagate through
the system like regular structural disturbances. Our ASD procedure can be used
in two ways. First, it can be used to test whether regular structural disturbances
are correctly specified. Second, an empirical specification can be enriched by adding
ASDs as additional structural disturbances. Using Monte Carlo experiments, we
document that the ASD procedure is capable of detecting and correcting for mis-
specification in samples of typical size.
The third contribution of our paper is to test whether the structural disturbances
of the model in Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW) are correctly specified using the
same US postwar data set. We find that the risk-premium and the investment-
specific productivity disturbance are not correctly specified. We use our procedure
to improve on the SW empirical specification. Specifically, our preferred specification
(based on marginal likelihood considerations) has three ASDs and excludes the SW
risk-premium and the SW investment-specific disturbance.
A nice feature of our procedure is that its outcomes provide insights into the
nature of the agnostic disturbances. That is, although the ASD procedure itself does
not rely on any theory, the estimation results – both the associated coefficients and
their IRFs – may reveal a lot about the type of structural disturbance the data has
identified.
One of the ASDs in our adjusted empirical specification of the SW model has
a strong impact on the investment Euler equation and plays an important role for
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the fluctuations in investment. While the same is true for the standard investment-
specific disturbance used in SW, our ASD enters the capital accumulation with a dif-
ferent sign than the investment-specific disturbance and also has a direct positive ef-
fect on capacity utilization. This ASD could capture an “investment-modernization"
disturbance that positively affects the return on new investment, but goes together
with an increased depreciation of existing capital. The latter would imply that this
disturbance affects the capital accumulation with the opposite sign as a standard
investment disturbance, consistent with our empirical results. The direct effect on
utilization could compensate for this scrapping of existing vintages of capital.
The second ASD shares similarities with the SW risk-premium disturbance.
Specifically, it plays a key role in the bond Euler equation. However, the way it
enters the capital valuation equation indicates it is a preference disturbance, not a
risk-premium disturbance. Interestingly, Smets and Wouters (2007) prefer the risk-
premium disturbance over the preference disturbance of Smets and Wouters (2003)
because it generates a positive comovement of the main economic aggregates, whereas
a preference disturbance does not. Our ASD generates a typical business cycle even
though it affects the capital valuation equation like a preference disturbance. The
reason is that it also has an important impact on the investment Euler equation.
Another noteworthy feature of this ASD is that it directly affects the policy rate.
This indicates that the central bank responds differently to economic developments
when these are due to changes in investors’ required rates of return.
The third ASD has an important impact on the wage mark-up. Whereas the SW
wage mark-up disturbance only affects one equation, our ASD also has an important
effect on the capital value, the utilization, and the capital accumulation equation.
Specifically, the data indicate that increased upward wage pressure goes together
with more efficient use of capital. This disturbance has a very temporary impact. In
contrast to the first two ASDs, this ASD does not replace a SW disturbance. Leav-
ing the SW wage mark-up disturbance out of our preferred empirical specification
reduces the marginal data density substantially. However, including this ASD does
substantially lower the value of the MA coefficient in the ARMA representation of
the SW wage mark-up disturbance.
In our application, we could give a sensible interpretation to each of the three
ASDs like one often can do for wedges. Similar to wedges, there may not be a unique
interpretation.2 However, with wedges the researcher has to take a stand on where
the wedges enter the model. The whole idea about our procedure is that it starts by
being agnostic and it lets the data decide where and how ASDs should enter each
model equation.
In the next section, we discuss the outcomes of our misspecification experiments,
in which we generate data using the SW model as the data generating process (dgp)
2For example, regarding our third ASD, it is possible that it captures a higher wage mark-up
that induces a more efficient use of capital. But it is also possible that it captures a desire to use
capital more efficiently and that the higher wage mark-up is the price firms have to pay to obtain
this efficiency increase.
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and then estimate parameters with slightly misspecified empirical models. We use
large samples, so the results are only due to misspecification and not to sampling
variation. Section 3.3 provides a general discussion and motivation of our proposed
misspecification detection and correction procedure. Section 3.4 describes how to use
ASDs in practice. Section 3.5 documents the ability of ASDs to detect and correct
for misspecification using Monte Carlo experiments for a typical application. We use
again the SW model to generate data and the same type of misspecification of the
empirical model as in section 3.2. But now we use a sample length of typical size.
Section 3.6 discusses the results when our procedure is applied to the SW model on
US data.
3.2 Large sample consequences of misspecification
In this section, we consider the consequences of estimating a misspecified empirical
model. Specifically, we generate data with a known structural business cycle model
and then estimate parameters using a misspecified empirical specification. We focus
on large sample properties and use a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator, which is
consistent in this environment. Thus, the results presented are not due to sampling
variation. We document that even a minor misspecification can lead to substantial
distortions in parameter estimates. These distortions matter in the sense that they
imply model properties that are quite different from the true ones. In fact, even
implied model moments for variables that are used as observables in the estimation
can deviate substantially from their data counterparts (which represent the truth
given that we focus on large sample properties).
3.2.1 The true underlying model for our experiment
We use the New Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007), the workhorse model
of empirical business cycle analysis, as the basis of our analysis. Parameter values of
the true data generating process are set equal to those of the SW posterior mode.3
The list of parameters estimated and their interpretation is given in Table 3.1.4
3The only exception is the parameter ρga, which captures the impact of the TFP structural
disturbance on the government expenditures structural disturbance. We set this coefficient equal to
zero in both the true dgp and in the empirical model. This implies that all structural disturbances
are uncorrelated. This is a typical assumption and makes our misspecification experiment more
transparent. As discussed below, the misspecification considered is related to the specification of
the set of structural disturbances. If ρga 6= 0, then we would have to make additional choices
whenever the misspecification involves either the TFP or the government spending shock. We
explored some alternative cases in which ρga 6= 0 and found similar results.
4We follow SW and do not estimate the depreciation rate, δ, the steady-state wage mark-up, µ,
the steady-state level of government expenditures, g, the curvature in the Kimball goods-market
aggregator, εp, and the curvature in the Kimball labor-market aggregator, εw. Since we use de-
meaned data, we also fix the trend growth rate, γ, the parameter controlling steady state hours, l,
the parameter controlling steady state inflation, pi, and the discount factor, β.
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Table 3.1: Parameter explanations
α Capital share
σc Inverse IES of consumption
Φ Fixed cost in production
φ Elasticity of adjustment cost function
λ Degree of consumption habits
ξw Degree of wage rigidity
σ` Inverse IES of leisure
ξp Degree of price rigidity
ιw Degree of indexation for wages
ιp Degree of indexation for prices
ψ Elasticity of capital utilization adj. cost function
rpi Taylor rule coefficient on inflation
ρ Degree of interest rate smoothing in Taylor rule
ry Taylor rule coefficient on output gap
r∆y Taylor rule coefficient on change in output gap
ρj Persistence of exogenous disturbance j
µj MA coefficient of exogenous disturbance j
σj Standard deviation of exogenous disturbance j
j ∈ {a, b, g, I, r, p, w}
Note: The table reports the parameters of the SW model that
are estimated and their interpretation. The list of exogenous
disturbances is given in the text.
3.2.2 The specification of the empirical model
The original SW model has seven exogenous random variables. Those are a TFP
disturbance, εat , a risk-premium disturbance, εbt , a government spending disturbance,
εgt , an investment-specific disturbance, εit, a monetary policy disturbance, εrt , a price
mark-up disturbance, εpt , and a wage mark-up disturbance, εwt . We leave out one of
these seven disturbances when generating data for our misspecification experiments.
The empirical specification also leaves out one disturbance, but not the right one.
This means we have 7 × 6 = 42 experiments. Everything else is always correctly
specified, including functional forms, specification of the processes for the exogenous
random variables, and the values of the parameters that are not estimated. The
observables used in SW consists of employment, the federal funds rate, the inflation
rate, GDP, consumption, investment, and the real wage rate. We exclude the real
wage rate so we have the same number of observables as structural disturbances
which is consistent with the empirical exercise in SW.
Is this a likely misspecification? We believe that this type of misspecification
is likely to be important in practice even if one includes a large set of structural dis-
turbances. The first reason is that having a large set does not necessarily imply one
includes all the true disturbances. Moreover, one does not only need to include all
true disturbances, each disturbance has to enter each model equation correctly. For
example, a TFP disturbance is typically modeled as a labor-augmenting productiv-
ity shock, but productivity changes could affect the production function differently.
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Moreover, TFP increases may also affect other aspects of the production process
such as the depreciation rate.5
Is this a “minor" misspecification? When generating the data, we adjust the
standard deviation of the disturbance that is incorrectly excluded from the empirical
specification to ensure that it is responsible for at most 10% of the volatility for any of
the six observables used in the estimation. By doing this we reduce the quantitative
importance of the misspecification.
One could argue that a misspecification is only minor if one would not detect it in
a typical data set using some model selection criterion such as the marginal likelihood.
This is a very strict requirement. Comparing a misspecified model with the correct
one requires that researchers are aware of the correct specification and test their
empirical model against it. Since structural disturbances can enter models in many
different ways, researchers may not consider the correct one even if they consider
several alternatives.6 In this section, we use very large samples and misspecified
models would be rejected against the truth. In section 3.2.6, we select two of the
forty-two experiments and data sets of typical length and document using a computer
intensive Monte Carlo analysis that a test comparing the misspecified model with
the correct model would often not lead to a rejection of the misspecified model. This
supports our claim that the misspecification considered here is indeed minor.
Estimation procedure. DSGE models are typically estimated with Bayesian
techniques, which means that the estimation outcome is a weighted combination
of the prior and the empirical likelihood. Misspecification of the empirical model
affects the latter. With a tight prior, observed data – and thus misspecification of
the likelihood – matter less for posterior estimates. Then, the quality of those esti-
mates will depend on the quality of the prior. This paper focuses on the question
how misspecification affects what the observed data imply for parameter estimates
and implied model properties. Thus, we focus on the likelihood and use Maximum
Likelihood estimation.7
In practice, there could be interesting interactions between the misspecification
of the empirical model and small sample properties of the estimator. We abstract
5Similarly, Cúrdia and Reis (2012) argue that assumptions about the correlation of structural
disturbances are important and that one can question the standard assumption that structural
disturbances in macroeconomic models are not correlated.
6Indeed, although the SW empirical specification is a very carefully constructed model that
incorporates insights of many previous empirical studies, it is still rejected against some minor
modifications, as is shown in 3.6.
7Our optimization problem is relatively well defined. It helps, of course, that our experiments
rely on very large samples and on empirical models that are only misspecified in terms of the driving
processes. Moreover, we use the true parameter values as the initial conditions for the optimization
routine and we specify bounds for the parameter values. These choices decrease computing time
and also give a misspecified model the best possible chance to deliver estimates that are close to the
truth. The innovation standard deviations of the disturbances are restricted to be in the interval
[0, 10] and the coefficients of their time series process in the interval [0, 99]. Given our focus on
misspecified disturbances, we want these intervals to be large. For the structural parameters we set
the lower bound and the upper bound to the first and ninety-ninth percentile according to the SW
prior, centered at the parameter values of the true dgp.
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from small sampling variation by using a large enough sample. In particular, our
experiments are based on a sample of 10,000 observations. Our estimator is consistent
and estimates are very close to the truth when the empirical model is correctly
specified. Section 3.5 studies the small sample properties in detail for two out of the
forty-two misspecification experiments.
Priors on the standard deviation of structural disturbances typically do not allow
for point mass at zero. Ferroni et al. (2015) point out that this biases the results
towards a positive role of all structural disturbances.8 This is not an issue for us,
since we use ML estimation. In fact, estimated standard deviations of disturbances
that are part of the empirical model but not part of the true dgp turn out to be often
close to zero.9
Identification. In appendix 3.7.2, we document that the estimated parameter val-
ues are identified using a strong version of the identification test of Komunjer and
Ng (2011). This is true according to the correct and the misspecified empirical
model. Thus, none of the results should be driven by non-identification rather than
misspecification. Further justification for this claim is given in section 3.2.5.
3.2.3 Misspecification: Consequences for parameter values
Table 3.2 reports some key percentiles (across experiments) to characterize the range
of the estimated parameter values. We only consider parameters that are in both the
true and empirical specification.10 All parameters are affected by misspecification
to some extent. Moreover, the minor misspecifications considered in these forty-two
experiments lead to massive distortions for several parameter estimates.
The median parameter estimates (across experiments) are relatively close to the
true parameter values. Thus, our choice of experiments does not favor bias in a
particular direction. There is one exception. The median value of the estimated
standard deviation of the productivity disturbance innovation, σa, is equal to 0.92
compared to a true value of 0.45. The reason is that this disturbance often “absorbs"
the variation of the disturbance that is not included in the empirical specification.
Thus, the disturbance that is wrongly included in the empirical specification does
not necessarily fulfill this role.
8There are several differences between their and our setup. They only consider one specific
misspecified empirical model whereas we consider forty-two. Although they consider a limited
Monte Carlo experiment (with 100 replications), the main discussion focuses on particular sample
of 200 observations. In this section, we abstract from small sample issues by focusing on one very
long sample. Most importantly, their main focus is on the consequences of using an inverse gamma
prior for parameters that could well be zero. Our focus is on the misspecification of the empirical
model, not the specification of the prior.
9In those cases, the role of the structural disturbance that is wrongly excluded from the empirical
specification is “taken over" by some of the correctly included disturbances, not the one that is
wrongly included.
10Specifically, for the parameters of the exogenous random processes, the experiments in which
the disturbance is part of the empirical model – but not part of the true dgp – are excluded from
the calculations of the percentiles.
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Table 3.2: Parameter estimates across misspecification experiments
Imposed Imposed
Truth Min Min 10% 25% Median 75% 90% Max Max
α 0.19 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.31 0.31
σc 1.39 0.53 0.53 0.78 1.14 1.35 1.60 1.82 2.25 2.25
Φ 1.61 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.53 1.77 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89
φ 5.48 1.99 2.71 3.59 5.47 7.38 8.97 8.97 8.97 8.97
λ 0.71 0.45 0.45 0.59 0.71 0.74 0.84 0.89 0.90 0.90
ξw 0.73 0.47 0.50 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.91 0.92
σ` 1.92 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.52 1.87 2.71 3.66 3.66 3.66
ξp 0.65 0.40 0.53 0.60 0.65 0.78 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
ιw 0.59 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.38 0.58 0.61 0.80 0.89 0.89
ιp 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.22 0.32 0.48 0.63 0.65
ψ 0.54 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.42 0.54 0.68 0.86 0.86 0.86
rpi 2.03 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.71 2.07 2.39 2.61 2.61 2.61
ρ 0.81 0.53 0.62 0.73 0.79 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.92 0.97
ry 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.20
r∆y 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 0.24 0.34 0.34 0.34
ρa 0.95 0.00 0.50 0.82 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρb 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.80 0.99
ρg 0.97 0.00 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
ρI 0.71 0.00 0.57 0.60 0.68 0.71 0.78 0.84 0.95 0.99
ρr 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.33 0.50 0.99
ρp 0.90 0.00 0.70 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.96 0.98 0.99
ρw 0.97 0.00 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
µp 0.74 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.43 0.73 0.82 0.91 0.95 0.99
µw 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.89 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.99
σa 0.45 0.00 0.42 0.47 0.67 0.92 1.49 2.57 3.20 10
σb 0.24 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 10
σg 0.52 0.00 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.57 10
σI 0.45 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.54 10
σr 0.24 0.00 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.31 10
σp 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 10
σw 0.24 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.31 10
Note: This table gives information about the parameter estimates across the forty-two misspecification
experiments. For the parameters of the laws of motion of the disturbances, we exclude an experiment
from the calculations of the percentiles when the disturbance is part of the empirical model, but not part
of the true dgp. The table also reports the bounds imposed on parameter estimates. See Table 3.1 for
the definitions of the parameters.
146
Even if we exclude cases for which the estimates fall in the bottom or top 10%,
then we find that estimates are substantially different from their true value for many
parameters. For example, for the labor supply elasticity with respect to the real
wage, σl, the 10th percentile is equal to 0.18 and the 90th percentile is equal to 3.66,
compared with a true value of 1.92. For the parameter capturing the indexation of
wages ιw, the same two percentiles are 0.27 and 0.8, compared with a true value of
0.59. For the parameter capturing the indexation of prices, ιp, the two numbers are
0.01 and 0.48, compared with a true value of 0.22. When the two 10% tails are not
excluded and the full range of estimates is considered, then the range substantially
increases. Specifically, the largest values are 0.89 and 0.63 for the indexation of
wages and prices, respectively.11 Recall that these distortions are solely due to
misspecification, not to small-sample variation.
For several parameters, the results remain bad when we narrow the range of
outcomes considered. For example, when we exclude the bottom and the top 25%,
then the values for σl, vary between 0.52 and 2.71 compared with a true value of
1.92. The results are also quite bad for φ, the elasticity in the capital adjustment
cost function, for which the 25th percentile is equal to 5.47 and the 75th percentile
is equal to 8.97.
3.2.4 Missspecification: Consequences for model properties
The previous section documents that misspecification can lead to large distortions in
parameter values. Parameter estimates are often of interest in themselves. At least
as important are the properties of the estimated structural model. It could be that
different parameter configurations lead to similar model properties. In this section,
we address this by looking at implied moments and IRFs.
Implied model moments
We begin by documenting the consequences of model misspecification for implied
model moments using the misspecification setup described above. Table 3.3 reports
the range of values for typical business cycle properties as implied by the estimated
parameter values of the forty-two experiments considered. Specifically, it reports
standard deviations and correlation coefficients relative to their true values. Thus, a
value equal to 1 means that there is no distortion. The column labeled “true value"
reports the range of values the corresponding moment has according to the true
dgp.12
Misspecification implies an upward bias for volatility in our experiments.13 This
11Parameter estimates are constrained to be in a range, and the largest estimate of the wage
indexation parameter is constrained by the imposed upper bound.
12Moments are not the same across experiments, since we adjust the standard deviations of the
structural disturbances to ensure that the wrongly omitted disturbance does not play an important
role.
13Section 3.2.3 documents an upward bias for σa, the standard deviation of the TFP disturbance.
Since one disturbance is missing from the empirical model, it is not surprising that there is a
shift towards some of the other disturbances. By contrast, here we find an upward bias for total
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Table 3.3: Moments: Ratio of implied value to truth across experiments
True value Min 10% 25% Median 75% 90% Max
(estimates, scaled by true value)
Std(yt) [ 3.48 , 5.12 ] 0.51 0.78 0.92 1.03 1.64 4.46 6.03
Std(ct) [ 3.30 , 5.58 ] 0.45 0.76 0.92 1.03 1.81 4.12 6.62
Std(it) [ 9.73 , 12.94 ] 0.70 0.87 0.99 1.11 1.71 3.81 6.47
Std(rt) [ 0.52 , 0.61 ] 0.76 0.90 0.94 1.00 1.36 2.28 2.78
Std(pit) [ 0.37 , 0.54 ] 0.64 0.72 0.94 1.01 1.25 2.21 2.98
Std(wt) [ 2.13 , 2.70 ] 0.73 0.83 0.92 1.08 2.28 5.57 10.87
Corr(yt, ct) [ 0.65 , 0.94 ] 0.28 0.68 0.93 0.99 1.07 1.15 1.52
Corr(yt, it) [ 0.74 , 0.87 ] 0.69 0.83 0.95 1.00 1.10 1.16 1.29
Corr(ct, it) [ 0.63 , 0.89 ] -0.68 0.60 0.92 1.00 1.19 1.34 1.57
Corr(ct, rt) [ -0.65 , -0.35 ] -0.71 0.54 0.86 0.99 1.11 1.52 2.13
Corr(it, wt) [ 0.29 , 0.69 ] -1.52 0.10 0.64 1.07 1.49 1.99 3.28
Corr(it, piw) [ 0.51 , 0.80 ] 0.36 0.84 0.97 1.02 1.17 1.34 1.75
Note: This table reports the outcomes across experiments for the indicated moment as implied by pa-
rameter estimates relative to its true value. Thus a value equal to 1 indicates that there is no distortion
due to misspecification. Each row reports percentiles across our forty-two experiments. It also reports
the range of values of the true moments across the experiments. All moments considered are related to
variables that are used in the estimation as observables.
upward bias could be specific to our particular type of misspecification. However,
the observed upward bias is consistent with the simple analytical example discussed
in appendix 3.7.1.14 The results are solely due to misspecification, since we use
very large samples and our ML estimator is consistent when the empirical model is
correctly specified.
The overestimation of volatility is enormous in some cases. Even if we exclude the
top 25%, then standard deviations can be multiples of the true standard deviation.
For example, the 75th percentile for the standard deviation of wages is 2.28 times
its true value. This ratio increases to 5.57 when we only exclude the top 10%. The
90th percentiles for the consumption and output standard deviation ratios are 4.12
and 4.46, which also indicates massive over-prediction. The 90th percentile number
for investment is equal to 3.81 and in the worst experiment the implied standard
deviation is 6.47 times as big as the true value. By contrast, the values in the lower
tail are less drastic. Excluding the bottom 10%, we find that the largest distortions
are found for inflation for which the 10th percentile is 0.72, that is, implied volatility
is 28% below its true value. If we consider all experiments, then the smallest ratio
is equal to 0.45, which is found for the implied standard deviation of consumption.
Misspecification also has large quantitative implications for correlation coeffi-
cients. In fact, the sign of the correlation coefficient as implied by parameter esti-
mates turns out to be different from its sample analogue in several cases. This would
not be a big deal if the two correlation coefficients are both close to zero. But there
variability.
14In appendix 3.7.1, we discuss a simple example which documents analytically how maximum
likelihood estimation of a misspecified model can lead to an arbitrarily large upward bias in the
implied variance of an observable.
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are also cases in which the implied correlation coefficient according to the estimated
empirical model and the true correlation coefficient are both large in absolute value
and differ in sign.15,16
Impulse response functions (IRFs)
To conclude the discussion on the consequences of misspecification, we document
that misspecification can also have a large impact on impulse response functions.
There are many IRFs to consider. Figure 3.1 plots for three IRFs the outcomes
across the experiments and documents that the distortions can be large. We exclude
the cases when the disturbance of interest is in the empirical specification, but not
part of the true dgp. It would not be surprising if these are different.17 Thus, the
disturbance of interest is part of the true dgp as well as the empirical model for all
three cases considered.
Figure 3.1a plots the response of output to a TFP disturbance. This is obviously
a key characteristic of the model. The black line plots the true IRF and the grey
lines plot the IRFs as implied by the empirical model for the different experiments.
All IRFs are based the same size shock.18 If the grey lines are close to the black line,
then misspecification of the empirical model has only minor consequences for the IRF
considered. The sign of the IRF is virtually always correct and TFP disturbances
always have a noticeable positive impact on aggregate output.19 Nevertheless, the
figure documents that there are large differences in terms of initial impact, overall
magnitude, shape, and persistence.
Figure 3.1b plots the response of the real wage to a monetary policy shock. This
is clearly the kind of model property one would want to get right when analyzing
monetary policy. The figure shows again a wide variety of responses across the
different empirical specifications. Whereas the true response is substantial, there are
several empirical specifications that predict a very small change. There are also a
few specifications that give a much larger response. We want to reemphasize that the
plotted IRFs are for a disturbance that is correctly included in the empirical model.
Figure 3.1c reports the results for the inflation IRF of an investment-specific
shock. For most experiments the IRFs display a similar pattern, but there are im-
portant differences in terms of magnitude. For three experiments, however, the IRFs
are completely at odds with the true IRF. Whereas the true IRF is positive and has
reverted back to zero after twenty periods, the IRFs implied by these three misspeci-
15A striking example is the experiment in which the government disturbance is not present in
the true dgp and the empirical model excludes the risk-premium disturbance instead. The true
correlation between consumption and investment is equal to 0.67 whereas the one implied by the
estimated model is equal to -0.41.
16The smallest correlation coefficient (in absolute value) according to the true model is 0.29, so
any sign change implies a nontrivial change in the correlation coefficient.
17Also, we cannot calculate IRFs for a particular disturbance if that disturbance is not part of
the empirical specification. This means that each figure plots IRFs for thirty-two cases.
18That is, one standard deviation according to the original SW model. Differences across IRFs
are bigger if we use the estimated standard deviations for the different experiments.
19In some experiments, the initial response is negative. However, its value is then very small.
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Figure 3.1: IRFs according to true and misspecified empirical models
(a) Output response to TFP shock
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(b) Wage response to monetary policy shock
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(c) Inflation response to investment shock
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Note: The figure plots the true IRF (black)and the IRFs implied by the misspecified (grey) empirical models
considered. The results are based on a very large sample, so results are not due to small sample variation.
These IRFs are for shocks that are correctly included in the model. Also, we do not use estimated standard
deviations, but use the same size shock for all IRFs.
fied empirical models are negative and indicate larger volatility and more persistence.
Again, relatively small changes in parameter values can change these IRFs such that
they are much closer to the true IRF.20
3.2.5 Is weak identification the cause?
In appendix 3.7.2, we demonstrate that all parameters are identified in all models
considered.21 Moreover, we use a very large sample to estimate the parameters so
the large range of values for parameter estimates cannot be caused by samples being
too short to be informative. Also, the finding that the different parameter values are
20Specifically, if σc, the parameter controlling curvature in the utility function and λ, the param-
eter indicating the habit component in the utility function, are set equal to their true values, then
these three IRFs have a shape that is similar to the true IRF, that is, also predict a hump-shaped
positive response. The responses still differ somewhat from the truth in having a more delayed
response and a more persistent effect. The estimated values for σc in the three experiments are
0.65, 0.53, and 0.53, whereas the true value if equal to 1.39. The estimated values for λ are equal
to 0.86, 0.87, and 0.85, whereas the true value is equal to 0.71.
21All true specifications have one structural disturbance less than the original SW model. This
turns out not to matter for identification. In fact, estimated parameters remain identified when
we do the identification test for specifications with five disturbances that exclude the disturbance
that is not part of the true dgp as well as the one that is erroneously omitted from the empirical
specification.
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associated with quite different model properties indicates that the results discussed
in this section are not due to parameters not being identified. As a final check,
we compare the values of the likelihood according to the misspecified model at the
estimated values and the true values. When using the true values, we do re-estimate
the parameters of the exogenous random variables.22 The smallest difference between
the two log likelihood values is equal to 14.5 and there are only four experiments
for which the difference is less than 100. The mean (median) difference is equal to
10, 371 (5501).23
3.2.6 Is the misspecification really minor?
The misspecification experiments considered above involve the inclusion of one wrong
and the exclusion of one correct structural disturbance. Everything else is correctly
specified. So the misspecification affects only a small part of all the model features
researchers have to specify when writing down a complete empirical model.
Nevertheless, one could argue, that this misspecification is not that likely for the
analysis in Smets and Wouters (2007), since SW was preceded by years of empirical
analysis by many authors. However, in section 3.6, we document that we clearly
reject the null that two of the included structural disturbances are correctly specified
against several alternatives. It is important to recall that correct specification of a
structural disturbance is not only getting the nature of the disturbance right, but
also that it enters each model equation correctly. In section 3.6, we will argue that
this is not the case for two of the seven SW structural disturbances.
Furthermore, it could be argued that a misspecification is only minor if the mis-
specified model is not rejected when its fit is compared with the fit of the correct
model. This is, of course, a test that one could never implement in practice, since it
requires knowing the truth. The large differences in likelihood discussed in section
3.2.5 indicate that the misspecified model would be easily rejected. However, those
likelihood values correspond to tests using unrealistically large samples. The appro-
priate question is whether one would reject the misspecified model with a sample of
typical length and typical estimation procedure.
To address this question, we do a Monte Carlo experiment in which the model is
estimated as in SW. That is, the data set has the same number of observations, the
parameters are estimated with the same Bayesian methodology, and the priors are
also the same. We assess model fit using the marginal data density (MDD). These are
expensive Monte Carlo experiments.24 Therefore, we consider only two of the possible
22This is a conservative choice, since differences in the likelihoods would be larger if these param-
eters are not re-estimated.
23It is not surprising that across experiments, there are some for which the misspecification is
smaller than for others resulting in smaller differences between the two likelihood values. After
all, our experiments are not designed to find large misspecification. Our set is constructed using a
simple variation in the set of the original structural disturbances.
24The reason is that they involve an optimization problem containing many parameter values.
In contrast to the exercise in section 2, the optimization here is a bit more difficult, since it is
affected by small-sample sampling variation. Moreover, it has to be repeated for every Monte Carlo
replication.
151
forty-two misspecification experiments of section 3.2. They were chosen as follows.
We ranked all experiments by the likelihood value of the misspecified specification
relative to the likelihood of the correct specification. The idea is that misspecification
is less severe if the likelihood values are close to each other. The first experiment
chosen is the one corresponding to the sixty-sixth percentile and the second is the one
corresponding to the thirty-third percentile.25 Thus, our experiments are neither the
least nor the most problematic in terms of misspecification. In section 3.5, we return
to these two examples and we will document that consequences of misspecification
are severe for both cases.
For the experiment at the thirty-third percentile we find that the misspecified
model has a higher marginal data density in 17.8% of the Monte Carlo replications.
Thus, one would prefer the wrong empirical model over the correct one in about four
out of five cases in cases if one is so lucky to be able to do the test against the true
model specification.
For the experiment at the sixty-sixth percentile, this number decreases to 52%.
That is, the correct and the misspecified model have roughly an equal chance of
having the best fit when realistic samples are used.26
3.3 Agnostic Structural Disturbances
In this section, we develop and motivate our “structural agnostic disturbance" (ASD)
procedure to detect and correct for misspecification. ASDs can be added to a struc-
tural model and they can be used to test whether a regular structural disturbance is
correctly specified.
3.3.1 Underlying theoretical model
Consider the following linearized model
0n×1 = Et [Λ2 (Ψ) st+1 + Λ1 (Ψ) st + Λ0 (Ψ) st−1 + Γ (Ψ) εt+1 + Υ (Ψ) εt] , (3.1a)
εt = Gεt−1 +Hηt, (3.1b)
Et [ηt+1] = 0, (3.1c)
Et
[
ηt+1η
′
t+1
]
= Im×m, (3.1d)
where Ψ is the vector containing the structural parameters, st is the n × 1 vector
of endogenous variables, and εt is the m × 1 vector of exogenous random variables.
25The first (second) Monte Carlo experiment corresponds to the case when the true dgp does not
include a monetary policy (TFP) disturbance, but the empirical model leaves out the investment
disturbance instead.
26This Monte Carlo experiment does indicate an interesting aspect of sampling variation. The
large sample analysis indicates that the empirical model considered in this second Monte Carlo
experiment is more misspecified than the one of the first Monte Carlo, since there was a large
difference in the marginal likelihoods of the correct and misspecified model. In terms of marginal
likelihoods, this ranking is reversed in small samples.
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All variables are defined relative to their steady state values. Most linearized DSGE
models can be represented with such a system of equations.27
Type of misspecification considered. As in section 3.2, the misspecification
focuses on the modeling of the structural disturbances. That is, whether the included
disturbances are the right ones and whether the restrictions they impose on the model
equations correct.
3.3.2 The ASD procedure
There are two ways to describe and implement the ASD procedure. The first formu-
lation is discussed in section 3.3.2. This formulation highlights that our procedure
is more general than the procedure that adds wedges to particular model equations.
We provide the second formulation in section 3.3.2 after discussing some background
information in section 3.3.2. This second formulation makes clear that our procedure
is more efficient than the misspecification procedures that combine a DSGE model
with a reduced-form empirical model as in Ireland (2004) and Del Negro et al. (2007).
This efficiency advantage is made possible by focusing on one particular type of mis-
specification, namely exogenous disturbances not being the right ones or not being
modeled correctly. As explained below, this allows us to use some of the structure
of the model.
We will show that these two formulations are not different procedures, but dif-
ferent ways to implement this procedure.28 Which procedure is more convenient in
practice will depend on the application.
ASD procedure: First formulation based on model equations
Consider the model given in equation (3.1). To simplify the exposition, we start with
the case for which st includes only state variables and all n state variables are ob-
servables. Suppose that the researcher is only sure aboutm1 structural disturbances.
These are part of the vector, ε1,t. If m1 < n and there are no other disturbances,
then there is a singularity problem. One option would be to add measurement error.
But structural disturbances and measurement errors are very different. Structural
disturbances affect economic variables and propagate through the system according
to the economic mechanisms of the model. Measurement error disturbances do not.29
Another option is to make a best guess and to add a vector ε2,t with m2 additional
27Linearization leads to accurate solutions for many business cycle models. When this is not the
case, then this is an additional source of misspecification.
28See section 3.3.2.
29See section 3.3.2 for an explanation. Moreover, most researchers would find it undesirable if
“measurement" error explains a large part of the data.
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structural disturbances with m2 ≥ n−m1. Equation (3.1) can then be written as
0n×1 = Et [Λ2 (Ψ) st+1 + Λ1 (Ψ) st + Λ0 (Ψ) st−1 + Γ (Ψ) εt+1 + Υ (Ψ) εt]
= Et
 Λ2 (Ψ) st+1 + Λ1 (Ψ) st + Λ0 (Ψ) st−1
+ [Γ1 (Ψ) Γ2 (Ψ)]
[
ε1,t+1
ε2,t+1
]
+ [Υ1 (Ψ) Υ2 (Ψ)]
[
ε1,t
ε2,t
]  , (3.2a)
[
ε1,t
ε2,t
]
=
[
G11 G12
G21 G22
][
ε1,t−1
ε2,t−1
]
+
[
H11 H12
H21 H22
][
η1,t
η2,t
]
, (3.2b)
Et
[
η1,t+1
η2,t+1
]
= 0, (3.2c)
Et
[[
η1,t+1
η2,t+1
] [
η1,t+1 η2,t+1
]]
= Im×m. (3.2d)
The column vectors Γ2(Ψ) and Υ2(Ψ) capture the restrictions imposed by them2 ad-
ditional structural disturbances. In the remainder of this section, we document that
no such restrictions are imposed when agnostic structural disturbances are added.
Adding ASDs to model equations. If one adds agnostic structural disturbances
instead of regular structural disturbances, then the system of equations is modified
as follows:
0n×1 = Et
 Λ2 (Ψ) st+1 + Λ1 (Ψ) st + Λ0 (Ψ) st−1
+ [Γ1 (Ψ) Γ2]
[
ε1,t+1
ε2,t+1
]
+ [Υ1 (Ψ) Υ2]
[
ε1,t
ε2,t
]  . (3.3)
The key aspect of our procedure is that Γ2 and Υ2 are reduced-form coefficients that
do not contain any restrictions on Ψ. Moreover, when G21 = 0, which is typically
the case as structural disturbances are usually modeled to be uncorrelated, then
Et [Γ2ε2,t+1 + Υ2ε2,t] = (Γ2G22 + Υ2) ε2,t. (3.4)
Using this insight, we can write the system as
0n×1 = Et
[
Λ2 (Ψ) st+1 + Λ1 (Ψ) st + Λ0 (Ψ) st−1
+Γ1 (Ψ) ε1,t+1 + Υ1 (Ψ) ε1,t + Υ̂2ε2,t
]
, (3.5)
where Υ̂2 = G22Γ2 + Υ2. All that matters for the model is Υ̂2, which means that
adding an agnostic disturbance introduces one additional parameter for each model
equation.30,31 Replacing regular structural disturbances with agnostic structural dis-
turbances may make it harder to identify Ψ, the structural parameters of the model.
30Without loss of generality one can set the standard deviations of the innovation of the ASDs
equal to 1, which in this case is a normalization of the diagonal elements of H2,2. As with regular
structural disturbances, one would need to estimate the parameters of the time series specification
contained in G.
31As discussed later, one could choose to leave the agnostic disturbance out of some equations.
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As discussed in appendix 3.7.2, this turned out to be not an issue for the experiments
discussed in this paper. Identification of Υ̂2 will be discussed in section 3.3.2.
Useful proposition for second ASD formulation
In this section, we will proof a proposition that will be helpful with the second
formulation of the ASD procedure. Consider again the model given in equation
(3.2), which divides the vector with exogenous disturbances, εt, into two parts, the
m1×1 vector, ε1,t, and the m2×1 vector, ε2,t. A recursive solution to equation (3.2)
has the following form:
st = A (Ψ) st−1 +B(Ψ)εt
= A (Ψ) st−1 +
[
B1 (Ψ) B2 (Ψ)
] [ ε1,t
ε2,t
]
. (3.6)
The following proposition states that the properties of ε2,t do not affect the
coefficients of the policy rule related to st−1 and ε1,t, that is, they do not affect
A(Ψ) and B1(Ψ). Thus, it does not matter whether ε2,t is a regular or an agnostic
structural disturbances and the time series properties of ε2,t do not matter either.
The only assumption needed is that the elements of G21 are equal to zero, which
corresponds to the case when ε1,t has no effect on future values of ε2,t. This is not
very restrictive given that the literature usually sets all elements of G21 equal to zero
(and also all elements of G12, H1,2, and H2,2 as well as the off-diagonal elements of
G11, G22, H1,1 and H2,2).
Proposition 1. If the model is given by equation (3.2) and all elements of G21 are
equal to zero, then (i) A(Ψ) and B1(Ψ) do not depend on Γ2(Ψ) and Υ2(Ψ), which
characterize the nature of the additional disturbances, and (ii) A(Ψ) and B1(Ψ) do
not depend on G22, H21, and H22, which characterize the time series properties of
ε2,t.
Proof. Substitution of the policy rule as given in equation (3.6) into the system of
equations (3.2) gives,
0n×1 =
(
Λ2A
2 + Λ1A+ Λ0
)
st−1 + (Λ2AB + Λ2BG+ Λ1B + ΓG+ Υ) εt,(3.7)
εt =
[
ε1,t ε2,t
]′
, (3.8)
B =
[
B1 B2
]
, (3.9)
G =
[
G11 G12
G21 G22
]
, (3.10)
where we have suppressed the dependence of coefficients on Ψ. The first equation
has to hold for all values of st−1 and εt. This implies that a solution must satisfy
Λ2A
2 + Λ1A+ Λ0 = 0n×n (3.11)
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and
Λ2AB + Λ2BG+ Λ1B + ΓG+ Υ = 0n×(m1+m2). (3.12)
A does not depend on the time series properties of ε1,t and ε2,t, since B, G, and H
do not appear in equation (3.11). Equation (3.12) can be written as follows
Λ
[
B1 B2
]
+Λ2
[
B1 B2
] [ G11 G12
G21 G22
]
+Γ
[
G11 G12
G21 G22
]
+Υ = 0n×(m1+m2),
(3.13)
where Λ = Λ2A+ Λ1. This is a system of n× (m1 +m2) equations to solve for the
elements of B. It can be split into the following two sets of systems:
ΛB1 + Λ2B1G11 + Λ2B2G21 + Γ1
[
G11
G21
]
+ Υ1 = 0n×m1 , (3.14)
ΛB2 + Λ2B1G12 + Λ2B2G22 + Γ2
[
G12
G22
]
+ Υ2 = 0n×m2 . (3.15)
If G21 = 0, then equation (3.14) contains n × m1 equations to solve for all the
elements of B1. The solution cannot depend on G22 or H2 since these matrices do
not appear in this equation.
It is intuitive that the elements of G21 have to be equal to zero, that is, ε1,t
should not affect future values of ε2,t. If current values of ε1,t do affect future values
of ε2,t and therefore future values of st, then one has to know how ε2,t affects model
outcomes to determine how ε1,t affects current outcomes for st.
ASD procedure: Second formulation based on policy functions
The second formulation highlights the differences with alternative procedures that
deal with misspecification by combining a DSGE model and a VAR. This alterna-
tive formulation is also useful in terms of understanding whether adding agnostic
disturbances leads to identification issues.
An alternative way of writing the solution to the model is the following:
st =
m∑
i=1
s
[i]
t , (3.16)
s
[i]
t = A (Ψ) s
[i]
t−1 +B·,i (Ψ) εi,t, (3.17)
where s[i]t represents the outcome of the state variable if the only disturbance in the
economy is the ith-disturbance, εi,t, and B·,i is the ith column of B. Thus, one can
think of the st variables as the sum of the outcomes in “one-disturbance" economies.
The linearity of the model is important for this additive property. According to
proposition 1, the coefficients on the lagged state variable, A (Ψ), do not depend
on the particular disturbance considered. That is, whereas B·,i(Ψ) is indexed by i
because it depends on what kind of disturbance is the driving force of the economy,
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A(Ψ) does not. This property greatly increases the efficiency of our procedure.
Our proposed procedure consists of includingm2 agnostic structural disturbances.
This results in the following time series representation of the policy functions:32
st =
m∑
i=1
s
[i]
t , (3.18a)
s
[i]
t = A (Ψ) s
[i]
t−1 +B·,i (Ψ) εi,t for i ≤ m1, (3.18b)
s
[i]
t = A (Ψ) s
[i]
t−1 +B·,iεi,t for m1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ m1 +m2 = m. (3.18c)
In terms of notation, B·,i(Ψ) contains coefficients associated with a regular struc-
tural disturbance which are a function of Ψ and bold font B·,i contains reduced-form
coefficients associated with a structural agnostic disturbance. The only difference
between this specification and the standard DSGE specification with only regular
structural disturbances is that the B·,i coefficients are unrestricted reduced-form co-
efficients. Since our agnostic disturbances are structural disturbances, their impact
propagates through the system exactly as regular structural disturbances do, that is,
as described by A(Ψ). The property of linear models that A(Ψ) does not depend at
all on what is the nature of the structural disturbances nor on their time series prop-
erties makes it possible to efficiently add structural disturbances to the specification
without having to be specific on what they are.
The dimension of B·,i is equal to n, the number of state variables. This means
that adding an agnostic disturbance means estimating an additional n parameters.
The number of additional parameters to be estimated is limited because structural
disturbances differ in their initial impact, but their propagation through time is the
same for all disturbances and controlled by A(Ψ). Moreover, an increase in the
standard deviation of an agnostic structural disturbance affects the model variables
in exactly the same way as an identical proportional increase of the elements of B·,i.
Consequently, the standard deviation of an agnostic disturbance can be normalized
to equal 1.33 If there are observables that are not state variables, then one also needs
an additional equation for these yt variables, which for our set-up is given by
yt =
m∑
i=1
y
[i]
t , (3.19a)
y
[i]
t = C (Ψ) s
[i]
t−1 +D·,i (Ψ) εi,t for i ≤ m1, (3.19b)
y
[i]
t = C (Ψ) s
[i]
t−1 +D·,iεi,t for m1 + 1 ≤ i ≤ m1 +m2 = m, (3.19c)
where yt is the (n×1) vector with observables that are not state variables. Each ad-
ditional observable used in the estimation will introduce one more coefficient related
32According to proposition 1, this specification is valid as long as the elements of G12 are equal
to zero, which is usually the case.
33If the time series processes of the two disturbances have the same number of parameters, then
replacing a regular structural disturbance by an agnostic disturbance typically means estimating an
additional n−1 parameters. The number would be less if some structural parameters are associated
only with the regular structural disturbance that is replaced.
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to the agnostic structural disturbances.
Identification
Replacing B·,i(Ψ) with B·,i reduces the number of restrictions on structural param-
eters, which could affect the identification of Ψ. We have verified that the structural
parameters, Ψ, continue to satisfy the local identification conditions as specified in
Komunjer and Ng (2011) when we replace regular structural disturbances by ASDs.
The coefficients of B·,i are also identified locally since they directly enter the policy
functions. However, there is no global identification of the B·,i coefficients when
m2 > 1, since the agnostic disturbances are interchangeable, that is, there is no dif-
ference between say the first and the second agnostic disturbance in how they affect
model equations. This is a consequence of being agnostic.
The first formulation of our procedure adds agnostic disturbances to the model
equations. Under what conditions are the associated coefficients, i.e., the elements of
Υ̂2 identified? What matters for identification are the policy functions, that is, the
B·,i and the D·,i coefficients. These coefficients are a function of the Υ̂2 coefficients.
Since the total number of coefficients in B·,i and D·,i is equal to the number of state
variables plus the number of observables that are not state variables, n + n, one
can add the agnostic disturbance to at most n + n model equations for each of the
elements of Υ̂2 to be identified. This is a necessary, not a sufficient condition.34
Identification of the elements of Υ̂2 only becomes important if one wants to give
an economic interpretation of the agnostic disturbance. As discussed in section 3.6,
however, this can be a useful exercise.
Equivalence of first and second formulation
The easiest case to consider is the one in which the model consists of n+n equations
and the observables are the n state variable plus n other observables, where n could
be zero. If the agnostic disturbance is added to all n+ n model equations, then the
two different ways to implement the procedure are identical.
The first formulation, which adds agnostic disturbances to model equations, is
more flexible. The reason is that it allows us to add the agnostic disturbances to only
a subset of the n + n equations. By excluding the agnostic disturbance from some
equations one does impose restrictions on the agnostic disturbance and this implies
that the first and the second implementation will lead to different policy functions
and different estimation results. Imposing such restrictions moves us away from being
fully agnostic, but there may be cases where this flexibility of the first formulation is
very useful. In section 3.6, we document how model selection procedures can be used
to impose restrictions leading to more concise formulations that make it possible to
interpret the agnostic disturbances.
34To understand why this is not a sufficient condition consider a system that consists of two
equations containing the model’s two state variables, s1,t and s2,t, and no other variables. Also, yt
satisfies the equation yt = 2s1,t+s2,t. If yt is not an observable, then one could not add the agnostic
disturbance to this equation, because its associated coefficient would, of course, not be identified.
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Now consider the case when the model has more than n + n equations, that
is, some model variables are not state variables or observables, and the agnostic
disturbance is added to more than n + n model equations. From the discussion
above, we know that not all the elements of Υ̂2 can be identified. That is, different
combinations of the coefficients in Υ̂2 lead to the same values for the n+n coefficients
in B·,i and D·,i. As long as the agnostic disturbance remains agnostic and there is
no need to interpret the Υ̂2 coefficients, then this is not a problem. Specifically, it
does not affect the identification of the structural parameters Ψ.35
Comparison with alternative procedures
In this section, we discuss how our procedure compares with alternatives proposed
in the literature. A detailed description of these alternative approaches can be found
in appendix 3.7.5.
Agnostic structural disturbances versus wedges. Equations (3.2) and (3.5)
point out the difference between adding an agnostic structural disturbance and
adding a regular structural disturbance. Adding a regular structural disturbance re-
quires specifying in which equation the disturbance appears and how the associated
elements of Γ2(Ψ) and Υ2(Ψ) depend on the structural parameters Ψ. Adding an
agnostic disturbance does not impose such restrictions. Wedges are similar to regular
structural parameters in that they only appear in a subset of equations. Sometimes
only one equation. Wedges may or may not impose restrictions on the structural
parameters, Ψ. For example, one of the wedges considered in Chari et al. (2007) is a
productivity disturbance. This disturbance appears in the budget constraint and the
first-order condition for capital and imposes cross-equation parameter restrictions.
By contrast, when a “labor wedge” is added to the labor-supply first-order condition,
then this does not impose restrictions on the structural parameters, since it does not
appear in any other equation. Relative to an agnostic disturbance, however, it is
restrictive because it is not allowed to appear in other model equations.36
Agnostic structural disturbances versus measurement error. ASDs differ
from measurement error in that the latter is not a structural disturbance. Conse-
quently, its impact on the different elements of model variables does not propagate
through the system as structural disturbances do. To understand this difference
35In practice, a good optimization routine should still be able to find the true optimized value
of the objective function and associated values for Ψ even though it may take some time before it
realizes that several variations in the elements of Υ̂2 do not lead to improvements in the target.
36Inoue et al. (2015) provide a formal analysis for using wedges to detect and identify misspeci-
fication. Using a New Keynesian model, they introduce a labor wedge into the cost minimization
problem of the intermediate good producing firm, and a final good wedge and a bond demand wedge
into the household budget constraint. Similar to the productivity disturbance, such wedges only
appear in a limited set of equations and do impose parameter restrictions.
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consider the following system of equations:
st = Ast−1 +Bεt, (3.20)
yt = Cst +Dεt, (3.21)
εt = Gεt−1 +Hηt. (3.22)
The first equation represents a very simple structural model that governs the law
of motion of the state variable, st. The second equation specifies the relationship
between the observable, yt and the state variable. εt is a scalar exogenous random
variable. A value of C equal to 1 means that the state variable is the observable. If εt
is measurement error, then D 6= 0 and B = 0. That is, measurement error affects the
difference between data and model variables, but does not affect how model variables
behave. By contrast, if εt is a structural disturbance, then D = 0 and B 6= 0. Now
εt does affect model variables and propagates through the system according to the
structural model, that is, according to equation (3.20).
The idea of the agnostic procedure is to add not one but two different ASDs
to equations (3.20) and (3.21). This procedure would allow for several possibilities
discussed above and combinations, namely one or two structural disturbances with
no measurement error, one structural disturbances that is correlated with measure-
ment error, one structural disturbance and uncorrelated measurement error, or just
measurement error.
Agnostic disturbances versus a DSGE-VAR. Ireland (2004) and Del Negro
et al. (2007) combine a DSGE model with a reduced-form VAR that contains the
observables. Specifically, they start with a fully specified DSGE model as represented
by equations (3.18a), (3.18b), (3.19a), and (3.19b). Since they have no agnostic
structural disturbances, the value of m2 is equal to zero.
There are two key differences between these two approaches and ours. First,
our approach focuses on a particular type of misspecification, which allows it to use
aspects of the model that are not affected by this misspecification, namely A(Ψ) and
C(Ψ). Second, introducing a VAR into the estimation means that the number of
disturbances necessarily increases by a number equal to the number of variables in the
VAR. Moreover, adding a VAR introduces many more parameters unless the number
of observables is small. Our procedure allows for a more parsimonious approach and
could consist of adding just one new disturbance or replacing one regular structural
disturbance with an agnostic structural disturbance.
Both differences imply that our approach is more efficient in terms of the number
of parameters that it has to be estimate.37 The price of parsimony is that our proce-
dure is not designed to detect misspecification unrelated to structural disturbances,
that is, misspecification associated with restrictions imposed by B(Ψ) and D(Ψ).
37For example, for the popular DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007) with 7 observables,
a VAR with 4 lags would mean estimating 204 additional coefficients. As discussed in section 3.6,
the implementation of our procedure for this model means estimating twelve more parameters.
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Although, it is not designed to do so, ASDs might very well pick up other types of
misspecification such as wrong functional forms and time variation in structural pa-
rameters. The DSGE-VAR approach explicitly allows misspecification in A(Ψ) and
C(Ψ). However, Chari et al. (2008) point out that the VAR with a finite number of
lags that does not contain all the model’s state variables is likely to be misspecified.
This means that the DSGE-VAR approach cannot deal with all possible misspecifi-
cations either.
Another difference emerges as the sample size goes to infinity. With the DSGE-
VAR approach one has two “competing" empirical specifications, a DSGE model
and a VAR. Since every DSGE suffers from at least some minor misspecification, one
can expect the VAR to fully take over as the sample size goes to infinity. If that
happens, then one is left with a reduced-form model that can no longer be used for
policy analysis. This will never happen with our approach, since the propagation of
state variables will always be determined by A(Ψ) and the relationship between state
variables and observables by C(Ψ). If the number of regular structural disturbances
in the true data generating process is less than or equal to the number of agnostic
structural disturbances, then one can expect the role of regular structural distur-
bances to be driven to zero as the sample size goes to infinity.38 The restrictions
imposed by B(Ψ) and D(Ψ) would then no longer play a role.
3.4 What to do in practice?
In this section, we first discuss how agnostic structural disturbances can be used as a
test for misspecification. Next, we discuss how agnostic structural disturbances can
be applied to reduce misspecification.
3.4.1 ASDs to test for misspecification
Agnostic structural disturbances differ from regular structural disturbances in that
their initial impact on the economy is not restricted and, thus, imposes no restric-
tions on model parameters. As indicated in equation (3.5), regular structural dis-
turbances, ε1,t, enter model equations as Γ1(Ψ)ε1,t+1 + Υ1(Ψ)ε1,t, whereas agnostic
structural disturbances, ε2,t, enter models equations as Υ̂2ε2,t, where Υ̂2 is a vector
of reduced-form coefficients that does not impose restrictions on Ψ. Since these are
two competing models, and the former is a restricted version of the latter, standard
model selection statistics can be used to test whether the restrictions imposed by
structural disturbances are correct.
Specifically, a simple and transparent way to proceed is to carry out a model
selection test, such as a likelihood-ratio test, for each of the regular structural dis-
turbance considered separately. For example, if the disturbance in question is a
wage mark-up disturbance, then one first estimates the model with a wage mark-up
disturbance and then re-estimates the model with the wage mark-up disturbance
38Assuming that there are enough ASDs to avoid any singularity issues.
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replaced by an ASD. Let L(Ψ) be the log likelihood of the model with the wage
mark-up disturbance and let L(Ψ, Υ̂2), be the log likelihood of the model with the
wage mark-up disturbance replaced by an ASD.39 To test the restrictions imposed
by the wage mark-up disturbance one checks whether L(Ψ, Υ̂2)− L(Ψ) exceeds the
critical value of a χ2(q) distribution with q degrees of freedom, where q is the dif-
ference in the number of parameters between the two models. One could compare
marginal data densities if one prefers a Bayesian methodology.
One can also assess whether a particular regular structural disturbance is restric-
tive by looking at changes in parameter estimates and model properties after the
regular structural disturbance has been replaced by an agnostic structural distur-
bance.
If the restrictions imposed by the wage mark-up disturbance are rejected, then
one has two options. First, one could modify how the wage mark-up affects the
model. In section 3.6, we show how the estimated model with agnostic disturbances
provides useful insights for such modifications. Second, one could simply use the
estimated model with the agnostic disturbance.
3.4.2 ASDs to reduce misspecification
To estimate models one would like to use all available observables. When estimating
DSGE models one needs at least as many disturbances as observables to avoid a
singularity problem. As the number of observables increases, it becomes more dif-
ficult to come up with sensible structural disturbances. Recall that it is not just a
question of conjecturing a particular type of structural disturbance. The structural
disturbance has to enter each and every model equation correctly. An alternative is
to add ASDs.
Adding agnostic disturbances does not complicate the estimation in practice. For
example, to add an agnostic disturbance, ε2,t, to a model estimated with Dynare one
would add Υ̂i,2ε2,t to the ith model equation, where Υ̂i,2 is the ith element of Υ̂2.
Under our second formulation, adding an ASD simply means adding an extra column
to the policy rules with the ASD and its reduced-form coefficients.
3.5 ASDs and Misspecification: Small-Sample
Monte Carlo experiments
In section 3.2, we considered the large-sample consequences of using a (slightly) mis-
specified empirical model which wrongly excluded one structural disturbance and
included one that was not part of the true model. In that experiment, an empiri-
cal model that includes an ASD instead of the wrongly included regular structural
39These expressions are based on the notation of the first formulation of our ASD procedure. In
terms of the notation of the second formulation, the log likelihood of the model with the agnostic
disturbance would be denoted by L(Ψ,B) when all observables are state variables or by L(Ψ,B,D)
when some observables are not state variables.
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disturbance, would uncover the true parameter values. The reason is that this ASD-
augmented empirical model is correctly specified, the ML estimator is consistent, a
large sample is used, and the structural parameters remain identified.40
In this section, we consider the same misspecification experiment, but now con-
sider small-sample Monte Carlo experiments. This will allow us two answer two
questions. First, is the ASD procedure effective in detecting misspecification when
we compare the ASD-augmented empirical model with the misspecified empirical
model? Second, what is the efficiency loss if one replaces a regular structural dis-
turbance that is part of the true underlying model with an ASD? The empirical
model remains correctly specified if one does so, but one looses efficiency because
one estimates additional reduced-form parameters and imposes less true restrictions.
3.5.1 Experiments and empirical specifications.
As in section 3.2, the dgp is the SW model with six of the seven structural distur-
bances, but now we use a sample of typical length, namely 156, which is the same
as the number of observations used to estimate the model in Smets and Wouters
(2007). The number of Monte Carlo replications is equal to 1,000. In each Monte
Carlo replication, we estimate model parameters using the SW empirical model that
is identical to the true dgp and two additional specifications. The first is an em-
pirical model, that is – as in section 3.2 – misspecified, because it excludes one of
the structural disturbances of the true dgp and erroneously includes another. The
second excludes the same structural disturbance, but now includes an ASD. This last
specification is also correct. That is, there are values of the reduced-form coefficients
such that the specification is identical to the original SW one.
These are computationally expensive Monte Carlo experiments. Therefore, we
only consider two of the possible forty-two combinations to misspecify and those are
the same two as those considered in section 3.2.6.
3.5.2 ASD misspecification test when alternative is misspecified
To evaluate whether the ASD procedure can detect misspecification, we first use a
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test that compares the likelihood of the empirical specification
with the agnostic disturbance to the likelihood of the misspecified empirical model.
The number of degrees of freedom is equal to ten, since the agnostic specification has
ten more parameters.41 With this procedure, the ASD procedure rejects the mis-
specified model in all Monte Carlo replications in both experiments. The procedure
is, thus, quite powerful in detecting misspecification. As discussed in section 3.2.6,
however, if we use a Bayesian model comparison procedure based on SW priors, then
the ASD procedure rejects the misspecified specification in 82.2% and 52% of the
generated samples for the first and the second Monte Carlo experiment, respectively.
40In fact, parameters remain identified, if two regular structural disturbances are replaced by
ASDs.
41We use the second formulation of our procedure. This formulation introduces the smallest
possible number of additional parameters.
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It is not surprising that the power reduces with a Bayesian approach. The reason is
that the posteriors of the misspecified and the agnostic specification are more similar
than their likelihood functions since the posteriors share the same prior.
3.5.3 ASD misspecification test when alternative is correct
Next, we do the same ASD test for misspecification when the alternative model is
correctly specified. For the first Monte Carlo experiment, we find that the rejection
rate is 21.5% at the 10%-level and 12% at the 5%-level. For the second experi-
ment, these two numbers are 20.9% and 12.6%. Thus, the small-sample results do
not coincide precisely with the theoretical predictions based on large-sample theory.
However, the distortions are not that unreasonable. In appendix 3.7.3, we document
that the histogram of estimated χ2 statistics is reasonably close to the theoretical
(large-sample) χ2 distribution, but has a slightly fatter upper tail.
3.5.4 Correcting for misspecification
The discussion above made clear that the ASD procedure does very well in terms of
detecting misspecified models and reasonably well in not rejecting correctly specified
models in small samples. In this subsection, we document that the estimates of
the structural parameters obtained with the agnostic procedure are much closer to
the true values than those obtained with the misspecified empirical model. In fact,
they are very similar to those obtained with the correctly specified fully-structural
empirical model.
Table 3.4 reports the average absolute error of the parameter estimates relative
to the true value for the three different empirical models across Monte Carlo repli-
cations. Consistent with the large-sample results discussed in section 3.2, parameter
estimates obtained with the misspecified structural model are substantially worse
than those obtained with the correctly specified model. The average of the errors
for the misspecified model is more than twice as large as the one for the correctly
specified model for several parameters.42 Average errors for the misspecified model
are typically better for the second experiment. However, that is not true for all pa-
rameters. For example, the average error for σc is substantially higher in the second
experiment, whereas there is only a modest increase for the correctly specified model.
For the first Monte Carlo experiment, the average error outcomes for the agnostic
setup and the correct specification are very similar. Although only slightly, the
average error is actually lower for the agnostic specification for ten of the twenty-
seven parameters. For the second Monte Carlo experiment, the fully specified SW
specification comes with some noticeable efficiency advantages for several parameter
estimates. Nevertheless, the estimates obtained using the agnostic procedure are still
much better than the one obtained with the misspecified model.
42Particular problematic is the standard deviation of the TFP disturbance in the first Monte
Carlo experiment for which the average error is almost nine time as large as the one for the correct
empirical model. Consistent with the results of section 3.2, this disturbance often takes over the
role of the wrongly excluded structural disturbance.
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3 plot histograms characterizing the distribution of the param-
eter estimates across Monte Carlo replications for a selected set of parameters.43
Each panel reports the results for the correctly specified model (dark line and dots),
the agnostic procedure (white bars), and the misspecified model (blue/dark bars).
Table 3.4: Average absolute errors across Monte Carlo experiments
true average error first MC average error second MC
value misspecified agnostic SW misspecified agnostic SW
α 0.19 0.098 0.035 0.028 0.056 0.048 0.037
σc 1.39 0.384 0.246 0.191 0.540 0.288 0.226
Φ 1.61 0.217 0.212 0.191 0.192 0.212 0.164
φ 5.48 1.793 1.326 0.899 1.429 1.269 0.896
h 0.71 0.096 0.069 0.052 0.083 0.077 0.057
ξw 0.73 0.082 0.090 0.076 0.092 0.095 0.081
σ` 1.92 1.652 0.640 0.532 1.506 0.939 0.831
ξp 0.65 0.130 0.074 0.068 0.090 0.080 0.070
ιw 0.59 0.205 0.165 0.159 0.190 0.168 0.160
ιp 0.22 0.142 0.109 0.101 0.128 0.112 0.100
ψ 0.54 0.182 0.128 0.109 0.150 0.134 0.118
rpi 2.03 0.295 0.277 0.241 0.347 0.380 0.333
ρ 0.81 0.031 0.025 0.022 0.034 0.038 0.030
ry 0.08 0.051 0.025 0.021 0.055 0.034 0.029
r∆y 0.22 0.058 0.014 0.012 0.057 0.039 0.033
ρa 0.95 0.071 0.028 0.020 - - -
ρb 0.18 0.161 0.078 0.073 0.133 0.079 0.071
ρg 0.97 0.020 0.016 0.013 0.018 0.016 0.014
ρI 0.71 - - - - -
ρr 0.12 - - - 0.089 0.072 0.067
ρp 0.90 0.181 0.090 0.067 0.188 0.070 0.053
ρw 0.97 0.031 0.030 0.019 0.022 0.029 0.021
µp 0.74 0.246 0.188 0.161 0.250 0.173 0.139
µw 0.88 0.071 0.072 0.056 0.069 0.071 0.057
σa 0.45 0.441 0.061 0.052 - - -
σb 0.24 0.050 0.021 0.021 0.040 0.023 0.021
σg 0.52 0.035 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.025
σI 0.45 - - - - -
σr 0.24 - - - 0.013 0.015 0.014
σp 0.14 0.022 0.017 0.015 0.019 0.017 0.015
σw 0.24 0.026 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.021
Note: This table reports the average absolute error across Monte Carlo replications for the indi-
cated parameter and empirical specification. See Table 3.1 for the definitions of the parameters.
The first (second) Monte Carlo experiment corresponds to the case when the true dgp does not in-
clude the monetary policy (TFP) disturbance, but the empirical model leaves out the investment
disturbance instead.
The figures document that the distributions of estimates obtained with the cor-
rect specification and the agnostic procedure are both qualitatively and quantita-
tively very similar. By contrast, the distribution of estimates obtained with the
misspecified empirical model can be vastly different. For example, Panel (a) of Fig-
ure 3.2 documents that the distribution of estimates of the capital share parameter,
α, displays a strong downward bias when the misspecified empirical model is used.
43A full set of results for all parameters is given in appendix 3.7.3.
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Figure 3.2: Histograms: First Monte Carlo experiment
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Note: The panels plot the distribution of the indicated parameter across the Monte Carlo replications. The
color of the histograms for the misspecified case changes in a lighter shade when they overlap with the
histogram for the agnostic specification. In this experiment, the true dgp does not include the monetary
policy disturbance, but the empirical model leaves out the investment disturbance instead.
The associated mean is equal to 0.09, whereas the true value is equal to 0.19. The
figure also documents that a large number of estimates are clustered at the imposed
lower bound. That is, by imposing bounds we limited the distortions due to mis-
specification. For α, the leftward shift is so large, that there is little overlap between
the distribution of the estimates based on the misspecified model and the other two
empirical models. Bunching at the lower or upper bound is more pervasive for the
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Figure 3.3: Histograms: Second Monte Carlo experiment
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Note: The panels plot the distribution of the indicated parameter across the Monte Carlo replications.
The color of the histograms for the misspecified case changes in a lighter shade when they overlap with
the histogram for the agnostic specification. In this experiment, the true dgp does not include the TFP
disturbance, but the empirical model leaves out the investment disturbance instead.
first experiment, but also observed for the second.
For the parameters considered in these figures, the distribution of estimates for
the agnostic and the fully-specified SW specification are almost always centered
around the true parameter value. In principle, there could be a small sample bias,
since this is a complex nonlinear estimation problem. The full set of results, discussed
in appendix 3.7.3, do indeed indicate that there is a bias for some parameters. In
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those cases, the bias is similar for the estimator based on the fully-specified spec-
ification and the agnostic one. An example of a parameter that is estimated with
bias is the labor supply elasticity with respect to the real wage, σl. Its true value is
equal to 1.92. In the first experiment, the average estimate across the Monte Carlo
replications is equal to 1.84 for the SW and 1.71 for the agnostic specification. By
contrast, the associated average estimate is equal to 0.27 for the misspecified model,
which indicates a large bias.
3.6 Are the SW disturbances the right ones for US data?
The Monte Carlo experiment of section 3.5 documents that the ASD procedure is a
powerful tool to detect and correct for misspecification when the SW model is used
as the true dgp. In this section, we use the ASD procedure on actual data. Specifi-
cally, we first use the ASD procedure to test the restrictions imposed by structural
disturbances in the SW model using the same US postwar data as in the original SW
paper. We will document that the restrictions imposed by the risk premium and the
investment-specific technology disturbance are rejected by the ASD procedure. That
is, replacement of these regular structural disturbances by an agnostic structural dis-
turbance leads to an increase in the marginal data density. The restrictions of the
other five disturbances are not rejected. Next, we use model selection procedures to
determine the number of ASDs to include and to construct a more concise specifica-
tion that excludes the agnostic disturbances from some model equations. The best
specification obtained from these selection procedures is one with three ASDs. To
conclude, we interpret the nature of these three agnostic structural disturbances by
examining the sign and magnitude of the associated coefficients in model equations
and the IRFs of the agnostic disturbances.
3.6.1 Introducing ASDs into the Smets-Wouters model
The ASD procedure can be used in frequentist and Bayesian settings. Since SW
use a Bayesian estimation procedure, we will do the same. To estimate the model
with agnostic disturbances, we use the formulation of the procedure as described
in section 3.3.2, which entails adding the agnostic disturbance to model equations
without restricting its impact.44 This only requires a minor modification of the
Dynare program that estimates the model for the original SW specification. We do
not include agnostic disturbances in equations that define observables.45 This means
44The SW model has an output gap measure that depends on the outcomes of a hypothetical
parallel economy with flexible prices. If an equation in the sticky-price part of the model has
an associated equation in the flexible-price part of the model, then we assume that the agnostic
disturbance enters the two equations with the same reduced-form coefficient.
45For example, the SW specification uses consumption growth as an observable and has an equa-
tion that defines consumption growth. Allowing an agnostic disturbance to affect this equation
would capture measurement error (which would be correlated with structural disturbances if this
ASD also appears in other model equations with a non-zero coefficient). We do not explore this
possibility to keep the analysis parsimonious and to stay close the SW approach, which does not
allow for measurement error.
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that there are thirteen coefficients to measure the impact of an agnostic disturbance
on the system. We can normalize the standard deviation of the agnostic disturbances
to one, since its coefficients are of a reduced-form nature. Thus, the difference in
the number of parameters between the most general agnostic specification considered
and the original SW specification is equal to twelve times the number of ASDs that
are introduced. Details are given in appendix 3.7.4.
The priors for the structural parameters are identical to the ones used by SW.
The prior for each agnostic coefficient is a Normal with a mean equal to what the
coefficient would be according to the SW restrictions and the SW prior means.46 By
centering the priors of the agnostic coefficients around the SW restrictions, we favor
the SW specification. However, the means of these priors hardly matter and our
results are robust to setting the prior mean equal to zero for all coefficients.47
The standard deviation of the prior distribution is set equal to 0.5. This implies
a very uninformed prior, since the model is linear in log variables. As a robustness
check we also consider a standard deviation equal to 0.1 and we find very similar
results.
3.6.2 Smets-Wouters structural disturbances: Specification tests
A specification that replaces a regular structural disturbance with an agnostic one
encompasses the original specification which gives it an advantage in terms of achiev-
ing a better fit. The additional parameters, however, act as a penalty term in the
marginal data density. Table 3.5 reports the marginal data densities for the different
specifications. The first row reports the marginal data density for the original SW
specification with its seven regular structural disturbances. The seven subsequent
rows give the results when the indicated regular structural disturbances is replaced
by an ASD.
Overall, these results are quite supportive of the original SW specification as the
SW restrictions are preferred for five of the seven structural disturbances.48 But the
results for the risk-premium and the investment specific disturbance indicate that
improvement is possible.49
46For example, suppose we use the ASD procedure to test the restrictions of the risk-premium
disturbance by replacing it with an ASD. The risk-premium disturbance appears in two equations,
namely the consumption/bond Euler equation and the capital-valuation equation. The prior means
of the reduced-form agnostic coefficients for these two equations are set equal to the values according
to the SW restrictions with structural parameters evaluated at their prior means. The reduced-form
coefficients associated with the other equations have a prior mean equal to zero.
47Having a non-zero prior has a practical advantage. The signs of the coefficients of an agnostic
disturbance are not identified. That is, one can switch the signs of the coefficients of an ASD as
long as one does it for all coefficients. A necessary consequence of its agnostic nature is that the
sign of an ASD disturbance has no a priori meaning. If the prior means of all ASD coefficients are
zero, then the ASD coefficients can flip sign for different runs of the MCMC procedure.
48However, it is possible that the SW specification would be rejected against more concise agnostic
disturbances, that is specifications that exclude the agnostic disturbance from some equations.
49When we narrow the prior of the agnostic coefficients by reducing the standard deviation to
0.1, then the restrictions of the monetary policy disturbance are also rejected. But the increase in
the marginal data density is relatively small, namely from -922.40 to -920.82.
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Table 3.5: Misspecification tests for original SW empirical model
structural SW
disturbance excluded SAD added marginal data density
None (original SW) no -922.40
TFP, εat yes -931.21
Risk premium, εbt yes -908.79
Government expenditure, εgt yes -934.14
Investment-specific, εit yes -919.81
Monetary policy,εrt yes -926.88
Price mark-up, εpt yes -938.85
Wage mark-up, εwt yes -947.31
Note: The table reports the marginal data density for different empirical specifications.
The first row reports the value for the original SW specification. The specifications
considered in subsequent rows replace the indicated structural disturbance with an
agnostic structural disturbance. The bold numbers indicate the cases for which the
MDD is higher when the indicated structural disturbance is replaced by an agnostic
disturbance.
3.6.3 Which regular and agnostic disturbances to include?
The results do not necessarily imply that we should exclude the structural risk-
premium and investment disturbance. After all, it is possible that a model that
includes agnostic disturbances as well as these two SW structural disturbances has
an even higher marginal data density. To investigate this issue, we compare a set of
models that do or do not include the risk-premium disturbance, that do or do not
include the investment disturbance, and that include one, two, or three ASDs.50
Table 3.6: Model selection procedure for SW model: Step 1
regular structural agnostic marginal
εbt ε
i
t ε˜
A
t ε˜
B
t ε˜
C
t data density
no no yes yes no -906.85
no no yes yes yes -925.55
no yes yes no no -908.79
no yes yes yes no -907.46
no yes yes yes yes -922.94
yes no no yes no -919.81
yes no yes yes no -907.32
yes no yes yes yes -921.71
yes yes no no no -922.40
yes yes yes no no -909.35
yes yes no yes no -920.26
yes yes yes yes no -908.09
yes yes yes yes yes -922.82
Note: The table reports the marginal data density for differ-
ent empirical specifications regarding three agnostic disturbances
and the two disturbances that are misspecified, that is, the risk-
premium disturbance, εbt , and the investment disturbance, ε
i
t.
The number in bold indicates the highest outcome.
Table 3.6 reports the results. It shows that the model with the highest marginal
data density is one with two agnostic disturbances and without the SW risk-premium
50To estimate the model with all seven observables, an empirical specification with only one ASD
would need either the risk-premium or the investment disturbance to avoid a singularity.
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as well as the SW investment-specific disturbance. Another indication that there is
no need for these two SW structural disturbances is that their role in terms of ex-
plaining variation in the data is very small when agnostic disturbances are included.
According to the (unconditional) variance decomposition of the estimated SW model,
the risk-premium disturbance is especially important for the price of capital, con-
sumption growth, and output growth explaining 45.4%, 61.2%, and 22.1% of total
variability, respectively. It only plays a minor role for other variables. When ag-
nostic disturbances are added, then these three numbers drop to 3.88%, 3.88%, and
2.05%, respectively.51 The reduction in the role of the investment disturbance is
even stronger. In the SW model, the investment disturbance plays a quantitatively
important role for many variables. For investment growth it even explains 82.1% of
the volatility. With agnostic disturbances added, its role becomes minuscule. Even
for investment growth it only explains 0.31%.
3.6.4 Finding the best agnostic empirical specification
To interpret ASDs, we could use the best specification found so far. However, inter-
pretation of an ASD is easier when the specification is more concise. To determine
whether an agnostic disturbance should be excluded from some equations, we imple-
ment model selection procedures using the marginal data density as the criterion of
fit. This statistic increases when fit improves, but also penalizes additional parame-
ters.
We consider both a specific-to-general procedure and a general-to-specific proce-
dure and we apply the procedure for the specifications with two and three ASDs.52,53
The specific-to-general procedure with three ASDs leads to the highest MDD and
the selected outcome is our preferred empirical model. The specific-to-general pro-
cedure with two ASDs and the general-to-specific procedure with two ASDs lead to
slightly lower MDDs.54 Moreover, the models selected by these three procedures are
very similar. Specifically, the additional ASD in the specification with three ASDs
only plays a minor role. The zero restrictions imposed for the other two ASDs are
not exactly the same, but the differences are due to coefficients that turn out to
be small. As documented in appendix 3.7.4, the estimates of the parameters are
similar and the estimates obtained with these three empirical specifications imply
similar model properties. The general-to-specific procedure with three ASDs leads
51These numbers are based on the specification with two ASDs and all seven SW structural
disturbances using posterior mode estimates.
52See appendix 3.7.4 for details.
53An informal alternative selection procedure would be the following. One starts at the same point
as the general-to-specific procedure, that is, with ASDs included in every equation. The marginal
posteriors of the agnostic coefficients provides information on the lack of importance of different
agnostic coefficients and may provide the researcher promising combinations of zero restrictions to
impose. In fact, the posteriors for the coefficients with the fully unrestricted ASD specifications are
very predictive of the equations selected by the specific-to-general procedures for this application.
Of course, there are good reasons why this informal procedure is not a generally accepted model
selection procedure and we cannot expect this to always work well.
54The specific-to-general procedure generates an MDD equal to −892.92 with two ASDs and
−890.76 with three. The general-to-specific with two ASDs results in an MDD of −894.94.
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to a specification that has a much lower MDD.55
In our preferred specification, the first agnostic disturbance enters eight of the
thirteen equations, the second in three, and the third in five. By contrast, the
original SW risk-premium and the investment-specific disturbance appear in only
two. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the estimation results for our
preferred specification and give an interpretation to the three ASDs.
3.6.5 Impact on parameter estimates and model properties
As documented in appendix 3.7.4, Table 3.11, there are several differences between
the estimated values of the structural parameters obtained with the fully structural
SW specification and our preferred agnostic specification with three ASDs. For
example, the inflation coefficient in the Taylor rule is equal to 2.05 in the SW speci-
fication and 1.77 in ours.56 The SW estimate is right at the upper bound of our 90%
highest posterior density (HPD) interval. The SW mean estimate for the parameter
characterizing the share of fixed cost in production is equal to 1.61 which is quite a
bit higher than our mean estimate of 1.47 and outside our 90% HPD interval. Also,
the mean posterior value of the MA coefficient of the wage mark-up disturbance is
equal to 0.85 according to the SW specification and 0.59 according to ours. Our
mean estimate for the standard deviation of this disturbance is roughly a third of
the SW estimate.
Although there are some nontrivial differences, they are relatively small and the
IRFs of the five regular structural disturbances that are included in both specifi-
cations are very similar for the two empirical models. The same is true when we
consider the role of these five disturbances for the variance decomposition. Details
are given in appendix 3.7.4, tables 3.12 and 3.13. One nontrivial change is the role
of the productivity disturbance for output growth, which is 16.1% according to SW
and 22.2% according to ours. Although the differences seem minor if we consider
the five structural disturbances in isolation, the combined role changes quite a bit
for some variables. For example, the combined role of these five structural distur-
bances for investment (amount of capital used) is equal to 55.5% (74.1%) for the SW
specification and 68.7% (92.6%) for our preferred specification.
3.6.6 Giving the ASDs an economic interpretation
ASDs are agnostic by nature. The model selection procedure also does not use
any economic reasoning. Here we will show how the estimation results, such as
parameter estimates of ASD coefficients and IRFs, can be used to give a meaning-
ful interpretation to the ASDs. We will argue that one ASD can be interpreted
55Namely, -909.48. The general-to-specific procedure already stops after two steps. That is, the
procedure does not detect that imposingmultiple restrictions simultaneously does lead to substantial
improvements. One has to impose some structure on any model selection procedure, because it
would be impossible to consider all possible combinations. That is, one has to give instructions on
what paths to follow and which ones to ignore. But this means that the model selection procedure
may not find the best model. This motivates our use of different model selection criteria.
56We report posterior mean estimates unless indicated otherwise.
172
as an investment-specific disturbance, but with some quite striking differences from
the regular one used in the literature and in SW. We will refer to this ASD as the
agnostic “investment-modernization disturbance." The second ASD has features in
common with the SW risk-premium disturbance, although it is closer to a prefer-
ence disturbance. Moreover, like the first ASD it displays some striking differences
with its original SW counterpart. We will refer to this ASD as the agnostic “Euler
disturbance". The role of the third ASD is quantitatively less important than the
other two. It mainly affects wage growth and is associated with a more efficient use
of capital. We will refer to this ASD as the “capital-efficiency wage mark-up dis-
turbance." By assigning names to agnostic disturbances, we may open ourselves to
criticism. Our main reason for assigning these labels is that we want to make clear
that agnostic disturbances are in principle theory-free, and yet allow the researcher
to go one step further, towards giving an economic interpretation to them.
Table 3.7: Role of structural disturbances for variance
risk/preference investment
SW εbt agnostic εAt SW εit agnostic εBt agnostic εCt
output 1.53 1.14 7.34 2.17 0.28
flex. price output 0 2.08 5.39 1.02 0.36
consumption 2.18 1.51 2.83 0.49 0.25
investment 0.22 1.06 44.2 29.3 1.00
hours 2.52 1.29 8.15 4.97 2.03
capital 0.04 0.12 32.5 2.37 9.75
utilization 0.86 4.14 35.4 9.46 14.7
price of capital 45.4 18.6 36.0 31.6 7.21
marginal cost 0.87 15.2 3.11 2.61 5.13
policy rate 7.40 17.2 18.3 12.5 0.65
inflation 0.58 0.68 3.18 3.96 0.91
output growth 22.1 21.3 15.8 8.04 1.82
consumption growth 61.2 61.7 0.95 2.03 0.10
investment growth 2.46 12.6 82.1 70.0 0.81
Note: The table reports the percentage of total variability explained by the SW and the
agnostic risk-premium disturbance and the SW and the agnostic investment disturbance.
The numbers for the SW disturbance are from estimation of the original SW model. The
numbers for the agnostic disturbance are from our preferred empirical model with three
agnostic disturbances.
The agnostic investment-modernization disturbance, ε˜Bt
In the SW model, the investment-specific technology disturbance shows up in the
investment Euler equation and in the capital accumulation equation. One of our
agnostic disturbances, ε˜Bt , also shows up in these two equations.57 The only other
equation in which ε˜Bt appears is the utilization equation that relates capacity utiliza-
tion to the rental rate of capital. These findings indicate that ε˜Bt could be interpreted
as an investment-specific productivity disturbance. Furthermore, as documented in
57In our computer programs, the ASDs are referred to as agnA, agnB, and agnC. The economic
story we are going to tell works best if we start with agnB. Labels for agnostic disturbances are
arbitrary and we could relabel this disturbance as ε˜At , which may seem more logical given that it is
discussed first. We chose not to do so, because it would create an inconsistency with our computer
programs.
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Table 3.7, ε˜Bt , plays an important role for the volatility of investment. Specifically,
it explains 70% of the volatility of investment growth compared to 82.1% for the
investment-specific disturbance in the SW model. Interestingly, ε˜Bt is not important
for the volatility of capital. Specifically it only explains 2.37% of the volatility of the
capital stock, whereas the SW investment disturbance explains 32.5%. Thus, if ε˜Bt
is an investment-specific disturbance, then it is not a typical one.
Figure 3.4: IRFs of the SW investment and corresponding agnostic disturbance
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the SW investment-specific productivity disturbance and the
agnostic disturbance ε˜Bt that we interpret as an investment-modernization disturbance.
Figure 3.4 plots the IRFs of our agnostic disturbance and the SW investment-
specific disturbance. This graph documents that there are some remarkable differ-
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ences. The SW investment disturbance generates a typical business cycle with key
aggregates moving in the same direction. A positive agnostic investment disturbance
also leads to a strong comovement between output and investment. However, a posi-
tive shock leads to a reduction in consumption and capital.58 Also, whereas capacity
utilization decreases in the SW model, our specification indicates an increase.
To understand these differences and to explain why we still think that ε˜Bt is
an investment-specific disturbance, we have to take a closer look at the relevant
equations and how ε˜Bt affects these equations differently than the SW investment
specific disturbance, εit. The three relevant equations are the following:59,60
Smets-Wouters investment-specific disturbance, εit
Inv. Euler: it = i1 (Ψ) it−1 + (1− i1 (Ψ))Et [it+1] + εit , (3.23)
Utilization: zt = z1 (Ψ) rkt , (3.24)
Capital: kt = k1 (Ψ) kt−1 + (1− k1 (Ψ)) it + k2 (Ψ) εit, k2 (Ψ) > 0.(3.25)
Agnostic investment-modernization disturbance, ε˜Bt
Inv. Euler: it = i1 (Ψ) it−1 + (1− i1 (Ψ))Et [it+1] + dB3 ε˜Bt , dB3 > 0, (3.26)
Utilization: zt = z1 (Ψ) rkt + d
B
7 ε˜
B
t , d
B
7 < 0, (3.27)
Capital: kt = k1 (Ψ) kt−1 + (1− k1 (Ψ)) it + dB8 ε˜Bt , dB8 < 0. (3.28)
The reason for the striking differences between the IRFs of our ASD and the SW
investment disturbance is that our unrestricted approach lets the agnostic investment
specific disturbance appear in the capital accumulation equation without restrictions.
That is, the sign of the coefficient of ε˜Bt , dB8 , is unrestricted, but the coefficient of εit in
the SW specification, k2(Ψ) is restricted by the values of the structural parameters,
Ψ. The outcome is that the posterior mean of dB8 has the opposite sign relative to
k2(Ψ).61
This means that a reduction in the cost of transforming current investment into
58Justiano et al. (2010) also report a negative consumption response to an investment disturbance,
but only for the first five periods. As discussed in Ascari et al. (2016), most models would predict
a countercyclical consumption response to an investment disturbance. The SW model overturns
this property due to a sufficiently high degree of price and wage stickiness. Our agnostic approach
implies similar estimates for price and wage stickiness, but nevertheless indicates that the data
actually prefer a countercyclical consumption response.
59These are equations (3), (7), and (8) in the original SW paper, respectively. Ψ is the vector
with structural coefficients and these restrict the coefficients in the model equations. See Smets and
Wouters (2007) for the definitions of the coefficient functions. The subscripts of the coefficients of
the agnostic disturbance refer to the SW equation number. For example, dB3 ε˜Bt is the term added
to equation (3) of SW. it is the investment level, rkt the rental rate of capital, zt the utilization rate,
εit the SW investment-specific investment disturbance, ε˜Bt the agnostic disturbance, and Ψ is the
vector with structural parameters. Variables are defined relative to their steady-state values.
60The other two ASDs also enter some of these equations. We leave these terms out for trans-
parency reasons and because there are no interactions in a linear framework.
61Moreover, the 90% HPD does not include 0. Although it does not make much of a difference,
we give the SW outcome the best possible chance by setting the prior means of the coefficients of
ε˜Bt to what they would be under the SW specification using SW prior means.
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capital goes together with increased depreciation of the existing capital stock in our
specification. In the SW model, an investment specific disturbance does not affect
the economic viability of the existing capital stock. Our agnostic approach questions
this assumption and suggests that the investment-specific productivity disturbance
goes together with scrapping of older vintages. This is the reason why we refer to it
as an agnostic investment-modernization disturbance.
In the SW model, capacity utilization is proportional to the rental rate and there
are no shocks that can affect this relationship. An accelerated depreciation of the
capital stock increases the rental rate, which in turn would induce an increase in
the utilization rate. In our agnostic specification, this relationship is dampened
somewhat, since a positive agnostic disturbance has a direct negative impact on
capacity utilization since it enters the capacity utilization with a negative coefficient.
The overall effect is still an increase in capacity utilization. It seems plausible that
scraping of old vintages goes together with higher utilization of the remaining capital
stock.
The agnostic Euler disturbance, ε˜At
The agnostic disturbance ε˜At appears in eight equations. This leaves open many
possible interpretations. The key equation, however, is the Euler equation for bonds,
because excluding the disturbance from this equation leads to by far the largest drop
in the marginal data density. This suggests that it could have key characteristics in
common with a preference or a risk-premium disturbance. This view is also supported
by Table 3.7 which documents that ε˜At is important for the same variables as the SW
risk-premium disturbance. However, this agnostic disturbance also has some quite
different characteristics from both. Therefore, we will adopt an alternative name
and refer to it as the agnostic Euler disturbance. For the interpretation of ε˜At , it
is important to understand the differences in impact of a regular preference and a
regular (bond) risk-premium disturbance.
Difference between a preference and (bond) risk-premium disturbance.
A preference disturbance affects current utility. This means it affects the marginal
rate of substitution and, thus, all Euler equations. Such a preference disturbance is
used in Smets and Wouters (2003). By contrast, Smets and Wouters (2007) include
instead a (bond) risk premium that introduces a wedge between the policy rate and
the required rate of return on bonds without affecting other Euler equations. Both
disturbances have a strong impact on current consumption. However, a positive
preference disturbance makes current consumption more desirable and reduces the
attractiveness of all types of saving. A positive risk-premium disturbance only makes
savings in bonds less attractive. That is, it induces a desire to substitute out of bonds
and into investment, in addition to an increase in consumption. Thus, a preference
disturbance leads to a negative comovement of consumption and investment, whereas
a (bond) risk-premium disturbance leads to a positive comovement. Smets and
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Wouters (2007) mention this as the reason for using a risk-premium instead of a
preference disturbance.
There is another key difference between these two disturbance. A preference
disturbance affects output in both the flexible-price and the sticky-price part of the
model. By contrast, a risk-premium disturbance has no affect on key aggregates such
as consumption and output in the flexible price part of the SW model.62
Is ε˜At a preference, a risk-premium, or another type of disturbance? Figure
3.5 plots the IRFs of the SW risk-premium and our agnostic disturbance. The figure
documents that both generate a regular business cycle with positive comovement
for output, consumption, investment, and hours. The positive comovement suggest
that the agnostic disturbance is a bond risk-premium disturbance as in Smets and
Wouters (2007) and not a preference disturbance as in Smets and Wouters (2003).
However, the agnostic disturbance has a strong impact on flexible-price output which
is inconsistent with it being a (bond) risk-premium disturbance and consistent with
it being a preference disturbance. These differences are big enough for us to come
up with a new label and we choose Euler disturbance.
To better understand the nature of the agnostic Euler disturbance, we take a
closer look at the equations in which ε˜At enters. It appears in the aggregate budget
constraint, the bond Euler equation, the investment Euler equation, the capital value
equation, the utilization rate equation, the price mark-up equation, the rental rate
of capital equation, and the Taylor rule.
Although our agnostic disturbance does have some effect on quite a few different
aspects of the model, the interpretation is eased by the fact that the role of the
agnostic disturbance is minor in most of the eight equations in the sense that allowing
it to enter these equations only has a minor quantitative impact on the behavior
of model variables or only affects the qualitative behavior of one or two variables
without affecting the behavior of the key macroeconomic variables.
Specifically, to understand the role of ε˜At on key macroeconomic aggregates we
can restrict ourselves to the Taylor rule and the three model equations that are
relevant for the savings/investment decisions, which are the bond Euler equation,
the investment Euler equation, and the capital value equation. The following set of
equations documents how the SW risk-premium disturbance and our agnostic Euler
enter these equations:63
62The reason is the following. In the flexible price part of the model, the nominal policy rate,
rt, the expected inflation rate, Et[pit+1], and the risk-premium disturbance, εbt , only appear in the
combination rt − Et[pit+1] + εbt . Consequently, a change in εbt is simply absorbed by the real rate.
This is not the case in the sticky-price economy, because it would be inconsistent with the Taylor
rule.
63In these equations, ct is consumption, lt is hours worked, rt is the nominal policy rate, pit is the
inflation rate, qt is the price of capital, yt is output, and ypt is output in the flexible-price economy.
Also see information given in footnote 59.
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Figure 3.5: IRFs of the SW risk-premium and the agnostic Euler disturbance
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the SW risk-premium disturbance and the agnostic disturbance
ε˜At that we interpret as an Euler-equation disturbance.
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Smets-Wouters risk premium, εbt
Bond Euler: ct = c1 (Ψ) ct−1 + (1− c1 (Ψ))Et [ct+1]
+c2 (Ψ) (lt − Et [lt+1])
−c3 (Ψ)(rt − Et [pit+1] + εbt), c3(Ψ) > 0, (3.29)
Inv. Euler: it = i1 (Ψ) it−1
+ (1− i1 (Ψ))Et [it+1] + εit, (3.30)
Capital value: qt = q1Et [qt+1] + (1− q1)Et
[
rkt+1
]
−(rt − Et [pit+1] + εbt), (3.31)
Policy rate: rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ){rpi + rY (yt − ypt )}
+r∆y[(yt − ypt )− (yt−1 − ypt−1)] + εrt . (3.32)
Agnostic Euler disturbance, ε˜At
Bond Euler: ct = c1 (Ψ) ct−1 + (1− c1 (Ψ))Et [ct+1]
+c2 (Ψ) (lt − Et [lt+1])
−c3 (Ψ)(rt − Et [pit+1])− dA2 ε˜At , dA2 > 0, (3.33)
Inv. Euler: it = i1 (Ψ) it−1
+ (1− i1 (Ψ))Et [it+1] + εit − dA3 ε˜At , dA3 > 0, (3.34)
Capital value: qt = q1Et [qt+1] + (1− q1)Et
[
rkt+1
]
−(rt − Et [pit+1])− dA4 ε˜At , dA4 > 0, (3.35)
Policy rate: rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ){rpi + rY (yt − ypt )}
+r∆y[(yt − ypt )− (yt−1 − ypt−1)] + εrt + dA14ε˜At , dA14 > 0.(3.36)
As in SW, we use the bond Euler equation to substitute the marginal rate of
substitution out of the capital valuation equation. While the SW bond risk-premium
disturbance, εbt , does not appear in the original capital valuation equation, it does
show up after this substitution has taken place. Moreover, it appears in these two
equations with the exact same coefficient as the nominal interest rate for bonds,
rt. By contrast, after substituting out the marginal rate of substitution in the
capital value equation, a preference disturbance would no longer appear in the capital
valuation equation.64
Our ASD appears in the bond Euler equation and the capital valuation equation
and it shows up with the same sign as the SW risk-premium disturbance. This sup-
ports the view that our ASD is similar to a risk-premium disturbance. Nevertheless,
64In the SW specification, the impact of the risk-premium disturbance is normalized to be equal
to 1 in one of the equations. The actual impact of this disturbance on this equation is then
determined by the estimated standard deviation. Instead, we normalize the standard deviation of
the ASDs. We do not want to impose the SW normalization, since it would imply that the agnostic
disturbance must affect the equation in which the coefficient is normalized unless the estimated
standard deviation is equal to zero, which would mean that it would not have an effect on any other
equation either.
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one could argue that the ASD is a preference and not a bond risk-premium distur-
bance for the following reasons. Although dA4 has the right sign for a risk-premium
coefficient, its magnitude, evaluated using the posterior mean, is too small.65 The
90% HPD interval of the coefficient of ε˜At in the capital valuation equation, dA4 , in-
cludes zero and setting the coefficient equal to zero has very little impact on model
properties and virtually none on the marginal data density.
As pointed out in Smets and Wouters (2003), a preference disturbance generates
consumption and investment responses that move in opposite directions. Our ASD
predicts responses in the same direction even if we impose that the ASD does not
enter the capital valuation equation (after substituting out the MRS). The reason for
the positive comovement is that our ASD also enters the investment Euler equation.
The investment Euler equation is a dynamic equation, but its dynamic aspects are
due solely to investment adjustment costs.66 Our agnostic approach indicates that
the structural disturbance that plays a key role in the bond Euler equation should
also appear in the investment Euler equation. In fact, it is the first equation chosen
in our specific-to-general model selection procedure.
So what could this agnostic disturbance represent? The simplest – and our
preferred explanation – is that it is a preference disturbance that is correlated with
an investment-specific disturbance.67 A more structural interpretation would be the
following. A preference disturbance would also affect the (linearized) investment
Euler equation if investment does not only lead to expenses in the current, but also
in subsequent periods. For example, investment may lead to additional expenses
when capital becomes productive. A positive preference disturbance would lower the
value of such future liabilities.
This disturbance appears directly in the Taylor rule with a negative coefficient.
This means that the central bank responds more aggressively to business cycle fluc-
tuations induced by this Euler disturbance. Without this effect on the Taylor rule
this disturbance would have a stronger impact on economic aggregates and inflation
would no longer be procyclical.68
65If our ASD is a risk-premium disturbance, then dA4 /dA2 should be equal to 1/c3(Ψ), but using
posterior means, we find that dA4 /dA2 = 3.3, whereas 1/c3(Ψ) = 7.27, substantially higher. Here, c3
is a function of the habit, the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, and the trend growth rate
parameter. c3 is calculated using posterior means of our preferred specification.
66Adjustment costs are zero in the steady state, which implies that neither a preference dis-
turbance nor a risk-premium disturbance appear in a linearized investment Euler equation. A
preference disturbance would appear in the original nonlinear equation. The main intertemporal
aspect of the investment decision, which is also present without adjustment costs, is captured by
the capital valuation equation.
67As discussed above, our agnostic structural investment disturbance, ε˜Bt , enters the capital
accumulation equation with a sign that is the opposite of the regular investment disturbance, which
we interpreted as scrapping of older vintages. ε˜At does not enter the capital accumulation equation.
This would indicate that this investment disturbance which goes together with an upswing in agents’
mood is between a regular investment disturbance and our agnostic investment disturbance in terms
of what it implies for the viability or depreciation of the existing capital stock.
68See appendix 3.7.4.
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The agnostic capital-efficiency wage mark-up disturbance, ε˜Ct
The third agnostic disturbance chosen by our model selection criterion increases the
total number of structural disturbances to eight, that is, one more than the number
in the SW specification. Thus, this agnostic disturbance cannot be interpreted as a
replacement of a SW disturbance. Figure 3.6 plots its IRFs.
This third agnostic disturbance, ε˜Ct , appears in five equations. The first equation
into which it is selected is the wage-adjustment equation. It also shows up into three
equations related to capital, namely the capital accumulation equation, the capital
utilization equation, and the capital-valuation equation. Finally, it appears in the
economy-wide budget constraint, although the impact on the latter is minor.
The SW wage mark-up disturbance, εwt also shows up in the wage-adjustment
equation. The differences with ε˜Ct are the following. First, εwt only shows up in
the wage-adjustment equation, whereas ε˜Ct has a direct impact on key equations
related to capital. This is an important difference that results in quite different
IRFs. A positive shock to εwt induces a regular economic downturn with all key
macroeconomic aggregates moving in the same direction, except for the price of
capital which increases initially. A positive shock to ε˜Ct also induces a recession
with a reduction in output, investment, and employment. However, it leads to
an increase in potential output, installed capital, and initially also an increase in
capacity utilization. In contrast to the SW εwt shock it leads to a decrease in the
price of capital.
The second difference between our agnostic ε˜Ct and the SW εwt disturbance is that
a shock to ε˜Ct is very temporary. ε˜Ct is an AR(1) process, and the posterior mean
of the auto-regressive coefficient is equal to 0.19. The SW εwt disturbance is a very
persistent ARMA(1,1) process. The presence of ε˜Ct in the empirical model strongly
reduces the coefficient of the MA component of εwt , but has little impact on the AR
component.69
Including ε˜Ct in the empirical specification does not reduce the role of εwt for
fluctuations of key variables. εwt remains the most important disturbance for key
economic aggregates. The only exception is the wage growth rate. In the SW speci-
fication εwt explains 61.6% of the volatility of wage growth, whereas it only explains
13.3% in our preferred specification. This role is clearly taken over by ε˜Ct which ex-
plains 53.5% of wage growth volatility. ε˜Ct also plays a nontrivial role for fluctuations
in the capital stock, capacity utilization, and the rental rate of capital, explaining
9.8%, 14.7%, and 13.1%, of total variability respectively.
The following equations document how ε˜Ct enters the model:70
69Specifically, with ε˜Ct included in the empirical specification the posterior means of the AR
and the MA coefficients of εwt are equal to 0.97 and 0.59, respectively. Estimates with the SW
specification for these two numbers are 0.97 and 0.85.
70We leave out the overall budget constraint since the role of the disturbance in this equation
is minor, but its impact in this equation is like a contractionary fiscal expenditure shock. Details
are given in appendix 3.7.4. wt is the real wage rate and µwt is the real wage mark-up, i.e., the
difference between the wage rate and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure. Also see footnote 59 for additional information.
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Figure 3.6: IRFs of the agnostic capital-efficiency wage mark-up disturbance
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the agnostic disturbance ε˜Ct that we interpret as a capital-efficiency
wage mark-up disturbance.
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Agnostic capital-efficiency wage mark-up disturbance, ε˜Ct
Capital value: qt = q1Et [qt+1] + (1− q1)Et
[
rkt+1
]
− (rt − Et [pit+1])− dC4 ε˜Ct , dC4 < 0, (3.37)
Utilization: zt = z1 (Ψ) rkt + d
C
7 ε˜
C
t , d
C
7 > 0, (3.38)
Capital: kt = k1 (Ψ) kt−1 + (1− k1 (Ψ)) it + dC8 ε˜Ct , dC8 > 0, (3.39)
Wage mark-up: wt = w1wt−1 + (1− w1)(Et[wt+1 + pit+1] (3.40)
− w2pit + w3pit−1 − w4µwt + dC13ε˜Ct , dC13 > 0. (3.41)
The equations indicate that this agnostic disturbance increases the wage mark-
up and is associated with increased efficiency of the capital stock, both in terms
of a lower depreciation rate and increased utilization. It also goes together with a
reduction in the value of existing capital. Thus, this ASD could capture an increase
in the wage rate, for example, because of increased bargaining power of workers, in
response to which firms use capital more efficiently. An alternative is that its origin
lies in changes in the ability or need to use capital more efficiently, but that a more
efficient use of capital comes at the cost of higher wage rates. That is, to adopt this
more efficient use of capital, firms have to pay a higher wage rate, perhaps in terms
of an overtime premium.
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3.7 Appendices
3.7.1 Consequences of misspecification: An analytical example
In this section, we give a very simple example to indicate that misspecification can
have large distortive effects in the sense that implied properties of the model using
the parameter estimates can be at odds with the actual corresponding properties
of the data that are used to estimate the parameters. The model is linear, and all
variables have a Normal distribution. Throughout this section, parameter estimates
are based on population moments. Thus, the results are not due to small sample
variation. The estimation procedure is Maximum Likelihood (ML).
More specifically, this example demonstrates that there can be massive differ-
ences between the variances of observables as implied by the model using estimated
parameter values and the actual variances in the data set. This result is surprising
since the ML estimator of the variance of a given time series is the sample variance
when the variable has a Normal distribution. We will show that this is not necessarily
true for implied variances when the empirical model is misspecified.71
True model. The true model is given by the following set of equations:
yt =
[
y1,t
y2,t
]
=
[
λ11 λ12
λ21 λ22
][
ε1,t
ε2,t
]
= Λεt, (3.42)
E
[
εtε
′
t
]
=
[
σ21 0
0 σ22
]
, (3.43)
and we make the following assumption about the distribution of the error terms:
ε1,t ∼ N(0, σ21) and ε2,t ∼ N(0, σ22). (3.44)
Misspecification. The objective is to estimate the standard deviations of the
structural disturbances, σ21 and σ22. The researcher takes the value of Λ as given.
The empirical model is misspecified, because Λ 6= Λ is used instead of the true value.
71As a byproduct of this paper, we learned that there also can be large gaps between actual
properties of the data used and the corresponding implied properties according to the Maximum
Likelihood estimates of the model parameters when the DSGE model is correctly specified, but a
data sample with finite length is used. Since the objective of Maximum Likelihood is not to match
moments, there is no reason why there should be a close match, but we were surprised by the large
magnitudes of the differences. For example, using a sample of 1,000 observations generated by the
SW model with seven disturbances and the correct empirical specification, it is not unusual to find
implied standard deviations for the observables that are three to five times their data counterpart.
Such differences will disappear as the sample size increases, since the estimator is consistent, but
such asymptotic results do not provide much assurance if there is a small sample bias even at a
relatively large sample size of 1,000 observations.
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Empirical specifications. We consider the following two empirical specifications:
Case 1: Empirical model given by
yt =
[
y1,t
y2,t
]
= Λεt, E
[
εtε
′
t
]
=
[
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
]
. (3.45)
Case 2: Empirical model given by
yt =
[
y1,t
y2,t
]
= Λεt, E
[
εtε
′
t
]
=
[
σ21 0
0 σ22
]
. (3.46)
Both empirical models are misspecified, because they use the wrong value of Λ. In
the first case, the empirical model allows the correlation between the two innovations
to be non-zero even though it is equal to zero according to the true data generating
process. In the second case, the empirical model imposes that the correlation is equal
to zero, just as it is in the true model.
Case 1: Wrong Λ and allow for wrong σ12. Since the model is linear and
the shocks have a normal distribution, the ML estimator of the variance-covariance
matrix E [εtε′t], Σ̂ε, is given by
Σ̂ε = Λ
−1
Σ̂′yΛ
−1′
. (3.47)
As mentioned above, we abstract from sampling variation and Σ̂′y is estimated using
population moments. This means that the ML estimator of Σ̂′ε is given by
Σ̂ε = Λ
−1E
[
yty
′
t
]
Λ
−1′ (3.48)
= Λ
−1
ΛΛ′Λ−1′. (3.49)
True versus implied variance. The purpose of this section is to document the
consequences of misspecification for the implied variance of the observable yt accord-
ing to the estimated model. The true variance-covariance matrix is given by:
Σtruey = E
[
yty
′
t
]
= ΛΛ′. (3.50)
The implied variance of yt according the researcher’s (misspecified) model, Σ̂y, is
given by
Σ̂y = ΛΣ̂εΛ
′ (3.51)
= ΛΛ
−1
ΛΛ′Λ−1′Λ′ (3.52)
= ΛΛ′ = Σtruey . (3.53)
Thus, the procedure actually generates the correct answer even though an incorrect
empirical specification is used. In this case, the estimated empirical model is mis-
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specified for two reasons, namely it has the wrong Λ and the estimated value of σ12
is not equal to its true value. These have exactly offsetting effects in terms of their
impact on the implied variance. Another way to look at this result is the following.
By allowing for a more flexible specification, i.e., a non-zero value for σ12, the re-
searcher would get a better answer for the implied variance of yt even though the
flexibility implies that the estimated model is wrong in more dimensions.
Case 2: Wrong Λ and correct σ12. Obtaining the estimate for Σ̂ε is just as easy
as in the previous case. Given Λ̂ and data for yt, one can calculate the values for
εt and use these to calculate the variance of εt and the implied variance of yt. The
following is a complicated, but useful way to express the outcome:
Σ̂ε =
[
1 0
0 0
]
Λ
−1
ΛΛ′Λ−1′
[
1 0
0 0
]
+[
0 0
0 1
]
Λ
−1
ΛΛ′Λ−1′
[
0 0
0 1
]
.
(3.54)
True versus implied variance. The implied variance of yt is equal to
Σ̂y =

Λ
[
1 0
0 0
]
Λ
−1
ΛΛ′Λ−1′
[
1 0
0 0
]
Λ
′
+
Λ
[
0 0
0 1
]
Λ
−1
ΛΛ′Λ−1′
[
0 0
0 1
]
Λ
′
 6= ΛΛ
′ = Σtruey (3.55)
The reason Σ̂y 6= Σtruey is that the Λ terms do not cancel out. In our Monte
Carlo experiments with misspecified models, we find that there often are large gaps
between the variances of the observables used in the estimation and the corresponding
variances as implied by the model using the estimated parameters. Moreover, there
is a bias. That is, the implied variance is typically larger than the actual variance.
Our Monte Carlo experiments are a lot more complicated than this example, but this
example may shed light on the coincidence of high implied variances. Specifically,
because the Λs do not cancel out, the expression for Σ̂y contains terms like the
following:
Λ
[
1 0
0 0
]
Λ
−1
=
1
λ11λ22 − λ12λ21
[
λ11λ22 −λ11λ12
λ21λ22 −λ12λ21
]
. (3.56)
This equation documents that the ratio of the implied variance relative to the true
variance could be arbitrarily large if the term in the denominator goes to zero.72
72The opposite is less likely, since it would require values for the λij coefficients such that the
combinations appearing in square brackets are small, but the particular combination in the denom-
inator is not. For example, one cannot accomplish this by simply choosing small values for the λij
terms.
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For a correctly specified model this would not matter, since the small term in the
denominator would then be offset by an equally small term in the numerator. But
this is not necessarily the case for an incorrectly specified model.
3.7.2 Identification of structural parameters
We use the test proposed in Komunjer and Ng (2011) to check whether the parameters
of the empirical specifications used in our experiments are identified. We will refer to
this test as the KN test. This test provides both necessary and sufficient conditions
for local identification under a set of weak conditions.73 It focuses on the state-space
representation of the model and – in contrast to earlier identification tests – does
not require the user to specify a set of particular autocovariances.74
Identification of original Smets-Wouters estimation exercise. SW fix the
values of five parameters: depreciation, δ, steady-state wage mark-up, µ, steady-
state exogenous spending, g, curvature in the Kimball goods-market aggregator,
εp, and curvature in the Kimball labor-market aggregator, εw. Komunjer and Ng
(2011) consider the identification of the SW model, but their empirical specification
is slightly different from the one of SW in that all variables are demeaned. By
contrast, the data in the SW estimation exercise does contain information about the
level, since the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate are in levels. Komunjer
and Ng (2011) show that several subsets of the five parameter restrictions mentioned
above are sufficient to obtain identification if the parameter controlling steady state
hours, l, and the parameter controlling steady state inflation, pi, are fixed as well.
It makes sense that identification requires more restrictions when information about
the levels is not used in the estimation.
Identification of our specifications. The empirical and true specifications used
in our Monte Carlo experiments have six structural disturbances, whereas the original
SW empirical model has seven. This may imply that less parameters are identified. It
is important that the parameters that we try to estimate are identified. If parameters
are not identified, then different parameter combinations lead to the same criterion
of fit used in the estimation, so it would not be surprising if parameter estimates are
different for slightly different specifications.
Consequently, we adopt the following conservative strategy to ensure identifica-
tion. The KN test checks rank conditions of matrices and to see whether there is a
singularity one needs to choose a tolerance criterion. We set the criterion at a level
that is more strict than the one chosen by KN.75 We follow SW and fix the values
of the five parameters mentioned above. In addition, we fix all parameters that have
a direct effect on the means of variables, since we use demeaned variables in the
estimation. The associated parameters are the trend growth rate, γ, the parameter
73These are a stability condition and regularity conditions on the innovations.
74An example of such an earlier test is Iskrev (2010).
75We set“Tol" equal to 1e-2 instead of 1e-3 (a higher number is more strict).
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Table 3.8: Komunjer and NG identification test
required number 41 225 36 302 -
n ∆
S
Λ ∆
S
T ∆
S
U ∆
S pass?
εat excluded 12 41 225 36 302 yes
εbt excluded 12 41 225 36 302 yes
εgt excluded 12 41 225 36 302 yes
εit excluded 12 41 225 36 302 yes
εrt excluded 12 41 225 36 302 yes
εwt excluded 13 41 225 36 302 yes
εpt excluded 13 41 225 36 302 yes
Note: Here, n is the number of restrictions, which includes the number of coefficients fixed in all experiments
and the number of coefficients in the law of motion of the excluded exogenous random variable that are all
set to zero. ∆SΛ is a matrix that contains the derivatives of all the vectorized elements in the state-space
representation of the model (the A, B, C, D matrices and the variance-covariance matrices) evaluated at
the true parameter values. It is intuitive that this matrix needs to have full rank for identification. But it is
not sufficient. ∆ST and ∆
S
U are matrices with particular elements related to the state-space representation.
The matrix ∆S = [∆SΛ ∆
S
T ∆
S
U ] needs to have full rank to pass the KN test.
controlling steady state hours, l, the parameter controlling steady state inflation, pi,
and the discount factor, β.76 Finally, as discussed in section 3.2.1, we fix the spillover
from the productivity disturbance to exogenous spending and set it equal to zero.
The results of the KN test are reported in Table 3.8 and it indicates that the
identification test is passed in all cases. That is, lack of identification is not driving
the results in section 3.2.
3.7.3 Additional results for Monte Carlo experiments
In this appendix, we report additional results for the analysis of section 3.5 in which
we compared estimation outcomes using the ASD specification, the SW model with
only regular structural disturbances, and an incorrect empirical model.
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 plot the histograms of the estimated χ2 statistics across Monte
Carlo replications for the two experiments of section 3.5 together with the theoretical
(large-sample) χ2 distribution. The number of degrees of freedom is equal to 10.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 document detailed information on the distribution of param-
eter estimates for the two Monte Carlo experiments.
76It is a conservative choice to fix all four, since identification only requires that two parameters
are fixed according to the test of Komunjer and Ng (2011).
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Figure 3.7: Likelihood ratio test agnostic versus fully specified model I
Note: The figure plots the distribution of χ2 statistics of the first Monte Carlo experiment and the theoretical
distribution according to large sample theory. This Monte Carlo experiment corresponds to the case when the
true dgp does not include a monetary policy disturbance, but the empirical model leaves out the investment
disturbance instead.
Figure 3.8: Likelihood ratio test agnostic versus fully specified model II
Note: The figure plots the distribution of χ2 statistics of the first Monte Carlo experiment and the theoretical
distribution according to large sample theory. This Monte Carlo experiment corresponds to the case when the
true dgp does not include a TFP disturbance, but the empirical model leaves out the investment disturbance
instead.
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Table 3.9: Parameter estimates across Monte Carlo replications I
misspecified estimation ASD procedure SW specification
Truth LB UB 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
α 0.19 0.07 0.31 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.24
σc 1.39 0.53 2.25 1.35 1.44 1.66 2.16 2.24 1.16 1.29 1.47 1.69 1.95 1.19 1.29 1.42 1.58 1.81
Φ 1.61 1.33 1.89 1.46 1.69 1.86 1.89 1.89 1.33 1.34 1.57 1.85 1.89 1.33 1.38 1.60 1.83 1.89
φ 5.48 1.99 8.97 3.42 5.03 6.48 8.05 8.87 3.18 3.78 4.59 5.63 6.74 3.80 4.27 4.91 5.55 6.24
λ 0.71 0.45 0.90 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.84 0.86 0.57 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.76 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.76
ξw 0.73 0.47 0.92 0.58 0.65 0.71 0.78 0.86 0.57 0.62 0.68 0.75 0.82 0.58 0.63 0.69 0.75 0.81
σ` 1.92 0.18 3.66 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.54 0.89 1.16 1.55 2.17 2.77 1.07 1.36 1.76 2.24 2.71
ξp 0.65 0.40 0.86 0.69 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.85 0.50 0.56 0.63 0.69 0.73 0.52 0.57 0.63 0.68 0.73
ιw 0.59 0.24 0.89 0.24 0.28 0.38 0.53 0.68 0.32 0.44 0.60 0.76 0.88 0.34 0.47 0.61 0.76 0.88
ιp 0.22 0.01 0.65 0.04 0.13 0.25 0.38 0.51 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.34 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.31
ψ 0.54 0.20 0.86 0.26 0.38 0.59 0.75 0.84 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.69 0.81 0.41 0.48 0.57 0.66 0.77
rpi 2.03 1.45 2.61 1.58 1.78 2.05 2.33 2.55 1.71 1.88 2.10 2.41 2.60 1.76 1.91 2.09 2.35 2.57
ρ 0.81 0.53 0.97 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.85
ry 0.08 -0.04 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12
r∆y 0.22 0.10 0.34 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24
ρa 0.95 0.00 0.99 0.60 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96
ρb 0.18 0.00 0.99 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.27 0.75 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.26 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26
ρg 0.97 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98
ρp 0.90 0.00 0.99 0.50 0.66 0.78 0.91 0.97 0.68 0.80 0.87 0.92 0.95 0.74 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.94
ρw 0.97 0.00 0.99 0.93 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99
µp 0.74 0.00 0.99 0.21 0.38 0.64 0.86 0.94 0.31 0.48 0.62 0.73 0.80 0.38 0.51 0.64 0.73 0.80
µw 0.88 0.00 0.99 0.72 0.81 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.73 0.80 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.76 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.92
σa 0.45 0.00 10.00 0.62 0.70 0.85 1.05 1.22 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.53 0.37 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.53
σb 0.24 0.00 10.00 0.06 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.28
σg 0.52 0.00 10.00 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.56
σp 0.14 0.00 10.00 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16
σw 0.24 0.00 10.00 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.28
Note: The table provides information on the distribution of the indicated parameter across the Monte Carlo replications. See Table 3.1 for the definitions
of the parameters. This is for the first Monte Carlo experiment which corresponds to the case when the true dgp does not include a monetary policy
disturbance, but the empirical model leaves out the investment disturbance instead.
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Table 3.10: Parameter estimates across Monte Carlo replications II
misspecified estimation ASD procedure SW specification
Truth LB UB 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
α 0.19 0.07 0.31 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.26
σc 1.39 0.53 2.25 1.39 1.57 2.07 2.24 2.25 1.14 1.27 1.45 1.75 2.14 1.16 1.26 1.41 1.63 1.93
Φ 1.61 1.33 1.89 1.39 1.58 1.79 1.87 1.89 1.33 1.35 1.58 1.85 1.89 1.34 1.43 1.61 1.78 1.87
φ 5.48 1.99 8.97 4.09 4.99 6.23 7.43 8.48 3.29 3.85 4.57 5.43 6.54 3.85 4.34 4.98 5.64 6.44
λ 0.71 0.45 0.90 0.54 0.61 0.69 0.76 0.80 0.55 0.61 0.66 0.72 0.77 0.60 0.64 0.68 0.73 0.77
ξw 0.73 0.47 0.92 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.72 0.78 0.55 0.60 0.67 0.74 0.81 0.58 0.62 0.69 0.75 0.80
σ` 1.92 0.18 3.66 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.55 1.03 0.46 0.89 1.56 2.58 3.54 0.67 1.07 1.78 2.64 3.38
ξp 0.65 0.40 0.86 0.62 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.49 0.54 0.62 0.68 0.73 0.51 0.56 0.62 0.68 0.72
ιw 0.59 0.24 0.89 0.24 0.30 0.42 0.57 0.69 0.32 0.46 0.61 0.78 0.89 0.34 0.47 0.62 0.77 0.88
ιp 0.22 0.01 0.65 0.04 0.11 0.24 0.34 0.46 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.24 0.32 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.32
ψ 0.54 0.20 0.86 0.30 0.40 0.53 0.67 0.80 0.37 0.45 0.57 0.70 0.81 0.40 0.48 0.58 0.68 0.79
rpi 2.03 1.45 2.61 1.74 2.04 2.32 2.54 2.60 1.59 1.86 2.28 2.59 2.61 1.68 1.89 2.22 2.52 2.60
ρ 0.81 0.53 0.97 0.79 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.85
ry 0.08 -0.04 0.20 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.13
r∆y 0.22 0.10 0.34 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.28
ρb 0.18 0.00 0.99 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.33 0.53 0.02 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.26 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26
ρg 0.97 0.00 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98
ρr 0.12 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.22
ρp 0.90 0.00 0.99 0.48 0.65 0.78 0.91 0.97 0.74 0.82 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.78 0.84 0.89 0.92 0.95
ρw 0.97 0.00 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98
µp 0.74 0.00 0.99 0.17 0.37 0.61 0.84 0.92 0.36 0.50 0.62 0.72 0.81 0.44 0.55 0.65 0.73 0.80
µw 0.88 0.00 0.99 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.76 0.81 0.85 0.89 0.92
σb 0.24 0.00 10.00 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.28
σg 0.52 0.00 10.00 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.56
σr 0.24 0.00 10.00 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26
σp 0.14 0.00 10.00 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16
σw 0.24 0.00 10.00 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.28
Note: The table provides information on the distribution of the indicated parameter across the Monte Carlo replications. See Table 3.1 for the definitions
of the parameters. This for the second Monte Carlo experiment which corresponds to the case when the true dgp does not include a TFP disturbance,
but the empirical model leaves out the investment disturbance instead.
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3.7.4 ASD procedure for the Smets-Wouters model
In this appendix, we provide further details on how the ASD procedure is imple-
mented in section 3.6. We also provide additional results.
Including ASDs in SW equations
To apply the ASD procedure to the SW model, we adapt the Dynare program pro-
vided by the authors.77 Adapting a Dynare program to add an agnostic disturbance
is easy. Specifically, for the first ASD, ε˜tA, we do the following.
1. In the model block, we add dAi ε˜
A
t to the ith equation, where ε˜At is the agnostic
disturbance and dAi the coefficient associated with the agnostic disturbance in
the ith equation. Details are given below.78
2. We add an equation to the model block that describes the law of motion for
ε˜At . If the agnostic disturbance replaces a regular structural disturbance, then
this disturbance should be taken out of the program.
3. Declare ε˜At as a variable and declare the elements of dAi and the coefficients of
the law of motion for ε˜At as parameters.
4. Specify a prior for the elements of dAi .
We do not add the agnostic disturbance to equations (6) and (12) of the SW
model, because these equations just contain definitions for capacity utilization and
the wage mark-up, respectively.79 The set of equations for the SW model consists
of two parts. The first part models the flexible price economy and the second part
models the actual economy with sticky prices. One needs to model the flexible-price
economy, because the flexible-price output level is used to define the output gap,
which is one of the arguments in the monetary policy rule. In principle, one could
let the agnostic disturbance enter the equations of the sticky-price economy and the
associated equations in the flexible-price economy with a different coefficient.80 In
most economic models, however, structural disturbances would enter the associated
pair of equations in the same way. Therefore, we also restrict the agnostic disturbance
to enter the associated equations in the same way. The exception is SW equation (13)
because it captures both potential stickiness in wages and the relationship between
the wage rate and its mark-up.
77The program is available at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.97.3.586 under
the “Download Data Set" link.
78The other two ASDs are added using the same procedure. The dA coefficients correspond to
the Γ̂2 coefficients in section 3.3.2. We adapt the notation, since SW also use lower case Roman
letters for coefficients.
79Equation numbers refer to those in Smets and Wouters (2007). We do allow the agnostic
disturbances to affect the utilization rate and the wage mark-up directly by including it in the
model equations that specify their relationship with other model variables.
80The sticky-price block contains some equations, such as the monetary policy rule, that do not
have a counterpart in the flexible-price economy.
192
Specifically, we add the agnostic disturbance to equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
(7), (8), (9), and (11) of the SW model and the associated equations of the flexible-
price economy. We also add it to equation (13) in both the flexible and the sticky-
price part of the model, but here we allow coefficients to differ. In addition, we add
the agnostic disturbance to equations (10) and (14) which do not have a counterpart
in the flexible-price economy. This means that dA has thirteen elements. The last
coefficient associated with the agnostic disturbance is the autoregressive coefficient of
its law of motion. The standard deviation of the agnostic disturbance is normalized
to be equal to 1.
Model selection procedures
The general-to-specific model selection procedure starts with the specification in
which the agnostic disturbances are allowed to enter each model equation. It then
calculates the marginal data densities for all possible specifications in which the ASD
is not allowed to enter one of the model equations. Thus, we estimate a set of models,
each having one less coefficient. If none of the specifications lead to a better fit, then
the procedure stops. If improvements are found, then the procedure is repeated using
the specification that led to the biggest improvement as the benchmark.
The specific-to-general procedure starts with the specifications in which each of
the two ASDs are allowed to enter only one model equation. To avoid a singularity,
one cannot start with a more parsimonious model.81 In the next step, we estimate
a set of models in which one of the ASDs is added to one equation and, thus, one
additional parameter is estimated. The procedure stops if none of the specifications
leads to an improvement. If there is an improvement, then the specification with the
largest improvement becomes the next benchmark and the procedure is repeated.
Why not consider even more general specifications? Although our model
selection procedures consider a rich set of models, they are not the most general. Un-
fortunately, there are practical limitations to what is feasible. Five SW disturbance
are always included in our specifications. The most ideal setup would be flexible in
this dimension as well and not safeguard any of the seven SW regular disturbances
and allow for the possibility of including seven ASDs (or more). With such a setup
all SW disturbances could be replaced by an ASD. The first problem one would have
to deal with is that identification of structural parameters is likely to limit the num-
ber of regular structural disturbances one can replace with ASDs. Let us consider a
simple setup in which there are seven equations for seven state variables and all state
variables are observables. Moreover, each equation has one regular structural dis-
turbance. A general-to-specific procedure would be complicated since the first-stage
model would have a large number of coefficients to estimate. Specifically, if all seven
ASDs appear in all equations, then one needs to estimate forty-nine reduced-form
81The posteriors of the ASD coefficients in the fully agnostic model provide clear evidence that
one of the ASDs is very important for the bond Euler equation and one for the investment Euler
equation. So these are natural choices.
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coefficients. One may need a rich data set to identify all of them. In our application,
the number of coefficients would be equal to ninety-one, since we have thirteen equa-
tions. The specific-to-general procedure faces the problem that each specification
needs at least seven disturbances to avoid singularities. This means that there are
a large number of different models one can start with. For the simple setup with
seven equations described above, this would mean that there are already 27 = 128
different models to consider in the first round alone.
Additional results
Specifications with and without restrictions on ASDs. Table 3.11 compares
structural parameter estimates of models chosen by our model selection procedures
with those that contain the same number of ASDs, but allow ASDs to enter all
equations. The latter are fully agnostic. The parameter estimates are fairly similar.
IRFs for the included regular structural disturbances are also quite similar. That
is not always the case for the IRFs of the agnostic disturbances themselves. The
IRFs for some variables do differ between the concise and the fully unrestricted ASD
specification. Given the misspecification results of section 3.2, it is not surprising
that different empirical specifications lead to different results. Another issue with the
fully unrestricted ASD specification is that it estimates a large number of coefficients
which complicates generating an accurate posterior with Monte Carlo Markov Chain
algorithms. Especially, for the 3-ASD fully unrestricted specification, the Brooks-
Gelman statistics did not look particularly good for some of the coefficients associated
with the agnostic disturbances.
Specifications with two and three ASDs. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 provide the
role of the regular and agnostic disturbances for the fluctuations of a wide range of
variables. In addition to the results of the SW specification, it also shows the re-
sults for the two-ASD and three-ASD specification chosen by our specific-to-general
procedure. It shows that the results are very similar for the two chosen ASD specifi-
cations. The same conclusion can be drawn from Figures 3.9 and 3.10 that plot the
IRFs for two agnostic disturbances.
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Table 3.11: Posterior Means
Parameter Original SW Agnostic: 2 ASDs Agnostic: 3 ASDs
concise unrestricted concise unrestricted
α 0.1903 0.2044 0.1878 0.1877 0.2089
σc 1.3889 1.4657 1.4535 1.4618 1.4772
Φ 1.6083 1.5211 1.5242 1.4741 1.4762
φ 5.7405 5.3843 4.4031 5.3425 4.6933
λ 0.7136 0.6544 0.7055 0.6679 0.6930
ξw 0.7066 0.6660 0.6706 0.7268 0.6453
σ` 1.8458 1.9094 1.7733 2.0770 1.5916
ξp 0.6541 0.6566 0.6981 0.6412 0.6902
ιw 0.5783 0.5556 0.5432 0.5077 0.5557
ιp 0.2389 0.2010 0.1997 0.1871 0.1891
ψ 0.5426 0.5345 0.5049 0.5283 0.3176
rpi 2.0469 1.7676 1.7797 1.7746 1.7438
ρ 0.8105 0.7933 0.8082 0.8018 0.8032
ry 0.0887 0.0725 0.0860 0.0787 0.0819
r∆y 0.2237 0.1903 0.1703 0.1941 0.1608
ρa 0.9572 0.9555 0.9483 0.9532 0.9510
ρg 0.9764 0.9719 0.9710 0.9702 0.9018
ρr 0.1464 0.1376 0.1219 0.1286 0.1227
ρp 0.8893 0.8975 0.8899 0.9262 0.9080
ρw 0.9680 0.9751 0.9790 0.9747 0.9822
ρb / ρA 0.2165 0.3344 0.6386 0.3239 0.4527
ρi / ρB 0.7116 0.6087 0.1660 0.6069 0.7232
ρC - - - 0.1865 0.1577
µp 0.6977 0.6764 0.6923 0.7166 0.7172
µw 0.8466 0.8241 0.8368 0.5945 0.8168
ρga 0.5184 0.6438 0.6525 0.6709 0.5448
σa 0.4586 0.4436 0.4421 0.4524 0.4411
σg 0.5299 0.4702 0.4689 0.4428 0.2285
σr 0.2449 0.2180 0.2171 0.2171 0.2114
σp 0.1403 0.1346 0.1299 0.1308 0.1311
σw 0.2427 0.2384 0.2361 0.0763 0.2249
σb 0.2398 - - - -
σi 0.4525 - - - -
100(β−1 − 1) 0.1648 0.1685 0.1826 0.1656 0.2038
γ¯ 0.4316 0.4349 0.4386 0.4367 0.4352
p¯i 0.7845 0.7483 0.7443 0.7391 0.7534
¯` 0.5617 0.1263 0.5216 0.1303 1.0360
MDD -922.40 -892.92 -906.85 -890.73 -925.50
Note: MDD stands for marginal data density. The “concise" ASD specifications are the ones chosen by the
specific-to-general model selection procedure. The “unrestricted" ASD specifications are the fully agnostic
with no zero restrictions. See Table 3.1 for the definitions of the parameters.
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Table 3.12: Variance decompositions across model specifications
εa εg εr εp εw εb/ε˜A εi/ε˜B ε˜C
∆y Original SW 16.10 28.88 6.17 4.55 6.39 22.12 15.79 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 20.29 27.01 7.15 6.04 8.12 20.53 10.85 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 22.21 24.60 7.04 4.66 10.30 21.33 8.04 1.82
∆c Original SW 5.29 2.10 11.56 4.40 14.54 61.17 0.95 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 3.26 1.62 11.29 4.56 15.33 62.34 1.61 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 2.95 1.28 10.69 3.37 17.90 61.67 2.03 0.1
∆i Original SW 6.01 0.84 2.47 3.80 2.37 2.46 82.05 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 4.86 0.91 2.19 4.24 2.76 12.25 72.80 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 5.49 1.02 2.38 3.80 3.94 12.55 70.01 0.81
` Original SW 1.94 10.34 3.15 6.23 67.66 2.52 8.15 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 1.29 6.84 2.47 6.04 71.23 1.56 10.57 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 1.08 4.33 2.15 4.44 79.70 1.29 4.97 2.03
∆w Original SW 4.53 0.09 1.48 29.47 61.61 0.79 2.03 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 3.82 0.22 2.43 30.84 54.34 3.02 5.34 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 4.09 0.11 1.25 25.18 13.32 2.23 0.38 53.45
pi Original SW 3.92 1.00 4.25 27.64 59.43 0.58 3.18 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 3.16 1.28 4.43 24.91 61.96 0.79 3.46 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 2.95 0.90 3.28 16.87 70.46 0.68 3.96 0.91
r Original SW 10.09 3.90 14.67 7.17 38.42 7.40 18.34 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 6.50 3.49 9.77 5.79 38.96 21.49 14.02 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 5.70 2.77 8.18 4.33 48.61 17.29 12.47 0.65
Note: The table provides the contributions (in percent) of the different structural disturbances to the variance
of the observable variables, across different model specifications. The ASD specifications are the ones chosen
by our model selection procedure. y stands for log output; c for log consumption; i for log investment; l
for hours; w for log wage rate; pi for inflation; and r for nominal interest rate. Structural disturbances are
defined as follows. εa: TFP; εg : government expenditures; εr:monetary policy; εp:price mark-up; εw: wage
mark-up; εb: risk premium; εi: investment; ε˜A: agnostic Euler; ε˜B : agnostic investment-modernization; and
ε˜C : capital-efficiency wage mark-up.
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Table 3.13: Variance decomposition for additional variables
εa εg εr εp εw εb/ε˜A εi/ε˜B ε˜C
yt Original SW 29.93 4.09 2.16 6.37 48.58 1.53 7.34 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 26.50 3.02 1.91 7.02 55.93 1.31 4.32 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 21.19 2.13 1.67 5.47 65.95 1.14 2.17 0.28
ct Original SW 11.06 8.42 2.08 4.19 69.25 2.18 2.83 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 6.60 6.60 1.78 4.23 78.76 1.81 0.22 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 4.29 4.30 1.52 3.16 84.48 1.51 0.49 0.25
it Original SW 20.37 5.41 1.27 6.93 21.56 0.22 44.23 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 17.22 6.35 1.14 8.25 29.78 1.21 36.04 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 15.31 5.79 1.13 7.75 38.72 1.06 29.25 1.00
rkt Original SW 14.86 17.47 1.63 10.58 19.21 0.86 35.39 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 12.28 20.44 2.65 19.09 29.73 0.92 14.88 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 8.41 14.66 1.73 13.16 30.17 0.67 18.12 13.08
qt Original SW 4.65 0.55 9.03 3.11 1.20 45.42 36.04 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 9.78 1.35 21.83 9.30 3.67 19.58 34.49 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 9.72 1.35 19.88 6.50 5.14 18.64 31.56 7.21
zt Original SW 14.86 17.47 1.63 10.58 19.21 0.86 35.39 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 12.23 20.36 2.64 19.02 29.61 4.43 11.71 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 8.86 15.43 1.82 13.85 31.76 4.14 9.46 14.68
µpt Original SW 11.56 0.29 3.27 57.02 23.87 0.87 3.11 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 8.06 0.37 3.38 53.22 18.90 14.59 1.48 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 7.99 0.24 2.13 54.80 11.88 15.22 2.61 5.13
kst Original SW 23.43 3.92 1.23 11.37 34.19 0.36 25.50 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 21.82 4.90 1.55 16.51 52.66 1.32 1.24 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 15.59 3.60 1.11 14.11 58.20 1.21 0.61 5.57
kt Original SW 22.38 8.11 0.50 4.93 31.56 0.04 32.48 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 22.16 11.30 0.55 7.27 55.74 0.21 2.77 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 14.84 8.05 0.42 6.18 58.26 0.12 2.37 9.75
wt Original SW 33.03 1.03 1.95 38.38 18.61 0.40 6.60 -
Agnostic: 2 ASDs 26.99 1.00 2.63 47.34 20.71 0.39 0.92 -
Agnostic: 3 ASDs 25.35 0.74 1.62 49.34 14.29 0.30 0.44 7.92
Note: The table provides the contributions (in percent) of the different structural disturbances to the variance
of the observable variables, across different model specifications. The ASD specifications are the ones chosen
by our model selection procedure. y stands for log output; c for log consumption; i for log investment;
l for hours; w for log wage rate; rk for rental rate on capital; q for the log price of capital; z for the
utilization rate; µp for the price mark-up; ks for log capital used in production; and k for log installed
capital. Structural disturbances are defined as follows. εa: TFP; εg : government expenditures; εr:monetary
policy; εp:price mark-up; εw: wage mark-up; εb: risk premium; εi: investment; ε˜A: agnostic Euler; ε˜B : agnostic
investment-modernization; and ε˜C : capital-efficiency wage mark-up.
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Figure 3.9: IRFs of the Euler ASD: 2 versus 3 ASDs
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the agnostic disturbance ε˜At that we interpret as a general Euler
disturbance for the empirical specifications with two and three ASDs. Both are chosen with the
specific-to-general model selection procedure.
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Figure 3.10: IRFs of the investment-modernization ASD: 2 versus 3 ASDs
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the agnostic disturbance ε˜Bt that we interpret as an investment-
modernization disturbance for the empirical specifications with two and three ASDs. Both are chosen
with the specific-to-general model selection procedure.
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Additional results for ε˜At
Figure 3.11 plots the IRFs associated with an innovation in the agnostic Euler dis-
turbance for our 3-ASD benchmark specification and also when the coefficient of
this agnostic disturbance in the capital valuation equation is equal to zero. A zero
coefficient in this equation means the disturbance is like a preference and not like
a bond risk-premium disturbance.82 The IRFs are very similar, which confirms our
claim that the coefficient in the capital valuation equation is quantitatively not very
important.
Figure 3.12 plots the same IRFs when the coefficient of the agnostic Euler distur-
bance in the Taylor rule is set equal to zero. The figure shows that the direct response
of the policy rate to a positive shock to this disturbance dampens the expansion and
prevents an upsurge of inflation.
Figure 3.13 plots the same IRFs when we set equal to zero the coefficients of the
disturbance in the four equations that we ignored in the discussion of the agnostic
Euler disturbance, namely, the overall budget constraint, the utilization, the price
mark-up equation, and the rental rate of capital equation. The figure documents
that the role of the agnostic disturbance through these equations is minor since the
IRFs are overall quite similar to those of our benchmark specification.
82Recall that the MRS has been substituted out of the capital valuation equation using the MRS
of the bond Euler equation.
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Additional results for ε˜Ct
Figure 3.14 plots the IRFs for our agnostic capital-efficiency wage mark-up distur-
bance when the coefficient of this disturbance in the overall budget constraint is set
equal to zero. The figure documents that this has a minor impact on IRFs.
Figure 3.11: IRFs of the Euler ASD with restrictions I
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the agnostic Euler disturbance for our benchmark specification
and when the impact of this IRF through the capital valuation equation is set equal to zero.
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Figure 3.12: IRFs of the Euler ASD with restrictions II
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the agnostic Euler disturbance for our benchmark specification
and when the impact of this IRF through the Taylor rule is set equal to zero.
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Figure 3.13: IRFs of the Euler ASD with restrictions III
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the agnostic Euler disturbance for our benchmark specification and
when the impact of this IRF through the overall budget constraint, the utilization, the price mark-up
equation, and the rental rate of capital equation is set equal to zero.
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Figure 3.14: IRFs of the capital-efficiency wage mark-up ASD with restrictions
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Note: These figures plot the IRFs of the agnostic capital-efficiency wage mark-up disturbance for our
benchmark specification and when the impact of this IRF through the overall budget constraint is set
equal to zero.
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3.7.5 Misspecification: Literature review
Most empirical papers that estimate a dynamic macroeconomic model do not raise
the issue of model uncertainty or misspecification, except possibly with some robust-
ness exercises.83 This does – of course – not mean that the profession is not aware
that misspecification is a serious concern. In fact, some of the most prominent re-
searchers in this research area have drawn attention to the risk of misspecification.
The first subsection discusses evidence that indicates that misspecification of DSGE
models is a serious concern. The second subsection discusses approaches proposed in
the literature to deal with misspecfication. See Paccagnini (2017) for a more detailed
survey.
Indications of DSGE misspecification
Del Negro et al. (2007) develop a procedure that allows the data to determine the
usefulness of a DSGE model relative to a much less restricted VAR. Using a model
very similar to the DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2003), they find that their
procedure does put some weight on the DSGE model, which implies that the re-
strictions of the DSGE model are of some value. However, they also argue that
misspecification is a concern that “... is not small enough to be ignored." Using the
same methodology, Del Negro and Schorfheide (2009) also find “... strong evidence
of DSGE model misspecification."
There is also more indirect evidence that misspecification of estimated DSGE
models is substantive. Using the Smets and Wouters (2003) model for the Euro
Area, Beltran and Draper (2015) find that the data prefer implausible estimates for
several parameters. For example, most of the mass of the marginal likelihood for
the parameter of relative risk aversion is above 200, way above the range of values
considered reasonable. This information provided by the likelihood is typically not
revealed in empirical studies, since only properties of the posterior are reported and
the choice of prior ensures that these aspects of the empirical likelihood have little
or no weight in the posterior. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Onatski and
Williams (2010). They estimate the same model using uniform priors over bounded
ranges. These ranges are such that the priors are less informative than the ones
typically used in the literature. Consistent with the results in Beltran and Draper
(2015), several of the point estimates in Onatski and Williams (2010) are at the prior
bounds. Using a new algorithm to deal with the complexity of estimating likelihood
functions, Mickelsson (2015) re-estimates the model of Smets and Wouters (2007)
and he also finds that several parameter estimates are significantly different from the
ones reported in Smets and Wouters (2007).
Another possible reason for misspecification is the assumption that parameters
are constant. To get efficient estimates we would like to use long time-series data,
83Interestingly, there are quite a few macroeconomic models in which agents – especially agents
setting fiscal and monetary policy – face model uncertainty. If policy makers face model uncertainty,
then researchers are likely to do so as well.
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but the longer the time series the less likely that all parameters are constant. Canova
et al. (2015) address this issue and document that this is important for the model of
Gertler and Karadi (2010).84
Dealing with misspecification: Other approaches
Richer models. Exogenous random disturbances are typically assumed not to be
correlated with each other. This is a convenient assumption, because allowing for
interaction between the different exogenous disturbances would substantially increase
the number of parameters to be estimated given that DSGE typically have a several
exogenous disturbances. However, it seems quite plausible that such disturbances
are correlated. Del Negro and Schorfheide (2009) and Cúrdia and Reis (2012) deal
with this possible misspecification and allow for more general processes to describe
the behavior of the exogenous random disturbances.
Cúrdia and Reis (2012) find that this generalization has nontrivial consequences
for the properties of the model. For example, the impact of a monetary policy shock
on output is only half as big when the exogenous random variables are allowed to be
correlated and the medium-term impact of a government spending shock switches
from being positive to negative.85
Enriching a model by allowing for additional features and more general specifi-
cations is likely to reduce misspecification. However, richer models typically have
more parameters, which will reduce the efficiency of the estimation by reducing the
number of degrees of freedom.
Multiple models. Another way to deal with potential misspecification is to con-
sider a set of different DSGE models. These could be compared informally or formally
using, for example, relative marginal likelihoods or model averaging.86 However,
given the difficulty of modeling macroeconomic phenomena, it seems likely that all
models in a set of DSGE models are subject to at least some type of misspecification.
Combining structural and reduced-form models. Ireland (2004) is an early
paper that proposes a more general procedure to deal with possible misspecification
when estimating a DSGE model even though the word misspecification is not used
in the paper. Specifically, Ireland (2004) “... augments the DSGE model so that
its residuals – meaning the movements in the data that the theory cannot explain
– are described by a VAR." To understand this procedure, consider the following
representation of the linearized solution of a DSGE model:
st = Ast−1 +Bηt, (3.57)
yt = Cst−1 +Dηt, (3.58)
84The literature cited in Canova et al. (2015) documents that this is an issue in a variety of DSGE
models.
85Cúrdia and Reis (2012) still impose that the innovations of the shocks are uncorrelated. Thus,
the innovations still have a structural interpretation.
86See chapter 5 in An and Schorfheide (2007) for a detailed discussion.
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where st is a vector containing (endogenous and exogenous) state variables, yt is a
vector containing the observables, and ηt is a vector containing the innovations of
the exogenous random variables. Ireland (2004) proposes to augment the observation
equation (3.58) as follows:
yt = Cst−1 +Dηt + ut (3.59a)
ut = Fut−1 + ξt (3.59b)
where ut captures the misspecification or incompleteness of the DSGE model. In
his application, the structural equations are the policy rules from a standard Real
Business Cycle (RBC) model with total factor productivity (TFP) as the only driving
process. If the standard deviation of ηt is equal to 0, then this procedure boils down
to estimating a standard VAR.
Note that the presence of the “missing elements” that are captured by ut is
assumed to have no effect on that part of agents’ behavior that is described by
the DSGE model, that is, the matrices A, B, C, and D. For this to be correct it
must be true that the response of the economy to a TFP shock does not depend
on the presence of other disturbances. One might think that such independence
of a DSGE’s policy rule to the presence of other disturbances is only correct if the
additional disturbances represent measurement error.87 However, section 3.3.2 shows
that this “independence” property is correct in linear(ized) models in the sense that
the specification of the structural part given in equations (3.57) and (3.58) does not
depend on the presence of not included structural disturbances. It must be noted that
the assumption that ut follows a first-order (or even a finite-order) VAR could very
well be restrictive. Thus the reduced-form specification for ut could be misspecified
as well.
The most comprehensive methodology to deal with misspecified DSGE models is
put forward in Del Negro et al. (2007). Their starting point is a VAR specification
of the observables. That is,
yt =
K∑
k=1
Fkyt−1 +Gξt (3.60a)
E
[
ξtξ
′
t
]
= I. (3.60b)
The key idea of the DSGE-VAR estimation proposed in Del Negro et al. (2007) is
to estimate this time series process with the prior distribution for F and Ω that
is centered at the values implied by a DSGE model, F (Ψ) and G(Ψ), where Ψ is
the vector containing the parameters of the DSGE model. The estimation procedure
consists of jointly estimating Ψ, the structural parameters of the DSGE model, which
pin down the prior for the VAR coefficients, and the VAR coefficients themselves.
The precision of the prior of the VAR coefficients is controlled with a scalar
87Although Ireland (2004) does not refer to the residual between model and data as measurement
error, other papers in the literature describing his procedure do. Examples are Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2009) and Cúrdia and Reis (2012).
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parameter, λ. If λ is equal to∞, then one estimates an unrestricted VAR and if λ is
equal to 0, then the procedure boils down to estimating a DSGE without allowing for
misspecification. The estimation is executed for different values of λ. To determine
the optimal value for λ, the authors propose using the marginal data density, which
compares in-sample fit with model complexity.88 If the restrictions imposed by the
DSGE model are incorrect, then the procedure will put more weight on the VAR.
As pointed out in Chari et al. (2008), DSGE models often do not imply a VAR
representation with a finite number of lags, unless all state variables are included.
Thus, not only the DSGE, but also the VAR component of the DSGE-VAR procedure
could be misspecified.
Wedges. Yet another approach to deal with misspecification is to add “wedges” to
specific model equations. This procedure was introduced in Chari et al. (2007). In-
oue et al. (2015) use this setup to formally test for model misspecfication. A wedge
may have different interpretations or possibly no simple interpretation. From an
econometric point a view, wedges are not different from regular structural distur-
bances in how they affect time series properties of the model. That is, they impose
restrictions on the policy functions just as structural disturbances do and it matters
crucially how one enters wedges. For example, the assumption that a wedge only
enters one and not all model equations is a restriction. Although some wedges can
enter more than one equation, wedges used in the literature only enter a few specific
model equations and these are chosen by the researcher a priori and – as pointed
out in Inoue et al. (2015) – wedges can be introduced in different ways. By contrast,
ASDs appear in all equations and if one prefers a more concise specification, then
our agnostic approach indicates one should use a statistical model selection criterion.
88The DSGE is less complex because it has fewer parameters, but could provide a worse in-sample
fit, because of the restrictions it imposes.
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Chapter 4
Tracking the Slowdown in
Long-Run GDP Growth
4.1 Introduction
“The global recovery has been disappointing (...) Year after year we have
had to explain from mid-year on why the global growth rate has been lower
than predicted as little as two quarters back”. Stanley Fischer, August 2014.
The slow pace of the recovery from the Great Recession of 2007-2009 has prompted
questions about whether the long-run growth rate of GDP in advanced economies
is lower now than it has been on average over the past decades (see e.g. Fernald,
2014, Gordon, 2014b, Summers, 2014). Indeed, forecasts of US and global real GDP
growth have been persistently too optimistic for the last six years.1 As emphasized
by Orphanides (2003), real-time misperceptions about the long-run growth of the
economy can play a large role in monetary policy mistakes. Moreover, small changes
in assumptions about the long-run growth rate of output can have large implications
on fiscal sustainability calculations (Auerbach, 2011). This calls for a framework
that takes the uncertainty about long-run growth seriously and can inform decision-
making in real time. In this paper, we present a dynamic factor model (DFM) which
allows for gradual changes in the mean and the variance of real output growth. By
incorporating a broad panel of economic activity indicators, DFMs are capable of
precisely estimating the cyclical comovement in macroeconomic data in a real-time
setting. Our model exploits this to track changes in the long-run growth rate of real
GDP in a timely and reliable manner, separating them from their cyclical counter-
part.2
The evidence of a decline in long-run US growth is accumulating, as documented
1For instance, Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) projections since 2009 expected US
growth to accelerate substantially, only to downgrade the forecast back to 2% throughout the course
of the subsequent year. An analysis of forecasts produced by international organizations and private
sector economists reveals the same pattern, see Pain et al. (2014) for a retrospective.
2Throughout this paper, our concept of the long run refers to changes in growth that are perma-
nent in nature, i.e. do not mean-revert, as in Beveridge and Nelson (1981). In practice this should
be thought of as frequencies lower than the business cycle.
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by the recent growth literature such as Fernald and Jones (2014). Lawrence Sum-
mers and Robert Gordon have articulated a particularly pessimistic view of long-run
growth which contrasts with the optimism prevailing before the Great Recession (see
Jorgenson et al., 2006). To complement this evidence, we start our analysis by pre-
senting the results of two popular structural break tests proposed by Nyblom (1989)
and Bai and Perron (1998). Both suggest that a possible shift in the mean of US real
GDP growth exists, the latter approach suggesting that a break probably occurred
in the early part of the 2000’s.3 However, sequential testing using real-time data re-
veals that the break would not have been detected at conventional significance levels
until as late as mid-2012, highlighting the problems of conventional break tests for
real-time analysis (see also Benati, 2007). To address this issue, we introduce two
novel features into an otherwise standard DFM of real activity data. First, we allow
the mean of real GDP growth, and possibly other series, to drift gradually over time.
As emphasized by Cogley (2005), if the long-run output growth rate is not constant,
it is optimal to give more weight to recent data when estimating its current state.
By taking a Bayesian approach, we can combine our prior beliefs about the rate at
which the past information should be discounted with the information contained in
the data. We also characterize the uncertainty around estimates of long-run growth
taking into account both filtering and parameter uncertainty. Second, we allow for
stochastic volatility (SV) in the innovations to both factors and idiosyncratic compo-
nents. Given our interest in studying the entire postwar period, the inclusion of SV
is essential to capture the substantial changes in the volatility of output that have
taken place in this sample, such as the “Great Moderation” first reported by Kim and
Nelson (1999a) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), as well as the cyclicality of
macroeconomic volatility as documented by Jurado et al. (2014).
When applied to US data, our model concludes that long-run GDP growth de-
clined meaningfully during the 2000’s and currently stands at about 2%, more than
one percentage point lower than the postwar average. The results are supportive of
a gradual decline rather than a discrete break. Since in-sample results obtained with
revised data often underestimate the uncertainty faced by policymakers in real time,
we repeat the exercise using real-time vintages of data. The model detects the fall
from the beginning of the 2000’s onwards, and by the summer of 2010 it reaches the
significant conclusion that a decline in long-run growth is behind the slow recovery,
well before the structural break tests become conclusive.
We also investigate the performance of the model in “nowcasting” short-term de-
velopments in GDP. Since the seminal contributions of Evans (2005) and Giannone
et al. (2008) DFMs have become the standard tool for this purpose.4 Interestingly,
our analysis shows that standard DFM forecasts revert very quickly to the uncondi-
tional mean of GDP, so taking into account the variation in long-run GDP growth
3This finding is consistent with the analysis of US real GDP by Luo and Startz (2014), as well
as Fernald (2014), who applies the Bai and Perron (1998) test to US labor productivity.
4An extensive survey of the nowcasting literature is provided by Banbura et al. (2012), who also
demonstrate, in a real-time context, the good out-of-sample performance of DFM nowcasts.
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substantially improves point and density GDP forecasts even at very short horizons.
Finally, we extend our model in order to disentangle the drivers of secular fluc-
tuations of GDP growth. Edge et al. (2007) emphasize the relevance as well as the
difficulty of tracking permanent shifts in productivity growth in real time. In our
framework, long-run output growth can be decomposed into labor productivity and
labor input trends. The results of this decomposition exercise point to a slowdown in
labor productivity as the main driver of recent weakness in GDP growth. Applying
the model to other advanced economies, we provide evidence that the weakening in
labor productivity appears to be a global phenomenon.
Our work is closely related to two strands of literature. The first one encompasses
papers that allow for structural changes within the DFM framework. Del Negro and
Otrok (2008) model time variation in factor loadings and volatilities, while Mar-
cellino et al. (2014) show that the addition of SV improves the performance of the
model for short-term forecasting of euro area GDP.5 Acknowledging the importance
of allowing for time-variation in the means of the variables, Stock and Watson (2012)
pre-filter their data set in order to remove any low-frequency trends from the result-
ing growth rates using a biweight local mean. In his comment to their paper, Sims
(2012) suggests to explicitly model, rather than filter out, these long-run trends, and
emphasizes the importance of evolving volatilities for describing and understanding
macroeconomic data. We see the present paper as extending the DFM literature,
and in particular its application to tracking GDP, in the direction suggested by Chris
Sims. The second strand of related literature takes a similar approach to decompos-
ing long-run GDP growth into its drivers, in particular Gordon (2010, 2014a) and
Reifschneider et al. (2013). Relative to these studies, we emphasize the importance of
using a broader information set, as well as a Bayesian approach, which allows to use
priors to inform the estimate of long-run growth, and to characterize the uncertainty
around the estimate stemming both from filtering and parameter uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents prelim-
inary evidence of a slowdown in long-run US GDP growth. Section 4.3 discusses the
implications of time-varying long-run output growth and volatility for DFMs and
presents our model. Section 4.4 applies the model to US data and documents the
decline in long-run growth. The implications for tracking GDP in real time as well
as the key advantages of our methodology are discussed. Section 4.5 decomposes the
changes in long-run output growth into its underlying drivers. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Preliminary Evidence
The literature on economic growth favors a view of the long-run growth rate as a
process that evolves over time. It is by now widely accepted that a slowdown in
productivity and long-run output growth occurred in the early 1970’s, and that ac-
5While the model of Del Negro and Otrok (2008) includes time-varying factor loadings, the
means of the observable variables are still treated as constant.
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celerating productivity in the IT sector led to a boom in the late 1990’s.6 In contrast,
in the context of econometric modeling the possibility that long-run growth is time-
varying is the source of a long-standing controversy. In their seminal contribution,
Nelson and Plosser (1982) model the (log) level of real GDP as a random walk with
drift. This implies that after first-differencing, the resulting growth rate fluctuates
around a constant mean, an assumption still embedded in many econometric models.
After the slowdown in productivity became apparent in the 1970’s, many researchers
such as Clark (1987) modeled the drift term as an additional random walk, implying
that the level of GDP is integrated of order two. The latter assumption would also
be consistent with the local linear trend model of Harvey (1985), the Hodrick and
Prescott (1997) filter, and Stock and Watson (2012)’s practice of removing a local
biweight mean from the growth rates before estimating a DFM. The I(2) assump-
tion is nevertheless controversial since it implies that the growth rate of output can
drift without bound. Consequently, papers such as Perron and Wada (2009), have
modeled the growth rate of GDP as stationary around a trend with one large break
around 1973.
Figure 4.1: Real-Time Test Statistics of Nyblom and Bai-Perron Tests
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Note: The gray and blue solid lines are the values of the test statistics obtained from sequentially re-
applying the Nyblom (1989) and Bai and Perron (1998) tests in real time as new National Accounts
vintages are being published. In both cases, the sample starts in 1947:Q2 and the test is re-applied
for every new data release occurring after the beginning of 2000. The dotted and dashed red lines
represent the 5% and 10% critical values corresponding to the two tests.
Ever since the Great Recession of 2007-2009 US real GDP has grown well below
its postwar average, once again raising the question whether its mean may have
declined. There are two popular strategies that could be followed from a frequentist
perspective to detect parameter instability or the presence of breaks in the mean
6For a retrospective on the productivity slowdown, see Nordhaus (2004). Oliner and Sichel
(2000) provide evidence on the role of the IT sector in the acceleration of the late 1990’s.
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growth rate. The first one is Nyblom’s (1989) L-test as described in Hansen (1992),
which tests the null hypothesis of constant parameters against the alternative that
the parameters follow a martingale. Modeling real GDP growth as an AR(1) over
the sample 1947-2015 this test rejects the stability of the constant term at the 10%
significance level.7 The second commonly used approach, which can determine the
number and timing of multiple discrete breaks, is the Bai and Perron (1998) test.
This test finds evidence in favor of a single break in the mean of US real GDP growth
at the 10%-level. The most likely break date is in the second quarter of 2000. In
related research, Fernald (2014) provides evidence for breaks in labor productivity in
1973:Q2, 1995:Q3, and 2003:Q1, and links the latter two to developments in the IT
sector. From a Bayesian perspective, Luo and Startz (2014) calculate the posterior
probability of a single break and find the most likely break date to be 2006:Q1 for
the full postwar sample and 1973:Q1 for a sample excluding the 2000’s.
The above results indicate that substantial evidence for a recent change in the
mean of US GDP growth has built up. However, the strategy of applying con-
ventional tests and introducing deterministic breaks into econometric models is not
satisfactory for the purposes of real-time decision making. In fact, the detection of
change in the mean of GDP growth can arrive with substantial delay. To demonstrate
this, a sequential application of the Nyblom (1989) and Bai and Perron (1998) tests
using real-time data is presented in Figure 4.1. The evolution of the test statistics
in real-time reveals that a break would not have been detected at the 10% signifi-
cance levels until as late as mid-2012, which is more than ten years later than the
actual break date suggested by the Bai and Perron (1998) procedure. The Nyblom
(1989) test, which is designed to detect gradual change rather than a discrete break,
becomes significant roughly at the same time. This lack of timeliness highlights the
importance of an econometric framework capable of quickly adapting to changes in
long-run growth as new information arrives.
4.3 Econometric Framework
DFMs in the spirit of Geweke (1977), Stock andWatson (2002) and Forni et al. (2009)
capture the idea that a small number of unobserved factors drives the comovement
of a possibly large number of macroeconomic time series, each of which may be
contaminated by measurement error or other sources of idiosyncratic variation. Their
theoretical appeal (see e.g. Sargent and Sims, 1977 or Giannone et al., 2006), as well
as their ability to parsimoniously model large data sets, have made them a workhorse
of empirical macroeconomics. Giannone et al. (2008) and Banbura et al. (2012) have
pioneered the use of DFMs to produce current-quarter forecasts (“nowcasts”) of GDP
growth by exploiting more timely monthly indicators and the factor structure of the
data. Given the widespread use of DFMs to track GDP in real time, this paper aims
7The same result holds for an AR(2) specification. In both cases, stability of the autoregressive
coefficients cannot be rejected, whereas stability of the variance is rejected at the 1%-level. Section
4.7.2 of the Appendix provides the full results of both tests applied in this section.
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to make these models robust to changes in long-run growth. We do so by introducing
two novel features into the DFM framework. First, we allow the long-run growth
rate of real GDP, and possibly other series, to vary over time. Second, we allow
for stochastic volatility (SV) in the innovations to both factors and idiosyncratic
components, given our interest in studying the entire postwar period for which drastic
changes in volatility have been documented. With these changes, the DFM proves to
be a powerful tool to detect changes in long-run growth. The information contained
in a broad panel of activity indicators facilitates the timely decomposition of real
GDP growth into persistent long-run movements, cyclical fluctuations and short-
lived noise.
4.3.1 The Model
Let yt be an n× 1 vector of observable macroeconomic time series, and let ft denote
a k× 1 vector of latent common factors. It is assumed that n >> k, i.e. the number
of observables is much larger than the number of factors. Formally,
yt = ct + Λft + ut, (4.1)
where Λ contains the loadings on the common factors and ut is a vector of idiosyn-
cratic components.8 Shifts in the long-run mean of yt are captured by time-variation
in ct. In principle one could allow time-varying intercepts in all or a subset of the
variables in the system. Moreover, time variation in a given series could be shared
by other series. ct is therefore flexibly specified as
ct =
[
B 0
0 c
][
at
1
]
, (4.2)
where at is an r×1 vector of time-varying means, B is anm×r matrix which governs
how the time-variation affects the corresponding observables, and c is an (n−m)×1
vector of constants. In our baseline specification, at will be a scalar capturing time-
variation in long-run real GDP growth, which is shared by real consumption growth,
so that r = 1,m = 2. A detailed discussion of this and additional specifications of
ct will be provided in Section 4.3.2. Throughout the paper, we focus on the case of
a single dynamic factor by setting k = 1 (i.e. ft = ft).9 The laws of motion of the
8The model can be extended to include lags of the factor in the measurement equation. In
the latter case, it is sensible to avoid overfitting by choosing priors that shrink the additional lag
coefficients towards zero (see D’Agostino et al., 2015, and Luciani and Ricci, 2014). We consider
this possibility when we explore robustness of our results to using larger data panels in Section
4.4.6.
9For the purpose of tracking real GDP with a large number of closely related activity indicators,
the use of one factor is appropriate, which is explained in more detail in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.
Also note that we order real GDP growth as the first element of yt, and normalize the loading for
GDP to unity. This serves as an identifying restriction in our estimation algorithm. Bai and Wang
(2015) discuss minimal identifying assumptions for DFMs.
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latent factor and the idiosyncratic components are
(1− φ(L))ft = σεtεt, (4.3)
(1− ρi(L))ui,t = σηi,tηi,t, i = 1, . . . , n (4.4)
where φ(L) and ρi(L) denote polynomials in the lag operator of order p and q,
respectively. The idiosyncratic components are cross-sectionally orthogonal and are
assumed to be uncorrelated with the common factor at all leads and lags, i.e. εt
iid∼ N(0, 1) and ηi,t iid∼ N(0, 1).
Finally, the dynamics of the model’s time-varying parameters are specified to
follow driftless random walks:
aj,t = aj,t−1 + vaj,t , vaj,t
iid∼ N(0, ω2a,j) j = 1, . . . , r (4.5)
log σεt = log σεt−1 + vε,t, vε,t
iid∼ N(0, ω2ε) (4.6)
log σηi,t = log σηi,t−1 + vηi,t , vηi,t
iid∼ N(0, ω2η,i) i = 1, . . . , n (4.7)
where aj,t are the r time-varying elements in at, and σεt and σηi,t capture the SV
of the innovations to factor and idiosyncratic components. Our motivation for spec-
ifying the time-varying parameters as random walks is similar to Primiceri (2005).
While in principle it is unrealistic model real GDP growth as a process that could
wander in an unbounded way, as long as the variance of the process is small and
the drift is considered to be operating for a finite period of time, the assumption is
innocuous. Moreover, modeling a trend as a random walk is more robust to misspec-
ification when the actual process is instead characterized by discrete breaks, whereas
models with discrete breaks might not be robust to the true process being a random
walk.10 Finally, the random walk assumption also has the desirable feature that,
unlike stationary models, confidence bands around forecasts of real GDP growth in-
crease with the forecast horizon, reflecting uncertainty about the possibility of future
breaks or drifts in long-run growth.
Note that a standard DFM is usually specified under two assumptions. First,
the original data have been differenced appropriately so that both the factor and the
idiosyncratic components can be assumed to be stationary. Second, it is assumed that
the innovations in the idiosyncratic and common components are iid. In equations
(4.1)-(4.7) we have relaxed these assumptions to allow for two novel features, a
stochastic trend in the mean of selected series, and SV. By shutting down these
features, we can recover the specifications previously proposed in the literature, which
are nested in our framework. We obtain the DFM with SV of Marcellino et al. (2014)
if we shut down time-variation in the intercepts of the observables, i.e. set r = m = 0
and ct = c. If we further shut down the SV, i.e. set ω2a,j = ω
2
 = ω
2
η,i = 0, we obtain
10We demonstrate this point with the use of Monte Carlo simulations, showing that a random
walk trend in real GDP growth ‘learns’ quickly about a discrete break once it has occurred. On the
other hand, the random walk does not detect a drift when there is not one, despite the presence
of a large cyclical component. Appendix 4.7.3 provides a discussion and the full results of these
simulations.
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the specification of Banbura and Modugno (2014) and Banbura et al. (2012).
4.3.2 A Baseline Specification for Long-Run Growth
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) allow for stochastic trends in the mean of all or a subset
of selected observables in yt. This paper focuses on tracking changes in the long-run
growth rate of real GDP. For this purpose, the simplest specification of ct is to in-
clude a time-varying intercept only in GDP and to set B = 1. However, a number of
empirical studies (e.g. Harvey and Stock, 1988, Cochrane, 1994, and Cogley, 2005)
argue that incorporating information about consumption is informative about the
permanent component in GDP as predicted by the permanent income hypothesis.
The theory predicts that consumers, smoothing consumption throughout their life-
time, should react more strongly to permanent, as opposed to transitory, changes in
income. As a consequence, looking at GDP and consumption data together will help
separating growth into long-run and cyclical fluctuations.11 Therefore, our baseline
specification imposes that consumption and output grow at the same rate gt in the
long-run. On the contrary, we do not impose that investment also grows at this rate,
as would be the case in the basic neoclassical growth model, since the presence of
investment-specific technological change implies that real investment has a different
low-frequency trend (Greenwood et al., 1997).
Formally, ordering real GDP and consumption growth first, and setting m = 2
and r = 1, this is represented as
at = gt, B = [1 1]
′ (4.8)
Note that in this baseline specification we model time-variation only in the inter-
cept for GDP and consumption while leaving it constant for the other observables.
Of course it may be the case that some of the remaining n −m series in yt feature
low frequency variation in their means. For instance, as mentioned above, this could
be the case for investment. The key question is whether leaving it unspecified will
affect the estimate of the long-run growth rate of GDP, which is our main object
of interest. We ensure that this is not the case by allowing for persistence (and,
in particular, we do not rule out unit roots) in the idiosyncratic components. If
a series does feature a unit root which is not included in at, its trend component
will be absorbed by the idiosyncratic component. The choice of which elements to
include in at therefore reflects the focus of a particular application.12 Of course, if
11While a strict interpretation of the permanent income hypothesis is rejected in the data, from
an econometric point of view the statement applies as long as permanent changes are the main
driver of consumption. See Cochrane (1994) for a very similar discussion.
12In principle, these unmodeled trends could still be recovered from our specification by applying
a Beveridge-Nelson decomposition to its estimated idiosyncratic component. In practice, any low-
frequency variation in the idiosyncratic component is likely to be obscured by a large amount of
high frequency noise in the data and as result the extracted Beveridge-Nelson trend component will
be imprecisely estimated, and as Morley et al. (2003) show, will not be smooth. In our specification,
the elements of at are instead extracted directly, so that we are able to improve the extraction by
imposing additional assumptions (e.g. smoothness) and prior beliefs (e.g. low variability) on its
properties.
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two series share the same underlying low-frequency component, and this is known
with certainty, explicitly accounting for the shared low frequency variation will im-
prove the precision of the estimation, but the risk of incorrectly including the trend
is much larger than the risk of incorrectly excluding it. Therefore, in our baseline
specification we include in at the intercept for GDP and consumption, while leaving
any possible low-frequency variation in other series to be captured by the respective
idiosyncratic components.13
An extension to include additional time-varying intercepts is straightforward
through the flexible construction of ct in equation (4.2). In fact, in Section 4.5
we explore how interest in the low-frequency movements of additional series leads to
alternative choices for at and B.14
4.3.3 Dealing with Mixed Frequencies and Missing Data
Tracking activity in real time requires a model that can efficiently incorporate infor-
mation from series measured at different frequencies. In particular, it must include
both quarterly variables, such as the growth rate of real GDP, as well as more timely
monthly indicators of real activity. Therefore, the model is specified at monthly
frequency, and following Mariano and Murasawa (2003), the (observed) quarterly
growth rates of a generic quarterly variable, xqt , can be related to the (unobserved)
monthly growth rate xmt and its lags using a weighted mean. Specifically,
xqt =
1
3
xmt +
2
3
xmt−1 + x
m
t−2 +
2
3
xmt−3 +
1
3
xmt−4, (4.9)
and only every third observation of xqt is actually observed. Substituting the corre-
sponding line of (4.1) into (4.9) yields a representation in which the quarterly variable
depends on the factor and its lags. The presence of mixed frequencies is thus reduced
to a problem of missing data in a monthly model.
Besides mixed frequencies, additional sources of missing data in the panel include:
the “ragged edge” at the end of the sample, which stems from the non-synchronicity
of data releases; missing data at the beginning of the sample, since some data series
have been created or collected more recently than others; and missing observations
due to outliers and data collection errors. Our Bayesian estimation method exploits
the state space representation of the DFM and jointly estimates the latent factors,
the parameters, and the missing data points using the Kalman filter (see Durbin and
Koopman, 2012, for a textbook treatment).
13We confirm this line of reasoning with a series of Monte Carlo experiments, in which data
is generated from a system that features low-frequency movements in more series, which are left
unmodeled in the estimation. Both in the case of series with independent trends and the case of
series which share the trend of interest, the fact that they are left unmodeled has little impact on
the estimate of the latter. Appendix 4.7.3 presents further discussion and the full results of these
simulations.
14The limiting case explicitly models time-varying intercept in all indicators, so that m = r = n
and B = In, i.e. an identity matrix of dimension n. See Creal et al. (2010) and Fleischman and
Roberts (2011) for similar approaches. This setup would imply that the number of state variables
increases with the number of observables, which severely increases the computational burden of the
estimation, while offering little additional evidence with respect to the focus of this paper.
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4.3.4 State Space Representation and Estimation
The model features autocorrelated idiosyncratic components (see equation (4.4)). In
order to cast it in state-space form, we include the idiosyncratic components of the
quarterly variables in the state vector, and we redefine the system for the monthly
indicators in terms of quasi-differences (see e.g. Kim and Nelson, 1999b, pp. 198-
199, and Bai and Wang, 2015).15 The model is estimated with Bayesian methods
simulating the posterior distribution of parameters and factors using a Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. We closely follow the Gibbs-sampling algorithm for
DFMs proposed by Bai and Wang (2015), but extend it to include mixed frequencies,
the time-varying intercept, and SV. The SVs are sampled using the approximation
of Kim et al. (1998), which is considerably faster than the exact Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm of Jacquier et al. (2002). Our complete sampling algorithm together with
the details of the state space representation can be found in Section 4.7.4 of the
Appendix.
4.4 Results for US Data
4.4.1 Data Selection
Our data set includes four key business cycle variables measured at quarterly fre-
quency (output, consumption, investment and aggregate hours worked), as well as
a set of 24 monthly indicators which are intended to provide additional information
about cyclical developments in a timely manner.
The included quarterly variables are strongly procyclical and are considered key
indicators of the business cycle (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 1999). Furthermore,
theory predicts that they will be useful in disentangling low frequency movements
from cyclical fluctuations in output growth. Indeed, as discussed in Section 4.3.2,
the permanent income hypothesis predicts that consumption data will be particularly
useful for the estimation of the long-run growth component, gt.16 On the other hand,
investment and hours worked are very sensitive to cyclical fluctuations, and thus will
be particularly informative for the estimation of the common factor, ft.17
15Since the quarterly variables are observed only every third month, we cannot take the quasi-
difference for their idiosyncratic components, which are instead added as an additional state with
the corresponding transition dynamics. Banbura and Modugno (2014) suggest including all of the
idiosyncratic components as additional elements of the state vector. Our solution has the desirable
feature that the number of state variables will increase with the number of quarterly variables,
rather than the total number of variables, leading to a gain of computational efficiency.
16Due to the presence of faster technological change in the durable goods sector there is a down-
ward trend in the relative price of durable goods. As a consequence, measured consumption grows
faster than overall GDP. Following a long tradition in the literature (see e.g. Whelan, 2003), we
construct a Fisher index of non-durables and services and use its growth rate as an observable
variable in the panel. It can be verified that the ratio of consumption defined in this manner to real
GDP displays no trend in the data, unlike the trend observed in the ratio of overall consumption
to GDP.
17We define investment as a chain-linked aggregate of business fixed investment and consumption
of durable goods, which is consistent with our treatment of consumption. In order to obtain a
measure of hours for the total economy, we follow the methodology of Ohanian and Raffo (2012)
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The additional monthly indicators are crucial to our objective of disentangling
in real time the cyclical and long-run components of GDP growth, since the quar-
terly variables are only available with substantial delay. In principle, a large number
of candidate series are available to inform the estimate of ft, and indirectly, of gt.
In practice, however, macroeconomic data series are typically clustered in a small
number of broad categories (such as production, employment, or income) for which
disaggregated series are available along various dimensions (such as economic sec-
tors, demographic characteristics, or expenditure categories). The choice of which
available series to include for estimation can therefore be broken into, first, a choice
of which broad categories to include, and second, to which level and along which
dimensions of disaggregation.
With regards to which broad categories of data to include, previous studies agree
that prices, monetary and financial indicators are uninformative for the purpose of
tracking real GDP, and argue for extracting a single common factor that captures
real economic activity.18 As for the possible inclusion of disaggregated series within
each category, Boivin and Ng (2006) argue that the presence of strong correlation
in the idiosyncratic components of disaggregated series of the same category will
be a source of misspecification that can worsen the performance of the model in
terms of in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting of key series.19 Alvarez et al.
(2012) investigate the trade-off between DFMs with very few indicators, where the
good large-sample properties of factor models are unlikely to hold, and those with
a very large amount of indicators, where the problems above are likely to arise.
They conclude that using a medium-sized panel with representative indicators of
each category yields the best forecasting results.
The above considerations lead us to select 24 monthly indicators that include
the high-level aggregates for all of the available broad categories that capture real
activity, without overweighting any particular category. The complete list of variables
contained in our data set is presented in Table 4.1. As the table shows, we include
representative series of expenditure and income, the labor market, production and
sales, foreign trade, housing and business and consumer confidence.20 The inclusion
of all the available monthly surveys is particularly important. Apart from being the
most timely series available, these are unlikely to feature permanent shifts in their
mean by construction, and have a high signal-to-noise ratio. They thus provide a
and benchmark the quarterly series of hours in the non-farm business sector provided by the BLS
to the annual estimates of hours in the total economy compiled by the Conference Board’s Total
Economy Database (TED). The TED series has the advantage of being comparable across countries
(Ohanian and Raffo, 2012), which will be useful for our international results in Section 4.5.
18Giannone et al. (2005) conclude that that prices and monetary indicators do not contribute to
the precision of GDP nowcasts. Banbura et al. (2012), Forni et al. (2003) and Stock and Watson
(2003) find at best mixed results for financial variables.
19This problem is exacerbated by the fact that more detailed disaggregation levels and dimensions
are available for certain categories of data, such as employment, meaning that the disaggregation
will automatically ‘tilt’ the factor estimates towards that category.
20When there are multiple candidates for the high-level aggregate of a category, we include both.
For example, we include employment as measured both by the establishment and household surveys,
and consumer confidence as surveyed both by the Conference Board and the University of Michigan.
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clean signal to separate the cyclical component of GDP growth from its long-run
counterpart. In Section 4.4.6 we explore sensitivity of our results to the size and
composition of the data panel used.
Our panel spans the period January 1947 to March 2015. The start of our sample
coincides with the year for which quarterly national accounts data are available from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This enables us to study the evolution of long-run
growth over the entire postwar period.21
4.4.2 Model Settings and Priors
The choice of the data set justifies the single-factor structure of the model. ft can in
this case be interpreted as a coincident indicator of real economic activity (see e.g.
Stock and Watson, 1989, and Mariano and Murasawa, 2003). The number of lags in
the polynomials φ(L) and ρ(L) is set to p = 2 and q = 2 as in Stock and Watson
(1989). We wish to impose as little prior information as possible, so we use unin-
formative priors for the factor loadings and the autoregressive coefficients of factors
and idiosyncratic components. The variances of the innovations to the time-varying
parameters, namely ω2a, ω2ε and ω2η,i in equations (4.5)-(4.7) are however difficult to
identify from the information contained in the likelihood alone. As the literature on
Bayesian VARs documents, attempts to use non-informative priors for these param-
eters will in many cases produce posterior estimates which imply a relatively large
amount of time-variation. While this will tend to improve the in-sample fit of the
model it is also likely to worsen out-of-sample forecast performance. We therefore
use priors to shrink these variances towards zero, i.e. towards the standard DFM
which excludes time-varying long-run GDP growth and SV. In particular, for ω2a we
set an inverse gamma prior with one degree of freedom and scale equal to 0.001.22
For ω2 and ω2η,i we set an inverse gamma prior with one degree of freedom and scale
equal to 0.0001, closely following Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005).23
We estimate the model with 7000 replications of the Gibbs-sampling algorithm, of
which the first 2000 are discarded as burn-in draws and the remaining ones are kept
for inference.24
21We take full advantage of the Kalman filter’s ability to deal with missing observations at any
point in the sample, and we are able to incorporate series that become available substantially later
than 1947, up to as late as 2007. Note that for consumption expenditures, monthly data became
available in 1959, whereas quarterly data is available from 1947. In order to use all available data,
we apply the polynomial in Equation (4.9) to the monthly data and treat the series as quarterly,
with available observations for the last month of the quarter for 1947-1958 and for all months since
1959.
22To gain an intuition about this prior, note that over a period of ten years, this would imply that
the random walk process of the long-run growth rate is expected to vary with a standard deviation
of around 0.4 percentage points in annualized terms, which is a fairly conservative prior.
23We provide further explanations and address robustness to the choice of priors in Appendix
4.7.7.
24Thanks to the efficient state space representation discussed above, the improvements in the
simulation smoother proposed by Bai and Wang (2015), and other computational improvements we
implemented, the estimation is very fast. Convergence is achieved after only 1500 iterations, which
take less than 20 minutes in MATLAB using an Intel 3.6 GHz computer with 16GB of DDR3 Ram.
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Table 4.1: Data series used in empirical analysis
Type Start Date Transform. Lag
Quarterly time series
Real GDP Expenditure & Inc. Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann 26
Real Consumption (excl. durables) Expenditure & Inc. Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann 26
Real Investment (incl. durable cons.) Expenditure & Inc. Q2:1947 % QoQ Ann 26
Total Hours Worked Labor Market Q2:1948 % QoQ Ann 28
Monthly indicators
Real Personal Income less Transfers Expenditure & Inc. Feb 59 % MoM 27
Industrial Production Production & Sales Jan 47 % MoM 15
New Orders of Capital Goods Production & Sales Mar 68 % MoM 25
Real Retail Sales & Food Services Production & Sales Feb 47 % MoM 15
Light Weight Vehicle Sales Production & Sales Feb 67 % MoM 1
Real Exports of Goods Foreign Trade Feb 68 % MoM 35
Real Imports of Goods Foreign Trade Feb 69 % MoM 35
Building Permits Housing Feb 60 % MoM 19
Housing Starts Housing Feb 59 % MoM 26
New Home Sales Housing Feb 63 % MoM 26
Payroll Empl. (Establishment Survey) Labor Market Jan 47 % MoM 5
Civilian Empl. (Household Survey) Labor Market Feb 48 % MoM 5
Unemployed Labor Market Feb 48 % MoM 5
Initial Claims for Unempl. Insurance Labor Market Feb 48 % MoM 4
Monthly indicators (soft)
Markit Manufacturing PMI Business Confidence May 07 - -7
ISM Manufacturing PMI Business Confidence Jan 48 - 1
ISM Non-manufacturing PMI Business Confidence Jul 97 - 3
NFIB Small Business Optimism Index Business Confidence Oct 75 Diff 12 M. 15
U. of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment Consumer Confid. May 60 Diff 12 M. -15
Conf. Board: Consumer Confidence Consumer Confid. Feb 68 Diff 12 M. -5
Empire State Manufacturing Survey Business (Regional) Jul 01 - -15
Richmond Fed Mfg Survey Business (Regional) Nov 93 - -5
Chicago PMI Business (Regional) Feb 67 - 0
Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Business (Regional) May 68 - 0
Note: % QoQ Ann refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM refers to
(yt−yt−1)/yt−1 while Diff 12 M. refers to yt−yt−12. The last column shows the average publication
lag, i.e. the number of days elapsed from the end of the period that the data point refers to until its
publication by the statistical agency. All series were obtained from the Haver Analytics database.
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4.4.3 In-Sample Results
Panel (a) of Figure 4.2 plots the posterior median, together with the 68% and 90%
posterior credible intervals of the long-run growth rate of real GDP. This estimate
is conditional on the entire sample and accounts for both filtering and parameter
uncertainty. Several features of our estimate of long-run growth are worth noting.
While the growth rate is stable between 3% and 4% during the first decades of the
postwar period, a slowdown is clearly visible from around the late 1960’s through
the 1970’s, consistent with the “productivity slowdown” (Nordhaus, 2004). The
acceleration of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s associated with the productivity
boom in the IT sector (Oliner and Sichel, 2000) is also visible. Thus, until the
middle of the decade of the 2000’s, our estimate conforms well to the generally
accepted narrative about fluctuations in potential growth.25 More recently, after
peaking at about 3.5% in 2000, the median estimate of the long-run growth rate has
fallen to about 2% in early 2015, a more substantial decline than the one observed
after the productivity slowdown of the 1970’s. Moreover, the slowdown appears to
have happened gradually since the start of the 2000’s, with most of the decline having
occurred before the Great Recession.26 Interestingly, a small rebound is visible at
the end of the sample, but long-run growth stands far below its postwar average of
3.2%, with the 90% posterior credible interval ranging from 1.5% to 2.5%.
Panel (b) plots the time series of quarterly real GDP growth, together with
the median posterior estimates of the common factor, aligned with the mean of
real GDP growth. This plot highlights how the common factor captures the bulk of
business-cycle frequency variation in output growth, while higher frequency, quarter-
to-quarter variation is attributed to the idiosyncratic component. In the latter part of
the sample, GDP growth is visibly below the factor, reflecting the decline in long-run
growth.
The posterior estimate of the SV of the common factor is presented in Panel (c).
It is clearly visible that volatility declines over the sample. The late 1940’s and 1950’s
were extremely volatile, with a first large drop in volatility in the early 1960’s. The
Great Moderation is also clearly visible, with the average volatility pre-1985 being
much larger than the average of the post-1985 sample. Notwithstanding the large
increase in volatility during the Great Recession, our estimate of the common fac-
tor volatility since then remains consistent with the Great Moderation still being in
place. This confirms the early evidence reported by Gadea-Rivas et al. (2014). It
is clear from the figure that volatility spikes during recessions, a feature that brings
25Appendix 4.7.8 provides a comparison of our estimate with the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) measure of potential growth, with some additional discussion.
26In principle, it is possible that our choice of modeling long-run GDP growth as a random
walk is hard-wiring into our results the conclusion that the decline happened in a gradual way.
In experiments with simulated data, presented in Section 4.7.3 of the Appendix, we show that if
changes in long-run growth occur in the form of discrete breaks rather than evolving gradually, the
(one-sided) filtered estimates will exhibit a discrete jump at the moment of the break. Instead, for
US data the filtered estimates of the long-run growth component also decline in a gradual manner
(see Figure 4.6 in Appendix 4.7.1).
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Figure 4.2: Trend, cycle and volatility: 1947-2015 (% Ann.)
(a) Posterior estimate of long-run growth
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(b) Posterior estimate of common factor vs. actual GDP growth
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(c) Posterior estimate of common factor volatility
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Note: Panel (a) displays the posterior median (solid red), together with the 68% and 90% (dotted
and dashed blue) posterior credible intervals of long-run real GDP growth. Panel (b) plots actual
real GDP growth (thin blue) against the posterior median estimate of the common factor, aligned
with the mean of real GDP growth (thick red). Panel (c) presents the median (red), the 68% and
the 90% (dotted and dashed blue) posterior credible intervals of the volatility of the common factor,
i.e the square root of var(ft) = σ2ε,t(1−φ2)/[(1+φ2)((1−φ2)2−φ21)]. Shaded areas represent NBER
recessions.
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our estimates close to the recent findings of Jurado et al. (2014) and Bloom (2014)
relating to business-cycle uncertainty.27 It appears that the random walk specifica-
tion is flexible enough to capture cyclical changes in volatility as well as permanent
phenomena such as the Great Moderation. Appendix 4.7.1 contains analogous charts
for the volatilities of the idiosyncratic components of selected data series. Similar
to the volatility of the common factor, many of the idiosyncratic volatilities present
sharp increases during recessions.
The above results provide evidence that a significant decline in long-run US real
GDP growth occurred over the last decade, and are consistent with a relatively
gradual decline since the early 2000’s. Our estimates show that the bulk of the
slowdown from the elevated levels of growth at the turn of the century occurred before
the Great Recession, which is consistent with the narrative of Fernald (2014) on the
fading of the IT productivity boom. This recent decline is the largest movement in
long-run growth observed in the postwar period.
4.4.4 Real-Time Results
As emphasized by Orphanides (2003), macroeconomic time series are heavily revised
over time and in many cases these revisions contain valuable information that was
not available at initial release. Therefore, it is important to assess, using the data
available at each point in time, when the model detected the slowdown in long-
run growth. For this purpose, we reconstruct our data set using vintages of data
available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ALFRED data base. Our aim
is to replicate as closely as possible the situation of a decision-maker which would
have applied our model in real time. We fix the start of our sample in 1947:Q1
and use an expanding out-of-sample window which starts on 11 January 2000 and
ends on 30 June 2015. This is the longest possible window for which we are able to
include the entire panel in Table 4.1 using fully real-time data. We then proceed by
re-estimating the model each day in which new data are released.28
Figure 4.3 looks at the model’s real-time assessment of long-run growth at various
points in time. Panel (a) plots the real-time estimate of current long-run growth, with
68% and 90% uncertainty bands. For comparison, the panel also shows the median
response to the Philadelphia Fed Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)
on the average growth rate for the next 10 years, and the estimate of long-run
growth from a model with a constant intercept for GDP growth. The latter estimate
27It is interesting to note that while in our model the innovations to the level of the common
factor and its volatility are uncorrelated, the fact that increases in volatility are observed during
recessions indicate the presence of negative correlation between the first and second moments,
implying negative skewness in the distribution of the common factor. We believe a more explicit
model of this feature is an important priority for future research.
28In a few cases new indicators were developed after January 2000. For example, the Markit
Manufacturing PMI survey is currently one of the most timely and widely followed indicators, but
it started being conducted in 2007. In those cases, we append to the panel, in real time, the
vintages of the new indicators as soon sufficient history is available. In the example of the PMI, this
is the case since mid-2012. By implication, the number of indicators in our data panel grows when
new indicators appear. Full details about the construction of the vintage database are available in
Appendix 4.7.6.
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Figure 4.3: Long-Run GDP Growth Estimates in Real Time
(a) Evolution of the current assessment of long-run growth
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(b) Selected vintages of long-run growth estimates using real-time data
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Note: The figure presents results from re-estimating the model using the vintage of data available at
each point in time from January 2000 to March 2015. The start of the estimation sample is fixed at
Q1:1947. Panel (a) plots the median real-time estimate of current long-run growth over time. This
is the locus traced by the end points of all vintages. The blue shaded areas represent the 68th and
90th percentiles. The dashed line is the contemporaneous estimate of the historical average of real
GDP growth. The diamonds are the median response to the Philadelphia Fed Livingston Survey
of Professional Forecasters on the average growth rate for the next 10 years. Panel (b) displays
the median estimate of long-run GDP growth for various vintages of data (dashed gray lines). The
estimate of the latest vintage is shown in solid red. Gray shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
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is also updated as new information arrives, but weighs all points of the sample
equally. Panel (b) displays vintages of the median long-run growth estimate, using
information available up to July of each year. The locus traced by the end point of
each vintage corresponds to the current real-time estimate of Panel (a).
The evolution of the baseline model’s estimate of long-run growth when esti-
mated in real time declines gradually from a peak of about 4% in early 2000 to
around 2.5% just after the end of the Great Recession. From this time, the constant
estimate shown in panel (a) is always outside of the 90% posterior bands. There is
a sharp reassessment of long-run growth around July 2010, coinciding with the pub-
lication by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the annual revisions to the National
Accounts, which each year incorporate previously unavailable information for the
previous three years. The revisions implied a substantial downgrade, in particular,
to the growth of consumption in the first year of the recovery, from 2.5% to 1.6%,
and instead allocated much of the growth in GDP during the recovery to inventory
accumulation.29 Reflecting the role of consumption as the most persistent and for-
ward looking component of GDP, the estimate of long-run growth is downgraded
sharply. Panel (b) shows how the 2010 revisions in fact trigger a re-interpretation
of the years leading to the Great Recession. With the revised information, the bulk
of the slowdown in long-run growth is now estimated to have occurred before the
recession.30 From 2010 onward, the model predicts a recovery that is extremely slow
by historical standards. This is four years before the structural break test detected
a statistically significant decline.31 It is evident from the preceding discussion that
revisions to past data by the BEA are an important source of changes to the long-run
growth estimate in real time. Since the revision process is not modeled explicitly
within the DFM, the in-sample results of Section 4.4.3 do not take into account the
uncertainty stemming from future revisions. Interestingly, in the latest part of the
sample, the estimate of long-run growth has recovered slightly to about 2% but this
has been triggered by improvements in incoming data, rather than revisions to past
vintages.
With regards to the SPF, it is noticeable that from 2003 to about 2010, the survey
is remarkably similar to the model, but since then, the SPF forecast has continued to
drift down only very slowly, standing at 2.5% as of mid-2015. It is noteworthy that,
as pointed out by Stanley Fischer in the speech quoted in the introduction, during
that period both private and institutional forecasters systematically overestimated
growth.
29See Appendix 4.7.10 for additional figures on the National Accounts revisions during this period.
30Indeed, the (one-sided) filtered estimate based on the latest vintage, which ignores the effect
of data revisions, displays a more gradual pattern of decline (see Figure 4.6 in Section 4.7.1 of the
Appendix).
31A simpler specification that does not use consumption to inform the trend would detect the
decline in long-run growth one year later, with additional revisions to past GDP in July 2011.
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4.4.5 Implications for Nowcasting GDP
The standard DFM with constant long-run growth and constant volatility has been
successfully applied to produce current quarter nowcasts of GDP (see Banbura et al.,
2010, for a survey). Using our real-time US database, we carefully evaluate whether
the introduction of time-varying long-run growth and SV into the DFM framework
also improves the performance of the model along this dimension. We find that over
the evaluation window 2000-2015 the model is at least as accurate at point forecast-
ing, and significantly better at density forecasting than the benchmark DFM. We
find that most of the improvement in density forecasting comes from correctly assess-
ing the center and the right tail of the distribution, implying that the time-invariant
DFM is assigning excessive probability to a strong recovery. In an evaluation sub-
sample spanning the post-recession period, the relative performance of both point
and density forecasts improves substantially, coinciding with the significant down-
ward revision of the model’s assessment of long-run growth. In fact, ignoring the
variation in long-run GDP growth would have resulted in being on average around
1 percentage point too optimistic from 2009 to 2015.32
To sum up, the addition of the time-varying components not only provides a tool
for decision-makers to update their knowledge about the state of long-run growth in
real time. It also brings about a substantial improvement in short-run forecasting
performance when the trend is shifting, without worsening the forecasts when the
latter is relatively stable. The proposed model therefore provides a robust and timely
methodology to track GDP when long-run growth is uncertain.
4.4.6 Inspecting the Role of Data Set Size and Composition
In this paper we argue that the rich multivariate framework of a DFM will facilitate
the extraction of the long-run growth component of GDP. The DFM will exploit
the cross-sectional dimension, and not just the time series dimension in separating
cycle from trend. It is interesting to quantify the advantage that the DFM provides
over traditional trend-cycle decompositions, and to investigate the robustness of
our main conclusions to alternative datasets of varying size and composition. In
order to do so, we consider (1) a bivariate model with GDP and unemployment
only (labeled “Okun”), (2) an intermediate model with GDP and the four additional
variables often included in the construction of coincident indicators, see Mariano and
Murasawa (2003) and Stock and Watson (1989) (labeled “MM03”), (3) our “Baseline”
specification with 28 variables, and (4) an “Extended” model that uses disaggregated
data for many of the headline series included in the baseline specification, totaling
155 variables.33 Moreover, in order to investigate the gains associated with imposing
32Appendix 4.7.9 provides the full details of the forecast evaluation exercise.
33As we argue in Section 4.4.1, the introduction of a large number of disaggregated series, even if
related to real activity, is likely to lead to model misspecification whenever the sectoral data are not
contemporaneously related. For the extended specification, we consider a solution to this problem
which allows to maintain the parsimonious one factor structure. By extending the model to include
lags of the factor in the observation equation, each variable can display heterogeneous responses to
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additional structure to long-run GDP growth, for the last two specifications we also
consider a version of the model that does not impose common long-run growth in
GDP and consumption.
The top panel of Table 4.2 reports the mean point-estimates for each specification
over selected subsamples.34 In all cases, the results are consistent with a decline in
the long-run growth rate in the last part of the sample. Quantitatively, most speci-
fications are very close to the baseline, with the specifications that impose common
long-run growth in GDP and consumption finding an earlier and sharper decline.
The exception is the “Okun” specification which instead estimates a smaller increase
in the mid 1990’s as well as a larger decline in long-run growth in the past decade.
It is noteworthy that the mean estimate of the extended specification is very close
to that of the baseline.
Table 4.2: Result comparison for alternative data sets and specifications
Baseline Extended
Okun MM03 GDP only GDP + C GDP only GDP + C
Long-run growth
1947-1972 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.9
1973-1995 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.2
1996-2007 2.6 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1
2008-2015 1.6 2.5 2.4 1.8 2.2 1.7
End of Sample 1.3 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.0
Uncertainty: Long run
Filtered 0.82 0.63 0.64 0.56 0.78 0.63
Smoothed 0.44 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.44 0.39
Uncertainty: Cycle
Filtered 2.08 1.47 0.79 0.76 0.23 0.23
Smoothed 1.89 1.32 0.62 0.60 0.25 0.25
Note: Each column presents the estimation results corresponding to the alternative models (data
sets) considered in this section. The upper panel displays the posterior means of the long-run
growth rate of real GDP, over selected subsamples. In the lower panel, the posterior uncertainty
corresponding to both the long-run growth rate of real GDP, as well as the common factor are
displayed. The uncertainty is calculated as an average over the entire sample.
The lower panel of Table 4.2 instead investigates the uncertainty around the
mean estimates. The uncertainty around the long-run growth estimate declines as we
move from the bivariate to the multivariate specifications, with most of the reduction
happening once a handful of variables are included. On the other hand, when the
panel is extended to include a large number of disaggregated series, the uncertainty
the common factor, and correlation between idiosyncratic components is reduced. Given that the
extended model is heavily parameterized, we follow D’Agostino et al. (2015) in choosing priors that
shrink the model towards the contemporaneous-only specification, which is nested in the extended
case. Full details and the composition of the data set and the changes to the estimation in case of
the extended model are provided in Appendix 4.7.11.
34See Figure 4.24 in Appendix 4.7.11 for a comparison of the results of each alternative specifi-
cation with the baseline results over the entire sample.
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increases.35 While including a few key series, such as the ones in the specification of
Mariano and Murasawa (2003) seems to already achieve the bulk of the reduction in
uncertainty, it should be taken into account that those variables are available only
with a relatively long publication lag, and subject to considerable revisions over time.
Our proposed strategy of using an intermediate number of indicators, including the
more timely and accurate surveys, is likely to lead to more satisfactory results in a
real-time setting. Furthermore, the inclusion of the surveys is helpful in identifying
the long-run growth rate, as those variables do not display a time-varying long-run
mean by construction.
Overall this exercise highlights that the finding of a substantial decline in the
long-run growth rate is confirmed across different specifications that use data sets of
varying size and composition. The baseline specification, which uses an intermediate
number of series including both hard data and surveys, leads to the lowest uncertainty
around the long-run growth estimate, supporting the baseline choice of data set size
and composition proposed in Section 4.4.1. Our results have important implications
for trend-cycle decompositions of output, which usually include only a few cyclical
indicators, generally inflation or variables that are direct inputs to the production
function (see e.g. Gordon, 2014a or Reifschneider et al., 2013). As we show, greater
precision of the trend component can be achieved by exploiting the common cyclical
features of additional macroeconomic variables.36
4.5 Decomposing Movements in Long-Run Growth
In this section, we show how our model can be used to decompose the long-run growth
rate of output into long-run movements in labor productivity and labor input. By
doing this, we exploit the ability of the model to filter away cyclical variation and
idiosyncratic noise and obtain clean estimates of underlying long-run trends. We see
this exercise as a step towards giving an economically more meaningful interpretation
to the movements in long-run real GDP growth detected by our model.
GDP growth is by identity the sum of growth in output per hour and growth in
total hours worked. It is therefore possible to split the long-run growth trend in our
model into two orthogonal components such that this identity is satisfied in the long
run. Here we make use of our flexible definition of ct in equation (4.2). In particular,
ordering the growth rates of real GDP, real consumption and total hours as the first
three variables in yt, we define
at =
[
zt
ht
]
, B =
[
1 1
1 1
0 1
]
, (4.10)
35We conjecture that as many more variables are added, the fit of the common factor to the
cyclical component of GDP worsens. As a consequence, some cyclical variation of GDP spills over
to the estimate of the long-run component. The uncertainty around the common factor, on the
other hand, continues to decline.
36Basistha and Startz (2008) make a similar point, arguing that the inclusion of indicators that are
informative about common cycles can help reduce the uncertainty around Kalman filter estimates
of the long-run rate of unemployment (NAIRU).
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Figure 4.4: Decomposition of Long-run US Output Growth
(a) Posterior median estimates of decomposition
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Note: Panel (a) plots the posterior median (solid red), together with the 68% and 90% (doted
and dashed blue) posterior credible intervals of long-run GDP growth and the posterior median of
both long-run labor productivity growth and long-run total hours growth (solid green and dashed
orange). Panel (b) plots the filtered estimates of these two components, i.e. zˆt|t and hˆt|t, since
1990. For comparison, the corresponding forecasts from the SPF are plotted. The SPF forecast for
total hours is obtained as the difference between the forecasts for real GDP and labor productivity.
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so that the model is specified with two time-varying components, the first of which
loads output and consumption but not hours, and the second loads all three series.
The first component is then by construction the long-run growth rate of labor pro-
ductivity, while the second one captures low-frequency movements in labor input
independent of productivity.37 Given the relation in (4.10), the two components add
up to the time-varying intercept in the baseline specification, i.e. gt = zt + ht.38 It
follows from standard growth theory that our estimate of the long-run growth rate
of labor productivity will capture both technological factors and other factors, such
as capital deepening and labor quality.39
Figure 4.4 presents the results of the decomposition exercise for the US. Panel
(a) plots the median posterior estimate of long-run real GDP growth and its labor
productivity and total hours components. The posterior bands for long-run real
GDP growth are included. The time series evolution conforms very closely to the
narrative of Fernald (2014), with a pronounced boom in labor productivity in the
mid-1990’s and a subsequent fall in the 2000’s clearly visible. The decline in the
2000’s is relatively sudden while the 1970’s slowdown appears as a more gradual
phenomenon starting in the late 1960’s. Furthermore, the results reveal that during
the 1970’s and 1980’s the impact of the productivity slowdown on output growth
was partly masked by a secular increase in hours, probably reflecting increases in the
working-age population as well as labor force participation (see e.g. Goldin, 2006).
Focusing on the period since 2000, labor productivity accounts for almost the entire
decline.40 This contrasts explanations by which slow labor force growth has been
a drag on GDP growth. When taking away the cyclical component of hours and
focusing solely on its long-run component, the contribution of hours has, if anything,
accelerated since the Great Recession. Panel (b) presents the filtered estimates of
the two components, i.e. the output of the Kalman Filter which uses data only up to
each point in time. For comparison, the corresponding SPF forecasts are included.
Most notably, this plot reveals that starting around 2005 a relatively sharp revision
to labor productivity drives the decline in long-run output growth.41 Interestingly,
37zt and ht jointly follow random walks with diagonal covariance matrix as defined by equation
(4.7). Restricting the covariance matrix is not necessary for estimation, but imposing it allows us
to interpret the innovations to the trends as exogenous shocks to the long-run growth rates of the
variables. The hours trend is therefore interpreted as those low-frequency movements in hours which
are uncorrelated with labor productivity. Allowing for a full covariance matrix would yield trends
that are linear combinations of the current ones, but would lack a clear economic interpretation.
38Since zt and ht are independent and add up to gt, we set the prior on the scale of their variances
to half of the one set in Section 4.4.2 on gt. In addition, note that the cyclical movement in labor
productivity is given by (1− λ3)ft.
39Further decomposing zt into technology and non-technology movements requires additional
information to separately identify these components. One possibility, which we explore in Appendix
4.7.12, is to use an independent measure of TFP to isolate technological factors. Note, however,
that reliable data on capital input, labor quality, or estimates of TFP are not available in real time,
making the focus on long-run labor productivity more appealing in a real-time setting.
40In Appendix 4.7.12 we extend the analysis to decompose the labor productivity trend into
long-run TFP and non-technological forces. We find that TFP accounts for virtually all of the
slowdown.
41In an additional figure, provided in Section 4.7.1 of the Appendix, we plot 5,000 draws from
the joint posterior distribution of the variances of the innovations to the labor productivity and
hours components. This analysis confirms the conclusion from the discussion here that changes in
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the professional forecasters have been very slow in incorporating the productivity
slowdown into their long-run forecasts. This delay explains their persistent overesti-
mation of GDP growth since the recession.
It is interesting to compare the results of our decomposition exercise to similar
approaches in the literature, in particular Gordon (2010, 2014a) and Reifschneider
et al. (2013). Like us, they specify a state space model with a common cyclical
component and use the ‘output identity’ to decompose the long-run growth rate of
GDP into underlying drivers. A key difference resides in the Bayesian estimation of
the model, which enables us to impose a conservative prior on the variance of the
long-run growth component that helps avoiding over-fitting the data. Furthermore,
the inclusion of SV in the cyclical component helps to prevent unusually large cyclical
movements from contaminating the long-run estimate. Another important difference
is that we use a larger amount of information, including key cyclical indicators like
industrial production, sales, and business surveys, which are generally not included
in a production function approach. This allows us to retrieve a timely and precise
estimate of the cyclical component and, as a consequence, to reduce the uncertainty
that is inherent to any trend-cycle decomposition of the data, as discussed in Section
4.4.6. As a result, we obtain a substantially less pessimistic estimate of the long-run
growth of GDP than these studies in the latest part of the sample. For instance,
Gordon (2014a) reports a long-run GDP growth estimate below 1% for the end of
the sample, whereas our median estimate stands at around 2%.42
4.5.1 International Evidence
To gain an international perspective on our results, we estimate the DFM for the
other G7 economies and perform the decomposition exercise for each of them.43
The median posterior estimates of the labor productivity and labor input trends are
displayed in Figure 4.5. Labor productivity, displayed in Panel (a), plays again the
key role in determining movements in long-run growth. In the Western European
economies and Japan, the elevated growth rates of labor productivity prior to the
1970’s reflect the rebuilding of the capital stock from the destruction from World
War II, and ended as these economies converged towards US levels of output per
capita. The labor productivity profile of Canada broadly follows that of the US,
with a slowdown in the 1970’s and a temporary mild boom during the late 1990’s.
Interestingly, this acceleration in the 1990’s did not occur in Western Europe and
labor productivity, rather than in labor input, are the key driver of low frequency movements in
real GDP growth.
42The results for a bivariate model of GDP and unemployment, which we have discussed in
Section 4.4.6 show that the current long-run growth estimate is 1.3%, close to Gordon (2014a).
43Details on the specific data series used for each country are available in Appendix 4.7.6. For
hours, we again follow the methodology of Ohanian and Raffo (2012). In the particular case of
the UK, the quarterly series for hours displays a drastic change in its stochastic properties in the
early 1990’s owing to a methodological change in the construction by the ONS, as confirmed by the
ONS LFS manual. We address this issue by using directly the annual series from the TED, which
requires an appropriate extension of equation (4.9) to annual variables (see Banbura et al. 2012).
To avoid weak identification of ht for the UK, we truncate our prior on its variance to discard values
which are larger than twice the maximum posterior draw of the case of the other countries.
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Figure 4.5: Decomposition for Other Advanced Economies
(a) Long-run Labor Productivity
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Note: Panel (a) displays the posterior median of long-run labor productivity across advanced
economies. Panel (b) plots the corresponding estimates of long-run total hours worked. In both
panels, ’Euro Area’ represents a weighted average of Germany, Italy and France.
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Japan.44 The UK displays a decline in labor productivity similar to the US. This
“productivity puzzle” has been debated extensively in the UK (see e.g. Pessoa and
Van Reenen, 2014). It is interesting to note that the two countries which experienced
a more severe financial crisis, the US and the UK, appear to be the ones with greatest
declines in productivity since the early 2000’s, similar to the evidence documented
in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
Panel (b) displays the movements in long-run hours worked identified by equation
(4.10). The contribution of this component to overall long-run output growth varies
considerably across countries. However, within each country it is more stable over
time than the productivity component, which is in line with our findings for the
US. Indeed, the extracted long-run trend in total hours includes various potentially
offsetting forces that can lead to changes in long-run output growth. In any case, the
results of our decomposition exercise indicate that after using the DFM to remove
business-cycle variation in hours and output, the decline in long-run GDP growth
that has been observed in the advanced economies since the early 2000’s is entirely
accounted for by a decline in the labor productivity trend. Finally, it is interesting
to note that for the countries in the sample long-run productivity growth appears
to converge in the cross section, while there is no evidence of convergence in the
long-run growth of hours.45
4.6 Conclusion
The sluggish recovery from the Great Recession has raised the question whether
the long-run growth rate of US real GDP is now lower than it has been on average
over the postwar period. We have presented a DFM that allows for both changes in
long-run GDP growth and stochastic volatility. Estimating the model with Bayesian
methods, we provide evidence that long-run growth of US GDP displays a gradual
decline after the turn of the century, moving from its peak of 3.5% to about 2% in
2015. Using real-time vintages of data we demonstrate the model’s ability to track
GDP in a timely manner. By the summer of 2010 the model would have concluded
that a significant decline in long-run growth was behind the slow recovery, therefore
substantially improving the real-time tracking of GDP by taking into account the
uncertainty surrounding long-run growth. Finally, we discuss the drivers of move-
ments in long-run output growth through the lens of our model by decomposing it
into the long-run growth rates of labor productivity and labor input. Using data for
both the US and other advanced economies our model points to a global slowdown
in labor productivity as the main driver of weak growth in recent years, extending
the narrative of Fernald (2014) to other economies. Studying the deep causes of the
secular decline in growth is an important priority for future research.
44On the lost decade in Japan, see Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Gordon (2004) examines the
absence of the IT boom in Europe.
45Similar evidence for emerging economies has been recently presented by Pritchett and Summers
(2014). Their evidence refers to convergence of overall GDP growth rates, whereas ours indicates
that convergence in productivity growth appears to be the dominant source of convergence.
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4.7 Appendices
4.7.1 Additional Figures
Figure 4.6: Filtered estimate of long-run growth
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Filtered long-run growth estimate Livingston Survey
Note: The solid red line is the filtered estimate of the long-run GDP growth rate, gˆt|t, using the
vintage of National Accounts available as of March 2015. The solid and dotted blue lines capture
the corresponding 68% and 90% posterior bands. The black diamonds represent the real-time mean
forecast from the Livingston Survey of Professional Forecasters of the average GDP growth rate for
the subsequent 10 years.
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Figure 4.7: Stochastic Volatility of Selected Idiosyncratic Components
(a) GDP
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
(b) Consumption
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1
3
5
7
9
11
(c) Total Hours
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1
3
5
7
9
(d) Investment
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
7
17
27
37
47
57
67
77
(e) Industrial Produc-
tion
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
(f) Retail Sales
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
1
2
3
(g) Employment
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
(h) Exports
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
(i) Imports
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
(j) Housing Starts
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
(k) ISM Manufacturing
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
2
3
4
5
6
7
(l) Consumer Confidence
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
7
9
11
13
15
Note: Each panel presents the median (solid red), the 68% and the 90% (solid and dashed blue)
posterior credible intervals of the volatility of the idiosyncratic component of selected variables.
Shaded areas represent NBER recessions. Similar charts for other variables are available upon
request.
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Figure 4.8: Joint Posterior Distribution of Growth Component Innovation Variances
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Note: The figure plots 5,000 draws of the joint posterior distribution of the variances of innovations
to the labor productivity and hours component. The dashed red line is the 45-degree line. Under
the equal-variance prior the draws would be equally distributed above and below this line. The
fact that the bulk of draws lie above indicates that changes in long-run labor productivity drive the
variation in long-run output.
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4.7.2 Full Results of Structural Break Tests
Nyblom Test
Table 4.3 reports the result for the Nyblom (1989) test applied to US real GDP
growth, as described in Hansen (1992). The sample starts is 1947:Q2. The speci-
fication is yt = µ + ρ1yt−1 + ρ2yt−1 + σt, where yt is real GDP growth. For each
parameter of the specification, the null hypothesis is that the respective parameter
is constant.
Table 4.3:
Test Results of Nyblom Test
Lc
AR(1) AR(2)
µ 0.518* 0.473*
ρ1 0.367 0.331
ρ2 0.094
σ2 0.843*** 0.838***
Joint Lc 2.145*** 2.294***
Note: Results are obtained using Nyblom’s L test as described in Hansen (1992). *, ** and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Bai and Perron Test
Table 4.4 reports the result for the Bai and Perron (1998) test applied to US real
GDP growth for the sample starting in 1947:Q2. We apply the SupFT (k) test for
the null hypothesis of no break against the alternatives of k = 1, 2, or 3 breaks.
Secondly, the test SupFT (k+1|k) tests the null of k breaks against the alternative of
k + 1 breaks. Finally, the Udmax statistic tests the null of absence of break against
the alternative of an unknown number of breaks. The null hypothesis of no breaks is
rejected against the alternative of one break at the 10% level. The null is not rejected
against the alternative of two or three breaks. Furthermore, the null hypothesis of
one break against two breaks, or the null of only two against three breaks is not
rejected. The final test confirms the conclusion that there is some evidence in favor
of at least one break, with the null rejected against an unknown number of breaks
at the 10% level. The most likely break is identified to have happened in the second
quarter of 2000.
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Table 4.4:
Test Results of Bai-Perron Test
Sample 1947-2015
SupFT (k)
k = 1 8.379*
[2000:Q2]
k = 2 4.194
[1968:Q2; 2000:Q2]
k = 3 4.337
[1969:Q1; 1982:Q4; 2000:Q2]
SupFT (k|k − 1)
k = 2 1.109
k = 3 2.398
Udmax 8.379*
Note: Results are obtained using the Bai and Perron (1998) methodology. Dates in square brackets
are the most likely break date(s) for each of the specifications. * indicates significance at the 10%
level.
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4.7.3 Monte Carlo Evidence
Setup for Monte Carlo simulations
To assess the performance of our model in the presence of potentially relevant types
of misspecification, we carry out a variety of Monte Carlo experiments. In each
experiment, we simulate a large number of data sets which are generated from the
model under known parameter values, and estimate our model repeatedly over these
data sets. This appendix presents the results for two sets of such experiments, which
are designed to explore the robustness of crucial assumptions made in the paper.
• In Section 4.7.3 we examine whether the random walk assumption for the
time-varying parameters is robust to a different type of structural change.
In particular, we verify how the model performs if the underlying long-run
growth rate of GDP features one or multiple discrete breaks rather than grad-
ual change. We also estimate our baseline model on data which is generated
with a constant instead of a time-varying long-run growth rate of real GDP
growth. Furthermore, we repeat this type of experiment for discrete breaks
rather than gradual change in the volatilities of both the common factor and
the idiosyncratic terms.
• In Section 4.7.3 we explore the robustness of our model to the presence of
(unmodeled) change in the long-run growth rate of other series. We entertain
the possibility that such unmodeled trends are either independent of the change
in the long-run growth real GDP growth or that some series share the trend
of GDP. We also verify robustness to both of these types of misspecification
simultaneously.
We aim to ensure a realistic environment for the correctly specified parts of the
model. In particular, we set the values of the parameters to their estimated posterior
median of the US results. We then take draws for the random disturbances and
generate a sample of the vector of 28 observables using equations (4.1) to (4.7), and
generate 800 periods of data, which corresponds to the monthly sample size in our US
application.46 The four quarterly series are generated by simulating the underlying
monthly series and then introducing missing observations by (backwards) applying
the polynomial in equation (4.9). We then estimate the model using the settings
described in the paper. The number of simulations (repeatedly drawn samples) per
given experiment is set to 100.47
46While we argue in the paper that the random walk assumption for the estimation of the time-
varying parameters is innocuous, it can be problematic to simulate data from parameters that follow
random walks. Although we would like the parameters to drift in a non-stationary fashion, i.e. to
generate realistic patterns of time-varying volatility, data sets generated from “explosive” processes
feature unrealistic properties. To address this issue in the Monte Carlo simulations we discard and
re-generate random walks when they drift across a fix threshold. For example, we do not allow
the range of (demeaned) time-varying intercept of a given series to exceed the range of its cyclical
component.
47In certain cases, convergence of the algorithm takes longer in the presence of misspecification,
which required us to increase the number of draws of the Gibbs sampler, and thus limited the
amount of repetitions that was feasible for a given experiment.
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Results: Sensitivity of random walk specification
The goal of this first set of Monte Carlo experiments is to explore the sensitivity
of our modeling choice with respect to the random walk specification of the time-
varying parameters. The details about how we justify this modeling assumption can
be found in Section 4.3.1 of the paper. In particular, we aim here to verify whether
the model is robust in a context in which there are changes in the long-run growth
rate of real GDP growth and in the volatility of business cycles, but these changes
occur as discrete breaks rather then as gradual change. Figures 4.9 to 4.12 present
the results of four Monte Carlo experiments.
In the first experiment, the simulated counterpart of real GDP growth features
a mean growth rate that is constant but subject to a level shift in the middle of the
sample. In Figure 4.9, panels (a) and (b), we plot the actual growth rate underlying
the data-generating process together with one and two standard deviation percentiles
of the 100 simulations of the posterior median, both for the filtered and smoothed
estimate. It is reassuring to see that the random walk process “learns” relatively
quickly about the underlying change, even in the case of a discrete jump. Panel
(c) displays the true, together with the posterior estimate of the common factor for
one of the 100 Monte Carlo draws. Panel (d) provides a scatter plot of the true vs.
estimated stochastic volatilities. Both pictures show that the models performs well
at capturing the simulated objects.
In the second experiment, we repeat the same exercise in the presence of two
discrete breaks in the real GDP growth rate. The results are visible in Figure 4.10,
which tells a very similar story to the first experiment. We omit panels for factor and
the stochastic volatility estimates, as they are very similar to the first experiment.
In the third experiment, we verify the consequences of estimating our model in
an in environment in which the parameters which we specify as time-varying are in
fact constant in the data-generating process. The results, displayed in Figure 4.11,
confirm that the random walk assumption appears to be entirely innocuous in this
setting. Both the long-run GDP growth rate (smoothed and filtered), as well as the
volatility of the factor are estimated to be constant, with relatively high precision.
In addition, similar to the first experiment, the estimate of the common factor is
very precise.
Finally, in the fourth experiment, we again keep the long-run growth rate of real
GDP constant but this time introduce a discrete shift in the volatilities of both the
common factor and the idiosyncratic terms of all series in the middle of generated
data sample. Reassuringly, the shift in the volatilities is well captures in the esti-
mation and does not spill over to the estimate of the long-run growth rate of real
GDP.
In conclusion from these experiments, the random walk assumption appears to
be flexible enough to accommodate structural change that occurs in discrete steps
rather than gradually. This underpins our conclusions about the apparent gradual
changes in the long-run growth of the US economy described in the paper.
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Figure 4.9: Simulation Results I
Data-generating process (DGP) with one discrete break in long-run real GDP growth
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Note: The DGP features a discrete break in the trend of GDP growth occurring in the middle
of the sample, as well as stochastic volatility. The sample size is n = 28 and T = 800, which
mimics our US data set. The estimation procedure is the fully specified model as defined
by equations (4.1)-(4.7) in the text. We carry out 100 simulations drawing from the DGP.
Panel (a) presents the long-run growth component as estimated by the Kalman filter, plotted
against the actual long-run growth rate generated from the DGP. The corresponding figure
for the smoothed estimate is given in panel (b). In both panels, the median (black) as well
the 68th (solid) and 90th (dashed) percentile of the 100 simulated outcomes are shown in
blue/purple. Panel (c) displays the factor generated by the the DGP (red) and its smoothed
estimate (blue) for one draw. Panel (d) provides evidence on the accuracy of the estimation
of the SV of the idiosyncratic terms, by plotting the volatilities from the DGP against the
estimates for the 24 monthly indicators. Both are normalized by subtracting the average
volatility.
244
Figure 4.10: Simulation Results II
Data-generating process (DGP) with two discrete breaks in in long-run real GDP growth
(a) True vs. Estimated Trend (Filtered)
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Note: The simulation setup is equivalent to the one in Figure 4.9 but features two discrete
breaks in the trend at 1/3 and 2/3 of the sample. Again, we show the filtered as well as the
smoothed trend median estimates and the corresponding 68th and 90th percentiles of the
100 simulated estimates of these objects. Panels (c) and (d) are omitted as they are very
similar to Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.11: Simulation Results III
Data-generating process (DGP) without in changes long-run real GDP growth and without SV
(a) True vs. Estimated Trend (Filtered)
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-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
(c) True vs. Estimated Factor
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Note: The DGP is the baseline model without trend in GDP growth and without stochastic
volatility. The estimation procedure is the fully specified model as explained in the descrip-
tion of Figure 4.9. Again, we plot the filtered and smoothed median estimates of the long-run
growth rate with 68th and 90th percentiles of the 100 simulated estimates in panels (a) and
(b). Panel (c) presents a comparison of the estimated factor and its DGP counterpart for
one Monte Carlo draw. Panel (d) in similar to (b), but for the volatility of the common
factor.
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Figure 4.12: Simulation Results IV
Data-generating process (DGP) with discrete break in volatility
(a) True vs. Estimated Trend (Smoothed)
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Note: The DGP does not feature any changes in the trend of GDP growth, but one discrete
break in the volatility of the common factor. As in Figures 4.9-4.11, the estimation proce-
dure is based on the fully specified mode. Panel (a) displays the smoothed posterior median
estimate of the trend component of GDP growth, with 68th and 90th percentiles of the 100
simulations shown as solid and dashed blue lines, respectively. Panel (b) displays the poste-
rior median estimate of the volatility of the common factor (black), with the corresponding
percentiles.
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Results: Sensitivity to confounding time-variation
Our model can flexibly accommodate time-varying intercepts in all or a subset of the
series contained in our data panel. Given our interest in tracking real GDP growth,
we restrict our baseline model to feature a trend in GDP only (shared by consump-
tion) and argue that such unmodeled time-variation is picked up by the idiosyncratic
components, which we allow to be persistent. Details about this discussion are con-
tained in Section 4.3.2 of the paper. The goal of this second set of Monte Carlo
experiments is to verify how robust our model is in a setting where time-varying
intercepts are indeed present in the data-generating process but not modeled ex-
plicitly in the estimation. Figures 4.13 to 4.15 present the results of three Monte
Carlo experiments in which such “confounding trends” are added when generating
the data.48
In the first experiment, the misspecification arises from the fact that our model
explicitly specifies a time-varying mean in the GDP equation only, while the data
is generated such that the first 18 series of the panel all feature independent non-
stationary means.49 Figure 4.13 presents the estimation results in this setup. Panel
(a) shows the percentiles of the deviations of the estimated from the actual real
GDP growth rates over the 100 simulations (repeated draws from the DGP). The
percentiles are centered relatively tightly around zero, meaning that the trend esti-
mates with 68 and 90% smallest deviations are relatively similar to the original trend
process. To illustrate this further, panels (b), (c) and (d) display more detailed results
for one of the 100 Monte Carlo simulations, labeled “Median Simulation”. This is
selected by ordering the outcomes of all repeated samples by the distance of squared
deviation of the estimated from the simulated GDP trend and then selecting the
median. This essentially means that 49% of the simulations had larger, and 50%
smaller deviations than the simulation displayed. The panels plot actual against
estimated (black/red) long-run real GDP growth rate, common factor and factor
volatility, respectively. In the case of the long-run growth rate the posterior credible
intervals are added in blue. These results reveal that in a typical (median) outcome
for this type of specification, the model performs well at capturing these objects.
Most importantly, the “true” long-run growth rate is contained within the posterior
bands throughout the entire estimation sample.
In the second experiment, the data-generating process features a single time-
varying mean which is present in the first 6 series, whereas we still only specify it
in the first series for the estimation.50 The results for this experiment are shown
in Figure 4.14. The panels here are similar to Figure 4.13. While the deviations
48For simplicity we assume that the estimated model in this section is the one with a trend in
GDP only, i.e. B = 1.
49Formally, in the DGP dim(at) = 18 and B = I18, while the model for estimation is specified by
at = gt and B = 1. We assume that the remaining 10 of the 28 series are stationary, which mimics
the presence of the surveys in our data set.
50In our notation this means that in the DGP we have at = gt and B = 16×1, while the model
for estimation is specified by at = gt and B = 1. We choose 6 series so that both quarterly and
monthly variables are affected by the misspecification.
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in panel (a) are slightly larger than for the previous figure, indicating that common
unmodeled trends are somewhat more challenging to pick up than independent ones,
the overall message remains the qualitatively similar. In particular, the results for
the “Median Experiment”, displayed in panels (b) to (d), are reassuring in that the
estimate tracks their data counterpart closely.
The third experiment introduces both types of misspecification simultaneously,
i.e. independent time-varying means in series 1-18 and an additional shared time-
varying component in series 1-6. The results are presented in Figure 4.15. The
take-aways are similar to the previous figures, even in the presence of this heavy
type of misspecification.
Overall, these simulation experiments confirm our intuition that the estimate of
the time-varying mean of interest is not affected by low frequency movements present
in other series that are not explicitly modeled. Despite the extremely unfavorable
assumption of a large amount of additional time-variation, the long-run growth rate
of real GDP is tracked very well in all settings considered.
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Figure 4.13: Simulation Results V
Data-generating process (DGP) with independent unmodeled trends in other series
(a) True vs. Est. Trend - Deviation Percentiles
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(b) True vs. Est. Trend (Median Simulation)
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(c) True vs. Est. Factor (Median Simulation)
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(d) True vs. Est. Vol (Median Simulation)
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Note: The DGP features independent time-varying means in series 1-18. The sample size is
n = 28 and T = 800, which mimics our US data set. The estimation procedure is the fully
specified model as defined by equations (4.1)-(4.7) in the text, with a time-varying mean
only specified for the real GDP growth equation. We carry out a Monte Carlo simulation
with 100 samples repeatedly drawn from the DGP. Panel (a) presents the median (red), as
well as the 68 and 90% bands (blue) of the deviation of the estimated long-run growth rate
from its actual data counterpart over 100 simulated outcomes. Panel (b) shows the true
(black) together with the posterior median estimate (red) of the long-run growth rate of
real GDP. The 68% (solid blue) and 90% (dashed blue) posterior credible intervals are also
plotted. Panels (c) and (d) plot the median estimate (red) against true (black) common
factor and its stochastic volatility.
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Figure 4.14: Simulation Results VI
Data-generating process (DGP) with shared unmodeled trends in other series
(a) True vs. Est. Trend - Deviation Percentiles
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(b) True vs. Est. Trend (Median Simulation)
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(c) True vs. Est. Factor (Median Simulation)
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(d) True vs. Est. Vol (Median Simulation)
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Note: The DGP features a common time-varying in series 1-6, while the estimation specifies
this stochastic trend only in the equation for real GDP growth. The rest of the setup of the
simulations, as well as the structure of the panels are similar to Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.15: Simulation Results VII
Data-generating process (DGP) with both independent and shared unmodeled trends in other series
(a) True vs. Est. Trend - Deviation Percentiles
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(b) True vs. Est. Trend (Median Simulation)
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(c) True vs. Est. Factor (Median Simulation)
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The DGP features both independent time-varying components in series 1-18 as well as a
common time-varying in series 1-6, while the estimation specifies a stochastic trend only in
the equation for real GDP growth. The rest of the setup of the simulations, as well as the
structure of the panels are similar to Figure 4.13
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4.7.4 Details on Estimation Procedure
Construction of the State Space System
For expositional clarity, we focus on the baseline case with B = 1 and at = at here,
so that m = r = 1. Recall that in our main specification we choose the order of the
polynomials in equations (4.3) and (4.4) to be p = 2 and q = 2, respectively. Let the
n× 1 vector y˜t, which contains nq de-meaned quarterly and nm de-meaned monthly
variables (i.e. n = nq + nm), be defined as
y˜t =

yq1,t
...
yqnq ,t
ym1,t − ρm1,1ym1,t−1 − ρm1,2ym1,t−2
...
ymnm,t − ρmnm,1ymnm,t−1 − ρmnm,2ymnm,t−2

,
so that the system is written out in terms of the quasi-differences of the monthly
indicators. Given this re-defined vector of observables, we cast our model into the
following state space form:
y˜t = HXt + η˜t, η˜t∼N(0, R˜t)
Xt = FXt−1 + et, et∼N(0,Qt)
where the state vector is defined as X′t = [at, . . . , at−4, ft, . . . , ft−4,u
q
t
′
, . . . ,uqt−4
′
].
Setting λ1 = 1 for identification, the matrices of parameters H and F, are then
constructed as shown below:
H =
[
[ccc|ccc|ccc]
Ha
Hλq Hu
Hλm
]
,
where the respective blocks of H are defined as
Ha =
[
1
3
2
3 1
2
3
1
3
0(n−1)×5
]
, Hλq =
[
1 λ2 ... λnq
]′ × [1/3 2/3 1 2/3 1/3] ,
Hλm =

[c|ccc]λnq+1 − λnq+1ρm1,1 − λnq+1ρm1,2 01×4
...
...
λn − λnρmnm,1 − λnρmnm,2 01×4

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Hu =
[
H¯u
0nm×5
]
, H¯u = 1nq×1 ×
[
1/3 2/3 1 2/3 1/3
]
,
and
F =

F1 0 . . . 0
0 F2
... F2+1
...
...
. . . 0
0 . . . . . . 0 F2+nq

,
where the respective blocks of F are defined as
F1 =
[
1 01×4
I4 04×1
]
F2 =
[
φ1 φ2 01×3
I4 04×1
]
F2+j =
[
ρqj,1 ρ
q
j,2 01×3
I4 04×1
]
for j = 1, ..., nq.
The error terms are denoted as
η˜t = [01×nq , η˜
m
t
′]′
et =
[
vat 04×1 t 04×1 η1,t 04×1 . . . ηnq ,t 04×1
]′
,
with covariance matrices
R˜t =
[
0nq×nq 0nq×nm
0nm×nq Rt
]
,
where Rt = diag(σ2ηm1,t , . . . , σ
2
ηmnm,t
) and
Qt = diag(ω
2
a,01×4, σ
2
,t,01×4, σ
2
ηq1,t
,01×4, . . . , σ2ηqnq,t
,01×4).
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Details of the Gibbs Sampler
For ease of notation, we restrict the description to the case m = r = 1, B = 1 and
at = at. Let θ ≡ {λ,Φ,ρ, ωa, ωε, ωη1 , . . . , ωηn} be a vector that collects the underly-
ing parameters, where Φ and ρ contain the parameters for factor and idiosyncratic
components respectively. The model is estimated using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) Gibbs sampling algorithm in which conditional draws of the latent vari-
ables, {at, ft}Tt=1, the parameters, θ, and the stochastic volatilities, {σε,t, σηi,t}Tt=1
are obtained sequentially. The algorithm has a block structure composed of the fol-
lowing steps.
0. Initialization
The model parameters are initialized at arbitrary starting values θ0, and so are the
sequences for the stochastic volatilities, {σ0ε,t, σ0ηi,t}Tt=1. Set j = 1.
1. Draw latent variables conditional on model parameters and SVs
Obtain a draw {ajt , f jt ,uqt}Tt=1 from p({at, ft}Tt=1|θj−1, {σj−1ε,t , σj−1ηi,t }Tt=1,y).
This step of the algorithm uses the state space representation described above
(Appendix 4.7.4), and produces a draw from the entire state vector Xt (which in-
cludes the long-run growth components, at, the common factor, ft, and the idiosyn-
cratic components of the quarterly variables, uqt ) by means of a forward-filtering
backward-smoothing algorithm, see Carter and Kohn (1994) or Kim and Nelson
(1999b). In particular, we adapt the algorithm proposed by Bai and Wang (2015),
which is robust to numerical inaccuracies, and extend it to the case with mixed fre-
quencies and missing data following Mariano and Murasawa (2003), as explained in
section 4.3.3. Like Bai and Wang (2015), we initialise the Kalman Filter step from
a normal distribution whose moments are independent of the model parameters, in
particular X0 ∼ N(0, 104I).
2. Draw the variance of the time-varying GDP growth component
Obtain a draw ω2,ja from p(ω2a|{ajt}Tt=1).
Taking the sample {ajt}Tt=1 drawn in the previous step as given, and posing
an inverse-gamma prior p(ω2a) ∼ IG(Sa, va) the conditional posterior of ω2a is also
drawn inverse-gamma distribution. As discussed in Section 4.4.2, we choose the scale
Sa = 10
−3 and degrees of freedom va = 1 for our baseline specification.
3. Draw the autoregressive parameters of the factor VAR
Obtain a draw Φj from p(Φ|{f j−1t , σj−1ε,t }Tt=1).
Taking the sequences of the common factor {f j−1t }Tt=1 and its stochastic volatil-
ity {σj−1ε,t }Tt=1 from previous steps as given, and posing a non-informative prior, the
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corresponding conditional posterior is drawn from the Normal distribution, see, e.g.
Kim and Nelson (1999b). In the more general case of more than one factor, this
step would be equivalent to drawing from the coefficients of a Bayesian VAR. Like
Kim and Nelson (1999b), or Cogley and Sargent (2005), we reject draws which imply
autoregressive coefficients in the explosive region.
4. Draw the factor loadings
Obtain a draw of λj from p(λ|ρj−1, {f j−1t , σj−1ηi,t }Tt=1,y).
Conditional on the draw of the common factor {f j−1t }Tt=1, the measurement equa-
tions reduce to n independent linear regressions with heteroskedastic and serially
correlated residuals. By conditioning on ρj−1 and σj−1ηi,t , the loadings can be esti-
mated using GLS and non-informative priors. When necessary, we apply restrictions
on the loadings using the formulas provided by de Wind and Gambetti (2014), see
Appendix 4.7.5 for further information.
5. Draw the serial correlation coefficients of the idiosyncratic components
Obtain a draw of ρj from p(ρ|λj−1, {f j−1t , σj−1ηi,t }Tt=1,y).
Taking the sequence of the common factor {f j−1t }Tt=1 and the loadings drawn in
previous steps as given, the idiosyncratic components for the monthly variables can
be obtained as ui,t = yi,t − λj−1f j−1t . For the quarterly variables, a draw of the id-
iosyncratic components has been obtained directly from Step 1. Given a sequence for
the stochastic volatility of the ith component, {σj−1ηi,t }Tt=1, the residual is standardized
to obtain an autoregression with homoskedastic residuals whose conditional posterior
can be drawn from the Normal distribution as in step 2.3.
6. Draw the stochastic volatilities
Obtain a draw of {σjε,t}Tt=1 and {σjηi,t}Tt=1 from p({σε,t}Tt=1|Φj−1, {f j−1t }Tt=1), and
from p({σηi,t}Tt=1|λj−1,ρj−1, {f j−1t }Tt=1,y) respectively.
Finally, we draw the stochastic volatilities of the innovations to the factor and the
idiosyncratic components independently, using the algorithm proposed by Kim et al.
(1998), which uses a mixture of normal random variables to approximate the elements
of the log-variance. This is a more efficient alternative to the exact Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm previously proposed by Jacquier et al. (2002). For the general
case in which there is more than one factor, the volatilities of the factor VAR can be
drawn jointly, see Primiceri (2005).
Increase j by 1, go to Step 2.1 and iterate until convergence is achieved.
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4.7.5 Implementing linear restrictions on the factor loadings
To impose linear restrictions on the factor loadings λ in equation (4.1) of the paper,
we follow de Wind and Gambetti (2014). For linear restrictions of the form
Rλ = r (4.11)
these authors consider the special case with r = 0 in equation (54) in the appendix
to their paper. For r 6= 0, this equation is amended as shown here. Let λu and λr
denote the unrestricted and restricted loading matrix, respectively. λr is then drawn
from a posterior distribution defined by (4.12) to (4.14):
λr ∼ N
(
λ
r
,Prλ
)
, (4.12)
where
λ
r
= λu −PuλR′
(
RPuλR
′)−1 (Rλu−r) (4.13)
Prλ = P
u
λ −PuλR′
(
RPuλR
′)−1 RPuλ. (4.14)
257
4.7.6 Details on the Construction of the Data Base
US (Vintage) Data Base
For our US real-time forecasting evaluation, we consider data vintages since 11 Jan-
uary 2000 capturing the real activity variables listed in the text. For each vintage,
the start of the sample is set to January 1960, appending missing observations to any
series which starts after that date. All times series are obtained from one of these
sources: (1) Archival Federal Reserve Economic Data (ALFRED), (2) Bloomberg,
(3) Haver Analytics. Table 4.5 provides details on each series, including the variable
code corresponding to the different sources.
For several series, in particular Retail Sales, New Orders, Imports and Exports,
only vintages in nominal terms are available, but series for appropriate deflators are
available from Haver, and these are not subject to revisions. We therefore deflate
them using, respectively, CPI, PPI for Capital Equipment, and Imports and Exports
price indices. Additionally, in several occasions the series for New Orders, Personal
Consumption, Vehicle Sales and Retail Sales are subject to methodological changes
and part of their history gets discontinued. In this case, given our interest in using
long samples for all series, we use older vintages to splice the growth rates back to
the earliest possible date.
For soft variables real-time data is not as readily available. The literature on real-
time forecasting has generally assumed that these series are unrevised, and therefore
used the latest available vintage. However while the underlying survey responses are
indeed not revised, the seasonal adjustment procedures applied to them do lead to
important differences between the series as was available at the time and the latest
vintage. For this reason we use seasonally un-adjusted data and re-apply the Census-
X12 procedure in real time to obtain a real-time seasonally adjusted version of the
surveys. We follow the same procedure for the initial unemployment claims series.
We then use Bloomberg to obtain the exact date in which each monthly data point
was first published.
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Table 4.5: Detailed Description of US Data Series
Frequ. Start Date Vintage
Start
Trans- for-
mation
Publ. Lag Data Code
Real Gross Domestic
Product
Q Q2:1947 Dec 91 %QoQ
Ann
26 GDPC1(F)
Real Consumption (ex.
durables)
Q Q2:1947 Dec 91 %QoQ
Ann
26
Hours worked Q Q2:1948 Dec 91 %QoQ
Ann
28
Real Investment (incl.
durable cons.)
Q Q2:1947 Dec 91 %QoQ
Ann
26
Real Industrial Production M Jan 47 Jan 97 % MoM 15 INDPRO(F)
Real Manufacturers’ New
Orders Nondefense Capital
Goods Excluding Aircraft
M Mar 68 Mar 97 % MoM 25 NEWORDER(F)1
PPICPE(F)
Real Light Weight Vehicle
Sales
M Feb 67 Mar 97 % MoM 1 ALTSALES(F)2
TLVAR(H)
Real Personal Income less
Transfer Payments
M Feb 59 Dec 97 % MoM 27 DSPIC96(F)
Real Retail Sales Food
Services
M Feb 47 Jun 01 % MoM 15 RETAIL(F)
CPIAUCSL(F)
RRSFS(F)3
Real Exports of Goods M Feb 68 Jan 97 % MoM 35 BOPGEXP(F)4
C111CPX(H)
TMXA(H)
Real Imports of Goods M Feb 69 Jan 97 % MoM 35 BOPGIMP(F)4
C111CP(H)
TMMCA(H)
Building Permits M Feb 60 Aug 99 % MoM 19 PERMIT(F)
Housing Starts M Feb 59 Jul 70 % MoM 26 HOUST(F)
New Home Sales M Feb 63 Jul 99 % MoM 26 HSN1F(F)
Total Nonfarm Payroll
Employment
(Establishment Survey)
M Jan 47 May 55 % MoM 5 PAYEMS(F)
Civilian Employment
(Household Survey)
M Feb 48 Feb 61 % MoM 5 CE16OV(F)
Unemployed M Feb 48 Feb 61 % MoM 5 UNEMPLOY(F)
Initial Claims for UE M Feb 48 Jan 00* % MoM 4 LICM(H)
(Continues on next page)
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Detailed Description of US Data Series (Continued)
Markit Manufacturing
PMI
M May 07 Jan 00* - -7 S111VPMM(H)5
H111VPMM(H)
ISM Manufacturing PMI M Jan 48 Jan 00* - 1 NMFBAI(H)
NMFNI(H)
NMFEI(H)
NMFVDI(H)6
ISM Non-manufacturing
PMI
M Jul 97 Jan 00* - 3 NAPMCN(H)
Conference Board:
Consumer Confidence
M Feb 68 Jan 00* Diff 12 M. -5 CCIN(H)
University of Michigan:
Consumer Sentiment
M May 60 Jan 00* Diff 12 M. -15 CSENT(H)5
CONSSENT(F)
Index(B)
Richmond Fed
Manufacturing Survey
M Nov 93 Jan 00* - -5 RIMSXN(H)
RIMNXN(H)
RIMLXN(H)6
Philadelphia Fed Business
Outlook
M May 68 Jan 00* - 0 BOCNOIN(H)
BOCNONN(H)
BOCSHNN(H)
BOCDTIN(H)
BOCNENN(H)6
Chicago PMI M Feb 67 Jan 00* - 0 PMCXPD(H)
PMCXNO(H)
PMCXI(H)
PMCXVD(H)6
NFIB: Small Business
Optimism Index
M Oct 75 Jan 00* Diff 12 M. 15 NFIBBN (H)
Empire State
Manufacturing Survey
M Jul 01 Jan 00* - -15 EMNHN(H)
EMSHN(H)
EMDHN(H)
EMDSN(H)
EMESN(H)6
Note: The second column refers to the sampling frequency of the data, which can be quarterly (Q)
or monthly (M). % QoQ Ann. refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM
refers to (yt−yt−1)/yt−1 while Diff 12 M. refers to yt−yt−12. In the last column, (B) = Bloomberg;
(F) = FRED; (H) = Haver;
1) deflated using PPI for capital equipment; 2) for historical data not available in ALFRED we
used data coming from HAVER; 3) using deflated nominal series up to May 2001 and real series
afterwards; 4) nominal series from ALFRED and price indices from HAVER. For historical data
not available in ALFRED we used data coming from HAVER; 5) preliminary series considered; 6)
NSA subcomponents needed to compute the SA headline index. * Denotes seasonally un-adjusted
series which have been seasonally adjusted in real time.
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Data Base for Other G7 Economies
Table 4.6: Data used for Canada
Freq. Start Date Transformation
Real Gross Domestic Product Q Jun-1960 % QoQ Ann.
Industrial Production: Manuf., Mining, Util. M Jan-1960 % MoM
Manufacturing New Orders M Feb-1960 % MoM
Manufacturing Turnover M Feb-1960 % MoM
New Passenger Car Sales M Jan-1960 % MoM
Real Retail Sales M Feb-1970 % MoM
Construction: Dwellings Started M Feb-1960 % MoM
Residential Building Permits Auth. M Jan-1960 % MoM
Real Exports M Jan-1960 % MoM
Real Imports M Jan-1960 % MoM
Unemployment Ins.: Initial and Renewal Claims M Jan-1960 % MoM
Employment: Industrial Aggr. excl. Unclassified M Feb-1991 % MoM
Employment: Both Sexes, 15 Years and Over M Feb-1960 % MoM
Unemployment: Both Sexes, 15 Years and Over M Feb-1960 % MoM
Consumer Confidence Indicator M Jan-1981 Diff 12 M.
Ivey Purchasing Managers Index M Jan-2001 Level
ISM Manufacturing PMI M Jan-1960 Level
University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment M May-1960 Diff 12 M.
Note: The second column refers to the sampling frequency of the data, which can be quarterly (Q)
or monthly (M). % QoQ Ann. refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM
refers to (yt − yt−1)/yt−1 while Diff 12 M. refers to yt − yt−12. All series were obtained from the
Haver Analytics database.
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Table 4.7: Data used for Germany
Freq. Start Date Transformation
Real Gross Domestic Product Q Jun-1960 % QoQ Ann.
Mfg Survey: Production: Future Tendency M Jan-1960 Level
Ifo Demand vs. Prev. Month: Manufact. M Jan-1961 Level
Ifo Business Expectations: All Sectors M Jan-1991 Level
Markit Manufacturing PMI M Apr-1996 Level
Markit Services PMI M Jun-1997 Level
Industrial Production M Jan-1960 % MoM
Manufacturing Turnover M Feb-1960 % MoM
Manufacturing Orders M Jan-1960 % MoM
New Truck Registrations M Feb-1963 % MoM
Total Unemployed M Feb-1962 % MoM
Total Domestic Employment M Feb-1981 % MoM
Job Vacancies M Feb-1960 % MoM
Retail Sales Volume excluding Motor Vehicles M Jan-1960 % MoM
Wholesale Vol. excl. Motor Veh. and Motorcycles M Feb-1994 % MoM
Real Exports of Goods M Feb-1970 % MoM
Real Imports of Goods M Feb-1970 % MoM
Note: The second column refers to the sampling frequency of the data, which can be quarterly (Q)
or monthly (M). % QoQ Ann. refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM
refers to (yt − yt−1)/yt−1 while Diff 12 M. refers to yt − yt−12. All series were obtained from the
Haver Analytics database.
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Table 4.8: Data used for Japan
Freq. Start Date Transformation
Real Gross Domestic Product Q Jun-1960 % QoQ Ann.
TANKAN All Industries: Actual Business Cond. Q Sep-1974 Diff 1 M.
Markit Manufacturing PMI M Oct-2001 Level
Small Business Sales Forecast M Dec-1974 Level
Small/Medium Business Survey M Apr-1976 Level
Consumer Confidence Index M Mar-1973 Level
Inventory to Sales Ratio M Jan-1978 Level
Industrial Production: Mining and Manufact. M Jan-1960 % MoM
Electric Power Consumed by Large Users M Feb-1960 % MoM
New Motor Vehicle Registration: Trucks, Total M Feb-1965 Diff 1 M.
New Motor Vehicle Reg: Passenger Cars M May-1968 % MoM
Real Retail Sales M Feb-1960 % MoM
Real Department Store Sales M Feb-1970 % MoM
Real Wholesale Sales: Total M Aug-1978 % MoM
Tertiary Industry Activity Index M Feb-1988 % MoM
Labor Force Survey: Total Unemployed M Jan-1960 % MoM
Overtime Hours / Total Hours (manufact.) M Feb-1990 % MoM
New Job Offers excl. New Graduates M Feb-1963 % MoM
Ratio of New Job Openings to Applications M Feb-1963 % MoM
Ratio of Active Job Openings and Active Job Appl. M Feb-1963 % MoM
Building Starts, Floor Area: Total M Feb-1965 % MoM
Housing Starts: New Construction M Feb-1960 % MoM
Real Exports M Feb-1960 % MoM
Real Imports M Feb-1960 % MoM
Note: The second column refers to the sampling frequency of the data, which can be quarterly (Q)
or monthly (M). % QoQ Ann. refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM
refers to (yt − yt−1)/yt−1 while Diff 12 M. refers to yt − yt−12. All series were obtained from the
Haver Analytics database.
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Table 4.9: Data used for the United Kingdom
Freq. Start Date Transformation
Real Gross Domestic Product Q Mar-1960 % QoQ Ann.
Dist. Trades: Total Vol. of Sales M Jul-1983 Level
Dist. Trades: Retail Vol. of Sales M Jul-1983 Leve
CBI Industrial Trends: Vol. of Output Next 3 M. M Feb-1975 Level
BoE Agents’ Survey: Cons. Services Turnover M Jul-1997 Level
Markit Manufacturing PMI M Jan-1992 Level
Markit Services PMI M Jul-1996 Level
Markit Construction PMI M Apr-1997 Level
GfK Consumer Confidence Barometer M Jan-1975 Diff 12 M.
Industrial Production: Manufacturing M Jan-1960 % MoM
Passenger Car Registrations M Jan-1960 % MoM
Retail Sales Volume: All Retail incl. Autom. Fuel M Jan-1960 % MoM
Index of Services: Total Service Industries M Feb-1997 % MoM
Registered Unemployment M Feb-1960 % MoM
Job Vacancies M Feb-1960 % MoM
LFS: Unemployed: Aged 16 and Over M Mar-1971 % MoM
LFS: Employment: Aged 16 and Over M Mar-1971 % MoM
Mortgage Loans Approved: All Lenders M May-1993 % MoM
Real Exports M Feb-1961 % MoM
Real Imports M Feb-1961 % MoM
Note: The second column refers to the sampling frequency of the data, which can be quarterly (Q)
or monthly (M). % QoQ Ann. refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM
refers to (yt − yt−1)/yt−1 while Diff 12 M. refers to yt − yt−12. All series were obtained from the
Haver Analytics database.
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Table 4.10: Data used for France
Freq. Start Date Transformation
Real Gross Domestic Product Q Jun-1960 % QoQ Ann.
Industrial Production M Feb-1960 % MoM
Total Commercial Vehicle Registrations M Feb-1975 % MoM
Household Consumption Exp.: Durable Goods M Feb-1980 % MoM
Real Retail Sales M Feb-1975 % MoM
Passenger Cars M Feb-1960 % MoM
Job Vacancies M Feb-1989 % MoM
Registered Unemployment M Feb-1960 % MoM
Housing Permits M Feb-1960 % MoM
Housing Starts M Feb-1974 % MoM
Volume of Imports M Jan-1960 % MoM
Volume of Exports M Jan-1960 % MoM
Business Survey: Personal Prod. Expect. M Jun-1962 Level
Business Survey: Recent Output Changes M Jan-1966 Level
Household Survey: Household Conf. Indicator M Oct-1973 Diff 12 M.
BdF Bus. Survey: Production vs. Last M., Ind. M Jan-1976 Level
BdF Bus. Survey: Production Forecast, Ind. M Jan-1976 Level
BdF Bus. Survey: Total Orders vs. Last M., Ind. M Jan-1981 Level
BdF Bus. Survey: Activity vs. Last M., Services M Oct-2002 Level
BdF Bus. Survey: Activity Forecast, Services M Oct-2002 Level
Markit Manufacturing PMI M Apr-1998 Level
Markit Services PMI M May-1998 Level
Note: The second column refers to the sampling frequency of the data, which can be quarterly (Q)
or monthly (M). % QoQ Ann. refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM
refers to (yt − yt−1)/yt−1 while Diff 12 M. refers to yt − yt−12. All series were obtained from the
Haver Analytics database.
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Table 4.11: Data used for Italy
Freq. Start Date Transformation
Real Gross Domestic Product Q Jun-1960 % QoQ Ann.
Markit Manufacturing PMI M Jun-1997 Level
Markit Services PMI: Business Activity M Jan-1998 Level
Production Future Tendency M Jan-1962 Level
ISTAT Services Survey: Orders, Next 3 M- M Jan-2003 Level
ISTAT Retail Trade Confidence Indicator M Jan-1990 Level
Industrial Production M Jan-1960 % MoM
Real Exports M Jan-1960 % MoM
Real Imports M Jan-1960 % MoM
Real Retail Sales M Feb-1990 % MoM
Passenger Car Registrations M Jan-1960 % MoM
Employed M Feb-2004 % MoM
Unemployed M Feb-1983 % MoM
Note: The second column refers to the sampling frequency of the data, which can be quarterly (Q)
or monthly (M). % QoQ Ann. refers to the quarter on quarter annualized growth rate, % MoM
refers to (yt − yt−1)/yt−1 while Diff 12 M. refers to yt − yt−12. All series were obtained from the
Haver Analytics database.
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4.7.7 Choice of Priors
As explained in the paper, we use non-informative priors for loadings and serial
correlation coefficients of factor and idiosyncratic components in order to aide com-
parability with the previous literature, which has generally used classical estimation
methods. With respect to the choice of priors on the new parameters of our specifi-
cation, namely ω2a, ω2ε and ω2η,i in equations (4.5)-(4.7), we closely follow the related
literature, in particular Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005), by setting
relatively conservative priors, which shrink the model towards the benchmark with
no time-variation, but are still loose enough for the data to be able to speak. In
particular, in all the inverse-gamma (IG) distributions we set the number of degrees
of freedom to 1, the minimum required to make the prior distributions proper while
keeping the weight of the prior low. As to the choice of the scale parameter of the IG
distributions, it is worth pointing out that this does not parametrize time variation
itself, but rather incorporates a prior belief about the amount of time variation. To
gain an intuition about the prior on ω2a, in Section 4.4.2 we note that the chosen
value of 0.001 implies that over a period of ten years the random walk process of
the long-run growth rate is expected to vary with a standard deviation of around 0.4
percentage points in annualized terms, which we believe is a fairly conservative prior
in terms of economic magnitudes. The choice of 10−4 for the prior on ω2ε and ω2η,i is
similar to the approach of Primiceri (2005).
To shed some light on the robustness of our results to the choice of priors, in
what follows we explore the sensitivity of our main results to varying the tightness
of the respective priors. To summarize the most notable finding, we find that the
data strongly drives the result of time variation both in the long-run growth rate and
the volatilies: a dogmatically large amount of shrinkage is needed in order to make
either of them disappear.
Robustness checks on prior choice
Prior on innovation variance to the time-varying long-run growth rate
In Figure 4.16 we explore the sensitivity of our key results to the choice of the
scale parameter of the prior on the innovation variance to the time-varying long-
run growth rate of real GDP, ω2a. Each panel plots our baseline estimate of gt,
which has been obtained with a prior scale of 10−3 (red/blue). We then successively
superimpose alternative estimates obtained when imposing both looser and tighter
prior scales (gray). Panel (a) of the figure reveals that with a prior implying a very
large variance the estimated trend is pinned down with relatively more uncertainty
and evolves in bumpy fashion, yet the qualitative pattern around the evolution of
long-run growth, remains clearly visible. Panels (b) and (c) show that using a ten
times looser prior (0.01) and a hundred times tighter prior (10−5) than the one in
our baseline setting gives very similar results to ours. In the later case, the estimate
is almost identical. Finally, a dogmatically tight prior (10−9) is required to make
variation in the long-run growth rate disappear entirely, which is visible in Panel (d).
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Figure 4.16: Comparison Across Different Prior Scales of ω2α
(a) ω2a = 0.1 (loose prior)
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(b) ω2a = 0.01 (looser prior)
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(c) ω2a = 10−5 (very tight prior)
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(d) ω2a = 10−9 (extremely tight prior)
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Note: In each panel our baseline the median estimate of real GDP growth based on a scale of 10−3 is
presented (red), with corresponding 68% (solid blue) and the 90% (dashed blue) posterior credible
intervals. The corresponding estimates based an different prior scales are superimposed in gray in
each panel.
Prior on innovation variance to the SV
Figure 4.17 presents the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the scale pa-
rameter of the prior on the innovation variance to the SV in both the common factor
and the idiosyncratic components. Similar to Figure 4.16 we compare our baseline
estimates (red/blue), where we set ω2ε = ω2η,i = 10
−4, with estimates obtained un-
der a range of varied prior scales (gray). In each case, the figure shows both the
estimated SV of the factor as well as the estimate of the long-run growth rate of
real GDP growth. Panel (a) displays the results for a very loose prior (1), while
Panel (b) for a prior which is ten times looser than the baseline (10−3). Finally, the
estimates shown in Panel (c) are obtained under a tighter prior (10−5). Again, the
results reported in the paper do not seem to be affected. Both the estimates of the
SV and the long-run growth rate of real GDP are almost identical to our main results.
Prior on serial correlation in factor and idiosyncratic components
As a final robustness check, we consider “Minnesota”-style priors on the autore-
gressive coefficients of the factor as well as shrinking the coefficients of the serial
correlation towards zero. To be precise, we center the prior on the first lag of the
factor around 0.9 and all other lags at zero. The motivation for these priors is to
express a preference for a more parsimonious model where the factors capture the
bulk of the persistence of the series and the idiosyncratic components are close to
iid, that is closer to true measurement error. These alternative priors do not mean-
268
Figure 4.17: Comparison Across Different Prior Scales of ω2ε and ω2η,i
(a) ω2ε = ω2η,i = 1 (very loose prior)
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(b) ω2ε = ω2η,i = 10−3 (looser prior)
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(c) ω2ε = ω2η,i = 10−5 (tighter prior)
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Note: In each panel our baseline estimate of the SV of the common factor based on a scale of 10−4
is presented (red) in the left chart. The right chart plots the estimate of the long-run growth rate
of real GDP based on the same scale. Corresponding 68% (solid blue) and the 90% (dashed blue)
posterior credible intervals are also plotted. The analogue estimates based on the alternative prior
scales are superimposed in gray in each panel.
ingfully affect the posterior estimates of our main objects of interest, so we omit
additional figures. Note that we have found some evidence that the use of such pri-
ors might at times improve the convergence of the algorithm. Specifically, when we
apply the model to the other G7 economies (see Section 4.5), we find that for some
countries where few monthly indicators are available, shrinking the serial correlations
of the idiosyncratic components towards zero helps obtaining a common factor that
is persistent.
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4.7.8 Comparison with CBO Measure of Potential Output
Our estimate of long-run growth and the CBO’s potential growth estimate capture
related but not identical concepts. The CBO measures the growth rate of potential
output, i.e. the level of output that could be obtained if all resources were used
fully, whereas our estimate, similar to Beveridge and Nelson (1981), measures the
component of the growth rate that is expected to be permanent. Moreover, the CBO
estimate is constructed using the so-called “production function approach”, which is
radically different from the DFM methodology.51
As a simple sanity check, it is interesting to see that despite employing different
statistical methods they produce qualitatively similar results, visible in Figure 4.18,
with the CBO estimate displaying a more marked cyclical pattern but remaining
for most of the sample within the 90% credible posterior interval of our estimate.
As in our estimate, most of the slowdown occurred prior to the Great Recession.
The CBO’s estimate was below ours immediately after the recession, reaching an
unprecedented low level of about 1.25% in 2010, and remains in the lower bound
of our posterior estimate since then. Section 4.4.6 expands on the reason for this
divergence and argues that this is likely to stem from the larger amount of information
incorporated in the DFM. In fact, the CBO estimate of potential growth is noticeably
more cyclical.
Figure 4.18: Long-run GDP Growth Estimate in Comparison to CBO
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Note: The figure displays the posterior median estimate of long-run GDP growth with the corre-
sponding credible intervals, as displayed in Figure 4.2 Panel (a) in the main body of the paper, in
comparison with the CBO’s measure of potential output growth, which is shown in black circles.
51Essentially, the production function approach calculates the trend components of the supply
inputs to a neoclassical production function (the capital stock, total factor productivity, and the
total amount of hours) using statistical filters and then aggregates them to obtain an estimate of
the trend level of output. See CBO (2001).
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4.7.9 Details About the Forecast Evaluation
Using our real-time database of US vintages, we re-estimate the following three
models each day in which new data is released: a benchmark with constant long-
run GDP growth and constant volatility (Model 0, similar to Banbura and Modugno
(2014)), a version with constant long-run growth but with stochastic volatility (Model
1, similar to Marcellino et al. (2014)), and the baseline model put forward in the
paper with both time-variation in the long-run growth of real GDP and SV (Model
2). Allowing for an intermediate benchmark with only SV allows us to evaluate
how much of the improvement in the model can be attributed to the addition of the
long-run variation in GDP as opposed to the SV. We evaluate the point and density
forecast accuracy relative to the initial (“Advance”) release of GDP, which is released
between 25 and 30 days after the end of the reference quarter.52
When comparing the three different models, we test the significance of any im-
provement of Models 1 and 2 relative to Model 0. This raises some important econo-
metric complications given that (i) the three models are nested, (ii) the forecasts are
produced using an expanding window, and (iii) the data used is subject to revision.
These three issues imply that commonly used test statistics for forecasting accuracy,
such as the one proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995) and Giacomini and White
(2006) will have a non-standard limiting distribution. However, rather than not re-
porting any test, we follow the “pragmatic approach” of Faust and Wright (2013)
and Groen et al. (2013), who build on Monte Carlo results in Clark and McCracken
(2012). Their results indicate that the Harvey et al. (1997) small sample correction
of the Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic results in a good sized test of the null
hypothesis of equal finite sample forecast precision for both nested and non-nested
models, including cases with expanded window-based model updating. Overall, the
results of the tests should be interpreted more as a rough gauge of the significance of
the improvement than a definitive answer to the question. We compute various point
and density forecast accuracy measures at different moments in the release calendar,
to assess how the arrival of information improves the performance of the model. In
particular, the computations are carried out starting 180 days before the end of the
reference quarter, and every subsequent day up to 25 days after its end, when the
GDP figure for the quarter is usually released. This means that we will evaluate the
forecasts of the next quarter, current quarter (nowcast), and the previous quarter
(backcast). We consider two different samples for the evaluation: the full sample
(2000:Q1-2015:Q1) and the sample covering the recovery since the Great Recession
(2009:Q2-2015:Q1).
52We have explored the alternative of evaluating the forecasts against subsequent releases, or the
latest available vintages. The relative performance of the three models is broadly unchanged, but
all models do better at forecasting the initial release. If the objective is to improve the performance
of the model relative to the first official release, then ideally an explicit model of the revision process
would be desirable. The results are available upon request.
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Figure 4.19: Point Forecast Accuracy Evaluation
(a) Root Mean Squared Error
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(b) Mean Absolute Error
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Note: The horizontal axis indicates the forecast horizon, expressed as the number of days to the
end of the reference quarter. Thus, from the point of view of the forecaster, forecasts produced 180
to 90 days before the end of a given quarter are a forecast of next quarter; forecasts 90-0 days are
nowcasts of current quarter, and the forecasts produced 0-25 days after the end of the quarter are
backcasts of last quarter. The boxes below each panel display, with a vertical tick mark, a gauge
of statistical significance at the 10% level of any difference with Model 0, for each forecast horizon,
as explained in the main text.
Point Forecast Evaluation
Figure 4.19 shows the results of evaluating the posterior mean as point forecast.
We use two criteria, the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the mean absolute
error (MAE). As expected, both of these decline as the quarters advance and more
information on monthly indicators becomes available, see e.g. Banbura et al. (2012).
Both the RMSE and the MAE of Model 2 are lower than that of Model 0, particularly
so from the start of the nowcasting period, while Model 1 is somewhat worse overall.
Our gauge of significance indicates that these differences in nowcasting performance
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are significant at the 10% level for the overall sample in the case of the MAE, but
not the RMSE. The improvement in performance is much clearer in the recovery
sample. In fact, the inclusion of the time varying long run component of GDP helps
anchor GDP predictions at a level consistent with the weak recovery experienced in
the past few years and produces nowcasts that are ‘significantly’ superior to those
of the reference model from around 30 days before the end of the reference quarter.
In essence, ignoring the variation in long-run GDP growth would have resulted in
being on average around 1 percentage point too optimistic from 2009 to 2015.
Density Forecast Evaluation
Density forecasts can be used to assess the ability of a model to predict unusual
developments, such as the likelihood of a recession or a strong recovery given current
information. The adoption of a Bayesian framework allows us to produce density
forecasts from the DFM that consistently incorporate both filtering and estimation
uncertainty. Figure 4.20 reports the probability integral transform (PITs) and the
associated autocorrelation functions (ACFs) for the 3 models calculated with the
nowcast of the last day of the quarter. Diebold et al. (1998) highlight that well
calibrated densities are associated with uniformly distributed and independent PITs.
Figure 4.20 suggests that the inclusion of SV is paramount to get well calibrated
densities, whereas the inclusion of the long-run growth component helps to get a more
appropriate representation of the right side of the distribution, as well as making sure
that the first order autocorrelation is not statistically significant.
There are several measures available for density forecast evaluation. The (aver-
age) log score, i.e. the logarithm of the predictive density evaluated at the realization,
is one of the most popular, rewarding the model that assigns the highest probabil-
ity to the realized events. Gneiting and Raftery (2007), however, caution against
using the log score, emphasizing that it does not appropriately reward values from
the predictive density that are close but not equal to the realization, and that it is
very sensitive to outliers. They therefore propose the use of the (average) continuous
rank probability score (CRPS) in order to address these drawbacks of the log-score.
Figure 4.21 shows that by both measures our model outperforms its counterparts.
Interestingly, the comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 suggests that failing to prop-
erly account for the long-run growth component might give a misrepresentation of
the GDP densities, resulting in poorer density forecasts.
In addition to the above results, we also assess how the three models fare when
different areas of their predictive densities are emphasized in the forecast evaluation.
To do that we follow Groen et al. (2013) and compute weighted averages of Gneiting
and Raftery (2007) quantile scores (QS) that are based on quantile forecasts that
correspond to the predictive densities from the different models (Figure 4.22).53 Our
results indicate that while there is an improvement in density nowcasting for the
53As Gneiting and Ranjan (2011) show, integrating QS over the quantile spectrum gives the
CRPS.
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Figure 4.20: Probability Integral Transform (PITs)
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Note: The upper three panels display the cdf of the Probability Integral Transforms (PITs) evaluated
on the last day of the reference quarter, while the lower three display the associated autocorrelation
functions.
entire distribution, the largest improvement comes from the right tail. For the full
sample, Model 1 is very close to Model 0, suggesting that being able to identify
the location of the distribution is key to the improvement in performance. In order
to appreciate the importance of the improvement in the density forecasts, and in
particular in the right side of the distribution, we calculated a recursive estimate of
the likelihood of a ‘strong recovery’, where this is defined as the probability of an
average growth rate of GDP (over the present and next three quarters) above the
historical average. Model 0 and Model 2 produce very similar probabilities up until
2011 when, thanks to the downward revision of long-run GDP growth, Model 2 starts
to deliver lower probability estimates consistent with the observed weak recovery.
The Brier score for Model 2 is 0.186 whereas the score for Model 0 is 0.2236 with the
difference significantly different at 1% (Model 1 is essentially identical to Model 0).
In sum, the out-of-sample forecasting evaluation indicates that allowing for time-
varying long-run GDP growth and SV produces short-run forecasts that are on aver-
age either similar to or improve upon the benchmark model. The performance tends
to improve substantially in the sub-sample including the recovery from the Great
Recession, coinciding with the significant downward revision of the model’s assess-
ment of long-run growth. The results indicate that while there is an improvement in
density nowcasting for the entire distribution, the largest improvement comes from
the right tail.
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Figure 4.21: Density Forecast Accuracy Evaluation
(a) Log Probability Score
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(b) Continuous Rank Probability Score
Full Sample: 2000:Q1-2015:Q1
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Note: The horizontal axis indicates the forecast horizon, expressed as the number of days to the
end of the reference quarter. Thus, from the point of view of the forecaster, forecasts produced 180
to 90 days before the end of a given quarter are a forecast of next quarter; forecasts 90-0 days are
nowcasts of current quarter, and the forecasts produced 0-25 days after the end of the quarter are
backcasts of last quarter. The boxes below each panel display, with a vertical tick mark, a gauge
of statistical significance at the 10% level of any difference with Model 0, for each forecast horizon,
as explained in the main text.
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4.7.10 Case Study - The Decline of The Long-Run Growth Esti-
mate in Mid-2010 and Mid-2011
Figure 4.23 looks in more detail at the specific information that, in real time, led the
model to reassess its estimate of long-run growth. There are large reassessments of
long-run growth around July 2010 and July 2011, coinciding with the publication by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the annual revisions to the National Accounts,
which each year incorporate previously unavailable information for the previous three
years. In both cases, the revisions implied substantial downgrades both to GDP
(Panel a) and in particular to the growth of consumption (Panel b) in the first years
of the recovery, from 2.5% to 1.6%, and instead allocated much of the growth in GDP
during the recovery to inventory accumulation. The estimate of long-run growth
produced by our model is downgraded sharply as information about these revision
is coming in, reflecting the role of consumption as the most persistent and forward
looking component of GDP. This is clearly visible in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure
4.23. In particular, Panel (c) presents the evolution of the GDP nowcast for 2010
produced by Model 2 (black line), in comparison with the counterfactual nowcast
that would result if there had been no revisions to long-run growth (dashed line). It
is evident that the bulk of the revisions to GDP growth that year are the consequence
of a large downward revision to long-run growth. Panel (d) plots the annual nowcast
of GDP produced by Model 0 (dashed line), which does not allow for changes in
long-run GDP growth, and Model 2 (solid line), our baseline specification. Up to
mid-2010, both models produce similar nowcasts (not shown). After 2010, however,
it is clearly visible that Model 0 begins each year expecting robust growth of above
3%, only to be disappointed by incoming data. The nowcasts by Model 2, which has
incorporated the decline in long-run growth, do not suffer from the same pattern of
systematic downward surprises.
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Figure 4.23: Case Study: Impact of National Accounts Revision
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Note: Panels (a) and (b) compare several vintages of data on real GDP and real personal con-
sumption expenditures around the time of important revisions by the BEA. Panel (c) presents the
evolution of the GDP nowcast for 2010 produced by Model 2 (black line), in comparison with the
counterfactual nowcast that would result if there had been no revisions to long-run growth (dashed
line). The evolution of calendar-year nowcasts of real GDP growth produced by Model 0 (dashed)
and Model 2 (solid) are presented in Panel (d).
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4.7.11 Inspecting Data Set Size and Composition - More Details
Extended Model: Estimation Using a Very Large Panel
With regards to the size of the data set, in Section 4.4.1 of the main text we argue in
favor of excluding disaggregated series within the various categories of real activity.
This is because of the fact that the strong correlation across series within the same
category might be a source of model misspecification. This is for two reasons: first,
strong correlation in the idiosyncratic terms of series between the same category, and
second, the fact that finer disaggregation levels are available for certain categories
can lead to oversampling, see Boivin and Ng (2006) and Alvarez et al. (2012) for
more details.
It is possible, however, to consider a more general specification of our model
that can alleviate this problem, once we take into account the fact that persistent
idiosyncratic movements common across series of the same category usually reflect
differences in phase relative to the common activity factor. For example, all series
related to employment respond to innovations to real activity with a lag. An interest-
ing question is how our results are affected if one were to aim to make the dimension
of yt as large as possible, instead of carefully making variable selection based on
the criteria discussed in the paper. In order to illustrate this point, we construct a
“universe” of potentially available real activity time series for inclusion, based on a
systematic attempt to find as many as possible US real activity time series. This is
the “extended model” introduced in Section 4.4.6 of the paper.
Construction of the Extended Data Set
To construct the data panel for the extended model, we proceed as follows. First,
we obtain all of the monthly real activity variables contained in the data set used
by Stock and Watson (2012), which results in 75 time series.54 Second, we exhaus-
tively expand the monthly series contained in our original data set along all levels
and dimensions of disaggregation available through Haver Analystics.55 Out of this
collection of expanded series, we then select any series that is not already contained
in the 75 Stock and Watson indicators. Overall, this procedure results in a data set
of as many as 155 time series capturing US real activity.56
Extended Model Specification
Maintaining the specification with a single factor (i.e. k = 1) we modify equation
(4.1) of the paper as follows:
yt = ct + Λ(L)ft + ut, (4.15)
54Details on this data set can be found in the online supplement to Stock and Watson (2012),
available on Mark Watson’s website. The only variable we were not able to obtain is Construction
Contracts, which is not publicly available.
55This includes for example disaggregation along sectoral, regional and demographic characteris-
tics.
56A detailed list of variables is available upon request.
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such that the loading matrix Λ(L) is now a polynomial in the lag operator of order
s, i.e. contains the loadings on the contemporaneous common factor and its lags. In
the special case where s = 0 we obtain our baseline specification. For the extended
model, we set the maximum lag length, s = 5. The remaining equations of the model
remain unchanged.
Priors and Model Settings
The data is standardized prior to estimation. “Minnesota”-style priors are applied
to the coefficients in Λ(L), φ(L) and ρi(L). More specifically:
• For the autoregressive coefficients of the factor dynamics, φ(L), the prior mean
is set to 0.9 for the first lag, and to zero in subsequent lags. This reflects a belief
that the common factor captures a highly persistent but stationary business
cycle process.
• For the factor loadings, Λ(L), the prior mean is set to 1 for the first lag, and
to zero in subsequent lags. This shrinks the model towards the factor being
the cross sectional average of the variables, see D’Agostino et al. (2015).
• For the autoregressive coefficients of the idiosyncratic, ρi(L) the prior is set
to zero for all lags, thus shrinking the model towards a model with no serial
correlation in ui,t.
In all cases, the variance on the priors is set to τ
h2
, where τ is a parameter gov-
erning the tightness of the prior, and h is equal to the lag number of each coefficent,
ranging 1 : p, 1 : q and 1 : s+ 1. Following D’Agostino et al. (2015), we set τ = 0.2,
a value which is standard in the Bayesian VAR literature.
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Results Across Alternative Data Sets
Figure 4.24: Comparison Across Alternative Data Sets/Models
(a) Baseline With And Without Including Consumption
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Note: In each panel our baseline the median estimate of real GDP growth is presented (red),
with corresponding 68% (solid blue) and the 90% (dashed blue) posterior credible intervals. The
corresponding estimates for the respective alternative data sets are superimposed in gray.
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4.7.12 A Growth Accounting Exercise
The decomposition exercise carried out in Section 4.5 of the paper provides a first step
towards giving an economically more meaningful interpretation of the movements in
long-run real GDP growth detected by our model. While our equation gt = zt + ht
follows from a simple identity, we demonstrate in this appendix how it can be related
to the standard growth accounting framework.
To illustrate this point, consider two versions of the standard neoclassical growth
model. In the first version, assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
with Hicks-neutral technological change and constant returns to scale. In growth
rates, this can be written as
dlogYt = dlogTFPt + αdlogKt + (1− α)dlogHt, (4.16)
where Yt, Kt and Ht denote the level of output, the capital stock and labor
input (total hours), respectively. α is the capital share and TFPt is total factor
productivity. Rearranging this relation gives
dlogYt = dlogTFPt + dlogHt + α(dlogKt − dlogHt), (4.17)
so that the growth rate of real GDP is the sum of long-run growth in technology,
total hours and a third term which captures differential growth in input factors
which implies changes in the capital-labor ratio (“capital deepening”). In the second
version of the neoclassical growth model, consider adding growth in labor-augmenting
technology in the form of labor quality, denoted Qt. In this case, the relation between
growth rates is rearranged to
dlogYt = dlogTFPt + dlogHt + α(dlogKt − dlogHt) + (1− α)dlogQt. (4.18)
Both relations (4.17) and (4.18) can be captured in our econometric framework.
We define the first four elements of our vector of observables yt in equation (4.1) to
be the growth rate in real GDP, real consumption, TFP and total hours worked. As
in the baseline model, transitory fluctuations in inputs (due to temporary shocks)
would still be captured by the cyclical dactor, ft, whereas the various sources of
permanent changes in the growth rate of inputs (say, the long-run growth rate of
technology, or the long-run growth rate of the population) would be included in
at. In order to mimic the relations prescribed by the two versions of the neoclassical
growth model, we specify the long-run time variation in our model, at as a composite
of three terms. While h˜t captures long-run movements in hours, the movements in
long-run labor productivity are now further decomposed into a “technology” term z˜t
and a “non-technology” term x˜t. Formally, ct in equation (4.2) is constructed as
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at =
z˜th˜t
x˜t
 , B =

1 1 1
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 0
 . (4.19)
What the non-technology term corresponds to depends on the underlying struc-
ture that is assumed. For instance, in the first version of the neoclassical growth
model above
x˜t ≡ α(dlogKt − dlogHt) (4.20)
and in the second case
x˜t ≡ α(dlogKt − dlogHt) + (1− α)dlogQt. (4.21)
In both cases, x˜t subsumes potential long-run factors other than TFP that may
explain changes in the long-run labor productivity trend we discuss in the paper.57
z˜t is intended to capture changes in the long-run technology growth rate.
Figure 4.25 presents the results for US data when defining ct by (4.19), and the
measure of utilization-adjusted TFP from Fernald (2012) is used as an additional
observable. Panel (a) shows the posterior estimate of long-run real GDP growth
(including bands), together with the decomposition into long-run total hours growth,
long-run technology growth and long-run non-technological growth. Reassuringly,
the evolution of the total long-run growth component, gt (red) is virtually identical
to the estimate from our baseline model. The estimate of long-run hours growth
(orange) is also very similar to its counterpart in Section 5 of the paper. Interestingly,
the non-technological term (dashed gray) is positive on average and is relatively
stable over the sample. Finally, the key insight from panel (a) is that our estimate of
the long-run technology (green) displays strong movements that are very similar to
the long-run growth rate of labor productivity which we have extracted in the simpler
decomposition in Section 4.5. Under the assumption of a neoclassical structure,
changes in long-run technology growth appear to be the main driver behind the
recent slowdown in long-run real GDP growth. Panel (b) plots the growth rate of
the utilization-adjusted TFP measure by Fernald (2012) in black, together with its
long-run counterpart as estimated by our model (green, with blue bands). It is visible
that the DFM approach is capable of extracting a smooth low frequency trend from
the volatile series of TFP, which captures well-known episodes such as the 1970’s
slowdown and the IT boom of the 1990’s. Overall, our framework is capable of
providing an interesting angle on real-time movements in technology trends.
57Note here that in the first case we could also directly capture the technological parameter α
into the matrix B by setting its (1,4) and (2,4) elements to α and interpreting z˜t directly as capital
deepening. The specification above is somewhat more appealing in that it allows for a non-constant
capital share. One can easily impose a constant value for α by scaling the posterior estimate of x˜t
by that value.
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Figure 4.25: Results of Growth Accounting Exercise
(a) Further Decomposition of US Long-Run US Output Growth
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Note: Panel (a) displays the posterior median estimates of long-run real GDP growth in red, together
with the posterior median estimates of its components, long-run hours growth, long-run TFP growth
and long-run non-technological growth (orange dashed, green, gray dotted). For long-run real GDP
growth the corresponding with corresponding 68% and 90% posterior credible intervals are shown
in solid and dashed blue. Panel (b) plots the growth rate of utilization-adjusted TFP by Fernald
(2012) in black, together with its long-run counterpart in our econometric framework, i.e. the
estimate of z˜t, with corresponding 68% and 90% posterior credible intervals (green/blue).
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